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REPORT BY THE
Comptroller General
OF THE UNITED STATES

10.7.21

**Police Forces In The District
Of Columbia Can Improve
Operations And Save Money**

CNGD

GAO reviewed four District police forces--the Metropolitan Police Department, the U.S. Park Police, the Capitol Police, and the Metro Transit Police.

DLG 00964

DLG 00963

DLG 02109

GAO concluded that District police could

--improve their patrol practices and

--save money by coordinating identification services, using civilian and guard employees more, and improving procurement practices.

GSA
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This review was requested by Senator Lawton M. Chiles.



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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-118638

The Honorable Lawton M. Chiles
United States Senate

Dear Senator Chiles:

As the Chairman, Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, you requested us to review the activities of the police and guard forces operating in the District of Columbia. We issued one report (GGD-78-16, Oct. 4, 1978) to you on guard and special police activities. This second report covers our review of four District police forces--the Metropolitan Police Department, the U.S. Park Police, the Capitol Police, and the Metro Transit Police. As requested by your office, this report is being sent to the current subcommittee chairman. We conclude that District police could

--improve their patrol practices and

--save money by coordinating identification services, using civilian and guard employees more, and improving procurement practices. (See app. I.)

The four forces reviewed need to improve certain inefficient and costly practices. Park and Metropolitan police officers patrol the same areas in some District locations because of overlapping jurisdictions. In addition, because Metropolitan and Park forces each maintain their own photography and fingerprinting facilities, they sometimes unnecessarily repeat identification processing of arrestees. Police officers perform clerical, administrative, technical, and protective duties, which lower-cost civilians and guards could do. The forces could have saved as much as \$3.1 million annually if civilians and guards were used instead of sworn officers.

Finally, sometimes the police forces buy weapons which are being stockpiled by other forces or purchase items which could have been bought at reduced prices from the General

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Services Administration. Purchases from the General Services Administration could have saved more than \$63,000. Additional savings are possible from other improvements as discussed in this report.

In drawing our conclusions, we reviewed the legislative histories, operating instructions, and reports, and obtained administrative and operating data for each force. We also interviewed each force's officials and operating personnel. We contacted Maryland and Virginia State and suburban law enforcement officials. Additionally, we discussed various items, included in our report, with the International Association of Chiefs of Police. We reviewed data from the Association, the Police Foundation, and the National Criminal Justice Reference System.

We are recommending, where applicable, the police forces

- should*
--transfer jurisdiction of certain land to avoid overlapping patrols;
- coordinate identification services;
- use civilians and guards instead of police officers, where possible; and
- adopt a policy to acquire goods and services from the General Services Administration when economically beneficial.

The forces' reactions to the specific recommendations in the report were mixed, although all forces agreed that seeking more efficient and economical operations is a worthwhile goal. Their comments on the report are included in full in appendixes VI through IX and are discussed in detail beginning on p. 10 of appendix I.


Also, in response to your request, we are providing data on the change in Metropolitan Police Department's effectiveness measures since 1965 (see app. II), police and demographic comparisons between the District and other cities (see app. III), and the history of each police force (see app. IV).

B-118638

The President has requested a study of the potential for consolidating various Federal law enforcement activities. This report may be helpful to him and the Congress in evaluating consolidation proposals.

As agreed with your office, we have not verified data furnished by the various police forces. Also, as requested by your office, we are making no further distribution of this report until you make its contents public, which we understand will be within a few days after its receipt. At that time, we will distribute the report in accordance with our normal distribution policies.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "William B. Atch". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "W".

Comptroller General
of the United States

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ABBREVIATIONS

GSA	General Services Administration
LEAA	Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
MPD	Metropolitan Police Department

DISTRICT POLICE FORCES CAN IMPROVE OPERATIONS
AND SAVE MONEY

Improved operations and reduced costs of the four police forces operating in the District of Columbia can be achieved by

- eliminating duplicate police patrols between the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) and Park Police forces;
- eliminating duplicate fingerprinting and photographing services;
- using civilians and guards, instead of police officers, in certain clerical, administrative, technical, and protective duty positions; and
- purchasing uniforms and equipment from the least costly sources.

Since 1789, when six watchmen were employed to protect the District of Columbia, four independent police forces have been established in the city. In the course of a year, these forces provide police protection for about 27 million residents, commuters, and visitors at a cost of about \$164 million. Although the forces have many similar duties and responsibilities, they generally protect separate segments of the city. Their duties include patrolling property, making arrests, and investigating criminal offenses.

The largest of the forces, MPD, is the responsibility of the District of Columbia government which by virtue of Home Rule, is moving toward independence from the Federal Government. The Metro Transit Police, smallest of the organizations, is unique in that it must meet the law enforcement requirements of each of the eight member jurisdictions in which the Metro system operates. The Capitol and Park police forces are entities specifically established by congressional acts to provide protection for specific segments of the city. (See app. IV.)

NEED TO AVOID OVERLAPPING POLICE PATROLS

Some MPD and Park Police patrols overlap. MPD patrols the District roadways which encircle and/or divide parcels of public land that are also patrolled daily by the Park Police.

The Federal and District governments are authorized for purposes of administration and maintenance to transfer among themselves jurisdiction over properties they own in the District. The Federal Government, in 1971 and 1972, transferred to the District, for recreation and related purposes, about 300 small parcels of land, including facilities for various types of community meetings. The Department of the Interior administered and maintained the parks. The Park Police patrolled the parcels before the transfer. Subsequently, the District took over administration and maintenance, and MPD took over patrol responsibility.

The Park Police patrols, on a daily basis, about 230 similar land parcels that have not been transferred to the District but are on the regular MPD patrol routes. These parcels, including triangles, circles, and other small parcels, represent about 51 acres. For example, one parcel, Thomas Circle, is 0.48 acres and is surrounded by four triangles that total 0.09 acres. An MPD official said that MPD could patrol the land in the triangles and circles without an increase in staff because such land is adjacent to its regular patrol routes.

The Park Police also patrols various Federal parks and monument grounds while MPD patrols the roadways that encircle and/or divide the land. As pointed out in appendix IV, MPD has concurrent jurisdiction with the Park Police in U.S. Parks in the District. Parks, such as Lafayette Square, Lincoln, and Stanton, are encircled by roadways patrolled by MPD. Monument grounds, such as the Mall east of the Washington Monument, are encircled and divided by roadways which MPD patrols. An MPD official said that MPD could also patrol these public lands, but a study would be necessary to determine whether additional staff would be needed.

According to a Park Service official, the Park Service would continue to administer and maintain the public land in the District not already transferred because of the land's national historic value. It seems to us, however, that

retaining jurisdiction of the parcels because of their national historic value should not preclude centralization of police patrol responsibilities. Also, when MPD regularly patrols the property that surrounds such public land, it is inefficient to have the Park Police specifically dispatch officers to duplicate the action once a day.

OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE COSTS

The forces increased cost unnecessarily by

- duplicating identification services;
- using police officers in clerical, administrative, technical, and protective duty positions that could have been filled by civilians and guards; and
- purchasing uniforms from commercial vendors when the General Services Administration (GSA) carried similar items for less.

Duplicative identification services result in unnecessary costs

MPD, Park, and Capitol Police operate separate identification facilities. Metro Transit Police, whose arrestees are fingerprinted and photographed by MPD, does not maintain its own facility. Some duplicate processing occurs between MPD and Park Police; each operate their own identification units, (which include fingerprinting and photographing facilities), at annual costs of about \$185,000 and \$140,000, respectively. In fiscal year 1977, MPD processed 23,969 arrestees while the Park Police processed 1,337 arrestees, 674 for violating District laws.

MPD maintains its facility to process requests from its departmental units and other authorized law enforcement agencies. The Park Police, whose arrestees include District law violators, maintains its facility as part of the Park Police Criminal Investigation Branch. According to a Park Police official processing District arrestees enables investigators to keep their own files which could be used to supplement MPD files in the event that an arrestee's record is lost. MPD could not tell us whether any Park Police arrestee records were ever lost.

