

*Report to the House
and Senate Committees
on Appropriations by the
Comptroller General of
the United States*

30645



**SUMMARIES OF
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OPERATIONS**

This is a summary of GAO's conclusions and recommendations resulting from its audits and other review work in the Department of Defense on which satisfactory legislative or administrative actions have not been taken. These summaries are compiled to assist congressional committees in their review of budget requests for fiscal year 1986. Previous GAO reports brought these matters to the attention of the congressional and departmental officials.

**GAO/OIRM-85-2
February 28, 1985**

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON D.C. 20548

B-205879

The Honorable Jamie L. Whitten
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Mark O. Hatfield
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

This is our annual report summarizing the conclusions and recommendations resulting from our audits and other review work in the Department of Defense on which satisfactory legislative or administrative actions have not been taken. To encourage prompt, responsive action on its audit findings and recommendations, GAO systematically follows up on its recommendations until some final disposition is reached. This report contains information on GAO reports with recommendations open as of November 1, 1984.

Our reports have previously brought these matters to the attention of the Congress and departmental officials. However, the summaries will be of interest to your committees in their review of budget requests for fiscal year 1986. We have not included suggested questions to be asked in appropriations hearings; however, please contact our Office of Congressional Relations if you wish us to suggest specific questions on the items summarized or if you need additional information about any of the specific reports.

To enhance its usefulness, in addition to a table of contents, this report contains three reference indexes. The Congressional index lists the titles of reports under the congressional committees to which they are related. The Budget Function index lists the titles of reports under function categories by which federal funds are appropriated and identified in the President's Budget. Finally, the Agency/Organization index lists the titles of reports which relate to the activities of a particular department, agency, bureau, or organization. The indexes also include page numbers where the reader may find summaries of the reports.

A similar summary report of conclusions and recommendations concerning the federal civil departments and agencies (GAO/OIRM-85-1) is being submitted separately.

B-205879

We are sending copies of this report to the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Defense, the military departments, and other agencies so they may be in a position to answer any inquiries made on these issues during the appropriations hearings. Copies are also being provided to other interested congressional committees and members.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Charles A. Bowsher". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent initial "C".

Comptroller General
of the United States

**SUMMARIES OF CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OPERATIONS**

U.S. General Accounting Office

Charles A. Bowsher

Comptroller General of the United States

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTS

Budget Function Heading
(Reports with other than a
Defense Budget Function appear
under the heading "Non-Defense
Budget Functions")

PROCUREMENT

Title ——— **Establishing New Federal Food-Buying Procedures Would Help Eliminate Unnecessary Special Examinations**

Report Number: ——— (RCED-84-150, 9-24-84)

Document Date

Departments of Agriculture and Defense, and Veterans Administration

Agency/Organization
Concerned

Budget Function ——— **Budget Function:** Agriculture: Agricultural Research and Services (352.0)

Legislative Authority ——— **Legislative Authority:** Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.), Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (15 U.S.C. 1451 et seq.), Meat Inspection Act (21 U.S.C. 601 et seq.), Poultry Products Inspection Act (21 U.S.C. 451 et seq.), Egg Products Inspection Law (21 U.S.C. 1031 et seq.).

Background ——— **Background**

GAO reviewed federal practices for accepting food purchases to determine if federal costs could be decreased by reducing the number of special examinations necessary to ensure the quality of accepted products.

Target: Department of Defense

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

Recommendation Status

Status Comments

Findings/Conclusions ——— **Findings/Conclusions**

GAO found that the direct cost of certification services was \$18 million in fiscal year 1982. Although the Department of Agriculture has instructed other federal agencies to waive certification when it is not cost effective, some agencies routinely require certification because federal buying agencies do not have procedures for weighing the costs and benefits of certification. Some agencies believe that certification is necessary because suppliers who have previously supplied defective products cannot be excluded from competition for food procurements, but GAO noted that agencies may consider past performance in determining suppliers' responsibility. GAO also found that: (1) many certifications duplicate industry quality control efforts or required federal inspections; and (2) certification can be extremely costly because the costs of increased production time brought on by unnecessary certification are passed on to the government by suppliers. GAO noted that the costs of certification of one purchase of ground beef amounted to 9.3 percent of the total value of the purchase.

Target: Veterans Administration

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

To assist buyers in weighing the benefits of certification, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Defense and the Administrator of Veterans Affairs should direct their buying agencies to establish procedures for obtaining available information on suppliers' qualifications and past records of performance from the Food and Drug Administration and the Food Safety and Inspection Service.

Target: Department of Agriculture

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

Target: Department of Defense

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

Target: Veterans Administration

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

Recommendations to Agencies ——— **Recommendations to Agencies**

to Agencies

The Secretaries of Agriculture and Defense and the Administrator of Veterans Affairs should direct their respective food-buying agencies to establish procedures which would require that the costs and benefits of certification be weighed before deciding to require that specific food purchases be certified. To determine the cost of certification which may be required for a specific food purchase, the buying agency should request suppliers to identify the food price with and without the cost of certification and inform prospective suppliers that certification costs may be waived for qualifying suppliers.

Target: Department of Agriculture

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

The Secretary of Agriculture should direct the Agricultural Marketing Service to recognize existing safety and quality control systems and to review and revise its certification procedures for meat and poultry products to: (1) eliminate certification procedures that duplicate existing safety inspection procedures; (2) reduce certification effort where the Food Safety and Inspection Service has found that the suppliers' quality control systems provide adequate assurance of product quality; and (3) reconsider the recommendations included in the report on the task force review of meat grading and certification control methods and procedures.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*



CONTENTS

Department of Defense—Military

Accounting Systems	1
Automatic Data Processing	2
Facilities Management	3
Housing	6
Logistics Support Planning	10
Military Manpower	14
Mission Analysis	19
Mission Budgeting	22
Preparedness	24
Supply Management	29
Support Functions	40
Training	43

Defense-Related Activities

Accounting Systems	48
Foreign Military Sales	49
Material Management	50
Medical Services	56
Personnel Support Services	62
Security Administration	63

Department of Defense—Procurement and Contracts

Automatic Data Processing	65
Contracts	66
Logistics Management	67
Procurement	68

Military Pay

Accounting Systems	77
Bonus Programs	78
Personnel Support Services	79

Weapons Systems

Individual System Studies	80
Logistics Support Planning	83
Mission Analysis	87
Mission Budgeting	92
Testing	94

Non-Defense Budget Functions

Accounting Systems	96
Automatic Data Processing	102
Facilities Management	103
Internal Audits	104
International Affairs	106
Medical Services	109
Personnel Management	113
Procurement Procedures	114
Research and Development	115
Supply Management	120

Index Section

Agency/Organization	123
Budget Function	131
Congressional	135



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS

Management Control of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools Needs To Be Strengthened

(HRD-83-3, 11-4-82)

Department of Defense

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: Defense Dependents' Education Act of 1978 (20 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.). Department of Education Organization Act (20 U.S.C. 3401). Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. Antideficiency Act (31 U.S.C. 665). Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982. 7 GAO 12.2. 1 Treasury Fiscal Requirements Manual 6-8030. DOD Manual 1342.6-M-1. DOD Accounting Guidance Handbook. Certifying Officers Act.

Background

GAO reported on the need for strengthening management control of the Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DODDS) overseas.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the financial management system of DODDS does not give managers the timely and accurate information necessary to plan for and control use of the school system's resources. DODDS has no accounting system; at present, accounting services are provided by four organizations. In addition, the school system has no adequate system of internal management controls to ensure, among other things, that receipts are properly accounted for and that goods and services paid for are received. Finally, GAO found that DODDS does not have authority to disburse funds. These conditions deprive management of information needed to ensure that the allotment of funds from DOD is not overexpended.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should: (1) develop accounting and internal management control systems in DODDS as

required by the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950; (2) develop a uniform financial coding system applicable to DODDS activities worldwide; and (3) establish a streamlined procedure for recording disbursements of DODDS funds in the school system's accounting records.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Director of DODDS to: (1) return to the reimbursable concept in obtaining logistics support services; (2) revise DOD Manual 1342.6-M-1 to require monthly billing with prompt follow-up for recurring logistics support services; (3) ensure that all support agreements are brought current and maintained in that status and that they contain specific details relating to the nature and cost of the support services to be provided; and (4) develop and implement a financial management training program for school principals so that they can fulfill their responsibilities in monitoring and controlling logistics support costs.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING

Development of Fire Support Command and Control Systems by the Army and the Marine Corps (NSIAD-84-15, 10-19-83)

Departments of Defense and the Army, and United States Marine Corps

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

GAO reviewed Army and Marine Corps efforts to automate their fire support command and control functions. Each service is independently developing computer-based systems to provide more accurate and timely information for use in effectively employing artillery, naval, and air support. These systems are estimated to cost billions of dollars over their life cycles and will help to manage combat resources. In fiscal year 1984, it is expected that \$40 million will be spent to develop these systems.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that, although their missions are similar and their fire support systems need to intercommunicate, the Army and the Marine Corps are developing individual systems. GAO feels that the services are not examining the potential of a common command system because they perceive their requirements to be unique and they lack central direction from the Department of Defense (DOD). The services' major arguments against a common system are mission differences and system preferences; however, neither service has explained why systems with totally unique hardware and software are required. GAO found that, even though DOD has written policies promoting standardization, it has not provided the services with the necessary direction regarding a common command system. Two separate offices within DOD are monitoring the

services' major systems and a limited amount of time is spent by these offices on the program. GAO concluded that achieving commonality will be complicated, but the issue should be addressed now while the second generation systems are being developed. Failure to explore its potential could mean costly duplication of development efforts and continued interoperability problems.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should consolidate responsibility in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for fire support command and control systems to enhance central direction in pursuit of common and interoperable systems.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should assess, independently of the services, the potential for common fire support command and control systems in the Army and the Marine Corps. This assessment should quantify the costs and benefits of joint programs versus those of unique developments and identify the most cost-effective combination of systems. It should also consider how systems now being developed can be accommodated by a joint program.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *DOD agrees and will pursue this recommendation during fiscal year 1985.*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

FACILITIES MANAGEMENT

DOD Can Increase Revenues Through Better Use of Natural Resources It Holds In Trust *(PLRD-82-9, 11-25-81)*

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: Endangered Species Act of 1973. Land Policy and Management Act (43 U.S.C. 1701). H. Rept. 95-1398. BOB Circular A-25. 16 U.S.C. 670(a). 16 U.S.C. 670(c). 10 U.S.C. 2667.

Background

Almost 25 million acres of land throughout the United States and its possessions have been set aside for the use of the Department of Defense (DOD). These lands, of which about two-thirds are undeveloped, contain vast natural resources helpful to the nation's economy and quality of life. To ensure optimal use of its lands and their natural resources, DOD requires all military bases to manage these lands encompassing vast natural resources under the multiple-use principle. This means that bases must exercise a balanced, coordinated management of all resources, applying the best combination of developmental and protective land uses, consistent with the military mission. GAO thus undertook a review of the effectiveness and efficiency of the military bases in managing these lands to determine where revenues can be increased and how the multiple uses of the land can be improved.

Findings/Conclusions

In its review, GAO found that, in fiscal year 1980, military bases managed 2.3 million acres of forest and sold \$12.3 million worth of timber and related products. Although most of the forestry programs were well managed, several forestry plans lacked a system for monitoring program effectiveness, were outdated, and had not been properly reviewed and approved. In addition, inadequate coordination, poor planning, and general management apathy

prevented timber sales and the bases' agricultural leasing programs from reaching and maintaining maximum benefits. GAO also found that the bases needed to improve their management of the lands' large areas of scenic wilderness, woodland, and waterways which are rich in wildlife and recreational resources. Although DOD has encouraged its bases to enter cooperative agreements with appropriate state and federal agencies and to collect hunting and fishing fees to help support the bases' fish and wildlife programs and recreational areas, many bases have not done so and have failed to use available technical expertise when planning and managing these valuable resources. As a result, plans are often inadequate or nonexistent, and military managers can neither gauge program effectiveness nor identify potential recreational areas. GAO believes that, by improving its management practices, DOD could collect an additional \$3 million annually in revenue.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to assess more equitable user fees, where possible, for hunting and fishing to finance fish and wildlife programs.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 02/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

FACILITIES MANAGEMENT

DOD Can Make Further Progress in Controlling Pollution From Its Sewage Treatment Plants

(NSIAD-84-5, 2-3-84)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: Natural Resources and Environment: Pollution Control and Abatement (304.0)

Legislative Authority: Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Federal) (33 U.S.C. 1151; P.L. 92-500). Executive Order 12088.

Background

GAO evaluated Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to control pollution from its sewage treatment plant operations and attempted to determine whether DOD plants are meeting Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) discharge permit requirements.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that, while DOD has made great efforts to improve its sewage treatment plants, these efforts have not been fully successful because: (1) the services have not always selected the most cost-effective treatment methods available; and (2) plant upgrades and modifications often have serious design and construction flaws that reduce plant efficiency. Major upgrades have occurred in the last 10 years at 11 of the 13 plants visited by GAO, but many of the upgraded plants are not meeting the sewage treatment levels expected because of design deficiencies. In addition, 11 of the 13 plants had been unable to consistently meet National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit requirements. GAO identified problems leading to noncompliance, including: (1) lack of specific guidance on how to ensure adequate operation, maintenance, and compliance; (2) lack of followup on problems found by DOD, EPA, and state environmental inspectors; (3) equipment deficiencies; (4) infiltration and inflow problems; and (5) deficient operation and maintenance practices.

Recommendations to Agencies

To guarantee that the most cost-effective sewage treatment methods are used, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that the services comply with DOD policy by carefully evaluating all feasible treatment alternatives, including regional or municipal tie-ins.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 10/86

To guarantee that the most cost-effective sewage treatment methods are used, the Secretary of Defense should

require the services to provide written justifications supporting the selection of sewage treatment alternatives that differ from those recommended by cost-effectiveness studies.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 10/85

To guarantee that the most cost-effective sewage treatment methods are used, the Secretary of Defense should study and pilot test making one party responsible under contract for designing and constructing a treatment plant and for demonstrating, with plant operators, that the plant will meet discharge permit requirements before turning over the plant to the services for operation.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 10/86

The Secretary of Defense should direct and assist the services as necessary to provide more specific guidance to their bases on how to ensure adequate plant operation and maintenance in order to be in compliance with permit requirements.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 10/85

The Secretary of Defense should require the service secretaries to establish some formal means of ensuring that deficiencies identified at sewage treatment plants are followed up and corrected in a timely manner.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 10/85

The Secretary of Defense should work with the Office of Personnel Management to revise the staffing guidelines for sewage treatment plants because of the ever increasing complexity of the treatment plants and processes.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 07/86

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

FACILITIES MANAGEMENT

Consolidation of Personal Property Shipping Offices (NSIAD-84-81, 4-5-84)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

Pursuant to congressional requests, GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to consolidate Personal Property Shipping Offices.

creased costs because of the need for additional staff at some offices.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the consolidation plan implemented by DOD was more limited in scope than that recommended by the Defense Audit Service and did not achieve the savings expected. Consolidation was generally limited to booking outbound personal property shipments and administering the Carrier Evaluation Reporting System, while other functions remained fragmented among the shipping offices. In some instances, consolidations resulted in in-

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics) to reassess these consolidations. In so doing, he should consider the potential for savings through economies of scale that could result through better and more complete consolidations as well as the need to provide adequate services to the users in various geographic locations.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

HOUSING

DOD's Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing--Better Living Conditions and Reduced Costs Possible (PLRD-82-59, 4-30-82)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: DOD Instruction 4165.47. H. Rept. 96-1097. H. Rept. 97-193.

Background

In view of the large sums of money that the Department of Defense (DOD) is spending on housing its unaccompanied enlisted personnel, GAO evaluated the military services' efforts to provide adequate housing; efforts to control off-base housing costs; computations of personnel housing requirements; and personnel housing modernization policies, procedures, and practices.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found opportunities for the military services to more efficiently use existing unaccompanied enlisted personnel housing assets, more accurately determine housing deficits, and control modernization costs. GAO believes that DOD can substantially reduce its off-base housing costs, as well as its construction and modernization costs, and at the same time provide better housing to its enlisted personnel. The services have not uniformly adopted or implemented the minimum standards of adequacy for housing and construction criteria which DOD has established. Seven of nine installations GAO visited provided service members accommodations that were below the DOD minimum standards of adequacy. Some installations could have provided adequate facilities through better

management and efficient utilization of enlisted personnel housing facilities. These housing costs could be further reduced by requiring installations to use underutilized facilities at other nearby installations and by constructing new facilities before modernizing existing ones. Nine installations which GAO visited overstated deficits in existing housing. GAO believes that four construction projects could either be eliminated or reduced in scope and that the Army and the Air Force are unnecessarily modernizing some facilities.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should revise the DOD inventory, occupancy, and utilization reporting requirements so that program managers receive accurate information.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the services to use underutilized space at nearby installations as a means of meeting unaccompanied enlisted personnel housing needs.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

HOUSING

Military Family Housing (PLRD-83-19, 12-3-82)

Department of Defense

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: DOD Instruction 4270.21. A.F.R. 91-1. A.F.R. 178-1. A.R. 210-50. A.R. 420-70.

Background

GAO surveyed major maintenance and repairs to military family housing units at five installations. Because the work disclosed a problem relating to wood floor replacement and maintenance, GAO concentrated its efforts in that area.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found wood floors at four of the installations surveyed. Over a period of several years, one Air Force installation had replaced the original veneer floors with solid oak parquet in most of the units constructed in 1960. GAO estimated that the cost of replacing these floors was \$1.6 million. At three other installations, hardwood or parquet floors had been replaced with vinyl or vinyl asbestos tile in some of their housing units. The Department of Defense (DOD) has instructions on sanding and refinishing wood floors, but it does not have a policy on which materials to use when floors need to be replaced. GAO believes that economic analyses are essential to

determine the most cost-effective materials when it is necessary to replace these floors. Neither DOD nor the services have records on the number of units with wood floors; therefore, the total number of units with the potential for floor replacement could not be determined. Because four of the five locations visited had wood floors in many units, the potential for savings could be significant. GAO also found that wood floors were being sanded or refinished more frequently than provided by DOD policy.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics should establish a policy which requires the services to perform economic analyses to identify the most economical materials for replacing wood floors in military family housing.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

HOUSING

Greater Emphasis on Occupant Responsibilities Can Reduce Military Family Housing Costs (PLRD-83-77, 6-6-83)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: Military Construction Authorization Act, 1981. P.L. 96-418.

Background

GAO evaluated the Department of Defense's (DOD) effectiveness in identifying and assessing occupant damages to military family housing and its efficiency in operating self-help maintenance programs.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that, although recent congressional legislation has provided additional authority and incentive to collect for damages, DOD remains slow in identifying occupant liability and implementing collection activities. GAO noted that family housing maintenance costs amounted to over \$400 million in 1981. Without explicit guidance to identify repair liability, unidentified damages are often treated as routine maintenance, and repair costs are absorbed by the government. GAO also found that, while self-help maintenance programs have significant potential to reduce maintenance costs, the current implementation of the self-help concept appears to be falling short of expectations, and some programs may cost more than they save. The programs are also handicapped by weak controls over funds, inventory, and issued materials. GAO concluded that, before potential benefits from the self-help programs can be realized, changes are needed to correct the problems it identified.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to provide highly visible emphasis on an assertive damage assessment and collection program.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretary of Defense, to enhance the potential benefits of the self-help programs and to increase their effectiveness if they have been determined to be cost beneficial, should require the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to determine the feasibility of making minor maintenance tasks mandatory for tenants and charging tenants if such maintenance is done at government expense.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force should require their installations to provide proper support and

command emphasis on enforcing housing occupants' responsibilities.

Target: Department of the Army

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

Target: Department of the Navy

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

Target: Department of the Air Force

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to develop and issue clear, specific instructions for identifying and collecting tenant damages.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force should require their installations to develop and implement procedures to ensure that maintenance personnel identify work necessitated by suspected tenant damages and that housing inspectors are notified in order to start collection actions.

Target: Department of the Army

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

Target: Department of the Navy

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

Target: Department of the Air Force

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretary of Defense, to enhance the potential benefits of the self-help programs and to increase their effectiveness if they have been determined to be cost beneficial, should require the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to provide uniform, specific guidelines for the

self-help programs that list: (1) those tasks which are to be tenant responsibilities; and (2) those items to be stocked in the self-help stores for tenant use in performing these tasks.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretary of Defense, to deter occupant damage and reduce housing maintenance costs, should provide more explicit criteria as to what constitutes abuse and neglect and strongly emphasize the importance of ensuring that tenants pay for damages. In particular, the Secretary should direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to: (1) provide highly visible emphasis on an assertive damage assessment and collection program; (2) develop and issue clear, specific instructions for identifying and collecting for tenant damage. The service Secretaries should require their installations to: (1) provide proper support and command emphasis on enforcing housing occupants' responsibilities; and (2) develop and implement procedures to ensure that maintenance personnel identify work necessitated by suspended tenant damages and that housing inspectors are notified in order to start collection actions.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretary of Defense should require the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to make a reassessment of their self-help programs. The reassessment should include a determination of the actual, where available, or the best estimated cost of the program and the savings being realized. These data should originate at the installation level.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretary of Defense, to enhance the potential benefits of the self-help programs and to increase their effectiveness if they have been determined to be cost beneficial, should require the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to strengthen internal controls to ensure that housing money used for self-help is properly accounted for, that store inventories are properly controlled, and that store items are used in military family housing to make minor repairs.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLANNING

Potential Reductions in Aircraft Operation and Maintenance Costs by Using Thrust Computing Support Equipment

(PLRD-82-4, 10-27-81)

Departments of Defense, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

In response to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the Department of Defense's efforts to save fuel and reduce maintenance costs on turbine jet engines through thrust and power management and studied the feasibility of using certain equipment which has the capability of measuring the thrust of engines while installed in aircraft.

Findings/Conclusions

The analyses showed that the accurate measurement and setting of thrust for installed jet engines is of vital importance, not only for aircraft readiness and safety, but also for operation and maintenance cost reductions. Although test results indicate that a system is available that can perform such measurements, the services have not been using it. The Air Force has conducted extensive tests of the thrust computing support equipment that will measure thrust for installed J85-5 engines. Although the Air Force has decided to implement the thrust computing system for its J85-5 engines, the system may not be implemented due to a lack of funding. If funds are not made available soon, the system may never be implemented. If this occurs, the Air Force will lose millions of dollars already invested in the program in addition to millions in projected savings. Furthermore, failure to implement the system may reduce aircraft readiness. The Navy has not performed any tests to determine whether its aircraft jet engines might benefit from such a system. According to the contractor, the system can offer similar significant benefits for Navy aircraft engines.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure that adequate plans are prepared to monitor implementation of the thrust computing support equipment for the J85-5 engines at Laughlin Air Force Base and to verify and evaluate the benefits of the system.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to develop a plan to ensure that the system will be timely implemented on the J79 engines if the system functions as well as expected on the J85-5 engines.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy to coordinate their efforts in evaluating the thrust computing system on variable nozzle afterburning jet aircraft engines. Such an exchange of information will prevent duplication of test and evaluation efforts between the services.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLANNING

Improving the Air Force Modification Process Will Benefit Management of Spare Parts in the Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency

(PLRD-83-3, 10-15-82)

Departments of Defense and the Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

Air Force Class IV and V modification programs are performed to correct deficiencies and improve capabilities of existing weapons systems and equipment. GAO reviewed the Air Force's modification coordination process to determine how effectively items affected by modification programs were managed.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that item managers are not routinely advised of modification programs that reduce or eliminate demand for their items. As a result, managers are spending millions of dollars purchasing and repairing unneeded items. Also Air Force managers are not effectively controlling critical items that could cause hazardous conditions if reinstalled on modified equipment. One of the principal reasons for the Air Force's longstanding problem in coordinating modification programs is the fragmented method by which the Air Force Logistics Command manages them. A number of different Command groups have responsibility for issuing policy on modification coordination, but no single group is responsible for ensuring that

policies are consistent, complete, and implemented. This practice has brought the Command substantial criticism and has prevented Command-wide corrective actions. GAO also found that, in addition to affecting Air Force-managed items, Air Force modification programs frequently involve removing and replacing items managed by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). However, Air Force policies do not require that DLA be notified and Air Force personnel are not doing so. GAO believes that the key to achieving a workable modification coordination process in the Air Force is increased emphasis at a sufficiently high level to ensure its success.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should require the Director of DLA to: (1) establish internal procedures for coordinating modification data with DLA item managers; and (2) insure that those procedures provide item managers with information concerning application of items they manage.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLANNING

The Army Can Do More To Assure War Reserve Funds Are Spent Effectively

(NSIAD-84-50, 2-17-84)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: DOD Instruction 4140.47. A.R. 710-1.