While each facility meets the special needs of its force, the possibility of duplicating services among the forces must be avoided. For example, in fiscal year 1977, the Park Police photographed and fingerprinted 252 of the 674 arrestees who were charged with serious criminal or traffic violations in the District. According to a Park Police official, however, MPD repeated the identification process when the 252 arrestees were transferred to the MPD detention facility.

Savings possible through greater use of
civilians and guards to perform duties
now assigned to uniformed officers

Police agencies could save money by using civilians in clerical, administrative, and technical positions presently filled by sworn officers. The MPD, Capitol Police, Park Police, and Metro Transit Police should examine their use of personnel to determine if civilians could be used in some positions presently occupied by sworn officers. In addition, the Capitol Police could reduce salary costs by replacing sworn officers with guards at certain locations.

On the basis of discussions with officials of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, we identified 27 clerical, administrative, and technical positions that could be filled by civilians. These positions include radio dispatchers, clerks, computer programmers, and accountants.

MPD and Park Police employ civilians on a limited basis while the other two forces use no civilians in police operations. Based on a prior GAO report (B-118638, Dec. 21, 1973), MPD converted 100 sworn positions to civilian positions. An MPD budget official said that, because of a District-wide hiring freeze, MPD was unable to convert additional positions. In an internal study, the Park Police identified 19 positions that could have been converted to civilian jobs but, at the time of our review, sworn officers still occupied those positions.

A common misgiving about using civilians expressed by Capitol and Metro Transit Police officials, was the loss of force flexibility, especially during emergencies or special events. They contended that, during emergencies, officers in clerical, administrative, and technical positions are needed to provide additional manpower on patrol.

Initially, the Metro Transit Police employed a civilian in an administrative position but later replaced the individual with a sworn officer. Metro Transit officials did not think the use of civilians was feasible because officers that perform administrative functions also conduct patrols and respond to emergencies.

Capitol Police officials cited various other management-related disadvantages to hiring civilians. They feared that the management-development potential for officers would be limited if administrative positions were filled by civilians. Capitol Police officials also thought that civilians would lack adequate indepth knowledge of police work and be difficult for police to supervise. A Capitol Police official told us the Capitol Police has neither studied, nor does it plan to use, civilians in its operations.

Information obtained from five District metropolitan area police forces showed that they use civilians in clerical, administrative, and technical positions. In 1977, about 20 percent of these forces' authorized personnel were civilians. One force uses civilians to issue parking tickets. It is considering the use of civilians to prepare motor vehicle accident reports.

Officials of the forces told us that the forces' objective was to convert jobs that did not require an individual to make an arrest to civilian positions. These officials stated that they continually evaluate additional positions that can be filled with civilians because hiring civilians rather than police officers reduces operating costs. Also, the forces had not had any difficulty with the supervision of officers and/or civilians on their forces.

We believe maintenance of force flexibility may be considered in determining how many civilians could be hired and what positions they could fill. With the other options available to the police forces reviewed, such as requesting assistance from MPD or the military, maintaining force flexibility does not preclude hiring civilians. The Capitol Police, the Park Police, and the Metro Transit Police have the option of calling on MPD for assistance during emergencies. Capitol Police officials told us that, in extreme emergencies, they could also request military assistance. The Capitol Police could not document the number of times officers in administrative, technical, and clerical positions

were required to respond to emergencies, but a Capitol Police official estimated that four or five emergencies, requiring such assistance, occurred a year.

The five metropolitan area police forces that we contacted had no difficulty with the use of civilians on their forces. We believe problems cited by the forces reviewed, such as (1) limited employee development potential, (2) lack of control, and (3) inadequate knowledge of police work, can be minimized by careful planning, training, and supervision. With the aid of an official of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, we identified 27 clerical, administrative, and technical positions, such as clerks, accountants, radio dispatchers and computer programmers, that could be filled by civilians.

We discussed the conversion of these positions with officials in each police force and identified 609 police officers in corresponding positions. Officials in each force said that sworn officers were needed in many of these jobs but agreed that 186 could be filled by civilians, or at least warranted serious consideration for civilian employment.

In 95 of 186 of these positions GAO and the police forces cooperatively identified comparable civilian grades. We agreed that the remaining ungraded positions would require more examination by classification specialists. We compared, for the 95 positions, the sworn officer's beginning salaries and retirement costs to the maximum civilian salaries and retirement costs. The comparison showed that it would be economical to convert 87 positions to civilian employment, which would save about \$428,000 of salary and retirement costs annually (an average of \$4,920 per position). Based on the average savings per position, as much as \$2,996,000 in annual salary and retirement costs could be saved if all 609 positions could be converted to civilian employment. Other costs, such as officer training, uniforms and equipment, and fringe benefits, could be reduced or eliminated.

Savings can also result from using guards instead of police officers in some instances. The Park and Metro Transit Polices' use of special forces demonstrates the opportunity for Capitol Police to save money by similarly employing guards for certain protective duties. Park Police determined that it was not necessary to deploy officers to

patrol closed buildings during nighttime hours. For example, after the Kennedy Center is closed, guards are stationed within the building while officers periodically patrol the perimeter.

The Metro Transit Authority employs special police officers to perform non-law enforcement duties, such as examining passes at building entrances. A Metro Transit Police official said that such duties do not require an officer and that it is more economical to use special police.

The Capitol Police, however, have 42 police officers stationed at locations (building entrances and parking garages) that could be patrolled by guards because (1) access can be limited and (2) the buildings are regularly patrolled by police officers.

A Capitol Police official said police officers are stationed at 42 posts between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. to limit access to Members of Congress and their staffs who work overtime and to cleaning and maintenance personnel. The official said that during this period police officers patrol the passageways and perimeter of the buildings. Because of the District's fire regulations, door entrances remain unlocked.

A District Fire Department official told us, however, that the District building code permits building entrances and exits to be locked after normal working hours provided a guard or police officer leaves one exit door unlocked to allow the occupants an exit in case of a fire.

The difference between the salary of a Capitol Police officer and a Park Police guard could mean an annual savings of about \$142,000 to Capitol Police if it used guards instead of officers at the 42 locations. In addition, training costs would decrease because guards receive about 13 fewer weeks of training than officers.

Procurement practices can be improved

Although the forces generally used similar equipment and uniform items, supply sources varied.

Savings are available immediately if each force purchases equipment and uniform items currently stocked by GSA.

GSA is the primary purchaser of goods and services for the Federal Government, except for military weapons and uniforms which the Department of Defense purchases directly. GSA usually can buy goods or services at prices that are lower than those available to an individual agency because purchases generally are made in large quantities. Each of the forces reviewed is eligible to buy through GSA.

Between July 1, 1976, and June 30, 1977, approximately \$325,000 was spent on uniforms by the four police forces. Procurement sources and the prices paid for similar items varied. However, if selected items had been purchased from GSA, about \$63,000 could have been saved as the following table illustrates:

	<u>Quantity purchased</u>	<u>Agency cost</u>	<u>GSA cost</u>	<u>Savings</u>
Shirts				
Short-sleeve white	a/7,930	\$ 51,650	\$ 28,070	\$23,580
Long-sleeve white	5,349	39,480	26,850	12,630
Long-sleeve blue	2,514	18,650	14,180	4,470
Trousers (tropical)	3,961	72,290	56,250	16,040
Policewomen caps	793	<u>11,700</u>	<u>5,300</u>	<u>6,400</u>
Total		<u>\$193,770</u>	<u>\$130,650</u>	<u>\$63,120</u>

a/Capitol Police purchases only.

The forces also used similar equipment, such as weapons, holsters, handcuffs, and batons. Although these items were not bought during our review, savings would have resulted from purchasing them through GSA.