Background

GAO reviewed the Army's current program to revise its system for computing war reserve materiel requirements, including its procedures for management reporting, funding, item identification, and selection of war reserve items.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that: (1) the Army needs to improve its war reserve item identification and selection procedures; (2) war reserve stocks are imbalanced; and (3) low priority assets are not redistributed overseas. GAO also determined that: (1) excess assets should be deleted and peacetime long-supply assets should be transferred to improve Army war reserves; and (2) the Army needs to establish criteria for preparing and using war reserve studies.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Army should direct the Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) to comply with existing regulations when identifying and selecting war reserve items in order to exclude unnecessary items and reduce requirements.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should direct DARCOM to screen existing war reserve items to eliminate requirements and inventories which do not meet selection cri-

teria and sell the unnecessary assets to buy needed war reserves.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should direct DARCOM to periodically meet with representatives from the major commands to ensure that existing low priority war reserves are screened for possible physical transfer to higher priority locations. The type of screening process used--providing major-command-computed shortages for DARCOM screening or having DARCOM provide lists of currently owned low priority war reserve assets for major command screening--should be jointly determined by all affected parties.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should direct DARCOM to transfer excess war reserve assets to general issue and use the proceeds to acquire war reserve items that have unfilled requirements.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should direct DARCOM to require that the major subordinate commands use long-supply general issue assets to meet war reserve requirements.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLANNING

Navy Can Improve Management of Nonaviation Depot-Level Repairable Spares (NSIAD-84-150, 9-20-84)

Departments of Defense and the Navy

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

GAO reviewed the Navy's management of nonaviation depot-level repairable spares.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the Navy manages about 82,000 spares, such as generators, transmitters and circuit card assemblies, valued at about \$5.6 billion. GAO also found that the Navy is repairing many spares that would be more economical to replace through procurement actions. A major cause of this condition is that the repair or buy decisions are based on adjusted data that favor repairing rather than on actual cost information. GAO believes that industrially funded using activities, such as shipyards, lack sufficient incentive to return unserviceable spares because they can pass the added cost of not returning spares onto their customers in the form of higher charges.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Navy should use up-to-date actual

purchase and repair cost information in making repair or buy decisions.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Navy should periodically review depot-level repairable spares to determine which should continue to be repaired or whether new spares should be purchased as replacements.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Navy should explore alternatives that encourage industrially-funded activities to return more unserviceable spares, test the feasibility of implementing these alternatives, and adopt the one that provides the most incentive to return the unserviceable spares.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 06/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

MATERIAL MANAGEMENT

Requirements and Production Capabilities Are Uncertain for Some Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts (PLRD-82-77, 7-22-82)

Departments of Defense, the Navy, and the Air Force, and United States Marine Corps

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the processes used by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps to develop their fiscal year (FY) 1982 budgets for aircraft spares and repair parts, the subsequent procurement plans for these items, and the adequacy of management information systems to address the problems associated with these items.

Findings/Conclusions

Many of the problems previously reported by GAO still exist. The Air Force and Navy procurement plans for aircraft spares and repair parts included in the FY 1982 budget have changed, because the requirements on which they were based have fluctuated. To more realistically determine war reserve requirements for aircraft spares and repair parts, the Air Force is developing a computer model, the wartime and assessment requirements simulation (WARS). The Air Force has revised its procurement plans on the basis of the interim model, and original cost requirements for eight C-5A items GAO reviewed were reduced. A number of deficiencies recently identified in Air Force and Navy programs for managing problem items occurred because the programs were using inaccurate data which did not always include all problem items. The remedial actions taken were frequently ineffective in addressing production-related causes. Delinquent deliveries of aircraft spares and repair parts have increased and have become a significant problem affecting the operational readiness of Air Force aircraft. Delinquent deliveries may also be a significant problem for the Navy; however, the Navy does not track and analyze delinquent contracts, and data required to do so have not been obtained or updated. Both the Air Force and the Navy have

some remedial actions planned to deal with the delinquency problem. GAO believes that, until the underlying systemic shortcomings in the requirements determination processes are corrected, the total annual budgets for aircraft will remain questionable.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Air Force should speed up the testing and validation of the WARS model as well as mission essentiality coding and use these tools in procuring spares and repair parts to fill war reserve material requirements.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 08/85

The Secretary of Defense should closely monitor the military services' actions to overcome systemic shortcomings with their requirements determination process to ensure proper resolution of the reported problems.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 11/84

The Secretary of Defense should require the Secretary of the Air Force to make limited tests of the feasibility of generically coding aircraft items, based on the material trends identified in the Joint Aeronautical Material Activity reports, to identify the causes of lengthening leadtimes. Based on the test results, if it is determined that shortages of certain critical materials, components, or manufacturing processes are the causes of lengthening leadtimes, the Secretary of Defense should pursue alternatives for resolving problems.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 11/84

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

MATERIAL MANAGEMENT

The Navy Can Reduce Its Stated Requirements for F/A-18 Weapons Tactics Trainers (NSIAD-84-84, 4-11-84)

Departments of Defense and the Navy

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

GAO reviewed the Navy's requirements for the F/A-18 weapon tactics trainers (WTT's).

Findings/Conclusions

GAO interviewed program officials at several training sites to determine how requirements for WTT's were established and the extent to which the Navy has supported and documented them. GAO believes that Navy planning documents show that WTT requirements at the sites are not adequately justified. GAO found that the Navy's projected demand for the trainer does not reflect changes that would reduce WTT requirements or reduce planned

costs by an estimated \$110 million. GAO also found that the demand for the use of WTT's will be less than currently projected and concluded that additional units are unnecessary. GAO suggested management initiatives that could accommodate peaks in WTT use.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Navy should reexamine the need for more than two each WTT's at Lemoore and Cecil Fields.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency does not plan to start action until the fiscal year 1986 budget cycle.*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

MILITARY MANPOWER

Improvements Needed in Army's Determination of Manpower Requirements for Support and Administrative Functions

(FPCD-79-32, 5-21-79)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: A.R. 5-4.

Background

Army manpower survey teams make onsite appraisals and recommend the number of people needed for support and administrative functions at Army installations. The recommendations of the survey team are also the basis for the garrison staffing guide, which provides criteria for subsequent surveys. The surveys, although useful for some installation and major command management decisions, are not coordinated with the major manpower activities of planning, programming, and budgeting; of allocating human resources to installations and work centers; and of evaluating manpower use. Consequently, the Army supports its garrison budget by adjusting prior year budgets. However, the Army cannot quantify the effect of not receiving the personnel which survey teams say are needed for garrison work and cannot accurately predict manpower needs.

Findings/Conclusions

In order to improve its justifications for budget requests, the Army needs to overcome various problems. The Army's manpower survey program is not designed to provide input to the budget. Since the survey teams determine garrison needs by organizational element, and the Army budgets by activity, the survey team recommendations cannot be summarized into the activity used for budgeting. Survey team recommendations have exceeded congressional authorizations; in fiscal year 1978 the shortage was 20 percent. Survey teams and work measurement staff make recommendations without regard to the source of labor, even though garrison labor is funded by four appropriations and can be managed under about

nine different programs. Installation commanders have been given a great deal of flexibility in distributing available resources, organizing activities, and using other labor sources, but this decentralized management contributes to a number of problems. Commands have been directed to develop work measurement standards for total programs or missions, but the Army headquarters has not provided the top level management direction on selecting the appropriate technique, how to relate work center requirements to program changes in the budget, how to develop standards to compare similar activities, the extent methods studies should be conducted to improve and standardize operations before setting standards, and collecting reliable labor and workload data.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should require the Army to use experienced personnel to design a manpower management system with the following characteristics: (1) an organizational structure that combines the manpower-related responsibilities and staffing into one organization at all levels; (2) a methodology for determining manpower needs based on work measurement where it is feasible and cost effective; (3) a management information system which uses a common data base for work center needs, garrison costs, budget requests, allocations, and evaluations of manpower use; and (4) a determination of the spaces needed to implement the system and an allocation of these manpower resources to the program.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 07/86

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

MILITARY MANPOWER

Army Can Better Use Its Soldiers Trained in Critical Shortage Occupations (NSIAD-84-17, 3-20-84)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: A.R. 600-200. DOD Directive 1304.22.

Background

GAO reviewed manpower utilization in the Army to determine: (1) the extent to which soldiers trained in critical shortage occupations are working in areas outside of their occupations; (2) why these soldiers are doing so; and (3) whether opportunities exist to reduce such utilization practices.

Findings/Conclusions

At the installations visited, GAO found that from 13 to 25 percent of the soldiers were performing tasks outside of their prime skill areas. This included personnel who had received cash bonuses for being trained in shortage occupations. Circumstances leading to this situation included: (1) the assignment of soldiers with skills for which installations had no authorization or for which they had more soldiers than were authorized or needed; (2) delays in processing security clearances for soldiers with intelligence specialties; and (3) mismatches between equipment and personnel. In addition, GAO found that local commanders chose to use personnel in areas outside of their occupations because they: (1) considered other tasks more important; (2) believed that it was not necessary for soldiers to work full time in their occupations to maintain their skills; and (3) needed personnel to do garrison work for which no personnel were authorized. Such practices are possible because the Army has not identified Army-wide critical shortages or set an Army-wide policy for appropriate manpower utilization, and local commanders have broad discretionary authority with regard to manpower utilization.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Army should examine and resolve those assignment, security clearance, and equipment-related problems that cause some soldiers to work outside of their occupations.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should develop an Army-wide listing of critical shortage occupations and issue policy guidance to all commanders on the discretionary use of soldiers with such skills outside of their occupations.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should ensure compliance by commanders, within the limits of their discretionary authority, to Army policy requiring the utilization of bonus recipients in their prime occupations.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should examine whether additional Army-wide policy should be established to limit the discretionary authority of commanders to utilize noncommissioned officers in select critical shortage occupations for tasks outside of their prime occupations.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

MILITARY MANPOWER

Confusion Over Validity and Effects of Purported Petty Officer Shortage (NSIAD-84-30, 6-27-84)

Departments of Defense and the Navy

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: NAVPERS 18068D. OPNAVINST 1000.16E.

Background

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the validity and effects of a purported shortage of petty officers in the Navy, focusing on: (1) the Navy's longstanding claim of a shortage; and (2) Navy plans to increase the number of petty officers.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that: (1) the Navy determined that a shortage of petty officers existed because it had more lower grade enlisted personnel and fewer petty officers than it believed it needed; and (2) confusion was generated because the Navy failed to clearly define the shortage before congressional hearings. In addition, GAO found that: (1) the Navy's determinations of its manpower needs are not derived from objective measures; (2) the purported shortage has no effect on combat readiness or mission capability; (3) plans to increase the number of petty officers

would be costly; and (4) the benefits of such an increase are not known.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Navy should develop and issue written guidelines for the enlisted programmed authorizations (EPA). At a minimum, the guidelines should explain what EPA is, how it is developed and revised, its uses, and its limitations.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet informed GAO of its intentions.*

The Secretary of the Navy should clearly identify the sources of all data used in calculations of enlisted personnel needs, authorizations, and shortages in all presentations of manpower and personnel issues to Congress.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet informed GAO of its intentions.*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

MISSION ANALYSIS

Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations (NSIAD-84-13, 11-7-83)

Departments of Defense and the Air Force, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-568). Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.

Background

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided its assessment of joint National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and Department of Defense (DOD) participation in space shuttle operations and Air Force activities concerned with developing and acquiring a dedicated DOD shuttle operations control facility.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that, with the advent of the space shuttle, a trend has developed toward increasingly integrated NASA/DOD space operations. However, this relationship is complicated by the agencies' differing missions and objectives. This is particularly true with respect to DOD requirements for classified operations. A large portion of the cost burden for many military shuttle requirements is being borne by NASA, and extensive, long-term NASA support to DOD will be required for launch and landing operations, tracking and data acquisition services, and backup to DOD mission control systems. While NASA support to DOD is growing, the civilian program's future direction is not clear because the organization of future shuttle operations is undecided, and overall civilian space goals are still

being defined. With the assistance of NASA, DOD is developing a shuttle operations and planning complex to be used solely for military missions. The complex would be equipped with the higher levels of security needed for such missions and would provide direct and exclusive military control of shuttle flight operations. However, GAO found that the development costs and system design options being considered for the complex could reduce the mission effectiveness of DOD.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Administrator of NASA, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, should assist Congress by expediting efforts to define how a fully operational shuttle program will be managed and controlled in the future. Such a definition should include: (1) agency roles and responsibilities; (2) performance criteria for the shuttle system which clearly define both the defense and civil capabilities and interoperability requirements; and (3) alternatives for providing backup capability for the DOD space program.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

MISSION ANALYSIS

How Well Do the Military Services Perform Jointly in Combat? DOD Joint Test-and-Evaluation Program Provides Few Credible Answers
(PEMD-84-3, 2-22-84)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984 (P.L. 98-94). DOD Directive 5000.3.

Background

In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) joint test-and-evaluation (JT&E) program, which was established in 1971, to determine how well the military services can perform their missions and roles in joint operations under combat conditions.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the office responsible for the joint testing and evaluation of DOD weapon systems has been dependent on organizations with vested interests in JT&E results. Joint tests have been managed, carried out, and partially funded by the individual services, which have vested interests in the results. It is not yet clear how new legislation will affect the organization of the program or alter JT&E dependence on the services for resources and capabilities. Most of the JT&E's that have been completed were requested by organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense while the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services have been infrequent requesters of joint tests. In the three JT&E's which GAO analyzed in depth, it found that: (1) factors important to judging operational effectiveness were omitted; (2) the validity of the test data could seriously be questioned; (3) the data were often not qualified with respect to the tests constraints; (4) conclusions and recommendations were not always supported

by test results; (5) the reports did not always address the concerns of the requesters; and (6) the requesters made little use of the tests. GAO believed that the reasons for the flaws of the joint tests could lie in the organizational structure of the program including: its organizational placement; its limited staff size; failure to chose staff members for their testing expertise; its limited budget; its dependence on the services for resources; and the absence of a strategic plan that sets priorities.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should, if he determines that DOD needs the JT&E program, take the further steps that are necessary to: (1) ensure that priorities are established for conducting JT&E programs; (2) endow the JT&E program with enough independence, permanence of expert staff, and control of resources to allow the program to conduct and report on joint tests and evaluations that are high in quality and provide relevant information to their requesters and other users; and (3) require the JT&E program director to develop routine procedures that will ensure that thorough records of test data, test results, and their use are maintained.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

MISSION ANALYSIS

Department of the Army's Program To Modify 155-mm. M109 Self-Propelled Howitzers to an M109A5 Configuration

(NSIAD-84-60, 3-26-84)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

GAO reviewed the Army's program for modifying some of its self-propelled howitzers, a program estimated to cost \$1.5 billion.

Findings/Conclusions

The Army has deferred approving the full-scale development of the improved howitzers because a cost and operational effectiveness analysis is still in progress, more definitive information on the number of howitzers that should be modified is needed, and the cost estimate needs to be updated. GAO believes that the Army exercised exemplary caution in withholding its approval considering the program uncertainties. The Army has consistently shown its concern about the program's affordability when it rejected several costly alternative modification programs. GAO found that the Army has a program to procure new armored ammunition supply vehicles which would replenish the howitzer's supply of ammunition. The Army's current ammunition supply vehicle is unarmored and affords little protection to the crew or equipment. However, the Army plans to procure only enough armored ammunition supply vehicles to supply half of the howitzers which would be developed. The benefits resulting from improvements to the howitzers may be offset by the fact that the majority of the howitzers will continue to operate with an ammunition supply vehicle which lacks adequate protection. In addition, GAO believes that more information is needed on the operational availability during wartime of the cannon and the effect of the proposed added weight on the howitzer's mobility.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army, during full-scale development, to perform an analysis that would determine whether it is cost effective to modify the number of M109 howitzers that will continue to operate alongside the vulnerable M548 ammunition supply vehicles.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 06/85

If it is not cost effective to modify the number of howitzers that will continue to operate alongside the vulnerable ammunition supply vehicles, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army, during full-scale development, to consider the option of modifying a lesser number of howitzers than the 1,500 now in the program and apply the savings toward the procurement of additional, more survivable, M992 vehicles, if affordability considerations continue to limit the funds available for both programs.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 06/85

If the decision is to continue into full-scale development, before contracting for modification of a large number of howitzers, the Secretary of the Army should ensure that the tests in the next acquisition phase adequately demonstrate that the selected cannon replacement will achieve the Army's availability goal and that the added weight resulting from the modifications will not materially degrade the howitzer's mobility.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 06/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

MISSION BUDGETING

The Defense Budget: A Look at Budgetary Resources, Accomplishments, and Problems
(PLRD-83-62, 4-27-83)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: P.L. 95-79.

Background

GAO reviewed the Department of Defense (DOD) budget to determine how it is planned and how resources are expended.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the growth of the defense budget continues at an unprecedented pace. The amount of money appropriated for fiscal year 1983 is 69 percent larger than the 1980 defense budget. GAO believes that the services are generally spending as they planned but that the budget can be improved by building in more accountability. GAO also found that some problems identified last year remain unresolved.

Recommendations to Congress

Congress should require DOD to develop a method of linking anticipated improvements in military capability to increased levels of funding.

Status: Action in process.

Congress should consider requiring the Office of Management and Budget to submit a special analysis of the DOD requirement using the link indicators as a basis for the analysis.

Status: Action not yet initiated.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

MISSION BUDGETING

Reductions in U.S. Costs To Station Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom Are Unlikely

(NSIAD-84-130, 7-31-84)

Departments of Defense and State

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974. Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975. Military Construction Appropriation Act, 1981. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1981 (P.L. 96-342). NATO Status of Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67.

Background

GAO reported on the prospects for reducing the costs to the government of stationing U.S. troops in Germany and the United Kingdom.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the United States maintains over 350,000 troops in support of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitments, and many more are stationed in the United States as NATO reinforcements. The Department of Defense (DOD) estimated that \$122.3 billion, or 56 percent of the fiscal year (FY) 1982 defense budget, was associated with the U.S. commitment to NATO. Approximately 80 percent of the U.S. troops stationed in Europe at the end of FY 1982 were stationed in Germany and the United Kingdom. The United States is currently working with Germany on two cost-sharing initiatives, wartime host-nation support and the master restationing plan. Under the host-nation support initiative, Germany will commit 93,000 reservists as military support for U.S. forces in such areas as rear area security, airfield security, and medical decontamination during times of crisis or war. The objectives of the restationing plan are to improve

troops' living and working conditions, accommodate modernization, and relocate to more tactically sound positions. Both host-nation support and restationing will substantially increase allied defense capabilities, but they will also increase U.S. costs. The United Kingdom shares substantially in the common defense burden of NATO and contributes to offset the cost of stationing U.S. forces within its boundaries. However, recent efforts to obtain additional cost sharing from the United Kingdom have had limited results.

Recommendations to Congress

Congress may want to consider the need for more detailed information from DOD concerning: (1) the costs of stationing U.S. forces in Europe and maintaining reinforcements in the United States, as well as alternative strategies for meeting the U.S. commitment to NATO; and (2) direct and indirect contributions by other NATO allies which would reduce U.S. stationing costs or the need for deploying U.S. forces in Europe.

Status: Action in process.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

PREPAREDNESS

Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel in Case of War?

(HRD-81-67, 6-24-81)

Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Selective Service System

Budget Function: Health: Health Care Services (551.0)

Legislative Authority: P.L. 96-342. 42 U.S.C. 215. 42 U.S.C. 217.

Background

The military services medical departments have two missions: (1) to provide peacetime care to eligible beneficiaries, and (2) to maintain readiness to meet wartime contingencies. Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the extent to which wartime military medical personnel shortages exist, what was being done or could be done to overcome the shortages, and how well available personnel were trained for wartime missions.

Findings/Conclusions

An analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data shows that the number and types of medical personnel in the active duty and reserve forces fall far short of the total projected personnel requirements for the current, most demanding wartime scenarios. DOD projections show that shortages of physicians, nurses, and enlisted medical personnel would be most severe, reduce capacity to deliver wartime care, and begin to occur soon after mobilization. Shortages of surgical personnel would be especially critical. Some other enlisted specialty shortages would also be critical because no pretrained pool exists in the civilian sector. To plan effectively for wartime contingencies, DOD planners need data not only on total medical personnel requirements, but also on what portion of those requirements DOD can actually use in its own military hospitals. It has made little progress toward implementing plans and initiatives to increase its capabilities in these personnel shortage areas. DOD medical readiness planning has focused on long-range goals and objectives to address anticipated changes in threat, personnel, and other factors in future years. Federal mobilization planners believe that the civilian sector has enough medical personnel to augment most military mobilization needs. Selective Service System planners have not determined the rate at which medical personnel could be brought into the military if mobilization occurred. Other alternatives are available to DOD in planning to overcome shortages of medical personnel after mobilization.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should make prearrangements for interservice assignments.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should obtain advance agreements with civilian medical personnel to fill key hospital shortages.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should make arrangements to use those PHS officers the Secretary of HHS determines could be committed to DOD.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should require the Army to provide needed clinical skills training programs to field personnel on loan to hospitals.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the services to periodically report their requirements estimates to DOD medical mobilization planners for developing overall medical mobilization plans.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should identify and implement specific initiatives to recruit and retain nurses while continuing its initiatives to recruit and retain physicians.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should require the Army to establish firm criteria for the frequency and duration of in-hospital training to be given to field unit personnel.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the services to develop a consistent and systematic method to estimate the rate at which reserve medical personnel can be expected to report for duty after mobilization.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should require the Army to increase in-hospital training programs for field unit personnel located within short distances of military hospitals.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the services to develop consistent estimates of near-term medical personnel requirements based on total needs and needs as constrained by available military facilities. The estimates of constrained personnel requirements should be developed together with complete assessments of the availability of other medical resources, such as hospital beds, equipment, and logistic support.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should develop specific plans to meet the early postmobilization requirements of DOD for (1) surgeons and other surgical personnel in-theater; and (2) medical personnel in military-unique specialties.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should require the Army to structure in-hospital training programs to provide exposure to the full range of needed skills.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should plan for near term contingencies by evaluating alternatives for overcoming post-mobilization medical personnel shortages which would occur before Selective Service inductees report and are trained for military duty.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should require the Army to develop a system for monitoring both clinical and combat related training to insure that they are given a high priority and are effectively accomplished.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should require the Army to provide guidance to unit and hospital commanders giving increased priority to medical readiness training.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should ascertain the extent to which courses, such as the recently developed triservice Combat Casualty Care Course, should be expanded to provide training to medical personnel not now eligible and assure that such training is provided to all appropriate categories of military medical personnel.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should evaluate the applicability of the GAO recommendations regarding the Army's medical personnel training programs to the programs of the other services and, where appropriate, assure that the other services take steps to implement them.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Selective Service System should jointly develop provisions to be included in a standby legislative proposal for a postmobilization draft of medical personnel.

Target: Department of Defense

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

Target: Selective Service System

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of HHS should ascertain the extent to which (1) civilian medical personnel will be required and available in the civilian sector during mobilization; and (2) DOD can rely on civilian medical personnel as it plans its mobilization efforts.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

PREPAREDNESS

Problems in Alerting and Preparing Army Reservists for Mobilization (NSIAD-84-52, 2-27-84)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)
Legislative Authority: Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940.

Background

GAO conducted a review to determine whether the notification system which the Army uses to notify its reservists of mobilization is adequate and whether reservists are provided information to help put their personal affairs in order before reporting for duty.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that, because of deficiencies in the Army's alert rosters, approximately 22 percent of Army Guard and Reserve personnel with early mobilization schedules may not be notified and assembled promptly. Units that are experiencing personnel shortages will be even more seriously hampered in accomplishing their mission if some members do not report for duty on time. Unit training and management could be affected because some who may not be contacted are noncommissioned officers. About 7 percent of the noncommissioned officers at the units GAO visited may not be contacted due to alert roster inaccuracies. In addition, GAO found that Army Guard and Reserve units were not using annual tests of their alert procedures to verify their alert rosters, and some units did not conduct their annual tests in accordance with established Army regulations. Finally, GAO found that many reservists had not received required annual briefings and other written materials concerning personal readiness forms. Moreover, the Army did not follow up to ensure that personal readiness information was provided to members who had not received it.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Army should ensure that appropriate emphasis is given to maintaining accurate alert rosters and require periodic feedback on progress made in keeping alert rosters accurate.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should revise the unit commander's handbook to state that testing of alert roster procedures should be conducted annually and be used to update and correct information on the alert roster.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should ensure that commanders comply with applicable directives requiring units to provide annual briefings and other written information on personal readiness to their unit members.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should develop follow-up procedures to ensure that members absent from briefings are afforded make-up sessions.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should require periodic feedback from command reviews on how well units are helping reservists get their personal affairs in order.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

PREPAREDNESS

Ensuring Retention of Essential Civilians Overseas During Hostilities (NSIAD-84-73, 3-14-84)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

GAO conducted a study to determine: (1) whether the military services were reasonably sure that contractor and Department of Defense (DOD) civilian support personnel would be available when needed overseas in the event of an outbreak of war; and (2) what actions might be taken to ensure continuity of essential functions during mobilization and conflict.

Findings/Conclusions

Recent studies have estimated that as many as 6,000 overseas U.S. civilian and contractor personnel are essential to maintain weapons systems and military equipment. There is reason for concern that some essential employees would choose not to stay at their jobs if they thought that conditions were excessively dangerous. Within the projected group of essential civilians, there is a smaller subset of critically needed civilians whose loss could be debilitating. DOD officials have suggested several alternatives to address the situation, including: (1) requiring civilians to remain at their posts under penalty of criminal sanctions; (2) expanding jurisdiction under the Uniform Code of Military Justice to cover civilians in situations not involving a declaration of war; (3) requiring military reserve status for civilians in essential positions; (4) requiring agreement to accept officer status upon mobilization; (5) requiring written agreements from civilians performing essential functions; and (6) requiring contract provisions aimed at ensuring retention of essential contractor personnel. However, progress in defining the extent and significance of the problem and in improving the situation

has been slow. DOD has recently issued draft policy guidance intended to ensure retention of essential civilians which calls for the use of written agreements and contract provisions for danger pay and evacuation of dependents. However, there has been some doubt about the effectiveness of such an approach because only administrative sanctions could be imposed on violators.