A Metro Transit Police official told us that between 1975 and 1976 the Metro Transit Police acquired about 150 basic officer weapons. A basic officer weapon is a 38-caliber handgun with a 4-inch barrel. The acquisition

cost of all of the weapons was not readily ascertainable, but 15 of the weapons were acquired for \$83.44 a weapon. During this period, MPD had a sufficient stockpile of comparable weapons. An MPD official said that the weapons were being stockpiled when MPD began reducing the size of its force in 1973. In June 1977, MPD had about 900 basic weapons stockpiled. The amount paid for the stockpiled weapons was not readily ascertainable. We previously reported (GGD-78-16 dated Oct. 4, 1978) that better procurement coordination could save money. For example, three special police and guard forces could have saved about \$10,400 had the procurement of weapons been coordinated among the forces. The Federal Protective Service had 510 weapons on hand which it did not need.

We believe the police forces should, when economically beneficial, purchase items from GSA or from each others' oversupplies.

CONCLUSIONS

We found that unnecessary, costly differences sometimes exist in the way the four police forces do their jobs. For instance, increased use of civilians could reduce costs, and procurement could be improved. Also, some forces could further coordinate the fingerprinting and photographing of arrestees to reduce costs and duplication of effort. Further, transfers of patrol authority over additional parcels of land now under the Park Police control to MPD could eliminate duplicate patrols and reduce police costs.

Efforts to achieve uniformity through administrative actions need to be coordinated among all forces. Because of their respective functional responsibilities within the Government, guidance and assistance from the Office of Personnel Management and the GSA would be helpful. In this connection, Metro advised us in November 1978 that it is working with GSA to facilitate Metro purchases from GSA.

Savings of as much as \$3.1 million annually could have been realized had civilians and guards been used instead of sworn officers. Procurement from GSA could have saved another \$63,000. Additional savings are likely from other improvements discussed in this report.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Mayor, District of Columbia; the Secretary, Department of the Interior; the Chairman, Capitol Police Board; and the General Manager, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, with respect to police activities, should

--adopt a policy to acquire goods and services from GSA when economically beneficial;

--use civilians to replace, where economically advantageous and technically feasible, police officers in administrative support, clerical, and technical positions.

In addition

--the Chairman, Capitol Police Board, should implement a program to use guards instead of police officers where possible;

--the Secretary, Department of the Interior, should direct his force to coordinate the photographing and fingerprinting of arrestees with MPD;

--the Secretary, Department of the Interior, should, as appropriate, transfer the police control of small parcels of land, such as circles and triangles to the District of Columbia; and

--the Mayor, District of Columbia, and the Secretary, Department of the Interior, should evaluate the feasibility of authorizing MPD the patrol responsibility for Federal parks and monument grounds in the District. The evaluation should consider the need to coordinate police efforts during emergencies, demonstrations, parades, and other events.

AGENCY COMMENTS

On November 17, 1978, we provided each of the four police forces reviewed with a draft of this report for comment. Their replies are included as appendixes VI through IX.

The forces' reactions to specific recommendations in the draft report were mixed, but all forces agreed that seeking more efficient and economical operations is a worthwhile goal.

Three of the four forces agreed with our recommendation to adopt a policy to acquire goods and services from GSA when economically beneficial and described the extent to which they were or would be following this approach. The Chief of the Capitol Police, while not disagreeing with our recommendation, cited an instance in which the quality of an item purchased through GSA was unsatisfactory. We agree with the Chief that cost is not the only consideration in procurement, and our recommendation to purchase through GSA when economically beneficial does not exclude considering other factors, such as "maintenance and upkeep."

Three of the four agencies agreed with our recommendation to use civilians to replace police officers in administrative support, clerical, and technical positions, when economically advantageous and technically feasible. Each of the three agencies described the problems encountered and efforts taken or planned to increase use of civilians. The Capitol Police disagreed with our recommendations, however, because of the possibility of being shorthanded in an emergency; but we feel that other area forces such as MPD, the Park Police, and even the military can assist in meeting emergencies at the Capitol. (See p. 5.)

The Capitol Police Chief said that in emergencies the entire Capitol Police contingent of trained personnel is needed to meet the commitment of protecting the Capitol and the people who work and visit there. He cited the demonstration by members of the American Agricultural Movement as a case in point. He said the force was operating at or near capacity because of the demonstration which was complicated by large amounts of heavy farm equipment within the vicinity of the Capitol.

We feel that MPD, however, bore the major portion of the increased workload. During the demonstrations it limited the movement and controlled the flow of farm vehicles, which, after the initial demonstrations, were corralled and kept stationary on the Mall.

The Chief's comments do not deal specifically with the 42 posts cited in the report where police officers are stationed and which we believe could be covered by guards.

These posts are covered by police officers between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. at building entrances and parking garages. It seems in these cases the primary issue is whether guards can handle the jobs, not the length of shifts in an emergency situation.

The Under Secretary of the Interior said that duplication of fingerprinting and photographing services does not exist between the Park Police and MPD. However, data provided by a Park Police official shows that 252 of 614 Park Police arrestees charged with certain crimes were photographed and fingerprinted not only by Park Police, but also by MPD when the arrestees were remanded to MPD for detention.

Because MPD must process all its prisoners through its own identification system, as the Mayor's comments indicate, reducing duplicative services must originate with other agencies involved. In addition, a memorandum of understanding between District and Federal law enforcement officials requires MPD identification services for all arrestees processed through the Federal District Court--the same court through which most Park Police cases are processed. Finally, according to an MPD official, MPD could undertake the entire Park Police workload with negligible impact on MPD's workload.

The Under Secretary disagreed with our statement that there were duplicative patrols and with our recommendations to transfer, as appropriate, police control of small parcels of land such as circles and triangles to the District of Columbia.

The Mayor said that the recommendation presented no problem provided that all parties are in agreement on the meaning of the word "small" and that each parcel is evaluated separately before the transfer takes place.

MPD officials said that the circles and triangles are afforded the same patrol protection in terms of numbers of times passed and attention given as other locations on a patrol beat. We concluded that the once-a-day Park Police visits are duplicative and unnecessary.

The Under Secretary also disagreed with our recommendation that the Mayor and the Secretary of the Interior evaluate the feasibility of authorizing MPD to patrol Federal parks and monument grounds in the District. The Under Secretary said that delegating its law enforcement

responsibility for park areas is not in keeping with the intent of Congress or with Interior's mission and philosophy. Citing specific legislation enacted in 1878 with respect to Federal parks within the District of Columbia and a 1976 "Report to Accompany H. R. 11877," he concluded that: "We cannot support any recommendation for changing our present system of providing police services."

The excerpt cited by the Under Secretary, however, was part of a larger commentary on designating employees of other Federal, State, or local agencies to act as special policemen in areas of the National Park System where supplemental law enforcement personnel may be needed. This section seems to be directed toward large tracts within the National Park System.

There is a difference between delegating law enforcement responsibility for large acreage of parkland and authorizing MPD to patrol smaller areas in the District, such as monument grounds and the Mall which are bordered and crossed by streets which are subject to MPD's normal patrol attention.

Concerning assigning MPD the patrol responsibility for Federal park and monument grounds in the District, the Mayor said any evaluation would have to include a study of manpower needs to continue the current level of service under normal conditions as well as during emergencies, demonstrations, parades, and other events. MPD officials had previously told us that such a study would be needed.

Our recommendation proposing MPD patrol responsibility would require Park Police to make certain changes to its current position, and might also require discussion with various congressional oversight committees. We see such action as an opportunity to improve efficiency and minimize duplication.

Taking exception to our position concerning Park Police responsibilities, the Under Secretary stated:

"The report considered the United States Park Police Force as an organization limited to performing law enforcement in the District of Columbia. The legal authority and broad responsibility of the Force were not accurately portrayed. * * * "

Page 24 of our report recognizes the Park Police's responsibilities in jurisdictions outside of the metropolitan Washington, D.C., area. The instant review was confined to police activities within Washington, D.C., however, and the background data provided dealt with those activities.

EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES USED BY MPD

MPD's mission is to provide maximum protection of life and property in the community. An MPD official told us MPD's primary purpose is the prevention and detection of crime. Between 1965 and 1977 MPD's primary measure of its effectiveness was the number of crime index offenses. The force's effectiveness has also been measured by the number of cases not papered (that is, the prosecutor decides not to go forward with the charge) because of the police officer's fault, and the closure rate. Other effectiveness measures are applied to specific programs and activities within MPD, such as impoundment of vehicles for nonpayment of outstanding parking tickets.