Recommendations to Agencies

DOD should expand its current policy proposals to include more specific guidance on what constitutes an essential civilian.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

DOD should expand its current policy proposals to include the identification of the subset of very critical civilian positions.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

DOD should expand its current policy proposals to include the tailoring of policy alternatives, based on the essentiality of individual positions, to provide an acceptable level of assurance that both critical and essential civilians will remain at their posts, focusing first on those whose loss would have the most severe impact on combat missions.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

PREPAREDNESS

The Army Needs To Better Plan To Meet Its Civilian Personnel Needs in Wartime
(NSIAD-84-107, 6-28-84)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: A.R. 690-11. DOD Directive 1200.7.

Background

GAO reviewed the Army's plans to meet its civilian personnel requirements in the event of mobilization. The Army would rely heavily on its civilian workforce as a key support base involved in mobilizing, training, deploying, and sustaining tactical forces.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that: (1) improved planning is needed for civilian personnel expansion requirements; (2) guidance on identifying key civilian employees lacks specificity; (3) additional guidance on replacing military retirees and draft eligibles is needed; and (4) guidance on planning for contractors' mobilization personnel requirements is needed. The Army estimates that the Continental United States (CONUS) support base will need an additional 175,000 civilian employees to accomplish this mission.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Army should monitor the actions required of the CONUS support base organizations in planning for the expansion of the civilian work force and re-

quire the preparation and implementation of action plans, as appropriate.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should develop a clear definition of the term "key employee" for use by installations in identifying civilians having key defense positions who are Ready Reservists.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 06/85

The Secretary of the Army should follow up to ensure that key employees are removed from the Ready Reserve or transferred to a non-key position.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should develop specific mobilization guidance on: (1) replacing peacetime civilian employees who are military retirees or draft eligibles; and (2) planning for the acquisition of additional and replacement contractor personnel to support expanding Army installations.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 09/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

SUPPLY MANAGEMENT

The Army Should Increase Its Efforts To Provide Government-Furnished Material to Contractors

(LCD-80-94, 8-11-80)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: DOD Instruction 4140.41. DARCOM Reg. 700-42.

Background

GAO reviewed operations at the five Army commands which function as inventory control points. Four of the five Army inventory control points are not doing enough to use the material in their long supply inventories as government-furnished material on major end-item contracts. Often, onhand quantities of secondary items, including parts, components, and assemblies, exceed the estimated amount of material needed to support U.S. and allied forces during peacetime and from the beginning of a war until industry can produce the material at a rate equal to expected wartime usage. This material is classified as being in long supply and, to the extent it does not exceed authorized retention levels, is retained for possible future use. Department of Defense regulations require that this material be screened and furnished, when practicable, as government-furnished material to contractors for use on major systems and equipment production contracts, thereby reducing the amounts paid to contractors. This should be done whenever substantial net savings are attainable with acceptable risks. Each of the five Army control points are required to implement these procedures and have substantial amounts of long supply material on hand which have potential use as government-furnished material. Only one control point had instituted a required screening procedure to ensure that material was provided to contractors when practicable. They had devised a computer program for use with each impending end-item procurement, which produces a list of long supply items which are part of the end items to be procured. Contractor representatives inspect and approve the material to avoid the problem of the contractor not being satisfied

with the quality or condition of the government-furnished material.

Findings/Conclusions

Officials, interviewed at the four commands which do not implement a screening procedure for long supply material as required, felt that the current potential for using long supply material as government-furnished material was limited and the results of such procedures, if implemented, would not justify their efforts. They did not have a computer software program to identify items in long supply which might be used in end item contracts. They felt that the manual performance of this identification process would be too time consuming to be practical and advanced other reasons for not attempting to institute the screening procedure, all of which GAO found to be unacceptable reasons for not implementing the required procedures. By not screening long supply inventories for possible use as government-furnished material on production contracts, these control points may be losing the opportunity to achieve significant savings or may lose such opportunities in the future. Such screening has been used by one Army control point with beneficial results. DARCOM officials have not adequately exercised their oversight responsibility to ensure compliance with this policy.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Army should: (1) establish reasonable time frames for DARCOM to develop and implement the procedures; and (2) monitor the progress of DARCOM to avoid further delay.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 04/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

SUPPLY MANAGEMENT

Better Methods for Validating and Reconciling Unfilled Materiel Orders Could Provide Substantial Economies to the Army

(PLRD-82-76, 6-2-82)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: P.L. 96-226. DOD Reg. 4140.17M. A.R. 725-50. A.R. 710-2. Army Technical Manual 38-L22-15-2. Army Technical Manual 38-L03-19.

Background

GAO made this followup review to assess the effectiveness of actions taken by the Army to strengthen its policies, procedures, and practices for periodically validating and reconciling older, outstanding material orders.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the Army continues to spend millions of dollars annually on unneeded materiel. GAO estimated that, on the basis of its sampling test, 65,000 invalid orders were on hand at Army wholesale supply sources, and the Army will spend \$100 million over a 3-year period to fill invalid orders to fund inflated forecasted requirements for the related items. Invalid orders revealed to GAO validation checks included orders for parts to repair inoperable equipment which did not exist or had already been repaired, orders for the wrong item, duplicate orders, and orders for materiel for special projects that had been terminated. Additionally, GAO found that the Army procedures and practices for reconciling and validating materiel orders have not been effective in ensuring that an acceptable level of compatibility is sustained for related materiel order data shown on supply records kept at wholesale and retail supply levels. Significant imbalances of as much as 53 percent exist between the records of Army wholesalers and their customers relative to either the number of outstanding orders or the quantities on order. The Army problems in reconciling and validating older, outstanding materiel orders continue because prescribed policies and procedures are either inadequate or not being observed and because of inadequacies in automated logistics and systems.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Army to establish and include in all pertinent Army regulations and technical manuals a uniform definition of materiel order validation and detailed guidance for conducting indepth validation checks. The Secretary should also require Army commands to establish and implement at the divisional and nondivisional user levels standard operating procedures for performing materiel order validation checks.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Army to revise existing and proposed policy and procedures to expand time allowed for materiel validation checks and to restrict such checks to outstanding materiel orders meeting the Department of Defense's age criteria for validation.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Army to strengthen existing and proposed procedures and controls by requiring that customer validation responses of continuing need for ordered materiel be subjected to independent sampling accuracy checks and authenticated in writing by a higher command level.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Army to strengthen provisions of the proposed standard procedures applicable to cancellation of orders repeatedly not validated by customers, by requiring that the customers be notified in writing at the start of a validation cycle that their validation responses will be subject to independent sampling checks and that orders not validated will be canceled.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Army to establish, as a part of the proposed standard Army validation and reconciliation procedures, an information system which will enable local management and higher command levels to evaluate and monitor the effectiveness of customer performance in validating materiel orders.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to strengthen prescribed procedures by requiring that underlying causes of significant materiel order reconciliation discrepancies be investigated and corrected.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

SUPPLY MANAGEMENT

Improvements Needed in DOD System for Controlling Material Shipments to DLA Depots and Customers (PLRD-82-81, 6-10-82)

Department of Defense and Defense Logistics Agency

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) practices and procedures for controlling material shipments to Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) depots and shipments from DLA distribution activities and vendors to military customers. GAO was primarily interested in whether: (1) DOD customers were receiving proper shipments of requisitioned material; and (2) the government received what it paid for when fast payment procedures were used.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that policies and procedures followed at some supply centers do not ensure the receipt of materials requisitioned by the military services from DLA and those purchased by DLA from vendors and contractors. This condition has resulted in instances where: (1) the government was not receiving material for which it had paid and had forfeited its recovery rights; (2) customers were being charged for material they did not receive; and (3) overdue material shipments costing millions of dollars were either

written off as inventory losses or remained on the books as items due in for a considerable period of time.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should require the Director of DLA to emphasize the importance of controlling material shipments and ensuring that the government receives what it pays for by: (1) strengthening processing controls; and (2) following up on reported deficiencies and assessing problem areas.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 07/85

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to emphasize to the DLA military customers the need to consistently follow established procedures for identifying, processing, and reporting shipping discrepancies, including container material shortages and overdue shipments.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 07/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

SUPPLY MANAGEMENT

The Navy Should Improve Its Management of Defective Government-Furnished Materials (PLRD-82-115, 9-2-82)

Department of the Navy

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: DOD Directive 4155.1.

Background

GAO reviewed the Navy's practice of providing government-furnished material (GFM) to contractors for use in the construction, overhaul, and repair of its ships, airplanes, and missiles.

Findings/Conclusions

The Navy spends millions of dollars each year to repair or replace materials which are found to be defective after contractors receive them. However, neither GAO nor the Navy know how much is being spent to replace or repair defective GFM because the reporting systems which the Navy has established to identify these costs are not working. The Navy's failure to identify the magnitude of defective GFM and its associated costs for replacement or repair has precluded management from having the oversight needed to take effective action to correct the problems. The Navy has no central point of control or accountability over defective GFM. Instead, Navy management is fragmented among the various commands which develop their own reporting systems. Such systems are not monitored to ensure consistency and needed interface. All of the systems reviewed were experiencing problems with underreporting of defective GFM and the submission of inaccurate data in their quality deficiency reporting (QDR) system reports. The data developed, which indicated vendors who habitually provided defective items, were not being used effectively to encourage those vendors to correct the deficiencies or to avert additional purchasing from the vendors. In addition, the Navy was not

taking action to make the vendors financially responsible for the poor quality of products provided as GFM.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Navy should direct the systems commands and other applicable organizations to develop a system for maintaining overall financial and logistical data that will provide the management visibility needed to identify the nature and magnitude of the problems with defective GFM.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 10/85

The Secretary of the Navy should direct the systems commands and other applicable organizations to ensure the consistency and compatibility of the various Navy QDR systems with each other and with other DOD components.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 10/85

The Secretary of the Navy should direct the systems commands and other applicable organizations to use the data developed by QDR systems to hold vendors accountable, either by having them take corrective action or by preventing future purchasing from them. Alternative sources should be developed if a sole-source vendor does not improve the quality of its products.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 10/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

SUPPLY MANAGEMENT

Continued Improvements Needed in Air Force Procedures and Practices (PLRD-83-36, 2-7-83)

Departments of Defense and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

GAO completed a followup review of the effectiveness of actions taken by the Air Force to improve its procedures and practices for identifying and canceling excess on-order stocks of system support stock fund items.

Findings/Conclusions

In response to an earlier GAO report, the Air Force made a policy change which increased the potential for canceling excess on-order stocks by \$39 million or more. A followup review showed that the Air Force can further correct identified weaknesses and increase its potential for cancellation of such stocks by \$58 million or more. In computing requirements and termination levels for on-order stocks, the Air Force is still using excessive buffers of stock above item requirements. This practice precludes timely identification and cancellation of on-order stocks which exceed requirements. In addition, GAO found that the Air Force still does not have an effective system to monitor the performance of air logistics centers in canceling excess on-order stocks. The Air Force could further increase its dollar potential for canceling excess on-order

stocks by excluding unfunded war reserve requirements from computation of termination levels for on-order stocks. Improvements in Air Force procedures and practices for maximum reduction of on-order stock excesses are especially appropriate now because of current and anticipated shortfalls in the Air Force's fiscal year 1982 and 1983 stock fund obligational authority.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Commander of the Air Force Logistics Command to revise its on-order stock termination policy and D062 requirement computation system for system support stock fund items to provide for: (1) a 3-month reduction in the on-order stock termination level buffer for items with annual dollar demands of more than \$500; (2) elimination of the 12-month stock buffer used to compute termination levels for items with annual dollar demands of \$500 or less; and (3) elimination of the use of unfunded war reserve requirements in computing on-order termination levels for all items.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 09/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

SUPPLY MANAGEMENT

Air Force Uses Inaccurate Production Leadtime To Compute Spare Parts Requirements (PLRD-83-85, 6-16-83)

Department of the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: A.F. Logistics Command Reg. 84-4.

Background

GAO analyzed a random sample of items being managed at two Air Force logistics centers to determine whether the Air Force is using current and accurate production leadtimes to compute requirements for consumable items and whether long leadtimes can be reduced.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the two logistics centers have overstated their requirements for many consumable parts by an estimated \$137.5 million and have understated requirements for others by about \$12 million. In addition, they were unnecessarily stocking an estimated \$16.7 million worth of parts with annual holding costs of \$2.9 million. GAO believes that the primary reason for invalid requirements determinations are the use of outdated leadtime data in computing the requirements. The centers are not using up-to-date leadtimes because: (1) regulations do not require them to periodically obtain timely leadtime data from contractors; and (2) management practices encourage the use of long leadtimes as a buffer to avoid shortages. Although the centers recognize that long leadtimes can result in additional inventory investment and readiness problems, only limited efforts have been made to reduce leadtimes. Furthermore, GAO found that several contractors provided the Air Force with inaccurate data by: (1) including in their proposed leadtimes inappropriate standards and contingency factors; and (2) not recognizing that many raw materials were already on hand or on order. GAO does not believe that the Air Force has made sufficient use of government representatives who are familiar with contractor operations and conditions which affect production leadtimes.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Commander of the Air Force Logistics Center to implement improved procedures and controls to ensure that appropriate production leadtimes are maintained at the air logistics centers. Such procedures and controls should ensure that center personnel limit the use of historical data to forecast leadtimes for items when current updates cannot be obtained from contractors.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Commander of the Air Force Logistics Center to implement improved procedures and controls to ensure that appropriate production leadtimes are maintained at the air logistics centers. Such procedures and controls should ensure that center personnel stress the importance of up-to-date and accurate leadtimes and monitor logistics center progress in correcting outdated and inaccurate data.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Commander of the Air Force Logistics Center to implement improved procedures and controls to ensure that appropriate production leadtimes are maintained at the air logistics centers. Such procedures and controls should ensure that center personnel frequently and periodically obtain and use leadtime updates from contractors on items with long production leadtimes and high annual demands.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Commander of the Air Force Logistics Center to require the air logistics centers to work more closely with contractors to identify and resolve conditions such as contingency factors and administrative leadtime standards that result in excessive leadtimes' being used in requirements computations.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Commander of the Air Force Logistics Center to require the air logistics centers to coordinate with Air Force plant representatives and Defense Contract Administration Services Management area offices in working with contractors to reduce long production leadtimes in the requirements computation when possible.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Commander of the Air Force Logistics Center to require the air logistics centers to accept advance deliveries only when advantageous to the Air Force.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

SUPPLY MANAGEMENT

The Air Force Equipment Management System Still Does Not Assure Control of Nonexpendable Equipment (NSIAD-83-20, 7-28-83)

Departments of Defense and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

GAO reviewed how the Air Force Equipment Management System (AFEMS) accounts for nonexpendable equipment valued at over \$15 billion.

Findings/Conclusions

Substantial amounts of proposed equipment purchases in the Air Force budget depend on AFEMS accuracy. To determine net requirements for its budget, the Air Force identifies gross requirements and subtracts equipment on hand. However, problems in accounting for that equipment hinder the Air Force's ability to accurately compute quantities of equipment to include in its budget. GAO concluded that, although the Air Force modernized the AFEMS and tried to establish inventory baseline data for all assets, system weaknesses still limit assurances that requirements are based on accurate and complete information. Based on its review, GAO suggested that the Air Force may need to reconcile data and establish baselines for one equipment category at a time.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Air Force should bring to bear the necessary management attention and resources to reestablish control over Air Force equipment on hand to help ensure accurate computation of future equipment requirements.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 09/85

The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Air Force Logistics Command to establish system controls to reconcile equipment inventories from one period to the next and to report variances.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 09/85

The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Air Force Logistics Command to validate field-reported data through use of control files.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 09/85

The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Air Force Logistics Command to provide guidance and procedures to item managers for accounting for equipment under the new automated system; as a minimum, the guidance should identify the documents needed for manual reconciliations, define acceptance levels of accuracy, and prescribe how variances should be corrected.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 09/85

The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Air Force Logistics Command and the major commands to improve the accuracy of data reported to AFEMS by analyzing and correcting variances in specific problem areas, such as intransit equipment, onboard aircraft equipment, condemned equipment, and equipment procured outside of the Command.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 09/85

The Secretary of the Air Force should restate Air Force policy on the need for, and frequency of, physical inventories and should direct that base commanders perform physical inventories and make timely adjustments to reported data.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 09/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

SUPPLY MANAGEMENT

Navy's Progress in Improving Physical Inventory Controls and the Magnitude, Causes, and Impact of Inventory Record Inaccuracies in the Army, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency (NSIAD-84-9, 11-4-83)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the Navy's progress in improving physical inventory controls; (2) the magnitude, causes, and impact of physical inventory adjustments in the Army, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA); and (3) the adequacy of Department of Defense (DOD) policies, procedures, and efforts to improve physical inventory controls and inventory record accuracy.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the Navy is making good progress in executing a plan to improve physical inventory controls and security over supply system inventories, and it has completed an immediate action designed to establish accurate inventory record baseline data. GAO also found that the magnitude and impact of the inventory accuracy problem in the Army, Air Force, and DLA are much greater than previously recognized by DOD and its components. These inaccuracies frequently have an adverse impact on supply economies and degrade the readiness of military forces. DOD is in the process of implementing a DOD-wide physical inventory improvement plan that calls for a series of actions to be taken through fiscal year 1985 to identify needed improvements in policies, procedures, and standards for upgrading inventory record accuracy. GAO concluded that, although the plan is a positive step, more steps need to be taken to enhance the accuracy of inventory records.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should expand the frequency and scope of quality control checks of work processes affecting inventory record accuracy at both the depot and inventory management levels. At a minimum, expanded quality control programs should include weekly sampling checks of the quality of research efforts to identify and correct recurring error causes, as well as the validity of reconciliations of major physical inventory differences and reversals of physical inventory adjustments. Also, it should be required that quality control results be reported to depot and inventory control point commanders and higher management levels and that a feedback system be established to ensure that problem areas repeatedly noted by quality checks are corrected promptly.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The Secretary of Defense should require inventory management levels to report the results of causative research of physical inventory adjustments to higher management levels and establish a feedback system to ensure that recurring error causes are being identified and corrected. Also, inventory management levels should be required to report results of causative research to affected depots and have the depots use the results to identify problem areas warranting expanded quality control coverage.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The Secretary of Defense should rescind the recent DOD policy changes that: (1) increase the timeframe for reversing physical inventory adjustments from 90 days to 1 year; and (2) increase the dollar criterion for researching physical inventory adjustments for pilferable items from over \$2,500 to over \$4,000.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Air Force to comply with the intent of the DOD policy by limiting preadjustment research to reconciliations of physical differences caused by recent unprocessed transactions that occurred immediately before or during the physical inventory control period.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The Secretary of Defense should require that reversals to physical inventory adjustments be viewed equally with physical inventory adjustments by DOD and its components in assessing overall inventory record accuracy performance.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The Secretary of Defense should require the inspector general and inventory control review teams in the services and DLA, as a part of their periodic annual inspections, to examine the quality of physical inventory performance, including the adequacy of efforts to identify and correct recurring error causes as well as the validity of reconciliations of physical inventory variances and reversals of physical inventory adjustments. The Secretary should also require more frequent and indepth service and DLA-wide

coverage of wholesale physical inventory controls and inventory record accuracy by internal audit organizations.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The Secretary of Defense should expand DOD plans to develop procedural requirements and techniques to relate impact of physical inventory adjustments on requirements determination and procurement to include identification of adjustments affecting mission essential items. The Secretary should also require that data on physical inventory adjustments affecting requirements, procurements, and mission essential items be reported to DOD and be included in the quarterly inventory control effectiveness report.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The Secretary of Defense, to improve physical inventory controls and inventory record accuracy, should adopt on a DOD-wide basis actions taken by the Navy to establish standard rewarehousing procedures that, at a minimum, will limit the amount of materiel movement to the lowest possible level, provide standard materiel movement controls to ensure that materiel location changes are reflected promptly on depot locator records, and require that either quality sampling checks or complete location surveys be made following rewarehousing projects to ensure that the new locations of rewarehoused materiel are reflected promptly and accurately on locator records.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

SUPPLY MANAGEMENT

Increased Joint Avionics Standardization Could Result in Major Economies and Operational Benefits (NSIAD-84-127, 7-10-84)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: Defense Cataloging and Standardization Act.

Background

GAO discussed the Department of Defense's efforts to standardize tactical avionics subsystems and provide support for these activities. Specifically, GAO reviewed progress toward standardization made by the Joint Services Review Committee (JSRC) for Avionics Components and Subsystems.

Findings/Conclusions

Standardization of avionics components could reduce life-cycle costs and enhance interchangeability, interoperability, and military force readiness. While most JSRC participants have expressed strong support for standardization, the JSRC program has been hindered by funding deficiencies and insufficient commitment to implement stated policies. Based on JSRC estimates, potential cost avoidance of \$770,000,000 could be realized by developing and procuring five subsystem candidates. Insufficient funding has been the result of conflicting priorities within the services. The military services anticipate that about 60 percent of the funds needed will be provided during the 1985-89 period. The projects' low visibility, ad hoc management, and their relatively small size have hampered their recognition by top management. In addition, organizations responsible for promoting equipment standards have neither the authority nor the resources to manage joint standard avionics programs.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct each of the service Secretaries to establish a management structure for standardization that includes a high-level sponsor accountable for supporting the JSRC programs through the budget process.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct each of the service Secretaries to determine whether funds for fiscal year 1984 and subsequent years should be reprogrammed to ensure that joint standard avionics systems sponsored by JSRC are developed and available when needed to meet candidate aircraft installation schedules.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct each of the service Secretaries to establish a dedicated budget line item for joint standard avionics programs.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

More Effective Use of Contract Airlift Could Reduce DOD Transportation Costs (PLRD-83-55, 4-22-83)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: DOD Directive 4500.9, 2 J.T.R. para. C2001-4.

Background

GAO reported on the Department of Defense's (DOD) use of aircraft under contract from commercial air carriers.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that DOD is losing millions of dollars annually because of empty seats on aircraft under contract from commercial carriers. The Military Airlift Command (MAC) spent \$228 million in fiscal year (FY) 1981 and about \$250 million in FY 1982 to airlift military and civilian personnel on contracted international flights. GAO found that a significant number of empty seats existed on these flights. There are two major reasons for these empty seats: (1) passengers did not show up for flights as scheduled; and (2) the services apparently did not generate the volume of passengers anticipated at the time their requirements were submitted to MAC. In FY 1981, the no-show rate was 13.5 percent. In FY 1982, the no-show rate climbed to 14.7 percent. GAO estimated that empty seats caused by no-shows cost \$13.5 million annually. This estimate of savings was reduced to give consideration to overbookings and passengers who walk in and actually use seats that were intended for use by no-shows. In addition, GAO estimated that underutilization of seating capacity for reasons other than no-shows cost DOD another \$13.0 million annually. At present, if authorizing orders are issued, military personnel have the option of buying tickets with their own funds with subsequent reimbursement not to exceed the MAC tariff rate, which leaves empty seats on MAC flights.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Army, Navy, and Air Force should place greater emphasis on managing the use of MAC-provided international airlift.

Target: Department of the Army

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 10/85

Target: Department of the Air Force

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 10/85

Target: Department of the Navy

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 10/85

DOD should consider penalty billing each military service for empty seats caused by their no-shows.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 10/85

DOD should revise DOD Directive 4500.9 to require that the military services use MAC airlift where appropriate and that order-issuing authorities be given guidance in revised travel regulations as to specific conditions under which authorized orders can be issued. In addition, DOD should consider revising the JTR provision governing civilian travelers to require them, like their military counterparts, to use MAC-provided airlift.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

Federal Actions Needed To Retain Essential Defense Rail Service (PLRD-83-73, 5-20-83)

Departments of Defense and Transportation

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)
Legislative Authority: P.L. 96-418.

Background

GAO examined the Department of Defense's (DOD) and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) efforts to maintain minimum levels of rail service at defense installations and to identify and correct rail deficiencies.

Findings/Conclusions

Despite the conclusions of a DOD study which determined that the condition of network and branch rail lines was satisfactory for national defense, GAO found that the number of military installations confronted with the potential loss of rail service is growing and that there may be a need for congressional action to ensure that minimum essential rail service is retained for mobilization needs. Although DOD is spending millions of dollars to improve rail capabilities at its installations, DOD cannot be assured that the rail network will move the required defense materiel and equipment during mobilization. GAO believes that the case-by-case basis by which DOD presently solves its maintenance service problems on branch lines could prove costly and ineffective in the long run. GAO believes that DOD must determine the minimum amount of rail capability needed and routinely explore the alternatives and their costs with DOT. GAO found that the data

on transportation movement capability reported by installations contained conflicting information; that some planned projects, if funded, would result in capabilities beyond what the services estimate would be needed during mobilization; and that a DOD concept of using motor convoys as a method of moving equipment has not been subject to extensive analysis and testing. Consequently, its feasibility and practicality for long distance transportation during mobilization are uncertain.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should: (1) modify DOD reporting requirements to ensure that defense installations accurately report their outloading and receiving capabilities to meet peacetime and mobilization movement needs and identify the key constraining factors; (2) establish procedures to ensure rail maintenance projects are appropriately justified and cost effective; and (3) reevaluate the feasibility and practicality of DOD movement criteria to include road marching vehicles for distances up to 800 miles.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 02/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

Unused Cargo Space on Military Aircraft Returning to the United States (NSIAD-83-19, 8-9-83)

Departments of Defense and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

GAO evaluated the Military Airlift Command's (MAC) air freight service TP-4 program to determine to what extent military shippers were utilizing cargo space on military flights returning to the United States from overseas.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that, although a significant volume of cargo was transported by the MAC system, MAC aircraft were still returning with unused space. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense (DOD) was paying commercial ocean carriers to move its cargo from countries served by MAC. GAO estimated that DOD could have reduced its ocean transportation costs by about \$3.4 million from October

1980 through March 1982. GAO concluded that constraints on use of MAC aircraft could be overcome with more effective program management.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should instruct the services to place a sufficient amount of their general cargo and household goods shipments into the MAC system to use MAC airlift to the maximum extent possible and direct MAC to provide the services with sufficient and timely notice of available space.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 06/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

TRAINING

The Army Needs To Improve Individual Soldier Training in Its Units (FPCD-81-29, 3-31-81)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Legislative Authority: P.L. 96-226.