The Department of Justice defines the number of crime index offenses as the number of major crime offenses--murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. A case not papered occurs whenever an MPD officer presents a case to the prosecutor and, for various reasons, it is rejected. An MPD official told us these reasons could include

- wrongful search of a suspect,
- failure to read suspects their rights, and
- arresting a suspect for probable cause when the prosecutor feels there was none.

The MPD closure or clearance rate is the percentage of the number of crime index offenses that were eradicated from the total outstanding crime index offenses in a specified period. An MPD official told us that the MPD closure rate is adjusted continually. For example, if a 1975 offense was not closed until 1976, the 1975 rate would be adjusted to reflect the closure.

The number of District crime index offenses includes no offenses reported by the Park Police within the District. However, the crime rate--number of crime index offenses per 1,000 population--does include those crime index offenses committed within other police jurisdictions in the District, such as the exclusive jurisdiction of the Capitol Police.

MPD officials told the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for the District that the number of offenses reported by the

Park Police in 1976 within the District was 1,023. MPD officials said that if these offenses were included in the District's crime statistics, the crime rate would increase from 65.7 to 67. This change would not affect the District's ranking among the 26 largest cities in the country. The following table shows the effectiveness measures used by the MPD and how they have changed since 1965.

Metropolitan Police Department
Effectiveness Measures

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Crime index offenses</u>	<u>Closure rate (percent)</u>	<u>Cases not papered for police fault (note a)</u>
1965	32,039	34.1	-
1966	34,751	26.3	-
1967	47,024	19.8	-
1968	57,969	24.4	-
1969	71,207	17.1	-
1970	89,417	13.2	-
1971	75,749	19.4	-
1972	61,992	19.5	-
1973	49,015	22.5	327
1974	52,508	22.1	104
1975	56,888	22.4	94
1976	52,304	25.1	98
1976 (Transition Quarter)	13,328	26.0	17
1977	49,798	26.0	59

a/Not computed until 1973.

COMPARISON OF THE DISTRICT WITH OTHER CITIES

Various analytical studies of police and crime in U.S. cities have shown that crime is influenced by many factors. These factors include--population, --age, --age distribution of the population, --wealth of the population, --percentage of minorities and --employment data.

Based on a review of 20 cities of about the same population as the District, an adequate comparison of the above factors is not possible. Of the 20 cities, Cleveland was most like the District in population; median family income; percentage of inschool persons, aged 14 to 17; and employment. However, Cleveland and Washington, D.C., were not comparable in housing; income distribution; public assistance; education; minority population; and percentage of crime causers, aged 15 to 24.

As requested, the following table compares various characteristics of 20 cities with Washington, D.C. The data used to prepare the table came from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Report; the Statistical Abstract of the United States, Bureau of Census; the 1970 Census of Housing; the 1970 Census of Population; and the Geographical Profile of Employment and Unemployment, U.S. Department of Labor.

Because of the wide variances in the demographics of these cities, no conclusions have been drawn from the comparison.

Comparison of Various Characteristics for Cities of
Comparable Population with Washington, D.C.

City	Crime index offenses 1975	Number of police officers 1975	Population (1970)	Population per square mile (1970)	Housing (1970)		Median family income (1970)	
					Median number of rooms	Percentage with 1.01 or more persons per room		
Washington, D.C.	55,157	4,583	756,510	12,321	3.9	2.3	12.2	9,583
Atlanta	48,884	1,415	496,973	3,779	4.5	2.3	11.0	8,399
Baltimore	70,411	3,377	905,759	11,568	5.3	1.8	8.7	8,815
Boston	80,350	2,425	641,071	13,936	4.5	6.3	7.6	9,133
Cleveland	57,806	2,211	750,903	9,893	4.9	2.8	7.4	9,107
Columbus	50,290	1,145	539,677	4,009	5.0	2.2	6.3	9,731
Dallas	94,411	1,968	844,401	3,179	4.8	1.6	9.0	10,019
Denver	50,387	1,382	514,678	5,406	4.6	4.0	5.5	9,654
Indianapolis	41,913	1,078	744,624	1,963	4.9	3.7	8.2	10,754
Jacksonville	44,489	935	528,865	690	5.2	5.0	8.4	8,671
Kansas City	44,954	1,246	507,087	1,603	4.9	3.7	6.5	9,910
Memphis	54,302	1,316	623,530	2,868	4.9	2.8	12.1	8,646
Milwaukee	38,518	2,128	717,099	7,548	4.8	4.1	7.3	10,262
New Orleans	39,802	1,647	593,471	3,011	4.3	3.5	14.3	7,445
Phoenix	75,720	1,527	581,562	2,346	4.7	2.0	9.2	9,956
Pittsburgh	32,005	1,411	520,117	9,442	4.7	7.1	6.4	8,800
St. Louis	69,399	2,173	622,236	10,167	4.0	2.2	12.7	8,182
San Antonio	58,993	1,175	654,153	3,555	4.7	6.1	16.3	7,734
San Diego	60,022	1,070	696,769	2,199	4.6	2.3	6.7	10,166
San Francisco	64,518	1,795	715,674	15,764	4.0	7.7	7.0	10,503
Seattle	46,110	1,085	530,831	6,350	4.5	4.2	3.5	11,037

City	Income (1970)			Education (1970) persons 25 years or older		Percentage of students 14 to 17 years
	Percentage of families below poverty level	Percentage of families above \$15,000	Percentage of families receiving public assistance	Median education	Percentage with 12 or more years of education	
Washington, D.C.	12.7	25.1	6.4	12.2	55.2	91.5
Atlanta	15.9	18.9	9.0	11.5	46.5	88.7
Baltimore	14.0	16.7	10.1	10.0	34.3	90.1
Boston	11.7	18.1	13.8	12.1	53.5	92.8
Cleveland	13.4	15.3	8.6	10.7	37.4	91.5
Columbus	9.8	18.5	6.2	12.2	55.6	92.1
Dallas	10.1	25.1	4.6	12.2	54.2	91.2
Denver	9.4	21.4	7.4	12.4	61.5	93.2
Indianapolis	7.1	24.9	2.9	12.1	54.8	91.2
Jacksonville	14.1	16.3	6.0	12.0	51.6	92.1
Kansas City	8.9	20.2	4.4	12.2	55.9	91.9
Memphis	15.7	16.5	7.3	12.0	50.1	93.7
Milwaukee	8.1	19.2	5.9	11.9	49.2	95.8
New Orleans	21.6	15.9	11.4	10.9	42.3	90.4
Phoenix	8.8	21.3	4.0	12.3	58.9	91.0
Pittsburgh	11.1	16.3	9.4	11.5	46.0	93.8
St. Louis	14.3	13.0	10.0	9.6	33.1	89.9
San Antonio	17.5	13.3	7.3	10.8	42.7	92.0
San Diego	9.3	24.4	6.6	12.5	66.2	90.0
San Francisco	9.9	27.2	9.2	12.4	61.8	94.3
Seattle	6.0	27.2	5.8	12.5	65.1	94.2

City	Age (1970)			Employment			
	Median age	Percentage of individuals 15 to 24 years	Percentage of blacks	1974 employment labor force participation	1974 unemployment rate	1974 whites 16-19 years unemployment rate	Unemployment rate August 1976
Washington, D.C.	28.4	19.2	71.1	67.0	4.4	13.1	5.3
Atlanta	27.2	19.6	51.3	68.2	5.0	9.2	7.1
Baltimore	28.7	17.2	46.4	60.4	5.1	12.8	6.6
Boston	28.1	21.5	16.3	62.4	7.2	14.4	7.4
Cleveland	28.7	17.1	38.3	60.4	4.3	11.8	5.6
Columbus	25.4	21.6	18.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	6.2
Dallas	27.2	17.8	24.9	66.3	3.5	N/A	4.7
Denver	28.6	19.1	9.1	68.2	3.7	11.1	6.7
Indianapolis	27.1	17.0	18.0	66.4	4.8	N/A	4.0
Jacksonville	26.0	19.4	23.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	7.0
Kansas City	29.5	16.2	22.1	66.3	5.1	N/A	6.1
Memphis	26.1	18.5	38.9	N/A	N/A	N/A	7.2
Milwaukee	28.2	18.1	14.7	65.3	4.5	11.6	5.2
New Orleans	27.9	18.1	45.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	8.5
Phoenix	27.5	17.0	4.8	N/A	N/A	N/A	7.1
Pittsburgh	33.4	18.1	20.2	55.0	5.7	20.9	6.9
St. Louis	31.4	16.6	40.9	61.0	5.9	13.6	6.5
San Antonio	24.8	18.5	7.6	N/A	N/A	N/A	7.3
San Diego	25.8	23.4	7.6	60.3	7.7	17.0	11.3
San Francisco	34.2	17.4	13.4	63.0	7.6	22.1	11.0
Seattle	31.9	19.6	7.1	63.6	6.8	17.0	8.5