Background

In an attempt to reduce training costs and make training programs more specific, the Army has shifted its emphasis from the formal school environment to the operating unit and designated specific tasks to be taught at each level. Most training now takes place in Army units. Because of the growing concern about the training capability of the Army and the need to assess the fundamental policy changes of the training philosophy, GAO conducted a review of Army training. GAO reviewed the Army's individual skill training programs at 15 active units and administered questionnaires to soldiers throughout the Army.

Findings/Conclusions

Army trainers have been provided guidance which specifies what tasks soldiers must know as well as the performance conditions and standards for each task. However, the trainers are not teaching soldiers all tasks the Army considers critical for proper job performance and survival in combat. The Army has announced a series of programs designed to improve individual skill training effectiveness. GAO found that soldiers are not being fully trained because: (1) individual skill training does not receive enough emphasis at the battalion and company levels; (2) unit commanders do not take advantage of all available time to provide individual skill training; (3) aids specifically designed to enhance training are not used as extensively as they should be; (4) there is a shortage of experienced trainers; (5) personnel are constantly being rotated in and out of units; and (6) equipment, ammunition, and other training items often are not available for use in training. The Army should require specific and immediate action to improve unit level programs. The management oversight of training programs needs strengthening and the Army training philosophy should be evaluated.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Army should determine ways existing resources, including NCO's, can be better used to improve training. More specifically, alternative management

techniques should be identified to reduce personnel turbulence, consolidate training to make better use of experienced trainers, and more rapidly prepare young NCO's to be effective trainers.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should ensure that the Army implements an effective individual skill training program. GAO believes this can best be accomplished by requiring an independent organization to perform periodic assessments of training effectiveness within the Army and encourages the Secretary of the Army to consider using the Army Audit Agency for such assessments.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should emphasize to Army commanders the importance of unit skill training and should require commanders at the battalion level and above ensure that primary trainers: (1) use Soldiers Manual as their program criteria; (2) develop a training plan which provides for training in all Soldiers Manual tasks; (3) maintain job books for the soldiers they supervise so that training needs are documented; (4) use training extension course lessons in their training programs; (5) incorporate individual training into all phases of unit activity and make use of available slack time to provide opportunity training; and (6) use job books, SQT results, and Soldiers Manuals to develop training programs which provide training in those tasks where additional work is needed.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should: (1) take action to see that the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans establishes a more effective Army-wide system to monitor the accomplishment of skill training provided to enlisted personnel; (2) require TRADOC to evaluate fully the current individual skill training doctrine; and (3) require TRADOC to evaluate the effectiveness of the Battalion Training Management System.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

TRAINING

The Army Needs To Reevaluate Its Extended Basic Training Program (FPCD-82-11, 3-3-82)

Department of the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

In October 1981, the Army extended basic training from 7 to 8 weeks for all recruits entering the service to improve recruit performance in basic soldiering tasks. GAO assessed: (1) how the Army developed the program; (2) what the Army has done to assure decisionmakers that program goals could be accomplished in the most effective manner; and (3) whether the Army had the qualified trainers necessary to implement the program fully beginning October 1, 1981.

Findings/Conclusions

The Army has not adequately identified, isolated, or analyzed the cause of performance problems. Therefore, the Army cannot be certain whether additional training time is necessary or whether restructuring the existing program could improve training. To justify the new program, the Army used survey information from operational and training units. However, the survey did not define the causes of training problems and was hampered by technical deficiencies, such as shortcomings in sampling strategy. The Army has yet to demonstrate that the new program is effective. Without such effort, GAO believes that the Army has little assurance about the amount of basic training necessary to field a well trained force. Recent Army efforts to begin collecting data on the benefits of the program raised more concern about program validation, because controlled testing procedures are not being used and the results may not be very useful in evaluating program effectiveness. Historically, the Army has operated

its basic training program with less than the authorized number of trainers and has recently relied on using less experienced trainers who may be inadequately trained in the tasks they are assigned to teach. Neither the Army nor GAO knows how well the extended basic training program is providing soldiers with the skills needed to perform effectively. Although the Army is taking actions to determine program effectiveness and to improve the training of instructors, GAO believes that these efforts will not answer critical questions.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Army should: (1) evaluate the basic training program to determine the most effective and efficient length of training; and (2) resolve trainer quantity and quality problems. Comprehensive plans for accomplishing these actions should include: how to demonstrate the effectiveness of the new program and measure improvements; how to demonstrate the skills and abilities needed for trainers to meet the basic training requirement; specific actions and timetables for providing the qualified trainers; identifying organizational responsibility for program evaluation components; specific resources, personnel and funds, required to accomplish this analysis; and milestones for completing various steps. Priorities should be established to assure continued authorization and assignment of the quantity and quality of trainers needed for basic training. Initial results of these actions should be presented to Congress in its FY 1984 budget.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

TRAINING

The Army Needs To Modify Its System for Measuring Individual Soldier Proficiency (FPCD-82-28, 3-30-82)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

GAO reviewed whether the Army's Skill Qualification Test Program measures soldier proficiency and identifies individual training needs.

Findings/Conclusions

The program is the Army's only diagnostic tool for measuring individual training effectiveness and individual soldier proficiency in critical job tasks. However, GAO found that unit commanders and trainers are not getting the necessary information to assess accurately either skill proficiency or individual training needs because: (1) only a selected number of critical job tasks are tested; (2) the testing is a once-a-year event rather than the culmination of a year-round training program; (3) promotions based on the test results create inequities among soldiers; (4) the test results are not routinely used to measure soldier proficiency or training needs at the unit level; and (5) the test program handicaps rather than improves professional skill development because training is provided primarily for the few skills tested. The program has become hard to administer and each year uses thousands of people to de-

velop, print, distribute, and score the tests at an annual cost of more than \$25 million.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Army should develop and implement, beginning in fiscal year 1983, a more effective system for measuring individual soldier proficiency and training needs. This system should incorporate separate programs for (1) assessing individual training needs, and (2) measuring individual proficiency for promotion decisions. More specifically, the program for assessing individual training needs should be tied directly to the Soldiers Manuals and used as a training tool.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should develop a system in which unit trainers are held accountable for using tests contained in Soldiers Manuals.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

TRAINING

Poor Design and Management Hamper Army's Basic Skills Education Program (FPCD-83-19, 6-20-83)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

GAO reviewed the Army's basic skills education program to evaluate whether the program: (1) was properly designed to determine the basic skills needed to do Army jobs; and (2) is being effectively implemented at initial entry training bases and permanent duty stations.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that, after 4 years and \$160 million in expenditures, a small percentage of soldiers has achieved the Army's prescribed goals. GAO found examples of program abuse, including ineligible soldiers' participating in the program and allowing soldiers to obtain high school equivalency certificates during on-duty hours. When designing the program, the Army did not identify the basic skills required for each military job. Implementation problems also have hampered the program. Course hours, duration, and cost differ widely. The Army has also not evaluated the overall effectiveness of its program. Army regulations assigned evaluation responsibilities to the Army Adjutant General's Office and directed that installation commanders keep data on program quality and effectiveness. In the fall of 1979, the Army established an evaluation and services division in its Education Directorate to monitor and evaluate the basic skills education program. Studies show that short-term remedial programs do not provide the competency needed to master highly

technical material in many Army jobs and that substantial resources would be required to bridge the literacy gap.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Army should clearly define the specific basic skills required to do each military job.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown. 12/85

The Secretary of the Army should determine whether the desired skills are attainable, given expected time and resource constraints and the expected reading and math skills of future Army recruits.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown. 10/85

The Secretary of the Army should develop a program which raises soldiers' basic levels to meet job needs.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown. 10/85

The Secretary of the Army should establish a monitoring system to track, measure, and report program effectiveness.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown. 10/85

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY

TRAINING

Better Followup Can Reduce Equipment and Facility Problems Affecting Army Guard and Reserve Training (NSIAD-84-29, 11-10-83)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting) (051.0)

Background

GAO reviewed the Army's Unit Status Reporting (USR) system to determine whether: (1) equipment shortages and constraints on access to training facilities adversely affect National Guard and Army Reserve units' ability to train; and (2) the Army has an effective means to identify and correct reported training problems.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that: (1) because instructions for preparing USR's are not clear, reported information is often inconsistent; (2) some commanders are not listing all of the equipment shortages or facility constraints affecting their training; and (3) followup on reported training problems is minimal because Army officials do not analyze USR training data and they lack confidence in the validity of reported training problems. GAO believes that, due to the inadequate followup system, valid training problems remain unresolved and that, once action is taken to provide valid

and complete information, the Army should use the USR data to assist in making decisions on equipment allocations.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Army should develop and implement criteria for classifying the training impact of equipment shortages and facility constraints and follow up to ensure that the criteria are used correctly.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretary of the Army should emphasize the importance of completing all information required by the USR.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS

Navy Can Improve Management of Shipyard Labor Resources Through Better Work Measurement Practices (NSIAD-84-96, 4-24-84)

Departments of Defense and the Navy

Budget Function: National Defense: Defense-Related Activities (054.0)

Background

GAO reviewed the adequacy of the Navy shipyard work measurement and cost accounting systems.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO has previously reported that the Navy needed to improve its work measurement and cost accounting systems to effectively control rising labor costs. Although the Navy has taken some corrective action, GAO found that overall the Navy has given work measurement and labor costing low priority. As a result, many problems still exist, including: (1) improper documentation of labor standards; (2) lack of justification by shipyard planners for increased work time allowances; and (3) incorrect application of standards for determining estimated job costs. Further, personnel responsible for monitoring employee labor-charging activities have not been able to determine the extent of time mischarged, and individuals administering work measurement and cost accounting activities have not been held fully accountable for their performance. The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) has issued instructions emphasizing the need to implement effective work measurement systems and ensure accurate time charges for shipyards and has initiated programs to identify problems with estimating procedures and labor charging. However, progress toward these goals has been impeded by various problems, including the lack of a firm commitment by management to operating and maintaining a viable work measurement system and a lack of staff

to effectively administer work measurement activities. GAO stated that, although it is difficult to estimate the impact of these weaknesses on labor costs, studies have shown that millions of dollars can be lost through low productivity.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Commander, NAVSEA, to: establish an improved work measurement system by ensuring that labor standards are properly set, supported, and used in calculating "should cost" allowances; identify and provide the staff required to effectively administer work measurement programs and to do work measurement studies; and develop training policies and plans which improve the skills required of those who administer, develop, and upgrade shipyard labor standards.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Commander, NAVSEA, to implement stronger controls to validate the accuracy of labor-charging practices by making sure that labor checks are done more frequently, are done in the prescribed format, and are used to help management correct problems, such as those relating to rework and lost time.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

Air Force Does Not Recover All Required Costs of Modification Kits Sold to Foreign Governments (PLRD-82-111, 8-27-82)

Department of the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Defense-Related Activities (054.0)

Legislative Authority: A.F.R. 170-3. A.F.R. 400-3. DOD Instruction 2140.1. DOD Instruction 2140.2.

Background

GAO conducted a review to determine whether Air Force procedures and practices ensure recovery of the costs of modification kits sold under the foreign military sales program and, if not, to identify those costs which are not being recovered.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that Department of Defense (DOD) pricing policies, which were designed to eliminate subsidies in the foreign military sales program, have not been effectively implemented by the Air Force. Some Air Force regulations and guidelines on pricing are ambiguous and confusing. As a result, many costs incurred in providing modification kits have not been charged to foreign governments. One Air Force regulation classifies certain costs as nonrecurring, while another regulation classifies those same costs as recurring. Air logistics centers do not have procedures to validate or update prices for modification kits that are installed on foreign-owned equipment undergoing overhaul at Air Force facilities. The Air Force does not have procedures to identify and accumulate costs incurred when modification kits are assembled in-house by Air Force personnel. As a result, the costs for direct labor, transportation, packing, crating, and the use of government-owned facilities are not being recovered. GAO concluded that ambiguous guidance, inadequate procedures, and the resultant undercharges are due in large part to fragmented management within the Air Force Logistics Command. GAO also found that the San Antonio Air Logistics Center in particular did not charge hundreds of

thousands of dollars to foreign governments even when clear and concise pricing procedures were provided. GAO believes that significant costs have not been recovered and that these undercharges will continue in future sales unless the regulations and procedures for pricing these items are revised.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Air Force Logistics Command to require air logistics centers to review their current operational procedures to ensure that they are in line with the full recovery policy and to identify and bill foreign governments for any undercharges. Specific areas that should be reviewed by all logistics centers are modification cases under which kits were: (1) installed on foreign-owned items being overhauled; and (2) assembled at Air Force facilities by Air Force personnel.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 3/85

The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Air Force Logistics Command to require the San Antonio Air Logistics Center to specifically review all modification sales to foreign governments made since October, 1, 1978, and apply the pricing criteria contained in the Air Force Logistics Command quality control program. In cases where pricing deviations are found, corrective billings should be promptly submitted.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 3/85

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

MATERIAL MANAGEMENT

National Defense-Related Silver Needs Should Be Reevaluated and Alternative Disposal Methods Explored (EMD-82-24, 1-11-82)

Departments of Defense and the Interior, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and General Services Administration

Budget Function: Natural Resources and Environment: Other Natural Resources (306.0)

Legislative Authority: Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-35). Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1982. Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98 et seq.). Bank Holding Company Act (84 Stat. 1768). National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980 (30 U.S.C. 1604). Coinage Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-81). P.L. 90-29. P.L. 96-41.

Background

GAO was requested to evaluate the consequences of a sale of silver from the National Defense Stockpile, a supply of materials retained to prevent costly dependence upon foreign supply sources during national emergencies. Specifically, GAO was asked to address all aspects of the sale, including changes which have occurred since the sale was last justified and alternatives to disposing of any excess silver.

Findings/Conclusions

The Federal Emergency Management Agency determined that the supply of silver from domestic production and reliable imports exceeded the estimated quantity required to sustain the United States for periods of not less than 3 years in the event of a national emergency. Subsequent legislation has suspended a proposed disposal pending a redetermination that the silver to be disposed of is in excess of stockpile requirements. Several factors used to establish stockpile goals for all strategic materials, including a zero silver goal, have changed. These changes have (1) increased projected defense-related demand for silver during national emergencies, and (2) reduced the availability of silver from existing domestic mines and processors. Additionally, three major foreign suppliers have protested the disposal, alleging that a sale will depress the market price, resulting in decreased employment and foreign exchange earnings. To dispose of the silver, the General Services Administration held weekly auctions, but the sale

did not assure that the disposal would be for domestic consumption nor did it assure that the short-term market price of silver would not be depressed relative to what it had been. GAO explored disposal alternatives, including coinage programs, small silver bars, transferring or selling the silver to the U.S. Treasury, and leaving the silver in the National Defense Stockpile. The bullion coinage program appears to be the most attractive alternative that should be considered.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, in evaluating various factors and information, should specifically consider: (1) the most recent war scenario hypothesized in terms of participants, war fronts, type of military action, and warning time; (2) defense-related uses of silver during past national emergencies; (3) reduced expansion from existing mines during wartime; (4) decreasing domestic smelting capacity; (5) the cost of silver from recycling, domestic stocks, and foreign suppliers; (6) the impact that selling the silver at auction may have on relations between the United States and its major foreign suppliers; and (7) long-term uncertainties relating to projected increased U.S. dependency on foreign silver sources and the possibility that a silver stockpile goal could be reestablished at some future date.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

MATERIAL MANAGEMENT

Management of DOD's Shelf-Life Program--Better, but Still in Need of Improvement (PLRD-82-84, 5-25-82)

Department of Defense

Budget Function: National Defense: Defense-Related Activities (054.0)

Background

GAO reviewed the management of the Department of Defense (DOD) Shelf-Life Program which covers supply items with inventories valued at about \$1 billion.

Findings/Conclusions

Since the last review, DOD has appointed an Administrator with overall responsibility for the Shelf-Life Program, and DOD has taken other initiatives to improve program management. GAO found that the ability of the Administrator and other interested parties to evaluate the program's effectiveness is hampered because a critically needed management reporting system has not been implemented. Such a critically needed management reporting system intended to overcome this problem has been allowed to slip far beyond its originally anticipated completion date. This reporting system would significantly enhance the Shelf-Life Program Administrator's capability to fulfill his responsibilities. One of the primary goals of the DOD Shelf-Life Program is to minimize the risk of shelf-life expiration before issuance, that is to keep disposal of shelf-life material to a minimum. Inconsistent and ineffective management practices continue to impair the

shelf-life program. Other continuing problems exist because: (1) inventory control points (ICP) make many errors when designating items for inclusion in the program; (2) the Air Force storage activities do not apply shelf-life management controls to many items designated for shelf-life management by non-Air Force ICP's; (3) military storage activities have not corrected longstanding deficient shelf-life management practices, although these deficiencies have been reported many times.

Recommendations to Agencies

To improve the accuracy of shelf-life designations assigned by ICP's, the Secretaries of the military services and the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency should require their ICP's to implement formal programs to: (1) thoroughly review contractor recommendations regarding the shelf life of items entering the supply system; and (2) periodically reevaluate assigned shelf-life designations of items in the supply systems to validate the need for continued shelf-life controls.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 05/85

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

MATERIAL MANAGEMENT

Unresolved Issues Concerning the Disposal of Stockpile Silver (RCED-83-7, 2-18-83)

Departments of Defense and the Interior, and Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Budget Function: Natural Resources and Environment: Other Natural Resources (306.0)

Legislative Authority: Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-35). Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1982 (P.L. 97-114). Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Revision Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-41).

Background

Comments by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on an earlier GAO report have raised new issues concerning the disposal of stockpile silver. GAO evaluated the DOD and FEMA positions to determine whether they warranted revising any of the conclusions and recommendations of the earlier report and identified new issues that must be addressed and resolved in reevaluating the need for the stockpile silver.

Findings/Conclusions

The Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1982 suspended the weekly auctions of silver stockpiles pending a redetermination that the silver intended for disposal is excess to stockpile requirements and congressional approval of any proposed disposal method. However, GAO believes that other unresolved disposal issues remain, including: (1) the lack of consideration of defense-related monetary uses of silver; (2) inadequacies in the decision-making data base relating to legislatively mandated supply factors; (3) the lack of consideration of the estimated cost of alternative sources of silver and the impact of proposed disposal methods on foreign relations; and (4) the viability of various alternative disposal methods, such as bullion coins and convertible bonds backed by silver.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Interior should require the Interagency Silver Commodity Committee in its report to Congress to make clear the demand factors considered in redetermining the need for the stockpile silver and provide justification for excluding any of the defense-related monetary

uses required by the fiscal year 1982 Defense Appropriations Act.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Interior should require the Interagency Silver Commodity Committee in its report to Congress to appropriately qualify those legislatively mandated supply factors that are based on incomplete data.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Interior should require the Interagency Silver Commodity Committee in its report to Congress to consider, as required by law: (1) the estimated cost of silver from recycling, domestic stocks, and foreign suppliers during a national emergency; and (2) the impact that any proposed disposal method may have on relations between the United States and its major foreign suppliers.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Interior should require the Interagency Silver Commodity Committee in its report to Congress to provide a benefit-cost analysis of the various alternatives to disposing of the stockpile silver, including bullion coins and convertible bonds backed by silver, in support of a recommended disposal method.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

MATERIAL MANAGEMENT

Adequacy of the DOD Response to Its Inspector General's Report on the Use of Vehicles Assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Motor Pool

(NSIAD-84-10, 10-25-83)

Department of Defense

Budget Function: National Defense: Defense-Related Activities (054.0)

Legislative Authority: DOD Reg. 4500.36-R. DOD Instruction 70. B-210555 (1983). 31 U.S.C. 1344.

Background

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the operations of the executive motor pools that support the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and it conducted a followup on a 1982 Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General report concerning executive motor pool operations to determine: (1) the corrective actions that were taken concerning questionable trips; (2) the reasons for no corrective actions if none were taken; and (3) the adequacy of present controls over the use of OSD vehicles.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) sent letters to officials involved in the questionable use of government-owned vehicles asking them to indicate the purpose of each trip and whether it was personal or official business. In addition, letters were sent to other officials asking them to indicate the purpose of trips taken by relatives and whether the trips were for personal or official business. As a result of these investigations, many officials were asked to reimburse the government. The GAO review also revealed that: (1) the listing of acceptable methods of transportation of personnel before and after normal duty hours was revised; (2)

trips are now being questioned by dispatchers; (3) DOD Instruction 70 was prepared as a guideline for the use of the executive motor pool; (4) drivers are now required to fill out a special daily log sheet for all their trips; and (5) quarterly reviews of dispatch records and daily logs are being conducted. GAO concluded that the actions taken to identify and collect for personal trips, except those concerning the transportation of unaccompanied relatives, were prompt and reasonable. Although GAO recognized that the transportation of unaccompanied relatives of government employees has been viewed by many as "official business," it could find no basis to authorize such use. In addition, GAO determined that the actions taken to tighten controls over the use of the motor pool should significantly lessen the possibility of misuse in the future.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should revise DOD regulations to preclude home-to-work transportation for any officials other than those authorized in the law as interpreted by the GAO June 3, 1983, decision or under special circumstances cited in previous GAO decisions.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

MATERIAL MANAGEMENT

The Army's Retention of Overage Vehicles (NSIAD-84-32, 12-9-83)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Defense-Related Activities (054.0)

Background

GAO conducted a survey at the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to assess the practice of retaining and extensively repairing overage vehicles rather than buying new ones.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that continued cutbacks in the procurement of nontactical vehicles have caused the Army commands to adopt other, less economical means of keeping their nontactical fleets operating. Because the Army consistently bought fewer than half of the nontactical vehicles that it had determined were needed for 5 years, commands were forced to repair vehicles that exceeded their life expectancies and that could not be economically repaired. Prompt replacement of vehicles when they reach certain replacement criteria is cost effective because of lower

maintenance costs, lower fuel consumption, and higher return from disposal sales. In addition, GAO found that major commands authorized their installations to compensate for the shortages by leasing vehicles without determining whether leasing was an economical alternative to procurement. In some cases, commands were forced to use tactical vehicles in nontactical roles, reportedly with adverse effects on both operating costs and combat readiness.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Army should reassess the adequacy of planned funding for replacement of commercial vehicles, taking into consideration the uneconomical practices that prior underfunding has necessitated.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

MATERIAL MANAGEMENT

Test Transfer of Consumable Supply Items to the DLA from the Military Services (NSIAD-84-82, 3-28-84)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, Defense Logistics Agency, and United States Marine Corps

Budget Function: National Defense: Defense-Related Activities (054.0)

Background

In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) test transfer of about 200,000 consumable items, some of which are considered essential for the operations of weapon systems, to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) from the military services. GAO also evaluated the cost and military readiness impact of returning items to the services and evaluated the methodology of the transfer to determine if the test should be terminated and if weapon system management sensitive items should be returned to the services.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the items transferred to DLA were not selected in a statistically valid manner; therefore, the transferred items were not representative of the 1 million consumable items that were not transferred. Accordingly, the test results cannot be projected to the remaining consumable items. In addition, GAO found that the cost and readiness impact of returning weapon system management sensitive items to the services cannot be determined until specific criteria to identify the items are implemented. DOD and the services are working together to implement criteria for identifying weapon system management

sensitive items. The Air Force and the Army want their weapon system sensitive items to be returned to preserve the readiness of their weapon systems. The Navy and Marine Corps do not want any of their items returned.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should ensure consistent application of the criteria within DOD and the services as part of the implementation plan.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 09/88

The Secretary of Defense should screen the test items against the criteria and return those items that meet the criteria to the services for their management.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 09/88

The Secretary of Defense should screen all other consumable items against the criteria and transfer all items that are not weapon system management sensitive to DLA for its management.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 09/88

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

MEDICAL SERVICES

Military Medicine Is in Trouble: Complete Reassessment Needed (HRD-79-107, 8-16-79)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Defense-Related Activities (054.0)

Legislative Authority: 10 U.S.C. 1074. 10 U.S.C. 1076.

Background

Since the end of the draft in 1973, the military's direct medical care system has experienced a gap between the number of military physicians it has available and the number needed to provide medical care, seriously impairing the system's ability to meet peacetime medical needs efficiently and effectively. Hospital operations have been hampered by the lack of physicians as has the ability of active-duty members to obtain medical care.

Findings/Conclusions

The military service medical departments project standard professional staffing levels past 1984, with no foreseeable increase in the supply of military physicians. Department of Defense (DOD) data showed widespread closings and reductions of medical services in fiscal year 1978 due to the shortage, affecting all beneficiaries. GAO visited seven military hospitals and found services closing and reopening, depending on physician availability; patients sent elsewhere or moved long distances for specialized services; greater dependence on civilian services; longer waits by patients; occasional denial of services; and temporary assignments of physicians to short-handed nonmedical functions. GAO recognizes the physician shortage but sees additional reasons for the system's

shortcomings, including shortages among other medical service personnel. GAO surveyed beneficiaries living within 30 miles of military hospitals and found that most families of retired members had tried to obtain medical care during an 8-month period; about one-third of them could not do so. GAO estimated that in the survey period, 104,000 active-duty members and 157,000 retirees failed to obtain care. A followup questionnaire from GAO showed that most patients sought medical care elsewhere because of physician shortages or long waits for appointments; they compared civilian care favorably to that of military hospitals and experienced only slight difficulty in paying for these services.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should improve the environment in which military physicians practice medicine to the extent practicable by: (1) reducing or eliminating emergency room duties for specialists, particularly those who do not have routine exposure to general medical practices; (2) reducing physicians' nonmedical duties; and (3) increasing the length of physicians' assignments at specific hospitals.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

MEDICAL SERVICES

The Congress Should Mandate Formation of a Military-VA-Civilian Contingency Hospital System (HRD-80-76, 6-26-80)

Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, the Army, and the Air Force, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Veterans Administration

Budget Function: Health: Health Planning and Construction (551.3)

Background

In response to a request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) plans to use nonmilitary hospitals to treat battlefield casualties in the event of war or conflict. The need for developing a contingency hospital system consisting of DOD, the Veterans Administration (VA), and civilian medical resources is discussed. The primary emphasis is that the VA role should be greater than currently planned by DOD. The extent of support VA will provide DOD in treating returning battlefield casualties is the most important issue in developing a civilian-military contingency hospital system for medical treatment of wartime casualties. DOD has looked primarily to civilian medical resources to meet anticipated shortfalls should the United States become involved in war. Only recently has specific consideration been given to VA medical capability. DOD officials said that civilian resources would still be needed to treat battlefield casualties even if DOD and VA resources were fully used for that purpose.

Findings/Conclusions

DOD recently revised several aspects of its original system. Major changes appear to be: (1) elimination of a new, possibly duplicative administrative structure as originally proposed; and (2) reliance on the military services for patient administration responsibilities. GAO agreed with these revisions. DOD revised plans are still unclear about how civilian beds and staff would be made available. Available beds and staff should be identified assuming patients are discharged early whenever possible and non-emergency admissions are restricted during the war surge period. Failure to resolve issues regarding civilian physician and hospital reimbursement and liability could limit implementation of the planned system. VA should be much more involved in planning and caring for battlefield casualties than it would be in caring only for those who will not return to duty. Just how much VA can participate is questionable. DOD has not told VA what its needs are, nor has VA told DOD what its capabilities are. GAO believes that the nation should prepare for a possible conflict by planning to appropriately use federal medical resources before calling on civilian resources. A strong peacetime medical resources sharing program could provide a more effective relationship between VA and DOD that could prove invaluable in war.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of Veterans Affairs should develop and establish the framework for a military-VA-civilian contingency hospital system. As part of this development, a mechanism should be established for obtaining civilian medical care capability that: (1) recognizes the responsibilities of the Federal Emergency Management Administration, the Department of Health and Human Services, and other federal agencies during war or conflict; and (2) adequately considers other unresolved issues, such as physician reimbursement and liability, and ground transportation availability.

Target: Department of Defense

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

Target: Veterans Administration

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should determine the optimal number and placement of U.S. aeromedical staging facilities with emphasis on locations near concentrations of military and VA medical resources.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of Veterans Affairs should identify federal and civilian capability that could be provided assuming that: (1) patients are discharged early whenever possible; and (2) nonemergency admissions are restricted during the war surge period.

Target: Department of Defense

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

Target: Veterans Administration

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of Veterans Affairs should analyze DOD and VA medical care resources to determine the federal patient treatment capability on a time-phased basis. This analysis should be made first near existing DOD aeromedical staging facilities, but should also include other locations where there

are large concentrations of DOD and VA medical resources.

Target: Department of Defense

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

Target: Veterans Administration

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should compare the medical care requirements calculated under various wartime scenarios with available federal medical resources to determine how much and what type of civilian medical care capability would be needed to augment federal capability.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Administrator of Veterans Affairs should provide estimates to DOD concerning its potential capabilities, in terms of both facilities and staffing, to treat returning battlefield casualties regardless of whether those casualties would be expected to return to duty. Such estimates should be based on the assumptions that patients would be discharged early whenever possible and nonemergency admissions would be restricted during the war surge period. These estimates should be developed through the joint DOD-VA planning effort to establish a military-VA-civilian contingency hospital system.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

MEDICAL SERVICES

Better Planning and Funding Approach Needed for Military Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Projects in Germany (HRD-82-130, 9-30-82)

Departments of Defense, the Army, and the Air Force

Budget Function: Health: Health Planning and Construction (551.3)

Background

GAO reported on the condition of military medical facilities in Europe as well as plans for their renovation and replacement.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO believes that the recent emphasis placed on European construction projects, together with significantly higher funding provide the Army with an opportunity to correct deficiencies, eliminate past inadequacies in facility geographic distribution, and consider construction alternatives. GAO found that consolidation of facilities in some military communities appears to be a cost-effective way to improve the quality of care. To justify and plan proposed projects, the Army needs information on the condition of existing facilities and guidance as to the optimum size and location of medical facilities. GAO also found that improvements are needed in the ways related maintenance and repair costs are estimated and total project costs are funded. Maintenance and repair estimates associated with the project are not always based on a detailed analysis of all deficiencies, with the result that Congress is not provided with complete cost information.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force to coordinate medical con-

struction programs for Germany with a view toward joint utilization of facilities where possible.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should develop: (1) a method to more accurately estimate the amount of maintenance and repair costs to ensure that Congress is made aware of the total project funding requirements; and (2) a funding approach for future medical facility modernization projects which will ensure that required operations and maintenance funding will be available throughout the project.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Army should give high priority to completion of the Resource Distribution Study so that it can be used in the 7th Military Command's Health Facility Modernization Program. The Secretary should ensure that the study: (1) examines ways to compile detailed data on the condition of Army medical facilities in Europe; (2) develops an evaluation criterion for proposed projects which considers the medical needs of the community, the conditions of facilities, and efficient distribution of Command resources; and (3) evaluates consolidation opportunities for clinics discussed in this report and other clinics located near each other or hospitals.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

MEDICAL SERVICES

Verifying Eligibility for Military Health Care: Some Progress Has Been Made, but Reliability Problems Remain

(HRD-83-1, 12-1-82)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Defense-Related Activities (054.0)

Background

GAO reviewed the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) to determine whether it would improve the eligibility determination process and provide accurate data on beneficiaries for use in military health resource planning. The DEERS was initiated specifically to accumulate accurate and timely data on all active duty and retired military sponsors, survivors, and dependents relating to their eligibility for health care benefits. This report discusses the problems experienced in the DEERS under the Uniformed Services Health Care System.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO learned that the DEERS will have an estimated beneficiary population of 11.5 million when the system is completed in 1985. When fully implemented, the estimated cost of this computer-based system is about \$33 million, with an annual operating cost of \$6 million. In its review GAO noted that the system contains many errors, which cause inaccurate replies to users' eligibility queries, and result in a lack of confidence in the system's reliability. Although the Department of Defense has made progress, needed improvements include: (1) obtaining more complete and accurate beneficiary enrollment data; (2) entering more accurately beneficiary information into the system; and (3) prompt reporting of beneficiary changes to the system.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct the military services to improve the accuracy and completeness of sponsor information submitted to the DEERS.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the military services to emphasize the implementation of procedures for identifying and enrolling dependents who have not been entered in the DEERS.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the military services to implement and monitor the application of more stringent verification procedures when determining the eligibility of children age 21 and over.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the military services to aggressively research the eligibility of dependents whose sponsor cannot be found in the DEERS.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the military services to more closely review the enrollment documents submitted to DEERS to assure their legibility and accuracy.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the DEERS Steering Group to monitor the DEERS Support Office efforts to promptly investigate and resolve erroneous information identified by system users.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the DEERS Steering Group to develop a comprehensive quality assurance program for assessing, on a systematic basis, the quality of DEERS information and the actions needed to improve it.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the DEERS Steering Group to delay enrollment of dependents outside the United States until the enrollment problems discussed in the chapter are resolved.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the services to develop programs to educate sponsors on the need for reporting changes in dependent status when they occur.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the services to require that sponsors comply with DEERS update procedures when processing dependent status changes in finance or emergency records.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the DEERS Steering Group to establish standards on how quickly status changes must be updated in the DEERS and the degree of accuracy that the system must achieve in order for it to be considered effective. These standards should be used in assessing the system's overall reliability and cost effectiveness.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

PERSONNEL SUPPORT SERVICES

Opportunities Exist To Reduce Operating Costs of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools

(HRD-82-86, 8-26-82)

Department of Defense

Budget Function: National Defense: Defense-Related Activities (054.0)

Legislative Authority: Defense Department Overseas Teachers Pay and Personnel Practices Act (20 U.S.C. 901), Defense Dependents' Education Act of 1978 (20 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.), Department of Education Organization Act (20 U.S.C. 3401), Annual and Sick Leave Act of 1951 (P.L. 82-233), District of Columbia Teachers' Leave Act of 1949 (P.L. 90-212; 10 U.S.C. 1430(d); 10 U.S.C. 1430(f)), DOD Directive 1400.13, DOD Manual 1342.6-M-1.

Background

GAO reviewed the opportunities for savings in the teacher substitution and pupil transportation programs in the Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DODDS) system.

Findings/Conclusions

Department of Defense (DOD) policy states that teachers who reside in the United States should be hired only if vacancies cannot be filled by transferring currently employed teachers or by hiring locally. However, a large number of substitute teachers are needed and local applicants constitute the only source to meet demand. As a result, some principals are reluctant to hire local applicants as full-time teachers. The high demand for substitutes is attributable primarily to the tightly structured rules covering accumulated leave-time among teachers which causes them to take their maximum earned leave-time to avoid forfeiting it. Hiring teachers in the United States is substantially more costly than hiring teachers locally; therefore, restructuring the leave-time regulations would lead to a decline in the need for substitutes so that more local applicants could be available for hire as full-time teachers. DODDS has budgeted approximately \$37 million for pupil transportation in fiscal year 1982. GAO found that military installation commanders, who are responsible for providing pupil transportation, have not made cost comparisons and other analyses to ensure that the most economical busing services are used. GAO believes that until the military services undertake these cost-effective analyses, cost savings in busing services will not be realized. GAO concluded that savings to DODDS could be achieved by reducing the demand for substitute teachers and identifying the most economical mode of pupil transportation.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should require the Director of DODDS to establish and maintain a data base on the

numbers of: (1) available and qualified local applicants who are dependents of DOD military and U.S. government civilian personnel; and (2) teacher vacancies filled by local applicants who are dependents of DOD military and U.S. government civilian personnel overseas.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

The Secretary of Defense should: (1) ensure that busing cost comparisons and other analyses are performed in all overseas communities where students are bused to DODDS and that military communities forward the results of the analysis to DODDS regions along with explanations, if the lowest cost alternative is not selected; (2) instruct the military departments to consider structuring contracts for pupil transportation services to allow competition by smaller companies and using multiyear contracting where it promises to reduce the cost of busing to the U.S. government; and (3) ensure that military communities providing pupil transportation services submit complete and accurate quarterly cost reports to DODDS as required by the DOD Manual.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

The Secretary of Defense should require the Director of DODDS to ensure that regional offices develop an information base and commit the resources necessary to: (1) review cost comparison and other studies and coordinate with the military communities to resolve differences in approach or methodology; and (2) analyze and compare cost data from communities to identify unusually high contract or in-house costs per mile, per bus, or per student.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Further Improvements Needed in Department of Defense Oversight of Special Access (Carve-Out) Contracts (GGD-83-43, 2-18-83)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Defense-Related Activities (054.0)

Legislative Authority: Freedom of Information Act. Executive Order 12036. Executive Order 12333. Executive Order 12356. DIA Manual 50-3. DIA Manual 50-5. DOD Reg. 5200.1-R. DOD Directive 5400.7.

Background

GAO completed a review of the security requirements and administration of Department of Defense (DOD) carve-out contracts as part of its continuing review of national security information. Carve-out contracts are those special access contracts for which the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) has been relieved of security inspection responsibility and the cognizant DOD component is responsible for security inspections and administration.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that an ever-increasing number of carve-out contracts has become a problem for contractor security administrators because the contracts result in a multiplicity of security requirements in addition to those prescribed by the DOD Industrial Security Manual. The exact number of carve-out contracts is unknown, but GAO estimated that there are probably several thousand such contracts; some contracts were given carve-out status for reasons other than security, and other carve-out contracts were not inspected by anyone.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should revise the Information Security Program Regulation to require all components to

annually: (1) inventory and report the status of all carve-out contracts to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and (2) revalidate the need for renewed contracts or contracts that extend for more than 1 year. In addition, the Secretary should require the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to make periodic inspections of components' central offices to evaluate compliance with the regulation.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

The Secretary of Defense should: (1) issue instructions that will require advance DOD approval of contractors' requests for special access authorizations for employees who will be working on nonsensitive compartmented information special access contracts; (2) direct DIS to return to contractors any requests for special access authorizations that do not contain the advance approval of the cognizant DOD component; and (3) remind DOD components of their responsibility to review and approve, in a timely manner, contractor nominees for all special access authorizations.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Need for Central Adjudication Facility for Security Clearances for Navy Personnel (GGD-83-66, 5-18-83)

Departments of Defense and the Navy

Budget Function: National Defense: Defense-Related Activities (054.0)

Legislative Authority: DOD Reg. 5200.2-R. Navy Security Managers Handbook.

Background

GAO evaluated the Department of Defense's (DOD) Personnel Security Program, focusing on the Navy's adjudication process of security clearances for military and civilian personnel.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that, although the Navy has maintained a centralized adjudication facility for many years, about 3,000 commands have been authorized to adjudicate the security clearances for military personnel. The commands reviewed by GAO experienced some problems, because the range in rank or grade level of the individuals adjudicating cases varied widely, formal training and security experience were lacking, and the clearance review verification procedures were inconsistent. GAO noted that, until a uniform adjudicating system is adopted, procedural

discrepancies may negatively affect the efficiency of the process.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Navy should establish a central adjudication facility for civilian and military personnel, in accordance with the requirement of DOD Regulation 5200.2-R, "Personnel Security Program."

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The Department of the Navy has not formally commented on this report.*

The Secretary of the Navy should require revisions to existing instructions to provide specific criteria on the procedures to be followed in determining individual eligibility for access to classified information.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The Department of the Navy has not formally commented on this report.*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTS

AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING

Army Has the Opportunity To Re compete DAS3 Purchases and Improve Automated Battlefield Support (IMTEC-84-20, 9-28-84)

Department of the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Procurement and Contracts (051.2)

Legislative Authority: A.R. 70-1. B-210100 (1983).

Background

GAO reviewed the Army's acquisition of the decentralized automated service support system (DAS3), which provides automation to combat service support functions on the battlefield.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that, after deciding to standardize combat service support computers, the Army developed a transition plan to move from old technology to new standardized hardware and software. Before the concept was approved, the Army conducted a competitive procurement and acquired 125 DAS3 systems of two different types, the DAS3-A and the more capable DAS3-B. Before operational testing of the DAS3-A was completed, the Army recommended that it be designated as the standard hardware for combat service support. After initial deliveries of DAS3-A systems, the Army determined that the DAS3-A could not meet mission requirements and needed to be upgraded. Subsequently, the Army, citing an urgent need, contracted on a sole-source basis with the original DAS3-A supplier to provide 260 DAS3-B systems. After a bid protest, the Army agreed to conduct a competitive procurement for the DAS3-B systems, but is continuing to acquire DAS3-B systems under the sole-source contract pending a competitive contract award. GAO also found that: (1) the Army erred in waiving the operational testing requirements for the DAS3-A and in prematurely declaring the DAS3-A standard; and (2) the Army has experienced delivery delays in applications software to be supported by hardware acquisitions under the sole-source DAS3-B contract. In addition, GAO found that

the Army's plans for conducting a competitive procurement for DAS3-B systems are inadequate because the Army has not: (1) determined how many DAS3-B systems it needs; (2) decided how many DAS3-B systems it will competitively procure; or (3) explored alternatives to the DAS3-B.

Recommendations to Agencies

To ensure that the Army achieves established combat service support goals cost-effectively and complies with current hardware standardization policy, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to reassess the Army's current contracts and proposed acquisition strategy by identifying units in urgent need of DAS3-B systems and providing these systems under the existing contract, but ordering no more new units under that contract.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

To ensure that the Army achieves established combat service support goals cost-effectively and complies with current hardware standardization policy, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to reassess the Army's current contracts and proposed acquisition strategy by developing and implementing a competitive acquisition strategy for combat administration support systems that: (1) considers a full range of technological alternatives; and (2) comprehensively addresses combat service support and other related mission requirements through 1987 and beyond.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTS

CONTRACTS

Contracting for Computer Teleprocessing Services Can Be Improved (AFMD-83-80, 6-20-83)

General Services Administration

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Procurement and Contracts (051.2)

Legislative Authority: Automatic Data Processing Equipment Act (P.L. 89-306). F.P.R. 1-3.8. F.P.R. 1-4.1103-1. F.P.R. 1-4.1203(f). F.P.R. 1-4.1206. F.P.R. 1-4.1206.6. P.L. 96-83. OMB Circular A-121. GSA Teleprocessing Services Program Handbook. B-204225 (1982).

Background

In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed 28 of the larger government teleprocessing services contracts representing a broad range of agencies, vendors, and contract types to determine whether there is a government-wide cost-overrun problem and, if so, what actions could be taken to remedy the situation.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that cost overruns are a common occurrence in its sample of contracts. Cost overruns were not measurable in the eight sole-source contracts in the sample; however, sole-source contracts are generally not as cost effective as competitive contracts, and replacing them with competitive awards could reduce costs. Agencies underestimate costs for teleprocessing services because of unrepresentative benchmark tests and unbalanced pricing. The combination of an inaccurate workload estimate and unbalanced pricing results in the highest cost overruns. In 1982, the General Services Administration (GSA) incorporated pricing clauses as part of its standard contract provisions to ensure that costs do not increase disproportionately. However, agencies need assistance from GSA in interpreting vendor cost proposals. In over half of the contracts which GAO reviewed, management had not controlled cost by establishing procedures to account for and allocate all costs of data processing to the end users according to the service received. Management also tended to renew contracts through the system life and beyond, even when costs were significantly higher than original evaluations. GAO also found that, if all users paid a small percentage of their monthly invoices into the Automatic Data Processing Revolving Fund, GSA could provide more service in that procurement area.

Recommendations to Agencies

Heads of federal agencies should improve benchmark tests by maintaining monthly usage statistics for ongoing contracts to build a foundation for accurate workload estimates.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

Heads of federal agencies should seek consultation with GSA during cost evaluation to avoid unbalanced pricing.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

Heads of federal agencies should seek to replace sole-source contracts through competitive procurement in all possible cases.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

Heads of federal agencies should take appropriate and timely action when cost overruns occur and evaluate cost versus marketplace at each option point to comply with FPR 1-4.1206.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

Heads of federal agencies should adopt cost accounting and chargeback according to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-121 to ensure that costs for service are passed back to users.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTS

LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT

Logistics Support Costs for the B-1B Aircraft Can Be Reduced (NSIAD-84-36, 9-20-84)

Departments of Defense and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Procurement and Contracts (051.2)

Background

GAO undertook a review to determine whether: (1) reasonable assumptions were being used to determine the B-1B logistics requirements; and (2) aircraft support could be more efficient and economical than that currently planned. GAO focused its review on the planned B-1B logistics support, basing, and maintenance.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that, while the Air Force's logistics support for the B-1B has been extensive, its logistics planning has been constrained by the inadequacy of the logistics data developed during the research and development of the aircraft's predecessor and a concurrent development and production schedule which forced Air Force planners to make logistics decisions before they had sufficient data. In addition, the Air Force had initially planned the combined purchasing of aircraft components for only about 15 percent of the initial spare parts procurement. However, in 1984, the Air Force used combined purchasing to order 68 percent of its initial spare parts procurements and 22 percent of its replenishments spare parts procurements. Furthermore, buying directly from the manufacturers versus buying from four contractors was not considered. The Air Force is planning to deploy the aircraft at four bases. GAO found that an elimination of one base could potentially save \$78 million in new facility costs, \$55 million in training and support equipment, and about \$25 million per year in personnel costs. GAO believes that deploying some strategic alert aircraft at a fourth location

could mitigate the Air Force's concern that fewer bases would increase aircraft vulnerability. Finally, GAO found that centralizing all B-1B avionics repair could reduce acquisition costs by \$85 million and operating costs by about \$15 million.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to use the combined procurement procedure to buy all future B-1B production components and investment spares.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Defense has not yet responded to the report.*

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to buy all investment spares directly from the manufacturers when quality control will not be jeopardized.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Defense has not yet responded to the report.*

The Secretary of Defense should evaluate the merits of: (1) repairing all B-1B avionics components at the B-1B airframe and engine depot repair facility; and (2) not establishing any avionics maintenance repair shops at each of the planned B-1B bases.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Defense has not yet responded to the report.*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTS

PROCUREMENT

Establishing Goals for and Subcontracting With Small and Disadvantaged Businesses Under Public Law 95-507

(PLRD-82-95, 6-30-82)

Department of Defense, General Services Administration, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, and Small Business Administration

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Procurement and Contracts (051.2)

Legislative Authority: P.L. 95-507.

Background

In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the small and disadvantaged business subcontracting program under Public Law 95-507, which essentially requires that all government contracts in excess of \$500,000, or \$1 million for construction contracts, contain a contractor's plan for subcontracting with small and disadvantaged businesses. In addition, GAO reviewed agency procedures for establishing small business prime contracting and subcontracting goals.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that contracting officers are generally obtaining subcontracting plans. However, Department of Defense (DOD) contracting officers did not require 18 prime contractors to submit such plans. Of these, two contractors were granted exemptions because of longstanding contractual relationships with their suppliers. This exemption is allowed by Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR). Small Business Administration (SBA) determinations that subcontracting plans were not acceptable were questionable for 23 of the 161 cases reviewed. In addition, cases which SBA considered unacceptable are acceptable when reviewed using DAR guidance. SBA determinations that some prime contractors did not comply with subcontract-

ing plans were valid. However, SBA did not always send contract administrators its determination reports. Because SBA did not attribute contractors' failure to achieve plans to a lack of good faith, contracting officers took no adverse actions against the contractors. DOD and the General Services Administration (GSA) used sound estimating procedures and methodology in establishing small business prime contracting goals. Likewise, the DOD small and disadvantaged business subcontracting goals were soundly based. However, because of unclear guidance, the GSA small and disadvantaged business subcontracting goals for fiscal years 1981 and 1982 did not consider subcontracting opportunities for prime contractors under \$500,000.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Administrator of OFPP and the Secretary of Defense should resolve the differences between OFPP policy and the DAR on whether contractors can be exempted from submitting plans when they have longstanding contractual relationships with their suppliers.

Target: Office of Federal Procurement Policy

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTS

PROCUREMENT

Improved Energy Management in the Facility Design Process Should Reduce Operating Costs for DOD (PLRD-83-46, 4-8-83)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Procurement and Contracts (051.2)

Legislative Authority: Executive Order 12003. P.L. 92-582.

Background

GAO reported on the Department of Defense (DOD) effort to design energy-efficient buildings for military use and the need for improved procedures in this regard.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that energy management methods used by DOD in the design process do not ensure that the most economical, energy-efficient, new buildings are being built for military use. While DOD has developed energy guidelines, set energy usage objectives, and required energy analyses of designs to reduce energy usage in facilities, these actions are not ensuring that energy reduction goals are being met. GAO found that: (1) energy budgets do not provide a means for determining whether design goals have been met; (2) energy guidelines are inconsistent among the services, and the Army and the Navy implement conservation requirements differently; (3) energy analyses are not always submitted by the architect-engineer, those received are not being adequately reviewed, and the Army and Navy construction agencies are not ensuring that errors in them are corrected; and (4) the Army and the Navy are not always ensuring that firms hired have the expertise needed to design energy-efficient facilities.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should require that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics develop and issue new DOD energy budgets for the various building types and climatic zones and rescind the interim budgets.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

The Secretary of Defense should require that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics issue guidance to the services clearly describing all the factors and assumptions used to calculate budgets and how they are to be used.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

The Secretary of Defense should require that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics require the services to perform additional energy analyses to take into account local environmental conditions, operations, and special project characteristics not

considered in the budgets which might significantly affect energy usage.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

The Secretary of Defense should require that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics give the services technical assistance in implementing energy budgets.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

The Secretary of Defense should require that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics require services to report to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installation and justify instances when the estimated energy usage for a design deviates from its energy budget by 15 percent.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to consolidate, for easy reference, all the energy conservation requirements applicable to facility designs.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

The Secretaries of the Army and the Navy should direct the Chief of Engineers, Army, and the Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), to establish controls to ensure that required energy analyses are submitted.