N/A=Not available

ESTABLISHMENT OF FORCESMetropolitan Police Department

In 1861, the Congress established a Metropolitan Police District for the District of Columbia and a board to supervise the Police District. The board's duties included the preservation of peace, prevention of crime, and the protection of people's rights and property. Under the direction of the board, these duties were to be executed by a police force. The board was eliminated in June 1878 and its powers and duties were transferred to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia.

MPD is the largest police agency in the District of Columbia and has the primary responsibility for preventing and detecting crime and apprehending criminals within District boundaries. Other duties include

- enforcing District statutes, regulations and ordinances;
- participating in community relations;
- cooperating with Federal law enforcement agencies in the enforcement of Federal laws; and
- providing services, as directed by the President, under emergency conditions.

An MPD official told us the President has not requested MPD to provide services under emergency conditions. The Secret Service has requested MPD to provide escort and protection services for the President in the District.

MPD has primary jurisdiction in the District, except where prohibited by law, although MPD can enter the Capitol areas by invitation from the Capitol Police. MPD has concurrent jurisdiction with the Park Police in U.S. Parks in the District. MPD also has primary jurisdiction in Metro Transit Authority stations and platforms and secondary jurisdiction on trains within the city's limits. Additionally, MPD has primary jurisdiction throughout the city for all homicide investigations. MPD has jurisdiction in public buildings owned by the United States in the District of Columbia pursuant to title 4, section 120 of the D.C. Code.

The number of MPD's sworn officers has decreased to 4,114 (estimated actual total), from a peak of 5,070, since fiscal year 1972. MPD told the House Appropriations Subcommittee for the District during its fiscal year 1975 budget hearings that in fiscal year 1972 MPD had reached a "leveling off" point and the fiscal year 1973 budget included a reduction in its overall strength. MPD also told the Subcommittee the number of annual crime offenses had declined from approximately 82,000 to 51,000 and that even with a reduced level of officers, the force would be able to maintain the downward crime trend.

MPD's fiscal year 1978 budget proposed to reduce the level of sworn officers to 3,955 (about a 22 percent reduction from the peak level). MPD subsequently told the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for the District, however, that after 22 consecutive months of crime reduction an increase occurred in 3 consecutive months.

Based on the reverse in the crime statistics, MPD officials stated that it would be prudent to refrain from further manpower reductions for 1 year. MPD believed this would provide an opportunity to

- make certain permanent and systematic adjustments to its manpower distribution,
- accommodate the reductions that had already taken place, and
- evaluate the changes in crime statistics.

Also, at the end of fiscal year 1978, MPD would be in a position to make rational decisions concerning future manpower levels and the degree of risk involved in further manpower reductions.

MPD believes that if an upward trend in crime develops and gains momentum, a significant increase in manpower and a considerable amount of time might be required to bring the situation under control. For fiscal year 1979, the District requested funding authorization for 4,141 uniformed positions; the approved budget authorized 4,120 uniformed positions.

An independent accounting firm's report to the then Senate Committee on the District stated that MPD's requested staffing levels presented in their annual budget are based generally on the prior year's staffing level adjusted for

desired changes. The firm reported that quantitative procedures are not used to help determine the desired staffing levels for each function within a police district.

The firm recommended that MPD explore the feasibility of implementing an ongoing program of planning and evaluating each organizational unit's functions and staffing. It also recommended the program be based on a desired service level, the estimated units of service to be provided, and the estimated staff each unit requires.

In January 1978, an MPD official told us that funds were being requested from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to study the accounting firm's recommendations. A District official told us in October 1978, that LEAA had not approved the grant and that plans for resubmitting the request were not firm.

U.S. Capitol Police

The Capitol Police believes the force was established in 1828 when the city regulations were extended to the Capitol. However, the legislative history showed that it was not until 1852 when the Congress first authorized funding for a Capitol police force.

The Capitol Police is responsible for protection of the Capitol grounds and buildings and their occupants and visitors. The Capitol area, located within the District, totals about one-third a square mile. The duties of the Capitol Police include

- patrolling the Capitol buildings and grounds,
- monitoring entrances to all buildings, and
- controlling pedestrian and vehicle traffic.

The force is under the direction of the Capitol Police Board which consists of the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms and the Architect of the Capitol.

The size of the Capitol Police force has increased steadily over the years. The Senate Sergeant at Arms told the Senate Appropriations Committee that increases were either because of destruction to property or requests for increased service. A Capitol Police official told us the

force's staff needs were not based on a systematic evaluation. In fiscal year 1968, the Capitol Police force totaled 432 officers; by fiscal year 1977, the force had almost tripled to a total of 1,131 officers. The most significant increase was in fiscal year 1972 when the force increased from 586 to 820 officers.

In March 1971 there was an explosion in the Senate wing of the Capitol Building. Subsequently, the Capitol Police implemented procedures to station officers at all entrances of the Capitol buildings during the periods when they were not secured and require examination of all packages, briefcases, tote bags, etc., at all entry points. The Capitol Police advised us that the Congress authorized 378 additional officer positions to provide security for the Capitol buildings and grounds.

The Congress authorized MPD to make arrests within Capitol buildings and grounds for violations of any Federal or State laws or regulations. However, the Congress denied MPD the authority to (1) make arrests in Capitol buildings in response to complaints, (2) serve warrants, or (3) patrol the Capitol buildings and grounds except with the consent or request of the Capitol Police Board.

U.S. Park Police

In 1919, the Congress authorized that the Government watchmen responsible for the protection of the public squares and reservations of the District be known as U.S. Park Police. Their law enforcement procedures and duties, which were similar to MPD's, were applicable to Federal parks and reservations in the District. In 1930, the Park Police authority was extended to park and parkway areas in Maryland and Virginia which were under jurisdiction of the National Capital Parks. In addition to the District, Maryland, and Virginia, Park Police have responsibilities in New York, New Jersey, California, and Nevada.

In the District, the Park Police have concurrent law enforcement jurisdiction with MPD. The Park Police patrol areas administered by the Department of the Interior in the District, such as Rock Creek Park, East and West Potomac Park, the Mall, the Jefferson and Lincoln Memorials, the Washington Monument, Ford's Theatre, and the Kennedy Center.

Between fiscal year 1975 and 1977, the number of Park Police assigned to the District has remained relatively

constant. There were 285 officers authorized in fiscal year 1975 and 290 officers in 1977.

Metro Transit Police

In June 1976, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority was authorized to maintain a regular police force to protect the Authority's patrons, personnel, and transit facilities. The primary purpose of the new force is to deal with the problems associated with the Authority's subway system which became operative March 27, 1976. The legislative history showed that the Congress believed a separate police force was necessary for the subway system because its vehicles pass through eight different local jurisdictions, each having its own laws and independent police departments.

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 3, 1976

JAMES R. CALLOWAY
 CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

The Honorable Elmer B. Staats
 Comptroller General of the
 United States
 U.S. General Accounting Office
 441 G Street, Northwest
 Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Elmer:

The D.C. Appropriations Subcommittee recently completed hearings on the city's FY 1977 budget request. During the course of those hearings we discussed with Chief of Police Cullinane the fact that there are approximately 25 police forces operating in the District of Columbia. Many of these forces have overlapping jurisdictions and little on-going effort seems to be devoted to coordination of police force activities.