Target: Department of the Army

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

Target: Department of the Navy

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

The Secretaries of the Army and the Navy should direct the Chief of Engineers, Army, and the Commander, NAVFAC, to establish quality assurance procedures over energy analyses to ensure that all are properly reviewed

for completeness and reasonableness and that design firms correct all significant errors and omissions in them.

Target: Department of the Army

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

Target: Department of the Navy

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

The Secretaries of the Army and the Navy should direct the Chief of Engineers, Army, and the Commander, NAVFAC, to state, when appropriate, that energy conservation expertise is a significant factor in the selection process and require that such expertise be evaluated during the selection process when the contract requires an energy analysis.

Target: Department of the Army

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

Target: Department of the Navy

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

The Secretaries of the Army and the Navy should direct the Chief of Engineers, Army, and the Commander, NAVFAC, to identify training needs of staff in energy analyses training.

Target: Department of the Army

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

Target: Department of the Navy

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTS

PROCUREMENT

Air Force Breakout Efforts Are Ineffective (PLRD-83-82, 6-1-83)

Department of the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Procurement and Contracts (051.2)
Legislative Authority: A.F.R. 57-6.

Background

GAO reviewed the effectiveness of efforts at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center (OC-ALC) to implement the Air Force High Dollar Spare Parts Breakout Program.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO believes that the Air Force is not breaking out, for maximum practicable competition or direct purchase, the high dollar value spare parts supplied by a large prime contractor. GAO stated that breakout efforts have been limited because of lack of information regarding the actual manufacturers of the parts and uncertainty about the government's rights to use technical data prepared by a prime contractor. Further, GAO believes that if the Air Force would develop better ways of identifying actual manufacturers, it could purchase directly from them. Specifically, GAO found that, although aircraft engine replenishment spare parts account for about 7.5 percent of the spare parts that OC-ALC buys from a prime contractor, they represent about 76.6 percent of the procurement dollars. Thus, by avoiding the prime contractor's markup and reducing production leadtime by direct purchase of a portion of these relatively few parts, OC-ALC could maximize savings.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Air Force should improve the effectiveness of the High Dollar Spare Parts Breakout Program by directing all appropriate Air Force units to rescreen all spare parts with procurement method codes of 3, 4, and 5, initially concentrating on procurements due to occur in the near future that come under the definition of the high dollar value replenishment spare parts in the breakout regulation, and establish procedures for identifying actual manufacturers of such parts scheduled for sole-source

procurement from the prime contractor. Actual manufacturers, other than the prime contractor, should be contacted and a determination made as to their capabilities for supplying the parts direct to the Air Force.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Air Force should improve the effectiveness of the High Dollar Spare Parts Breakout Program by directing all appropriate Air Force units to include in all future aircraft engine contracts or contracts for major components where high dollar value spare parts are likely to be purchased a clause that requires: (1) the identification of part manufacturers and suppliers at the time of the initial acquisition; (2) notification of changes in manufacturers and suppliers during the life of the contract; and (3) if the prime contractor fails to make a good faith effort to meet these requirements, any limited rights markings on technical data related to the parts may be canceled or ignored by the contracting officer.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Air Force should improve the effectiveness of the High Dollar Spare Parts Breakout Program by directing the Commanding Officer of OC-ALC to establish the identity of the actual manufacturer of an engineering critical high dollar value replenishment spare part. If there is doubt as to the propriety of the "engineering critical" designation, the Commanding Officer should ask the prime contractor to justify the designation. If the prime contractor refuses or fails to substantiate the claim, the Commanding Officer should initiate action to remove the restrictive markings.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTS

PROCUREMENT

Contract Pricing in the Meals-Ready-To-Eat Program (NSIAD-83-29, 8-8-83)

Defense Logistics Agency

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Procurement and Contracts (051.2)

Background

GAO examined the pricing of a contract for the assembly of individual combat meal packages awarded by the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC).

Findings/Conclusions

The contract was the first in a series of contracts awarded to the same firm for the assembly of the meal packages, called Meals-Ready-To-Eat (MRE). GAO found evidence that the DPSC did not follow sound procurement practices in negotiating the contract. For example, it awarded a fixed-price contract even though the contractor was a newly formed division with no production history. DPSC deviated from the government's usual practice by agreeing to directly reimburse the contractor for leasehold improvements to a production facility, and it did not try to increase competition for the program by telling other contractors in the request for proposals that it was willing to directly reimburse for investments in facilities. In addition, DPSC did not follow all of the requirements of Defense Acquisition Regulations in preparing memorandum records of negotiations; the memorandums did not adequately demonstrate the reasonableness of the negotiated prices, the appropriateness of demands and concessions made in negotiations, or the extent to which the government's interests were protected. DPSC obtained a waiver from following the weighted profit guidelines, but the data supporting the basis for the waiver were incomplete. GAO believes that these poor procurement practices, coupled with audit data that should have been considered, led to acceptance of significantly overstated costs, an allowance of greater profit rate than permitted by the weighted

guidelines, and direct payment to the contractor for leasehold improvements to an assembly building.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Director, Defense Logistics Agency, should direct DPSC to: determine the extent to which the government is entitled to a price adjustment on this contract.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Defense has not yet responded to this recommendation.*

The Director, Defense Logistics Agency, should request that an audit be made to review the pricing of the other MRE program contracts to identify any overpricing or defective pricing and obtain appropriate price adjustments where indicated.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Defense has not yet responded to this recommendation.*

The Director, Defense Logistics Agency, should ensure that its proposed pricing data evaluation on future MRE contracts includes an analysis of the acceptability of the contractors' estimated costs, which should eliminate overpricing and defective pricing such as discussed in this report or identified in the recommended review.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Defense has not yet responded to this recommendation.*

The Director, Defense Logistics Agency, should ensure that the contracting officer prepares and maintains accurate and complete records of negotiations as required by the Defense Acquisition Regulations.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Defense has not yet responded to this recommendation.*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTS

PROCUREMENT

Government Could Save Millions by Revising Its Purchase Specification for Ground Beef
(RCED-84-29, 2-21-84)

Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service; Department of Defense; and Veterans Administration.

Budget Function: Agriculture: Farm Income Stabilization (351.0)

Legislative Authority: School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1755). 7 U.S.C. 612c. Interim Federal Specification PP-B-2120.

Background

The major federal agencies that buy ground beef require that the product meet certain formulation and certification specifications, some of these specifications increase the material costs and restrict the flexibility of suppliers without increasing the quality, flavor, or nutritional value of the meat. GAO reviewed this matter to determine whether the federal government could buy ground beef at a lower cost.

Findings/Conclusions

Ground beef suppliers and meat experts told GAO that, despite the Government's formulation and certification requirements for its meat purchasing, the commercial product, which accounts for more than 95 percent of U.S. ground beef production, is adequate for the government's use. Commercial customers rely on the Department of

Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) to ensure the quality of their meat products. The government could have saved about \$20 million of the \$181 million it spent for ground beef in fiscal year 1982 if it had purchased commercial ground beef. Further, if the responsibility for product quality assurance were transferred to FSIS, at least 2 cents per pound could be saved by eliminating some duplication in the certification process.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Agriculture should modify the federal purchase specification for ground beef to enable the government to purchase ground beef more economically.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTS

PROCUREMENT

Added Emphasis on Consolidation of Multiple Purchase Requests Could Result in Significant Savings (NSIAD-84-143, 8-20-84)

Department of the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Procurement and Contracts (051.2)

Background

GAO reviewed the potential for consolidating multiple procurements at agencies under the U.S. Army Materiel Command, including the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) and the U.S. Army Troop Support and Aviation Materiel Readiness Command, which was recently reorganized as the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) and the U.S. Army Troop Support Command (TROSCOM).

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the agencies reviewed are not consolidating procurements to the maximum extent feasible. Multiple procurement actions have been processed concurrently for identical items, and about 23 percent of the procurements reviewed could have been combined with other purchases of the same items to obtain lower unit prices. GAO found that about 13 percent of the awarded contracts could have been eliminated. GAO believes that the lack of efficiency is caused by: (1) overemphasis by procurement personnel on minimizing the time required to process each procurement; (2) a lack of aggressive action to match procurements for identical items; and (3) a TACOM local directive that had the effect of discouraging consolidation under certain circumstances.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command, should direct the Commanders of AVSCOM, TROSCOM, and TACOM to require documentation and supervisor review of each decision to not consolidate multiple purchase requests. This procedure should require consideration of the potential savings available through consolidation.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

The Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command, should direct the Commanders of AVSCOM, TROSCOM, and TACOM to expedite the handling of purchase requests received in the procurement directorate while another request for like items is being placed on contract. This would allow buyers more time to combine the purchase requests.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

The Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command, should direct the Commander, TACOM, to reevaluate the propriety of the local directive restricting consolidation of multiple purchase requests dated 30 days or more apart.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTS

PROCUREMENT

Defense Fuel Supply Center Procedures for Purchasing Strategic Petroleum Reserve Oil *(RCED-84-61, 9-21-84)*

Departments of Defense and Energy

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Procurement and Contracts (051.2)

Legislative Authority: Energy Policy and Conservation Act (P.L. 94-163). Cargo Preference Act (Merchant Marine) (46 U.S.C. 1241(b)). Truth in Negotiations Act (Military Procurement).

Background

Pursuant to a congressional request to monitor the development, fill, and operation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), GAO reviewed the Defense Fuel Supply Center's (DFSC) oil purchasing procedures during the period from February 1981 to May 1983.

Findings/Conclusions

Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition regulations require DFSC to: (1) negotiate contract prices that are fair, reasonable, and result in the lowest overall cost to the government; (2) use competitive procedures; and (3) perform a cost analysis to determine whether offers are fair and reasonable. GAO found that DFSC used a 2-week solicitation and negotiation process to competitively purchase oil on the spot market and similar procedures for long-term contracts. DFSC formulated a market price analysis process to establish a price range for each crude oil type and to select offers within a price range that minimized the cost to the government. GAO found that a price analysis was performed for each spot market solici-

tation during the period reviewed and that the prices for most of the contracts awarded during fiscal year 1982 fell within the spot market price ranges. GAO concluded that DFSC procedures generally ensured fair and reasonable prices at the lowest overall cost to the government. However, GAO determined that DFSC could have paid \$1.9 million less during the period evaluated and still acquired oil of acceptable quality if it had been more flexible in its purchasing practices.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should instruct the Commander, DFSC, to develop formal guidelines for the contracting officer to use for making exceptions to the DFSC purchase procedures. In particular, the guidelines should allow for consideration of offers for acceptable quality oil that slightly exceed the spot market high price but result in lower per barrel acquisition costs.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTS

PROCUREMENT

Establishing New Federal Food-Buying Procedures Would Help Eliminate Unnecessary Special Examinations

RCED-84-150, 9-24-84)

Departments of Agriculture and Defense, and Veterans Administration

Budget Function: Agriculture: Agricultural Research and Services (352.0)

Legislative Authority: Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.). Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (15 U.S.C. 1451 et seq.). Meat Inspection Act (21 U.S.C. 601 et seq.). Poultry Products Inspection Act (21 U.S.C. 451 et seq.). Egg Products Inspection Law (21 U.S.C. 1031 et seq.).

Background

GAO reviewed federal practices for accepting food purchases to determine if federal costs could be decreased by reducing the number of special examinations necessary to ensure the quality of accepted products.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the direct cost of certification services was \$18 million in fiscal year 1982. Although the Department of Agriculture has instructed other federal agencies to waive certification when it is not cost effective, some agencies routinely require certification because federal buying agencies do not have procedures for weighing the costs and benefits of certification. Some agencies believe that certification is necessary because suppliers who have previously supplied defective products cannot be excluded from competition for food procurements, but GAO noted that agencies may consider past performance in determining suppliers' responsibility. GAO also found that: (1) many certifications duplicate industry quality control efforts or required federal inspections; and (2) certification can be extremely costly because the costs of increased production time brought on by unnecessary certification are passed on to the government by suppliers. GAO noted that the costs of certification of one purchase of ground beef amounted to 9.3 percent of the total value of the purchase.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretaries of Agriculture and Defense and the Administrator of Veterans Affairs should direct their respective food-buying agencies to establish procedures which would require that the costs and benefits of certification be weighed before deciding to require that specific food purchases be certified. To determine the cost of certification which may be required for a specific food purchase, the buying agency should request suppliers to identify the food price with and without the cost of certification and inform prospective suppliers that certification costs may be waived for qualifying suppliers.

Target: Department of Agriculture

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

Target: Department of Defense

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

Target: Veterans Administration

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

To assist buyers in weighing the benefits of certification, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Defense and the Administrator of Veterans Affairs should direct their buying agencies to establish procedures for obtaining available information on suppliers' qualifications and past records of performance from the Food and Drug Administration and the Food Safety and Inspection Service.

Target: Department of Agriculture

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

Target: Department of Defense

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

Target: Veterans Administration

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

The Secretary of Agriculture should direct the Agricultural Marketing Service to recognize existing safety and quality control systems and to review and revise its certification procedures for meat and poultry products to: (1) eliminate certification procedures that duplicate existing safety inspection procedures; (2) reduce certification effort where the Food Safety and Inspection Service has found that the suppliers' quality control systems provide adequate assurance of product quality; and (3) reconsider the recommendations included in the report on the task force review of meat grading and certification control methods and procedures.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not yet responded to the final report.*

MILITARY PAY

ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS

Dual Compensation Is Paid When Military Reservists Do Not Waive VA Disability Benefits (HRD-84-13, 11-18-83)

Department of Defense and Veterans Administration

Budget Function: National Defense: Military Pay (051.3)

Background

GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Administration (VA) efforts to prevent dual compensation from being paid to reservists who receive VA disability benefits.

Findings/Conclusions

Although the agencies have taken actions within recent years to better identify reservists who should be waiving VA benefits, about 65 percent of these reservists continue to receive dual compensation. GAO estimated that in fiscal year 1982 VA paid about \$2.2 million in benefits that should have been waived. GAO suggests that increased coordination between DOD and VA is needed to prevent dual compensation payments.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct DOD to provide the results of the tape matches to VA.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Administrator of Veterans Affairs should direct that VA, for the next match, review its records for all paid reservists identified as receiving compensation to identify missing, improperly processed, and unprocessed waivers.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Administrator of Veterans Affairs should direct that VA establish an annual reservist waiver indicator in its automated records when waiver actions are processed so that

missing waivers can be identified in subsequent tape matches.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Administrator of Veterans Affairs should direct that VA solicit waivers from reservists who have not already submitted them and advise DOD when reservists do not submit waivers.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of Veterans Affairs should direct that their respective agencies make arrangements to identify the extent to which waivers were not submitted, not processed, or improperly processed for prior years and take appropriate corrective action.

Target: Department of Defense

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct DOD to continue to make an annual tape match to identify reservists who should submit waivers. The data that are matched should include all reservists who could be subject to waiver, and the results of the match should be edited to reduce inaccurate data.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

MILITARY PAY

BONUS PROGRAMS

Army Incentive Funds Need More Effective Targeting To Reduce Critical Personnel Shortages (FPCD-83-10, 3-2-83)

Department of the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Military Pay (051.3)

Background

GAO reported on its review of the Army's Selected Reserve Incentive Program. The purpose of the review was to determine whether the Army is: (1) targeting incentive funds to correct the more critical personnel shortages in units and skills; and (2) adequately evaluating the effects of the incentives on strength levels.

Findings/Conclusions

Although Army policy is to target incentives to high-priority units and critical skills, GAO found that about one-third of the incentives awarded in fiscal year 1981 went to persons with noncritical skills in low-priority units. The poor use of incentive funds resulted from changes in criteria the Army used to determine eligibility for incentives. GAO found that units no longer classified as high priority continued to be eligible to award new incentives. Moreover, GAO found that the Army did not know whether incentives were being effectively targeted because it had not developed an adequate reporting system on their use. Beginning in fiscal year 1983, the Army deleted low-priority units from incentive eligibility and began basing eligibility for critical skills on specific occupations rather than the broader career management fields. Although expenditures for the incentive program have increased, the Army has not determined the effectiveness of the incentives in assisting selected reserve recruiting and retention efforts. Data are not available to determine whether the

program is reducing personnel shortages in essential units and skills or to assist Congress to determine whether the program should be modified.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Army should discuss eligibility criteria, relative to the congressional intent of the program, when testifying in connection with congressional oversight hearings and appropriations requests.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretary of the Army should develop and implement a plan for evaluating the incentive program which would provide significant, valid, and reliable information on the effect of the program on essential skills or units.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretary of the Army should use the results of the evaluation as a basis for making any necessary program adjustments.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

The Secretary of the Army should discuss evaluation results when testifying in connection with congressional oversight hearings and appropriations requests.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

MILITARY PAY

PERSONNEL SUPPORT SERVICES

Small Percentage of Military Families Eligible for Food Stamps (FPCD-83-25, 4-19-83)

Departments of Agriculture and Defense

Budget Function: Income Security: Housing Assistance and Other Income Supplements (604.0)

Legislative Authority: P.L. 97-248, S. Rept. 97-494, 7 U.S.C. 2014(d), 37 U.S.C. 101(25).

Background

GAO determined whether the reportedly large percentage of military families eligible for food stamps actually met the benefits criteria, and it reviewed the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) program administrative practices.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that only a small percentage of military families are eligible to receive food stamps and most of those families qualify only because their government-furnished housing is not counted as income. However, there are some families who would be eligible for food stamps regardless of their housing status, and USDA has provided them with the appropriate information concerning their benefits. GAO noted that, under certain circumstances, especially when parents are assigned away from home, there is potential abuse of the program. Inadequate reporting of income and housing status changes also contributes to ineligible families' receiving food stamp benefits.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Agriculture should issue new guidelines that would ensure that households would not become eli-

gible for food stamps solely because of an active duty-related absence.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 08/85

The Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, should propose legislation to amend 7 U.S.C. 2014(d) to require that government-furnished housing be included in the gross income computation for determining food stamp eligibility.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Repeated inquiries with Agriculture have failed to elicit a statement as to when or if it intends to implement this recommendation. Defense agreed with the recommendation, but action must be initiated by Agriculture.*

The Secretary of Agriculture should instruct the food stamp caseworkers that, in addition to any other recertifications, they should recalculate food stamp eligibility for all military food stamp recipients at the same time the amount of the annually scheduled military pay raise becomes known.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 08/85

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

INDIVIDUAL SYSTEM STUDIES

The Army's AH-64 Helicopter and Hellfire Missile Retain Risks as They Enter Production (C-MASAD-83-9, 1-26-83)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Weapons Systems (051.1)

Background

GAO reviewed the risks still facing the AH-64 advanced attack helicopter and the Hellfire missile upon entering production and the progress the Department of Defense has made in addressing these risks. The programs' affordability will continue to meet congressional questioning as future production increments are considered for funding.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that there are no indications at this time that either the AH-64 or Hellfire programs should not continue on their present schedules. However, some aspects of both programs bear watching if they are to continue the progress they have made in the past year. GAO pointed out that the government must complete testing and evaluation to verify the success of modifications made to certain critical components which earlier had exhibited some performance problems. Defense officials have closely managed the production aspects of both programs, and many uncertainties have become better understood. Projected costs for building the AH-64 and the Hellfire have escalated the original procurement cost figures and, the

Army has reduced significantly the number of helicopters to be procured. GAO stated that the actual affordability of the programs cannot be adequately determined until the production stage has begun and several areas of uncertainty are clarified.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should develop firm Hellfire quantity requirements, including those needed for testing and training and have their cost reflected in the total program cost.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should have an Army test and evaluation agency conduct realistic operational testing of the automatic test station and evaluate the results before its fielding.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 05/85

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

INDIVIDUAL SYSTEM STUDIES

Results of Forthcoming Critical Tests Are Needed To Confirm Army Remotely Piloted Vehicle's Readiness for Production

(NSIAD-84-72, 4-4-84)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Weapons Systems (051.1)

Background

GAO reviewed the changes made in the Army's remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) program during the past 2 years and analyzed the work that remains ahead. This report is one in a series of annual reports on the status of selected major weapon systems.

Findings/Conclusions

The Army is developing the RPV to provide field surveillance information which it relays to supporting ground units. GAO noted that the cost of the RPV program is estimated to be \$2.44 billion, an increase of \$1.9 billion since the baseline estimate in 1978. A major part of this increase was due to technical problems, reduced funding allocations which lengthened the program's schedule, and the addition of an infrared vision system. The remaining increase is attributable to changes in the system's concept that involve enhancements necessary to expand mission capabilities. GAO believes that the number of enhancements may represent too ambitious a program and that the potential exists for additional substantial cost increases. While most of the subsystems which had earlier technical difficulties have shown good progress when tested individually, their integration may prove difficult and

this may delay initial production. Other significant problems which developed during the past year involved the vehicle's weight and the software which overtaxed the computer's internal capacity. GAO found that the tight development schedule allows little room for setbacks.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Army should analyze the planned RPV system enhancements to determine their cost effectiveness and affordability before including them in future budget requests.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Defense will initiate action after the ASARC/DSARC III decision in August 1985.*

The Secretary of the Army should determine, through analysis, whether the number of air vehicles under the new employment concept provides enough flight hours of air coverage for the artillery mission and other missions being contemplated.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Defense will initiate action after the ASARC/DSARC III decision in August 1985.*

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

INDIVIDUAL SYSTEM STUDIES

The Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile: Resolve Uncertainties Before Production (C-NSIAD-84-18, 5-7-84)

Departments of Defense, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Weapons Systems (051.1)

Background

GAO conducted a review to examine the potential usefulness and progress of the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) System which the Air Force and the Navy are developing.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the AMRAAM might go into production without adequate assurance that it will be operationally effective. If all goes as planned, the Air Force will exercise several priced production options while some initial operational testing and evaluation is still going on. However, the risks involved in committing resources before completing testing may be greater than the Air Force currently envisions due to potential delays in development and testing schedules. If such delays occur, the Air Force will have inadequate information on the expiration dates for the production options. In addition, GAO found that the program's estimated cost has more than tripled since concept validation began 4 years ago, it does not include all costs, and there is some uncertainty associated with certain cost elements. If costs are not controlled, potential cost increases could affect the procurement rate, inventory levels, and the overall combat effectiveness of the pro-

gram. Finally, GAO found that the Air Force's cost effectiveness study excluded some significant costs and did not consider recent cost increases.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to explore the feasibility of negotiating a contract modification which would provide that production options not expire until specific test objectives have been achieved in initial operational test and evaluation with F-15 and F-16 aircraft.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 11/84

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Navy to: (1) make a joint cost-effectiveness study using the most complete and current cost and performance estimates; and (2) use the results of that study to determine how force-level effectiveness would be affected by reductions in planned procurement rates.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 05/85

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLANNING

Logistics Planning for the M1 Tank: Implications for Reduced Readiness and Increased Support Costs (PLRD-81-33, 7-1-81)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Weapons Systems (051.1)

Background

Integrated logistics support (ILS) is the approach to weapons systems development which attempts to link development and production to deployment and operation. GAO examined the M1 tank ILS planning and strategies to: (1) identify options for improving the M1 ILS program, (2) determine whether the implementation of current planning strategies will provide adequate logistics support, and (3) evaluate alternative logistics strategies which could more economically provide effective logistics support. The review was undertaken in response to growing congressional concern over the support costs for weapon systems which have been drastically increasing while recently fielded systems are not achieving required operational readiness.

Findings/Conclusions

ILS has not been adequate or timely for the M1 tank program. Although recent planning efforts have improved, many supportability questions remain and opportunities exist to reduce M1 support costs. M1 program emphasis has been on achieving established design-to-cost objectives and fielding a tank within a 7-year development cycle. As a consequence of this program momentum, there was little early emphasis on logistical support and life-cycle cost issues. The ongoing DOD operational and developmental M1 testing is supposed to provide the data needed to answer questions on operational supportability. However, GAO believes that emerging results from current testing raise serious doubts that the M1 will be proven supportable before full production and fielding decisions are made. GAO is concerned that the past momentum of the M1 program will push the program forward even

though many supportability issues remain. DOD believes that the M1 is supportable and that the current testing will provide adequate supportability information on which to base a sound full production and fielding decision in September 1981. GAO believes that improvements can be made in evaluating test data to measure supportability better and to provide better data on which to base upcoming production and fielding decisions. Also, information on the M1 supportability and the potential that insufficient data will be available to support the upcoming M1 program decisions should be made available to Congress.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should support the life-cycle cost reduction programs during future program and budget reviews.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the various DOD components to implement effective life-cycle cost reduction programs.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should require the Secretary of the Army to direct that maintenance planning in future development programs be adequately done to minimize design-dictated maintenance, to ensure cost-effective field repair capability, and to provide timely transition from contractor depot support to in-house capability.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLANNING

Air-Launched Cruise Missile: Logistics Planning Problems and Implications for Other Weapon Systems (PLRD-82-68, 5-10-82)

Departments of Defense, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Weapons Systems (051.1)

Legislative Authority: DOD Directive 4151.1. DOD Directive 4151.16.