Determining the appropriate resource level of any one police force in the District of Columbia is difficult when the request of one of these police forces is considered in isolation.

This letter is, therefore, to request a GAO audit of the overall police delivery system that operates in the District of Columbia. This audit should cover the following areas:


- Background information on each police force that operates in the District of Columbia including budgets, manpower, general authorities, geographical jurisdictions and some of the historical factors that resulted in the creation of each of these separate police forces.
- Information to permit a comparison between D.C. and other cities of the same approximate size with regard to crime rates, unemployment, size of police forces, etc.

Information in the above two categories should be displayed graphically to the extent possible.

- Provide options (including appropriate legislative options) and accompanying discussion regarding possible consolidation actions and desirable coordination measures that should be persued to help insure efficient police services in the District of Columbia and a responsible use of the taxpayers resources.
- Provide data on effectiveness measures used by the Metropolitan Police Department by areas of responsibility to help it determine effectiveness in these areas and how that has changed over time since 1965.

I request that you complete the report as soon as possible, but a preliminary report is required in time to assist the Committee with its mark up of the FY 1977 budget request. Any questions you have, clarification of the scope of the study or any additional information you may need should be directed to Mike Hall of my D.C. Appropriations Subcommittee staff. Mr. Hall may be reached at 224-7220.


Sincerely yours,



Lawton Chiles, Chairman
District of Columbia Subcommittee

CC: Senator John L. McClellan

LC:mhc



WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY

600 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20001

(202) 637-1234

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Mr. Henry Eschwege
Director
United States General Accounting Office
Community and Economic Development Division
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Eschwege:

This is in reply to your letter of November 17, 1978, which requested comment on a draft of a proposed GAO report entitled "Police Forces in the District of Columbia Can Improve Operations and Save Money."

In general, the Authority concurs with the report and strongly favors any measures that will save money without diminishing operational efficiency. In this regard, we are currently in the process of replacing all sworn police radio dispatchers with civilian dispatchers. Additionally, the Metro police officer on duty in the Administrative office mentioned in the report has been returned to police duty. The Authority also utilizes civilian contract guards in lieu of Special Police to protect facilities where feasible.

[See GAO note.]

The Transit Police have previously obtained surplus weapons from the Metropolitan Police stockpile and some of these weapons are currently issued to members of the force. Moreover, they have also obtained, and are now utilizing, surplus equipment from other agencies in the area when it is available. Further, we will continue the practice of screening lists of property available in other agencies prior to the purchase of new police equipment.

I appreciate the opportunity to review the draft of your report and believe that significant savings may be achieved as a direct result of your efforts.

Sincerely yours,

Theodore C. Lutz
Theodore C. Lutz



GAO note: Material deleted concerns matters included in the report draft but excluded from the final report.



United States Department of the Interior

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240

JAN 18 1979

Mr. Henry Eschwege
Director, Community and Economic
Development Division
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Eschwege:

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft of a proposed report, "Police Forces in the District of Columbia Can Improve Operations and Save Money."

The goals of the report, improving operations and saving money, are certainly desirable and some of the specific recommendations are very worthwhile. However, the report contends that a duplication of police services exists and, regrettably, ignores the critical issues of congressional intent and the law enforcement philosophy of the Department of the Interior as they relate to providing police services in National Park System areas.

The report considered the United States Park Police Force as an organization limited to performing law enforcement in the District of Columbia. The legal authority and broad responsibility of the Force were not accurately portrayed. The Park Police is the urban law enforcement arm for the National Park Service in the Washington metropolitan area, San Francisco, California, and New York City, New York. The Park Police also provides law enforcement advisors to each Regional Office of the Service and responds, upon request, to law enforcement emergencies in any area of the System. It has been utilized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service within the Department of the Interior, and has assisted other Federal Agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Federal Preparedness Agency, the Department of Agriculture, and the Federal Aviation Agency. Therefore, the Park Police is firmly established as an integral part of the Department's and Service's law enforcement program.

We will address each recommendation as it pertains to the Park Police.

--adopt a policy to acquire goods and services from GSA when economically beneficial.

We firmly support this recommendation and will continue the present policy of acquiring goods and services from GSA whenever economically beneficial.

[See GAO note.]

-- use civilians to replace, where economically advantageous and technically feasible, police officers in administrative support, clerical and technical positions.

We agree. Several years ago the Park Police recognized the merits of utilizing civilians in certain functions and has been implementing such a program. Unfortunately, this program has been delayed due to hiring constraints.

-- the Secretary of the Interior should direct his Force to coordinate with the Metropolitan Police Department the photographing and fingerprinting of arrestees.

GAO note: Material deleted concerns matters included in the report draft but excluded from the final report.

The report states that the fingerprinting and photographing services performed by the United States Park Police are unnecessary since the same function is duplicated by the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). This statement is inaccurate because most persons arrested by the Park Police in the District are released under the D.C. Bail Agency Citation and Release Program, thus they are not processed by the Metropolitan Police Department. Also the figure of \$140,000 attached to the cost of the Park Police photographing and fingerprinting arrestees is incorrect because that is the approximate cost of the entire Park Police Identification (ID) Unit in the District. The function of prisoner fingerprinting and photographing accounts for less than 5 percent of the total ID Unit's budget.

-- The Secretary of the Interior should, as appropriate, transfer the police control of small parcels of land such as circles and triangles to the District of Columbia.

The national significance of these small parcels of National Park System land is periodically evaluated to determine if they should be transferred to the District for administration as a part of the city's local park system. The proper administration and management of System areas require that police services be directed towards providing a safe park environment and ensuring the protection of the park's natural, cultural, and historic resources. This is the role of the Park Police. We disagree that it would be appropriate to transfer police control and retain all other administrative responsibility for these parcels of land in the District.

It is an oversimplification to assume, because there is an overlap in jurisdiction, that MPD units travelling near parklands duplicate the police services and responsibilities of the Park Police. In reality, the MPD patrols, mentioned in the report, merely supplement Park Police patrols. In effect, there is no duplication of patrol.

-- the Mayor, District of Columbia, and the Secretary of the Interior should evaluate the feasibility of authorizing MPD the patrol responsibility for Federal parks and monument grounds in the District. The evaluation should consider the need to coordinate police efforts during emergencies, demonstrations, parades, and other events.

We have long recognized the importance of coordinating police services during emergencies or major events. The Park Police maintains a close

liaison with affected Federal and District agencies prior to and during all major events. This liaison has established a forum to discuss areas of responsibility, tactics, needs, and anticipated problems.

The recommendation that the Department delegate its law enforcement responsibility to the District is not in keeping with the intent of Congress. When the District was established, Federal officials were charged with the responsibility for improvements, policing, care, and maintenance of the city. The Act of June 11, 1878, which provided for a permanent form of government for the District, delegated to the District Commissioners control over governmental matters of purely local interest, and vested in the Commissioners jurisdiction and control over the streets of the city. In the same Act, Congress reaffirmed that the park areas within the city were to remain exclusively under the control of the United States (30 Stat. 570, 571).


Congress has further emphasized that the National Park Service should not relinquish its responsibilities for providing day-to-day law enforcement services within the National Park System. This is specifically stated in "A Report to Accompany H.R. 11877" (P.L. 94-458) from the Honorable James A. Haley, Chairman, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, dated September 16, 1976.

"The authorities provided to the Secretary to enter into cooperative agreements as provided in this subsection are to be supplemental to the law enforcement responsibilities of the National Park Service, and are not intended to authorize the delegation of permanent enforcement responsibilities to any State or local agency." (underlining added)

The necessity for a special force to police the urban areas of the National Park System is well established and consistent with the intent of Congress. Relinquishing the law enforcement responsibility of park areas in the District is inconsistent with the mission and philosophy of the Department of the Interior. This philosophy guides the law enforcement program of the National Park Service throughout the National Park System.

We cannot support any recommendation for changing our present system of providing police services.

Sincerely,



UNDER SECRETARY

Enclosure

F. NORDY HOFFMANN
SERGEANT AT ARMS

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE SERGEANT AT ARMS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 23, 1979

Mr. A. R. Voss, Director
United States General Accounting Office
General Government Division
Washington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Voss:

This is to acknowledge your letter of November 17, 1978, addressed to the Honorable Kenneth R. Harding, Sergeant at Arms, U. S. House of Representatives and Chairman of the U. S. Capitol Police Board during 1978. Your letter was forwarded to me on February 9, 1979, as the current chairman for reply.


Since receiving your letter and enclosed draft of a report prepared by the staff of the GAO, I have reviewed and discussed at length your recommendations to improve the operations of the U. S. Capitol Police with the Chief of the U. S. Capitol Police and his staff.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter prepared by Chief Powell which responds to the specific recommendations contained in your report, and would only add that I concur with the views expressed in Chief Powell's letter.

We hope this information will be of assistance to you in the report your are preparing which I understand will be submitted to Senator Chiles. If we may be of further assistance to you, or to Senator Chiles, concerning this or any other matter, please do not hesitate to call me.

In closing, I wish to compliment the staff of the GAO who worked on this report for their efforts in seeking to improve operations among area law enforcement agencies. This is a goal worthy of all of our best efforts, and I welcome any and all suggestions which would help us do a better job.

Sincerely,



F. Nordy Hoffmann
Sergeant at Arms

Enclosure

UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
331 FIRST STREET, NE.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

February 22, 1979

Honorable F. Nordy Hoffmann
Chairman
U. S. Capitol Police Board
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We have thoroughly reviewed the draft of the proposed report prepared by the Staff of the United States General Accounting Office for Senator Lawton M. Chiles. This report reviews four police forces operating within the District of Columbia: the Metropolitan Police, the United States Capitol Police, the United States Park Police and the Metro Transit Police. In this report the General Accounting Office concludes that the Capitol Police could effect a savings through making greater use of civilians and guards to perform duties now assigned to uniformed officers, and by improving procurement practices.

Initially, I would like to emphasize that any study or comparison involving the United States Capitol Police should be prefaced with an acknowledgment of the unique nature of their responsibility in protecting the United States Congress and the United States Capitol Buildings and Grounds. People throughout the world look upon the Capitol more than any other edifice as the symbol of the United States Government. As such the Capitol is the focal point of not only visitors to the city, but also those desiring to influence public policy by whatever means.

During Calendar Year 1978, the Capitol Police were called upon to provide security for no less than 77 separate visits by ranking dignitaries of foreign governments. Additionally, 41 divergent groups of varying persuasions and dispositions ranging from Iranian Students opposing American policy toward the Iranian Government, to farmers seeking legislation

Hon. F. Nordy Hoffmann
Page Two

Feb. 22, 1979

favorable to increased agricultural price supports, conducted demonstrations at the Capitol.

Not only is the Capitol the focal point of public demonstrations, unlike the White House and other government buildings which restrict access, the Capitol is the people's building and allows virtually unlimited access by any citizen or visitor. Security and accessibility are essentially opposing concepts, and the greater accommodation of one must be at the expense of the other. If we are going to allow freedom of access to the Capitol, our challenge of providing adequate security is measurably increased and made more difficult.

The recent demonstration by members of the American Agricultural Movement is a prime example of the exigencies which arise from time to time for which we must be prepared to act on short notice. Because of the vociferous nature of the demonstrators and the complicating factor of large amounts of heavy farm equipment and machinery within the vicinity of the Capitol, it has been necessary to assign all members of the Capitol Police force to twelve hour tours of duty on a seven day a week basis. Other area law enforcement agencies have been experiencing similar circumstances and have also been operating at near capacity levels in order to maintain effective control over events as they have occurred.

For the Capitol Police, responding to the special needs created by this major demonstration while at the same time providing for the daily law enforcement requirements of the Legislative Branch necessitated the use of administrative personnel in addition to the personnel assigned to shifts. Had these trained personnel not been available, we would have been sorely pressed to meet our commitments.

On the basis of our experience as well as our responsibility to the Congress and to the people whose right it is to come to the Capitol of the United States, we must respectfully and strongly disagree with the General Accounting Office staff opinion that certain administrative personnel and those personnel assigned to the 11:00 P. M. to 7:00 A. M. tour of duty could be replaced by civilian or guard employees. To do so would in our opinion be an exercise in false economy and would undoubtedly compromise the high level of professional law enforcement service we strive to render.

Honorable F. Nordy Hoffmann
Page Three

Feb. 22, 1979


The remaining area in which the General Accounting Office suggests improvement is needed is that of procurement. They suggest [See GAO note 1/.]

as well as the purchase of goods through the General Services Administration. They cite as an example that a potential savings could have been effected had we purchased shirts through the G.S.A. It should be pointed out that the brand of shirt G.S.A. would have had us purchase was * * *. 2/ As you remember, Mr. Chairman, we did purchase a quantity of (the) shirts on a previous occasion and subsequently had to return them due to poor quality and workmanship. Initial savings on the purchase price of an item is not necessarily an accurate indicator of true cost as we learned in this case. In my opinion, the measure of net savings on items purchased must take into account the total serviceability of an item as well as the cost for maintenance and upkeep.

Mr. Chairman, with the guidance and leadership of the Capitol Police Board and the oversight of the various Congressional Committees, the Capitol Police have achieved a level of professionalism and expertise in which we take pride. As you are aware, operational policies of the force are under constant review and those that are not cost-effective are discontinued or modified. It is my considered opinion that to adopt the personnel policies suggested by the General Accounting Office would seriously jeopardize the standard of security provided the Legislative Branch and drastically limit the ability of the Capitol Police to respond as appropriate to all contingencies.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me an opportunity to respond to the views and findings expressed by this General Accounting Office. Staff report.

Sincerely,


James M. Powell
Chief of Police

JMP:rh

1/Material deleted concerns matters included in the draft report but excluded from the final report.

2/Contractor's name deleted because it was not germane to issue in the report.



THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004

MARION S. BARRY, JR.
MAYOR

March 2, 1979

Mr. A.R. Voss, Director
General Government Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Voss:

The following comments are hereby submitted in response to the draft GAO report entitled "Police Forces in the District Can Improve Operations and Save Money." We are addressing our comments specifically to those recommendations relating to the Metropolitan Police Department. Our comments are presented in the same sequence as the recommendations on pages 21, 22 and 23 of Appendix I of your report.

Regarding the recommendations to adopt a policy to acquire goods and services from GSA when economically beneficial, [See GAO note.]

The Metropolitan Police Department is required to observe the purchasing procedures and regulations prescribed by the D.C. Department of General Services (DGS). This includes the maximum feasible utilization of GSA procurement contracts after taking into consideration the requirements of D.C. Law 1-95.

[See GAO note.]

GAO note: Material deleted concerns matters included in the report draft but excluded from the final report.

-- Regarding the recommendation to use civilians to replace police officers in administrative support, clerical and technical positions --

Proposals to civilianize various numbers of police positions have been made on several occasions from sources within the Department as well as from other agencies and private consultants. In Fiscal Year 1975 an attempt was made to introduce a systematic civilianization program. One hundred positions were identified for the first phase of the program, and authorization for one hundred civilian positions was obtained from the Congress. Subsequent budget cuts, hiring freezes, and city-wide manpower ceilings made it impossible to continue the program and resulted in the loss of not only the one hundred civilian positions added in Fiscal Year 1975, but of 310 additional civilian positions as well. The Department's civilian manpower authorization has been reduced in total from 1033 positions in Fiscal Year 1975 to 623 at the present time. All of these reductions have been made in order to achieve budget reductions or comply with city-wide manpower ceilings. Under these conditions it has not only been impossible to carry out a systematic civilianization program, but in isolated cases, it has been necessary to reverse the procedure in order to insure continuity of certain essential functions.