Background

GAO reviewed the integrated logistics support (ILS) planning for the Air Force's air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) and the related B-52 carrier aircraft modifications programs.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found a number of problems which will inhibit the economy and effectiveness of logistics support for the systems. These problems were primarily caused by the programs' concurrent development and production acquisition strategy, which was adopted to meet the required operational availability date for the ALCM. Specifically, GAO found that: (1) program constraints created special problems for logistics planners, which made it difficult to ensure timely and accurate logistics support; (2) action on suggested design changes to improve logistics supportability was given a low priority; (3) testing programs which

would provide needed information on logistics supportability requirements were delayed, and a program to develop depot maintenance capabilities was deferred; and (4) management tools, such as logistics support analysis, life-cycle costing, and budgeting for logistics resources, could be used more effectively. GAO also found that logistics support costs for the ALCM and other cruise-missile variants might be reduced by consolidating depot maintenance for those components which are common to the missile system.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should determine whether cost savings can be achieved by consolidating depot maintenance for common cruise-missile components.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 06/88

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLANNING

Intermediate-Level Maintenance for Navy Tactical Missiles Can Be Better Managed (NSIAD-84-64, 3-5-84)

Departments of Defense and the Navy

Budget Function: National Defense: Weapons Systems (051.1)

Background

GAO reviewed the Navy's management of intermediate-level maintenance for tactical missiles.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the cost of missile maintenance reached about \$23 million in fiscal year 1983 and, although the Navy has made some maintenance improvements, it needs to make further improvements if maintenance activities are to be effectively managed. GAO believes that better techniques are needed to monitor and evaluate the performance of missile maintenance activities for air- and surface-launched missiles.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Navy should direct both air- and surface-launched missile maintenance managers to: (1)

collect actual labor-hour expenditure data from their activities; (2) analyze and compare these data; and (3) based on the data, set specific goals for improving maintenance productivity.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Navy should direct the surface-launched missile maintenance managers to develop work-measurement standards for the major intermediate-level maintenance jobs.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLANNING

Requisitions for M-1 Components Are Not Justified by Past Demands (NSIAD-84-118, 5-29-84)

Department of the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Weapons Systems (051.1)

Legislative Authority: A.R. 710-2.

Background

During a review of the fielding of the M-1 tank in Europe, GAO examined Army general supply policies and new equipment spare parts provisions actions by the U.S. Army, Europe.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that two Army units had requisitioned M-1 tank components valued at \$511,000 which were not justified by past demands. The units requisitioned direct exchange assets to eliminate identified shortages based on inventory control recommended supply levels for the number of tanks fielded. However A.R. 710-2 provides that a reparable component must have at least six demands per year to be added to the direct exchange stock list and three demands per year to be retained on the list. A sample of M-1 component demand histories identified 21 items that had not experienced the minimum number of requests to be retained on the list. GAO reported that the requisitions were inappropriate based on the M-1 tank's record of operational readiness, Army supply policies, and actual parts demands.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army, Europe, should cancel the requisitions submitted by VII Corps'

support activity for those components listed in enclosure I of this report.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army, Europe, should apply direct exchange supply policies in A.R. 710-2 to the remaining M-1 direct exchange component requisitions submitted by VII Corps' support activity and cancel those which are not justified by demands.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The agency has not notified GAO of an action date.*

The Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army, Europe, should cancel the division's requisitions listed in enclosure II of this report.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army, Europe, should base future requisitions on the policies in A.R. 710-2.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

MISSION ANALYSIS

Some Land Attack Cruise Missile Acquisition Programs Need To Be Slowed Down (C-MASAD-81-9, 2-28-81)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Weapons Systems (051.1)

Background

Cruise missiles are subsonic, jet-powered airframes that are being acquired to deliver nuclear or conventional warheads against a variety of targets. GAO reviewed some major areas of concern with regard to matters which affect the acquisition and deployment of these missiles.

Findings/Conclusions

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has placed the highest national priority on deployment of the Air-Launched Cruise Missile system in order to preclude shortfalls in strategic weapons in the 1980's. Accordingly, a rigorous, success-oriented, highly concurrent schedule was established. Production of the missile was authorized, even though a number of critical problems remained to be resolved. Specifically: (1) operational testing completed before the production decision revealed that mission reliability of the system was deficient and that it failed to demonstrate important missile performance features; (2) the testing that had been done was not operationally realistic; (3) engine reliability was still a matter of serious concern; (4) certain components which were essential to the system's performance have not been available for operational testing; (5) a critical measurement program was about a year behind schedule; and (6) errors were found in

the terrain elevation data base. The Navy plans to request authority to begin full-scale production of the first tactical land attack cruise missile system. Major problems have to be resolved before that time including: (1) cruise missiles probably will not be sufficiently accurate to deliver conventional warheads; (2) because of exposure to enemy defensive systems, it is doubtful that the missiles will survive when delivering certain nonnuclear warheads; and (3) no statement of mission need has been prepared to support acquisition of the Tomahawk or Medium Range Air-to-Surface Missiles.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should closely monitor the Air-Launched Cruise Missile program to ensure the resolution of operational testing issues, engine reliability problems, uncertainty about terrain roughness thresholds, and deficiencies in the terrain elevation data base prior to deployment.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 05/85

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

MISSION ANALYSIS

Navy Needs To Increase S-3A Readiness To Ensure Effective Use of Planned Weapon System Improvements

(C-MASAD-83-6, 1-26-83)

Departments of Defense and the Navy

Budget Function: National Defense: Weapons Systems (051.1)

Background

GAO reviewed the S-3A carrier-based aircraft improvement program and assessed the issues which may determine the effectiveness of the planned program.

Findings/Conclusions

The Navy has embarked on a \$1.3 billion weapon system improvement program which is a major modification to the S-3A program. GAO noted that the S-3A program office is concerned about timely delivery and additional funding needed for its operational software and also a \$15 million congressional cut in fiscal year 1983 research and development funds. GAO stated that critical to the success of the improvement program is the Navy's ability to increase the aircraft's operation readiness. The Navy's present efforts include establishing the Readiness Improvement Program, the Operational and Safety Improvement Program, and initiatives by the Chief of Naval Oper-

ations. GAO found that poor operational readiness has been caused by low reliability and maintainability of equipment as well as shortages of trained flight and maintenance personnel and inadequate spares support. GAO stated that the Navy has sufficient aircraft for current active squadrons, but there are not enough aircraft available for attrition and reserve squadrons. GAO stated that currently it cannot assess the increase in operational readiness, because the Navy has changed its readiness reporting methods.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should require the Navy to provide assurance that the operational readiness goal will be attained or, if not attainable, that the mission capability can be fulfilled with a lesser performance.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/84.

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

MISSION ANALYSIS

Status of the CG-47 Cruiser and DDG-51 Destroyer Shipbuilding Programs
(C-MASAD-83-11, 2-22-83)

Departments of Defense and the Navy

Budget Function: National Defense: Weapons Systems (051.1)

Background

In response to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the status of the Navy's CG-47 cruiser and DDG-51 destroyer shipbuilding programs and commented on issues raised in prior GAO reports.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that: (1) operational testing of the CG-47 AEGIS combat system was not adequately completed before it was commissioned; (2) the Navy plans to install SPS-49 radar systems on the CG-47 class against congressional wishes and an earlier GAO recommendation; (3) the CG-47 displacement and center of gravity exceed design goals which could have an adverse effect on the

ship's speed and stability; and (4) the estimated cost of the DDG-51 destroyer has increased to the point where the Chief of Naval Operations has said that it is not affordable and is no longer a cost alternative to the CG-47.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should closely monitor the Navy's February 1983 review of its proposal to modify an existing target to fully test AEGIS. If the Secretary is convinced that the proposal will meet testing requirements, approval should be given to start development.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

MISSION ANALYSIS

Air Force and Navy Trainer Aircraft Acquisition Programs (MASAD-83-22, 7-5-83)

Departments of Defense, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Weapons Systems (051.1)

Legislative Authority: P.L. 97-252.

Background

GAO reviewed three proposed Navy and Air Force programs to acquire 1,184 trainer aircraft at a cost of about \$10.8 billion during the next 20 to 25 years.

Findings/Conclusions

The Navy has changed its plan to buy 282 T-45 trainer aircraft which can operate from aircraft carriers. To reduce costs in the early program years, it plans to buy a mixed fleet of 305 aircraft, of which 251 would be carrier-capable. GAO found that a mixed aircraft fleet is feasible, but may be more costly, and the Navy might be able to avoid buying a mixed fleet. Despite a congressional desire to have training aircraft meet the needs of both the Navy and the Air Force, the Air Force probably will not procure any T-45's because they do not meet Air Force performance requirements. No periodic reports on the status of this program have been presented to Congress. GAO found that the estimated costs for the full-scale development of the T-46A aircraft increased 5

percent from July 1981 to June 1982 because of inflation and an extended production schedule. GAO found that there is overlap between development and production schedules which may delay the development schedule or result in the need to make post-production changes in the aircraft. The Navy is not interested in acquiring this aircraft due to its cost. Congress failed to appropriate funds for the Tanker-Transport-Bomber Training System in 1983, but the Air Force is requesting 1984 funds to begin development of the system.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Navy to develop a firm program plan which discloses the uncertainties, risk, and judgment factors involved in determining the quantity of T-45 aircraft to be procured, the procurement schedule, and funding requirements.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 02/85

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

MISSION ANALYSIS

Joint Major System Acquisition by the Military Services: An Elusive Strategy
(NSIAD-84-22, 12-23-83)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Weapons Systems (051.1)

Background

GAO undertook a review to determine how the merger strategy has been working in the military services' joint major system acquisitions and to offer some guidelines for criteria in joint programs.

Findings/Conclusions

The first joint major system acquisition program was initiated in the 1960's, and a number of other joint programs have been formed or are still in development. However, specific criteria for choosing a joint program have yet to be established. GAO has found little communality in the joint program systems deployed and few satisfied services or documented savings. The major problem in establishing joint programs is getting the services to agree on joint requirements. The Department of Defense (DOD) has few formal processes to harmonize the mission needs of services, and GAO stated that system acquisition experts were pessimistic about joint acquisitions under present arrangements. Joint programs are intended to lessen budget problems and satisfy the needs of more than one user. Therefore, GAO offered the following guidelines which might help in selecting promising joint program candidates: (1) essential service doctrines should not be unduly compromised; (2) program development

should not be so advanced that the programs are not malleable; (3) military effectiveness should not be unduly lessened; (4) the programs' potential for economy should be persuasive; and (5) there should be program support by Congress, the Secretary of Defense, top military officers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Recommendations to Congress

Congress ought to be assured that the selection criteria have been applied for proposed new joint acquisition programs.

Status: Action not yet initiated.

Congress should require DOD to explain its plans to cope with the acquisition problems discussed in this report for the many joint programs underway.

Status: Action in process.

Recommendations to Agencies

DOD should develop specific criteria for selecting joint programs. The guidelines suggested by GAO should be helpful in developing criteria. Future program mergers should be in accordance with such criteria.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

MISSION BUDGETING

DOD Needs To Provide More Credible Weapon Systems Cost Estimates to the Congress (NSIAD-84-70, 5-24-84)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: National Defense: Weapons Systems (051.1)

Legislative Authority: Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982 (P.L. 97-86). DOD Instruction 5000.2. DOD Directive 5000.1. DOD Directive 5000.4. DOD Instruction 7000.3. OMB Circular A-76. NAVMATINST 7000.19B. OPNAVINST 7000.17A.

Background

In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) cost estimating process on seven selected weapon systems. GAO noted that, while its sample does not permit a projection of the results servicewide or DOD-wide, the cases do illustrate the types of problems that have hampered effective cost estimating for weapon systems.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that, while DOD has initiated efforts to improve cost estimating and reporting, the estimating process could be further improved with better guidance, assumptions, and methodologies. In particular, GAO noted that some guidance provided in DOD and service instructions is vague and conflicting and that guidance is not always strictly implemented to ensure that estimates are properly structured, documented, and developed. In addition, while DOD instructions call for the use of realistic factors and assumptions, management's efforts to keep cost estimates as low as possible sometimes lead to optimistic estimates. GAO also believes that the recommendations of independent estimators should be thoroughly considered and that the reasons for not accepting such estimates should be documented. Finally, GAO stated that DOD reports to Congress on the cost, schedule, and performance of major weapon systems could be improved by expeditiously recognizing total anticipated program costs and reflecting them in the reports.

Recommendations to Congress

Congress may want to require DOD to certify that the cost estimates it reports are prepared according to sound cost estimating guidelines and represent the total cost for the weapon systems program. Programs in danger of breaching these estimates should undergo a rigorous evaluation by DOD and Congress.

Status: Action in process.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that all estimates are fully documented.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *No status available until the official DOD response is issued.*

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that appropriate methodologies are used to develop the estimate.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *No status available until the official DOD response is issued.*

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the estimate is updated when significant changes occur in the program.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *No status available until the official DOD response is issued.*

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that program risks and uncertainties be fully identified in DOD cost estimates. Cost estimators should be directed to structure their estimating assumptions to consider proven historical cost growth drivers, such as technical changes due to engineering problems and added requirements, schedule changes, and funding instability.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *No status available until the official DOD response is issued.*

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that inflation should be calculated consistently and in accordance with DOD procedures.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *No status available until the official DOD response is issued.*

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that cost estimates be based on realistic assumptions rather than optimistic assumptions.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *No status available until the official DOD response is issued.*

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that cost discipline be enforced by establishing the total program acquisition cost estimate developed for the production milestone as a not-to-exceed threshold. A program danger of breaching the threshold should be assessed to determine whether it should be restructured, discontinued, or permitted to proceed as planned.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *No status available until the official DOD response is issued.*

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that DOD management make fuller use of independent estimates. The

independent estimates should not be arbitrarily accepted, but the recommendations of the independent estimators should be considered and decisions not to accept them should be fully explained and documented.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *No status available until the official DOD response is issued.*

To provide more realistic cost reports to Congress, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that SARs report all relevant program costs (such as operation and support), use the most current data, and report costs in a consistent manner. In an exceptional situation where costs are excluded from the estimate, those costs should be clearly identified and the rationale for their exclusion explained.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *No status available until the official DOD response is issued.*

To provide more realistic cost reports to Congress, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that clear criteria are established regarding the costs to be included in the officially approved program for a weapon system.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *No status available until the official DOD response is issued.*

To provide more realistic cost reports to Congress, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that DOD disclose the total number of units it is considering for a program by providing an SAR footnote when that number is different from the approved program reported in the body of the SAR.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *No status available until the official DOD response is issued.*

To provide more realistic cost reports to Congress, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that unit cost exception reports disclose any anticipated cost growth that has not been included in the latest officially approved estimate.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *No status available until the official DOD response is issued.*

The Secretary of Defense should revise Office of the Secretary of Defense and service cost estimating guidance to ensure that it is clear and consistent.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *No status available until the official DOD response is issued.*

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

TESTING

Better Management of Threat Simulators and Aerial Targets Is Crucial to Effective Weapon Systems Performance

(MASAD-83-27, 6-23-83)

Departments of Defense, the Army, and the Navy

Budget Function: National Defense: Weapons Systems (051.1)

Legislative Authority: P.L. 92-156.

Background

GAO reported on the Department of Defense's (DOD) capability to test its weapon systems. Specifically, GAO focused on the adequacy of aerial targets and testing against two of the more significant threats to the military services: the newer Soviet aircraft and missile systems and the Soviets' considerable capabilities in electronic warfare.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that important weapons will be deployed without their having fully demonstrated their capabilities under representative combat conditions, because development of electronic warfare threat simulators and aerial targets have not kept pace with the deployment of the enemy's weapons. Realistic testing requires test resources that duplicate the characteristics of the enemy's weapon systems. GAO noted that the shortcomings in testing have been primarily caused by problems in four areas: test resource planning, organizational structures, management emphasis, and intelligence support. GAO believes that, although resolving issues in these areas will not solve all testing problems, it will ultimately result in better tested and more effective weapons for DOD fighting forces.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense, to improve the planning and management of critical test resources, should require the Director, Defense Test and Evaluation, to enforce existing

requirements for the preparation and approval of weapon system Test and Evaluation Master Plans (TEMP's) before the demonstration/validation and subsequent decision milestones.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense, to improve the planning and management of critical test resources, should require predemonstration/validation phase TEMP's to state whether or not test resource requirements are available and outline what actions have been or need to be taken to develop or acquire those not available. In addition, the effect of being unable to test against the full threat spectrum should be clearly identified.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense, to improve the planning and management of critical test resources, should establish a joint-service threat simulator and aerial target improvement program to identify, time phase, and prioritize DOD-wide test resource deficiencies, and start development of the resources necessary to match the test capability with current requirements.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

TESTING

The Army Needs More Comprehensive Evaluations To Make Effective Use of Its Weapon System Testing (NSIAD-84-40, 2-24-84)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: National Defense: Weapons Systems (051.1)

Background

Evaluations of development and operational tests are used to assess the progress of new weapon systems as they proceed through development. As part of its continuing assessment of major weapon system acquisition management, GAO reviewed the Army evaluation process and discussed improvements that could better inform decisionmakers about a system's progress in development and operational effectiveness.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that Army evaluators have not been giving acquisition officials adequate technical and operational evaluations to fully assess weapons' development progress and potential combat usefulness. In most cases, the evaluations seldom went beyond reciting the test results and did not address critical issues, such as the consequences of fielding the system before resolving remaining technical problems. Evaluations need to be broadened and integrated to provide a more meaningful and coherent picture of system development progress and potential operational effectiveness. This will require greater participation by Army analysts in planning evaluations and in determining the technical and operational implications of test findings.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Army should seek the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council decisionmakers' concurrence on critical is-

ssues that are to be evaluated for each proposed weapon system.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 06/86

The Army should transmit these issues to the pertinent Army test evaluation and analysis organizations so that they can be addressed in the test reports and analyses which they will be providing for inclusion in the overall evaluation of new systems.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 06/86

The Army should prepare, for critical major acquisition decision points, a comprehensive evaluation of the weapon system under review by integrating the reports and analyses of the individual test evaluation and analysis organizations.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 06/86

The Army should make the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity responsible for providing risk assessments to the decisionmakers.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 06/85

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS

Improvements Needed in Operating and Using the Army Automated Facilities Engineer Cost Accounting System

(AFMD-82-27, 5-19-82)

Departments of Defense and the Army

Budget Function: Financial Management and Information Systems: Accounting Systems in Operation (998.1)

Legislative Authority: Accounting and Auditing Act.

Background

GAO reported on the need for the Army to improve its automated Facilities Engineer Job Order Cost Accounting System and to better utilize it in managing the operation and maintenance of real property facilities. The review was made to determine whether the Army was operating and using the system in accordance with the approved system design.

Findings/Conclusions

The Army has invested much time and money in designing and implementing this cost and accounting system. By 1982, it had been implemented at about 70 installations. Ultimately, the Army plans to extend the system to about 150 installations around the world. However, users have not been convinced that the system is sound and that it could lead to more efficient and effective operations. At the installations, cost accounting system data were not being effectively used to manage facility engineer operations. Managers were not being held fully accountable for project costs incurred. At the installations visited, reported actual costs incurred on about 80 percent of the projects varied by more than 10 percent from the estimated costs. On 40 percent of the projects reviewed, reported actual costs varied by more than 50 percent from estimated costs. Managers did not research these variances and, therefore, did not know why they occurred or how to correct them. Because managers were not using the system, personnel had little incentive to see that system data were accurate, complete, and timely. GAO approved the system design 5 years ago with the understanding that certain problems would be corrected, but this has not been fully accomplished. Adequate training has not been provided to user personnel. Because

cost reports produced by the system are so lengthy and do not present data in convenient formats, facility managers have been reluctant to use them. GAO believes that, with the incorporation of the design changes, the system is worthwhile.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to: (1) direct installation operating personnel to prepare and enter cost information into the system in an accurate, complete, and timely manner; (2) revise cost report formats to permit ready use by management and to include more use of management exception reports; (3) correct the two system design deficiencies which GAO identified when it approved the system; (4) adequately train system users to operate the system and use its reports; and (5) make sure through periodic review that managers use the cost data and other information contained in the automated Facilities Engineer Job Order Cost Accounting System to effectively maintain and operate Army facilities.

Target: Department of the Army

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 09/86

The Secretary of Defense should take these actions before the system is implemented at the remaining installations scheduled for conversion.

Target: Department of the Army

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 09/86

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS

Criteria for Recording Obligations for Defense Stock Fund Purchases Should Be Changed (AFMD-83-54, 8-19-83)

Department of Defense

Budget Function: Financial Management and Information Systems: Regulatory Accounting Rules and Financial Reporting (998.6)

Background

GAO evaluated Department of Defense (DOD) procedures for obligating operation and maintenance appropriations for stock fund purchases to determine whether the obligations are being made in accord with existing statutory requirements. Defense stock funds finance the purchase of materials and common-use items and hold these items in inventory until purchased by military service or DOD customers, and customer activities use appropriated funds to reimburse the stock fund for the cost of items delivered.

Findings/Conclusions

DOD regulations have required that obligations for purchases from stock funds be recorded at the time the material is dropped from stock fund inventory records for delivery to the customer. This policy can present a problem because the customer has little control over when funds are obligated, and the inability to record obligations until ordered items are delivered by the stock fund creates additional problems near the end of the fiscal year. GAO has long held the opinion that DOD criteria should be changed so that obligations for stock fund purchases are recorded at the time orders are placed to improve administrative controls over appropriations. In 1974, DOD attempted to make this change in criteria, but the Senate Appropriations Committee would not allow the change in

accounting procedures. As a result, DOD continued to require the military services to obligate appropriations at the time of delivery. Despite this DOD policy, the military services have changed their procedures and record obligations at the time orders are placed. In 1982, DOD again proposed a change in its accounting policy so that obligations for stock fund purchases would be recorded when orders are placed with the stock fund. GAO believes that this change would provide a consistent base from which the military services could operate and would improve overall DOD financial management.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Army and the Air Force should complete, as soon as practical, the change in procedures for recording obligations for stock fund purchases that the Assistant Secretary of Defense recently outlined to the military services.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 11/84

The Secretary of Defense should, in accord with the criteria detailed in this report, make sure that the new procedures are uniformly implemented and effectively operated by all three military services.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 11/84

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS

Improved Internal Controls Are Needed To Better Assure That Obligations Will Not Be Backdated
(AFMD-84-14, 11-9-83)

Department of Defense

Budget Function: Financial Management and Information Systems: Regulatory Accounting Rules and Financial Reporting (998.6)

Legislative Authority: 31 U.S.C. 1501, 31 U.S.C. 1108, 18 U.S.C. 1001, 18 U.S.C. 1018, 31 U.S.C. 1341.

Background

GAO reviewed 85 Department of Defense activities to determine whether existing internal controls adequately preclude the backdating of obligations against expired appropriations.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that, although there was virtually no evidence of backdated obligation transactions at the activities reviewed, a number of internal control weaknesses need to be corrected to provide reasonable assurance that backdating does not occur. GAO noted that effective controls are needed to provide an audit trail enabling management and audit personnel to verify whether obligation transactions were finalized before the appropriation expired.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense, in those instances where backdating was detected, should determine whether 18 U.S.C. 1018 and 31 U.S.C. 1341 have been violated and take appropriate action.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 11/84

The Secretary of Defense, in those instances where backdating was detected, should direct that backdated obligations recorded against expired appropriations be removed from accounting records.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 11/84

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS

Internal Controls Can Be Improved To Help Ensure Proper and Correct Military Retirement Payments (AFMD-84-7, 2-28-84)

Department of Defense and Veterans Administration

Budget Function: Financial Management and Information Systems: Accounting Systems in Operation (998.1)

Legislative Authority: Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-255), OMB Circular A-123, DOD Military Retired Pay Manual.

Background

GAO reviewed the retirement pay systems of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to determine whether internal controls are in effect to ensure proper and correct payments to retirees and their families.

Findings/Conclusions

The military services maintain independent payroll systems to pay and administer benefits to military retirees and survivors. GAO found that there is a need for the military services to improve internal controls to help ensure that: (1) the Navy and Marine Corps place only authorized persons on their payrolls; (2) payments by the military services continue only if recipients retain their eligibility for such payments; and (3) payments by the military services are not made to deceased persons. Furthermore, GAO reported that military retirees have received overpayments because: (1) required offsets to military retirement pay were not made when the retirees entered the federal civil service; and (2) Veterans Administration compensation was not deducted from military retirement benefits.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct the services to ensure that annuitants submit certificates of eligibility and, where appropriate, that payments to ineligible persons are promptly terminated and overpayments collected.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The Secretary of Defense should direct the services to ensure that controls over payments to 18- to 23-year-old survivors attending school are improved.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The Secretary of Defense should require the services to ensure that existing control techniques to identify deceased persons on the payment rolls are improved and to ensure that the feasibility of additional control techniques are considered, including requiring certifications of existence from retirees residing in the United States and expanding the computer death matches and performing them on a recurring basis.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that a central computerized data file is developed and used to identify recipients of readjustment and severance pay so that the services and the Veterans Administration can make required offsets to benefits paid.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS

Improper Use of Industrial Funds by Defense Extended the Life of Appropriations Which Otherwise Would Have Expired

(AFMD-84-34, 6-5-84)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: Financial Management and Information Systems: Regulatory Accounting Rules and Financial Reporting (998.6)

Legislative Authority: Economy Act. H. Rept. 97-943. 31 U.S.C. 1535. 41 U.S.C. 23.

Background

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined whether the life of Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations was being extended through improper use of working capital funds.