The Office of Budget and Resource Development will study the feasibility of reinstating civilianization in the Police Department. This study will recognize the fact that the civilianization program will be jeopardized if the civilian positions are subjected to future budgetary reductions and manpower ceilings. There will also be recognition of the fact that it will take a considerable period of time to recruit competent employees and train them to the point where they are capable of relieving a uniformed man for other duty. Most important of all, the program must be approached on a phase-in basis, since any attempt at sudden, wholesale replacement of uniformed personnel will result in confusion and chaos.

-- Regarding the recommendation that the Secretary, Department of the Interior should direct his force to coordinate the photographing and fingerprinting of arrestees with MPD --

The attached memorandum of understanding details the legal requirements for processing of all prisoners through the Metropolitan Police Department's identification system. When requested, the Department will furnish copies of fingerprints and I.D. photographs to the arresting agency. Since there is

apparently no legal procedure for avoiding the processing of all prisoners through MPD's identification system, it would appear that if duplicate processing is to be eliminated, the action must originate with the other agencies involved.

-- Regarding the recommendation that the Secretary, Department of the Interior should, as appropriate, transfer the police control of small parcels of land such as circles and triangles to the District of Columbia --


This recommendation presents no problem provided that all parties are in agreement on the meaning of the word "small" in this particular context. Most traffic circles and triangles are already patrolled by MPD vehicles to the same extent that the adjacent areas are patrolled, and no additional manpower would be required. There are, however, areas which may not be larger in area than some of these circles and triangles, but which are the focus of activities which would add appreciably to the workload and manpower requirements of the Department. It would be necessary to examine each parcel independently before the transfer of responsibility could take place.

-- Regarding the recommendation that the Mayor, District of Columbia and the Secretary, Department of the Interior should evaluate the feasibility of authorizing MPD the patrol responsibility for Federal parks and monument grounds in the District--

In order to discharge such responsibilities without degradation in the current level of service delivery, the evaluation should include not only the coordination of police efforts during emergencies, demonstrations, parades, and other events, but also the additional manpower authorizations which would be required to provide such areas with adequate police services during "normal" conditions.

Thank you for permitting me to review the report in draft form and provide our comments. I hope they will be helpful to you in finalizing the report.

Sincerely,



Marion S. Barry, Jr.
Mayor

Enclosure

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE METROPOLITAN
POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND THE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES MARSHAL FOR THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA

A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

Notwithstanding various booking agreements which exist between the Metropolitan Police Department and other local law enforcement agencies, plus several federal agencies, it is still possible that some federal offenders can be processed through the United States District Court for the District of Columbia without having been processed through the Metropolitan Police Department's Central Cell Block. Since provisions of the District of Columbia Code establish the Metropolitan Police Department as the central repository for criminal history records in the District of Columbia, only those offenders who have been fingerprinted and photographed by the Metropolitan Police Department's Central Cell Block are assigned the unique Police Department Identification number (PDID) which is necessary before such offender's record can be retained in the District of Columbia's criminal history index. In addition, procedures established for the development of an automated Offender Based Transaction Statistics/ Computerized Criminal History project (a joint project being developed by the Metropolitan Police Department, D. C. Department of Corrections, D. C. Bail Agency, D. C. Parole Board and the D. C. Office of Criminal Justice Plans and Analysis under L.E.A.A. grant and which will track an offender's movement - from time of arrest through release from parole commitment - through the D. C. Criminal Justice system) mandate the PDID as the unique identifier for entry into the District of Columbia's various automated criminal justice systems.

B. PURPOSE OF THIS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING:

The purpose of this memorandum of understanding is to provide a procedure for persons arrested by federal law enforcement agencies for violations of the United States Code to obtain PDID numbers. This PDID number is to be obtained prior to the acceptance of any offender for prosecution purposes by the Grand Jury Intake Section, U. S. District Court for the District

of Columbia. This Memorandum of Understanding outlines the general procedures for the processing and/or detention; establishment of true identity; and the assignment of a PDID number for such offenders.

B. GENERAL PROCEDURES:

1. Processing prisoners when U. S. District Court is in session:

a. When U. S. District Court is in session, prisoners will be brought to the Central Cell Block (CCB), located in the basement of the Municipal Center, 300 Indiana Avenue, N.W., by the arresting Federal agent. The accompanying Federal agent will present both the prisoner and a copy of P.D. Form 163 to the CCB personnel who will then fingerprint and photograph the prisoner.

(Note: The P.D. Form 163 is the MPD prosecution report which must be prepared, in an abbreviated form for Federal agents, for each prisoner to be processed by the CCB. (A sample P.D. Form 163 is attached.) It should further be understood that, during this type of processing, the CCB will neither accept custody of the prisoner nor handle the prisoner's personal property.)

b. A PDID number will be entered by CCB personnel on all pages of each P.D. Form 163.

(1) Page one (1) of the P.D. Form 163 will be retained by CCB.

(2) Page two (2) through five (5) of the P.D. Form 163 will be returned to the Federal arresting officer.

c. The accompanying Federal agent will then transport the prisoner to Court and present pages 2 through 5 of the P.D. Form 163 to the U. S. Marshal in the Court Cell Block.

(1) Page 3 of the P.D. Form 163 will be retained by the U. S. Marshal's Office.

(2) Pages 2, 4 and 5 of the P.D. Form 163 will be returned to the arresting officer by the U. S. Marshal in the Court Cell Block.

d. The Federal arresting officer will thereupon take pages 2, 4, and 5 of the P.D. Form 163 to the Grand Jury Intake Section of the U. S. Attorney's Office.

(1) The Magistrate's Docket or Criminal Case number will be placed on pages 2, 4, and 5 of the P.D. Form 163 by the Grand Jury Intake Section.

(2) Page 2 of the P.D. Form 163 will be forwarded to the MPD Identification and Records Division, Attention: Data Conversion Section, by the Grand Jury Intake Section.

2. Processing and detention of prisoners when U. S. District Court is not in session:

a. When the U. S. District Court is not in session, the procedures outlined in Section 1 will still apply; however, the CCB will accept custody and detain the prisoner after the Federal arresting officer completes P.D. Form 709 (sample attached) to the satisfaction of the official then in charge of the CCB.

b. The duration of custody and detention will be until the next Court day, at which time the Federal arresting officer will return the prisoner to court.

3. NCIC and WALES checks.

a. Prisoners processed by the CCB, after being identified, will have their names entered into WALES for both WALES and NCIC checks by CCB personnel.

b. If such automated checks reveal that warrants are outstanding on any prisoners, the Federal arresting officer will retain custody of the prisoner (except during custody/detention by the MPD) until the prisoner is presented to the U. S. District Court. The CCB personnel will make the appropriate notifications on all outstanding warrants in order for necessary detainers to be filed.

D. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

1. Establishing Probable Cause for Arrest:

The CCB can neither process nor detain any prisoner unless the official then in charge of the CCB is satisfied that the P.D. Form 163 establishes probable cause for the arrest. For purposes of processing prisoners under this Memorandum of Understanding, a warrant number on the P.D. Forms 163 or 709, or a statement of facts attached thereto, will be sufficient to establish probable cause.

2. Processing prisoner who resists:

a. If any prisoner refuses to submit to processing by CCB personnel when U. S. District Court is IN session (whereby the CCB has not accepted custody of the prisoner), then it shall be the responsibility of the accompanying Federal agent to determine whether processing shall continue.

b. If any prisoner refuses to submit to processing by CCB personnel when U. S. District Court is NOT in session (and the CCB has accepted custody of such prisoner) then CCB personnel will process such prisoner under the same procedures applicable to other in-custody prisoners.

E. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Memorandum of Understanding will not take effect until federal law enforcement agencies within the District of Columbia have been informed by the United States Attorney of this Memorandum of Understanding and advised of its effective date.

Burtell M. Jefferson
Burtell M. Jefferson
Chief of Police
Metropolitan Police Department

Earl J. Silbert
Earl J. Silbert
United States Attorney for
the District of Columbia

JUN 7 1978
(Date)

May 31 1978
(Date)

J. Jerome Bullock
J. Jerome Bullock
United States Marshal for
the District of Columbia

6-2-78
(Date)

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