Findings/Conclusions

At six industrial fund activities visited by GAO, about \$35.7 million of the \$192.5 million in operation and maintenance (O&M) funded workload was carried over from fiscal year (FY) 1982 to FY 1983 through improper use of industrial funds. GAO found that industrial funds were improperly used because the activities did not adhere to existing statutes and regulations governing industrial fund operations and the use of O&M appropriations, resulting in extension of the availability of O&M funds which would have otherwise expired. GAO believes that the carryover found at the six activities may exist to some degree in other appropriations and at the other 79 defense industrial funds and related customer activities.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should have the Secretaries of the military services emphasize to industrial fund and customer activities the requirements in DOD and service regulations that project orders are to be placed by customers with industrial funds for only those items for which there is a bona fide need at the time of the order.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Although DOD agreed with the recommendation when commenting on a draft of the report, the agency has not yet provided comments on the final report.*

The Secretary of Defense should have the Secretaries of the military services emphasize to industrial fund and customer activities the requirements in DOD and service regulations that work on orders accepted by industrial funds is to be started within a reasonable amount of time.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Although DOD agreed with this recommendation when commenting on a draft of the report, the agency has not yet provided comments on the final report.*

The Secretary of Defense have the Secretaries of the military services emphasize to industrial fund and customer activities the requirements in DOD and service regulations

funds related to O&M funded Economy Act orders which are not used by an industrial fund by the end of the fiscal year are to be promptly deobligated.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Although DOD agreed with this recommendation when commenting on a draft of the report, the agency has not provided comments on the final report.*

The Secretary of Defense should have the Secretaries of the military services emphasize to industrial fund and customer activities the requirements in DOD and service regulations that customer order amendments are to be financed with expired appropriations only when there is no increase in the scope of work to be done.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Although DOD agreed with this recommendation when commenting on a draft of the report, the agency has not provided comments on the final report.*

The Secretary of Defense should, in order to facilitate industrial fund and customer activities satisfying these requirements, have the Secretaries of the military services ensure that officials emphasize to industrial fund activities and their customers, which obligate funds based on estimated requirements, to deobligate those funds to the extent that estimated requirements do not materialize by fiscal yearend.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Although DOD agreed with this recommendation when commenting on a draft of the report, the agency has not provided comments on the final report.*

The Secretary of Defense should, in order to facilitate industrial fund and customer activities satisfying these requirements, have the Secretaries of the military services ensure that, when a military service deems it to be appropriate, specific timeframes are developed department-wide or by type of industrial fund activity for satisfying the requirement that work be started "within a reasonable amount of time."

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Although DOD agreed with this recommendation when commenting on a draft of the report, the agency has not provided comments on the final report.*

The Secretary of Defense should, in order to facilitate industrial fund and customer activities satisfying these requirements, have the Secretaries of the military services ensure that additional guidance is provided to prohibit industrial fund activities from using subsidiary orders to extend the life of appropriations which would otherwise expire.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Although DOD agreed with this recommendation when commenting on a draft of the report, the agency has not provided comments on the final report.*

The Secretary of Defense should have the Secretary of the Navy require that Navy industrial fund and customer activities comply with existing regulations which specifically prohibit: (1) combining dissimilar jobs on project orders to meet the requirements that at least 20 percent of requested work be accomplished in-house by the industrial fund; and (2) work which will be done entirely on outside contract from being requested on project orders.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Although DOD agreed with this recommendation when commenting on a draft of the report, the agency has not provided comments on the final report.*

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING

The Air Force Weapons Laboratory Should Validate Its Computer Needs and Evaluate Alternatives Before Continuing Its Cray-1 Computer Lease
(AFMD-83-70, 7-22-83)

Departments of Defense and the Air Force

Budget Function: Automatic Data Processing (990.1)

Legislative Authority: OMB Circular A-121.

Background

In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Air Force Weapons Laboratory's (AFWL) use of a Cray-1 computer system to determine whether continued lease of the Cray-1 is justified.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO stated that, although AFWL research programs benefit from large-scale computer support, the extent to which the Cray-1 has been used may not justify its continued lease and operation. GAO found that: (1) the planned research workload of AFWL and other users has been less than expected; (2) AFWL research computer use has declined; and (3) AFWL has not validated its large-scale computer workload requirements or evaluated available alternatives since 1974. GAO noted that the Cray-1 was

used less than anticipated because Defense Nuclear Agency data processing needs were satisfied by the Department of Energy computer facility, and research staff turnover and budget constraints caused cancellation or delay of research projects. GAO also found that AFWL does not fully recover the Cray-1 computer operating costs from the users it supports. GAO noted that the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to provide guidance during 1983 to implement full cost recovery.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Air Force should evaluate and validate large-scale computer needs at AFWL and identify and evaluate any available alternatives that could provide economically effective computer support for AFWL validated needs.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 10/85

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

FACILITIES MANAGEMENT

Cleaning Up Nuclear Facilities: An Aggressive and Unified Federal Program Is Needed (EMD-82-40, 5-25-82)

Departments of Defense and Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Budget Function: Energy: Energy Information, Policy, and Regulation (276.0)

Legislative Authority: Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970.

Background

GAO conducted a review to determine the status of federal efforts and activities to correct decommissioning problems identified in a prior report. In addition to following up on the implementation of the recommendations for correcting these problems, GAO also evaluated how effectively the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC), the Department of Energy's (DOE), the Department of Defense's (DOD), and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decommissioning and standard-setting programs were functioning. The review was made as part of a continuing effort to identify issues in the nuclear area, which will provide public health and safety through better federal program administration.

Findings/Conclusions

Nuclear facilities and sites which require or eventually will require cleanup or other disposition can be tracked, evaluated, and recorded for followup action if needed. In the past, nuclear facilities and sites were abandoned or decommissioned without adequate documentation of their radiological status or even a record of their existence. As a result, federal agencies are uncertain about the location or status of some facilities and sites that may be in need of decommissioning. NRC, DOE, DOD, and EPA are attempting to locate and evaluate the hazards at old, inactive sites. Despite the problems that inadequate record-keeping systems have caused federal agencies, only DOE is revising its current recordkeeping system to provide sufficient information on the location and radiological condition of its current and future nuclear facilities and sites. Federal decommissioning programs have not sufficiently considered and incorporated decommissioning

needs during the facility planning and design phase. DOE and NRC are making some progress in developing comprehensive decommissioning policies which include many of the necessary provisions. DOD has not initiated action to develop a comprehensive decommissioning policy. Standards prescribing acceptable levels of residual radioactive contamination for decommissioned nuclear facilities are not expected to be available until mid-1986. EPA is responsible for setting these standards, but has not done so because it considers their development a low priority.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Chairman of NRC should reevaluate and, if at all possible, accelerate the NRC timetable for issuing a decommissioning policy with a view toward shortening the time required to submit a paper to the Commissioners. Shortening the timetable would enable NRC to institute earlier front-end planning and funding requirements for decommissioning NRC-licensed facilities as a condition of licensing. The funding requirements should also be made applicable to currently active licensees.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 12/85

The Secretary of Defense should establish a decommissioning program that specifies criteria for selecting tentative decommissioning methods during the facility planning phase and criteria for design features to be incorporated in facility planning.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

INTERNAL AUDITS

DOD Can Combat Fraud Better by Strengthening Its Investigative Agencies (AFMD-83-33, 3-21-83)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: Financial Management and Information Systems: Internal Audit (998.3)

Legislative Authority: Posse Comitatus Act (Use of Army). Uniform Code of Military Justice. Inspector General Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-452).

Background

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed efforts of the Army, Navy, and Air Force investigative agencies to combat fraud.

Findings/Conclusions

The Department of Defense (DOD) has four separate criminal investigative agencies to prevent, detect, and investigate fraud in its operations. GAO found that one way these agencies could strengthen their fraud investigations would be to limit them to cases involving significant allegations. Some problems that hinder criminal investigators in pursuing fraud in DOD programs include the requirement that the Navy and Air Force criminal investigators seek a commanding officer's request to conduct an investigation before proceeding; Army investigators must receive approval before they can investigate high-ranking officials. A criminal investigator is hindered by virtually nonexistent U.S. legal jurisdiction over the civilians accompanying the armed forces overseas. Further, investigators do not follow up to see whether there is an adequate response to their findings. GAO believes that efforts to combat fraud in DOD could be strengthened if the criminal investigators operated more independently. Compared with the inspector general organizations, those who investigate fraud in the Army, Navy, and Air Force are less independent of operations.

Recommendations to Congress

Congress should enact legislation to extend criminal jurisdiction over U.S. citizen civilian employees and dependents accompanying the Armed Forces overseas.

Status: Action not yet initiated.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should make organizational changes to enhance the independence of the DOD criminal investigators.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The DOD Inspector General should issue guidelines to the DOD criminal investigators that will require them to investigate only fraud allegations that will probably result in prosecutions if substantiated, meet a minimum dollar loss, or indicate larger or systematic problems that must be investigated and refer the remaining allegations to commanding officers, military inspectors generals, or military police for investigating.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 01/85

The DOD Inspector General should issue guidelines that ensure at a minimum that fraud prevention surveys cover all types of operations both servicewide and at individual locations; survey reports are addressed to the program management level; surveys are part of a plan developed by the investigative agency; and surveys identify causes and make recommendations for corrective action.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Air Force, Navy, and Army to authorize their investigative agencies to follow up to assess the adequacy of actions taken by commanding officers.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 03/85

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

INTERNAL AUDITS

Department of Defense Progress in Resolving Contract Audits (AFMD-84-4, 10-27-83)

Department of Defense

Budget Function: Financial Management and Information Systems: Internal Audit (998.3)

Legislative Authority: Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982. Supplemental Appropriations and Rescission Act, 1980 (P.L. 96-304). DOD Directive 5000.42. DOD Directive 7640.2. OMB Circular A-50.

Background

In response to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the Department of Defense's (DOD) contract audit resolution system to determine whether: (1) procurement officials comply with resolution system requirements; (2) the system meets government standards; and (3) the system needs improving.

Findings/Conclusions

Before 1982 revisions, the contract auditing resolution system did not work as intended because of design weaknesses and because procurement officials did not comply with system requirements. Further, DOD experienced mixed results in resolving audits. As of March 31, 1983, there were about 600 contract audits with questioned costs of \$1.7 billion which had remained unresolved for more than 6 months. This represented a 55-percent increase over the previous year. While the revisions made in the system corrected many of the weaknesses, the revised system had just become operational and it was too early for GAO to determine the extent of compliance with system requirements. If properly implemented, the system should satisfy almost all government requirements for audit resolution. However, a few changes are still needed to

improve effectiveness and ensure the most economical operation.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Inspector General, DOD, should periodically audit contracting officer resolution decisions.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should require performance appraisals to reflect officials' effectiveness in resolving contract audits.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 06/85

The Secretary of Defense should compare the cost of having the Defense Contract Audit Agency report the status of audit resolutions with the cost of current requirements and implement the less costly approach.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *The Inspector General's office plans to conduct an analysis beginning in the first quarter of fiscal year 1985 and ending in the third quarter of fiscal year 1985.*

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Export Control Regulation Could Be Reduced Without Affecting National Security (ID-82-14, 5-26-82)

Departments of Commerce, Defense, State, and the Treasury

Budget Function: International Affairs: Conduct of Foreign Affairs (153.0)

Legislative Authority: Export Administration Act of 1979.

Background

GAO was requested to examine how well the export control system is carrying out the Export Administration Act's national security goal of controlling exports of militarily significant technology and products to the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc nations.

Findings/Conclusions

The government carefully examines less than 1 out of every 17 export applications it processes. The need to continue licensing requirements for high-technology products, as well as design and production technology related to both high- and low-technology products, to Communist destinations is clear. However, GAO found that there is little justification for continuing to license the vast majority of low-technology products exported to Communist countries, non-Communist countries, and Coordinating Committee countries. The Department of Commerce by law is required to develop a recommendation for each export application before consulting with other departments or agencies. In high-technology cases, Commerce cannot make a credible recommendation, because it lacks the information necessary to assess military risk. Although it would be both impossible and cost-prohibitive to prevent all illegal exports, the government recognizes that it needs to provide a more credible deterrent. Some constraints faced by the United States in controlling exports include: (1) practical limits to cargo inspections; (2) lengthy crimi-

nal investigations and a large backlog of incomplete investigations; (3) difficulty in obtaining criminal convictions; and (4) no monitoring of conditional licenses to ensure that conditions are being fulfilled.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretaries of Commerce and Defense should reexamine the need for licensing of high-technology products to Coordinating Committee countries and other allies by exploring various alternatives that would satisfy control objectives and reduce or eliminate the burden of licensing.

Target: Department of Commerce

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Commerce favors the recommendation but, on the advice of the Justice Department, will take no action. Both houses of Congress considered and adopted this recommendation in the conference committee. This will most likely be reintroduced in the 99th Congress.*

Target: Department of Defense

Status: Action not yet initiated. *Defense believes that the recommendation has merit but, on the advice of the Justice Department, will take no action. Both houses of Congress considered and adopted this recommendation in the conference committee. This will most likely be reintroduced in the 99th Congress.*

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Defense Department's Management of Property Leased to Foreign Governments Is Still Inadequate (ID-83-6, 11-23-82)

Department of Defense and Defense Security Assistance Agency

Budget Function: International Affairs: Military Assistance (152.0)

Legislative Authority: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Arms Export Control Act. P.L. 97-113. 10 U.S.C. 2667.

Background

GAO reviewed leases of defense property to foreign governments, in conjunction with a 1981 report, to determine whether the leases complied with the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).

that there is little monitoring of the use of leased property and, in some instances, the property has not been returned at the expiration of a lease.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the financial management and monitoring of leased property is inadequate and that congressional notification requirements are not being fully met. As a result, Congress is not being provided information needed for effective oversight and thousands of dollars in lease costs are not being recovered. In addition, GAO found

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should require that DSAA work with the military departments, military advisory groups, the State Department, U.S. embassies overseas, and Congress to resolve the problem of unreturned property.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Excess Navy Ships Sold to Foreign Countries at Understated Prices (NSIAD-84-7, 4-12-84)

Departments of Defense and the Navy

Budget Function: International Affairs: Conduct of Foreign Affairs (153.0)

Legislative Authority: Arms Export Control Act, 10 U.S.C. 7307.

Background

GAO reviewed Navy policies and procedures for selling excess ships to foreign countries.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the 11 ships sold during 1981 and 1982 were not priced in accordance with Navy guidelines which require that ships be sold at the higher of fair or scrap value. By using scrap value to set prices for eight of the sales, the Navy did not: (1) include the amount spent to upgrade the ships while they were in service; (2) charge overhaul costs to foreign countries; (3) determine the condition of the ships at the time of sale; or (4) include incidental costs. GAO also found that, in the three cases where fair value was used, conversion and incidental costs were excluded from the sales price. While the Navy believes that political and diplomatic considerations often outweigh approved pricing guidelines, the decision to sell a ship at a lower price rests with Congress rather than with the Navy. GAO found that, if the Navy had used appropriate prices for the 11 sales, they would have totaled \$36.4 million rather than the \$5.2 million actually charged.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should require the Secretary of the Navy to adhere to the established pricing instructions, which require pricing ships at the higher of fair value or scrap value. Specifically, when computing the sale prices

for ships being sold to foreign countries, the Navy should include conversion costs to determine fair value.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise pricing guidance to require that the Board of Inspection and Survey, in addition to determining whether a ship is fit or unfit for further U.S. Navy service, also determine the overall condition of the ship.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise pricing guidance to require that the Chief of Naval Operations should use the fitness of a ship in deciding what fair value rate to apply in computing the fair value price.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise pricing guidance to require that ship overall costs be prorated based on their recommended schedule for overhaul and such prorated costs be included in the sale price.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

MEDICAL SERVICES

DOD Needs Better Assessment of Military Hospitals' Capabilities To Care for Wartime Casualties (HRD-81-56, 5-19-81)

Department of Defense

Budget Function: Health: Health Planning and Construction (551.3)

Background

GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to provide medical facilities for American casualties who would be returned to the United States for medical care in the event of a war in an overseas area.

Findings/Conclusions

The latitude provided in DOD guidance on the wartime use of military hospitals in the continental United States (CONUS) permits significant differences in the way the military services determine the extent of care that could be provided in their facilities if a war began. Under DOD guidance, the services have adopted different: (1) transition plans for converting individual hospitals to handle wartime casualties; (2) methods for identifying capacity of individual hospital facilities to expand the care for wartime workload; (3) stockpiling policies for medical materiel to meet mobilization expansion requirements; (4) types of buildings as wartime assets to augment hospital capacity; and (5) policies for retention of closed hospitals as future mobilization facilities. As a result of these differences, DOD does not have an accurate assessment of the medical mobilization capacity of CONUS military facilities. Recently, DOD has given little consideration to mobilization in configuring new hospitals, and its construction planning has been directed primarily to meeting design requirements for peacetime operations. Economic feasibility studies performed by the services before undertaking hospital construction projects have been used primarily to select the most cost-effective means of meeting peacetime military medical care needs. Design concept studies performed to determine configuration of new hospitals before construction are oriented to meeting peacetime performance requirements.

Recommendations to Congress

Congress should consider the relative importance of the planned hospitals' roles in the event of mobilization, the extent of mobilization expansion flexibility being built into the new hospitals, the gain or loss of mobilization capacity resulting from the planned hospital replacements, and whether nearby civilian hospitals can be expected to support mobilization needs.

Status: Action in process.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should provide guidance to the military services by permitting sufficient floor space in

one-bed rooms to accommodate expansion flexibility for two beds.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should provide guidance to the military services by permitting inclusion of medical utilities to support expansion beds in military hospitals planned for readiness areas.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should require the services to complete planned capability assessments in conjunction with the updating of mobilization plans being completed in 1981.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should provide guidance to the military services by requiring that economic feasibility studies assess and weigh, in conjunction with peacetime requirements, the mobilization implications of each construction alternative under active consideration.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should provide guidance to the military services by requiring that design concept studies identify bed expansion capacity targets, within peacetime sizing constraints, for building the flexibility to expand for mobilization into military hospitals.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should provide guidance to the military services by basing the distribution of one-, two-, and four-bed rooms on an assessment of expected peacetime patient needs and mobilization requirements.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should provide guidance to the military services by reducing, where appropriate, the number of one-bed rooms in favor of two-bed rooms to improve mobilization capacity of key readiness hospitals.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should develop criteria for services' use in determining which military facilities, such as onpost barracks, housing, or schools, are suitable for medical readiness use to augment military hospitals.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should provide guidance to the military services by identifying adjustments in normal hospital operation procedures for nursing units and central surgical and medical support areas necessary to accommodate emergency expansion and compressed bed spacing during mobilization.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should instruct the services to remove from their mobilization plans such designated commercial buildings as hotels and motels that have been designated for conversion to hospitals.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should develop, as part of a 5-year construction plan submitted to Congress, information necessary to assess the impact on mobilization of each hospital to be replaced. For hospital replacements not included in the current DOD construction year, information provided should be identified as preliminary pending approval of planning funds for more detailed design development.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should assess past hospital design concept studies undertaken by DOD and new hospital design concepts being implemented in civilian hospitals to identify hospital construction design practices that would enhance flexibility for mobilization expansion. Design practices found useful for this purpose could be utilized by the military services for designing future hospitals.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should require the military services to reassess mobilization plans to determine if hospitals and augmenting buildings are in adequate physical condition and are operationally configured to function at planned mobilization expansion capacity.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should instruct the services to remove from their mobilization plans those inactive hospitals that cannot be efficiently equipped and operated under expanded wartime requirements and retain rights to

newer hospitals that have been excessed, but offer additional operating potential.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should provide criteria for the military services to use in developing mobilization transition plans for each hospital that provide for the (1) conversion of facilities to wartime configurations; (2) stockpiling for war readiness of beds and materials to support expansion capacity; (3) phasing out of peacetime patient workloads; and (4) transition of hospital operations to designated mobilization staffs.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

MEDICAL SERVICES

Millions Can Be Saved Through Better Energy Management in Federal Hospitals (HRD-82-77, 9-1-82)

Departments of Defense and Health and Human Services, and Veterans Administration

Budget Function: Energy: Energy Conservation (272.0)

Legislative Authority: Energy Conservation Policy Act (P.L. 95-619). 10 C.F.R. 436. Executive Order 12003.

Background

GAO discussed the potential of federal hospitals to reduce energy consumption and costs through improved energy management.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found a potential for additional energy savings at the 19 hospitals it visited. Furthermore, they had not implemented many low-cost conservation measures, which include reducing hot-water temperature, installing water-flow restrictors, repairing duct insulation, and installing low-wattage fluorescent lighting. GAO identified conservation opportunities at several hospitals which would drastically reduce their annual energy costs, and many of the energy savings measures would pay for themselves in less than a year. Conservation measures used by non-federal institutions can be implemented while keeping lighting, temperature, humidity, and airflow within prescribed agency standards and without otherwise affecting patient safety or comfort. Most non-federal hospitals have aggressive energy saving programs which have resulted in savings around the 20- to 40-percent range. Comparable savings by federal hospitals have not been achieved, primarily because of weaknesses in their energy management programs. GAO believes that federal hospitals, in order to achieve savings of 20 to 40 percent, would have to finance conservation measures costing about two to three times their estimated annual savings. The more costly measures should result in savings that would recover the required investment in 3 years or less, with additional savings continuing throughout the life of the equipment or building.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should require that the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force: (1) conduct technical audits in federal hospitals using qualified energy personnel; (2) establish for each federal hospital quantifiable energy conservation goals based on its energy-saving potential; (3) direct federal hospitals to maintain data and report on their energy use; (4) provide their hospitals comprehensive information on low-cost conservation measures applicable to hospitals; (5) direct federal hospitals to implement cost-effective, low-cost conservation measures; (6) monitor the results of energy-saving efforts in federal hospitals and take action to ensure that feasible conservation measures are implemented

when these results are not satisfactory; and (7) reset hospitals' energy conservation goals based on results of technical audits or when formerly established goals have been reached and cost-effective measures still remain.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should require that the Secretary of the Navy: (1) conduct technical audits in federal hospitals using qualified energy personnel; (2) establish for each federal hospital quantifiable energy conservation goals based on its energy-saving potential; (3) provide its hospitals comprehensive information on low-cost conservation measures applicable to hospitals; (4) direct federal hospitals to implement cost-effective, low-cost conservation measures; (5) monitor the results of energy-saving efforts in federal hospitals and take action to ensure that feasible conservation measures are implemented when these results are not satisfactory; and (6) reset hospitals' energy conservation goals based on results of technical audits or when formerly established goals have been reached and cost-effective measures still remain.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services should require that the Indian Health Service: (1) establish for each federal hospital quantifiable energy conservation goals based on its energy-saving potential; (2) direct federal hospitals to maintain data and report on their energy use; (3) provide its hospitals comprehensive information on low-cost conservation measures applicable to hospitals; (4) direct federal hospitals to implement cost-effective, low-cost conservation measures; (5) monitor the results of energy-saving efforts in federal hospitals and take action to ensure that feasible conservation measures are implemented when these results are not satisfactory; and (6) reset hospitals' energy conservation goals based on results of technical audits or when formerly established goals have been reached and cost-effective measures still remain.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Administrator of Veterans Affairs should: (1) conduct technical audits in federal hospitals using qualified energy

personnel; (2) direct federal hospitals to implement cost-effective, low-cost conservation measures; (3) monitor the results of energy-saving efforts in federal hospitals and take action to ensure that feasible conservation measures are implemented when these results are not satisfactory; and (4) reset hospitals' energy conservation goals based on results of technical audits or when formerly established goals have been reached and cost-effective measures still remain.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Objectivity of DOD's Senior Scientific Advisory Committees Can Be Better Assured (GGD-83-76, 9-21-83)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

Budget Function: General Government: Executive Direction and Management (802.0)

Legislative Authority: Advisory Committee Act (Federal).

Background

In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the operations of the Defense Science Board, the Army Science Board, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, and the Naval Research Advisory Committee to determine: (1) whether the Department of Defense (DOD) is following appropriate legal procedures and ethical standards in operating the committees; (2) whether members of the advisory committees appear to have conflicts of interest; (3) whether all relevant points of view are represented in the advisory groups and their panels; (4) the degree with which the same individuals participate in multiple advisory groups within DOD; and (5) the full cost of such committees.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the services do not always follow appropriate procedures in the operation of their scientific advisory committees. Although the services have procedures for reviewing committee members' financial disclosure statements, these procedures do not provide for documenting determinations regarding potential conflicts of interest. GAO found that 32 panel members were employed by or had financial interests in areas that could be affected by their panels' recommendations. The Navy does not require its panel members to submit financial disclosure statements. GAO found that, although the services attempt to achieve balanced representation on these committees, the methods of selecting members vary, the services do not document the selection process, and military personnel sometimes participate in panel decisionmaking processes. In addition, DOD panels do not always comply with a Federal Advisory Committee Act requirement to

announce meetings beforehand and prepare minutes. GAO found that about 15 percent of the panel members served on more than one of the panels established from 1978 through 1982. Due to the lack of sufficient records, GAO could not determine all of the costs of the scientific advisory committees.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should require the services to: (1) document the review of financial disclosure information when members are selected for specific panels; (2) document the resolution of potential conflicts of interest or the appearance of such conflicts; (3) comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act's requirements relating to announcing meetings and preparing minutes; and (4) document the steps followed in selecting individuals for panels.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Defense should require the Secretary of the Navy to: (1) appoint Naval Research Advisory Committee panel members as special government employees and make them subject to the same conflict-of-interest standards as other committee members; and (2) apply the same standards of balance, independence, and openness to the Naval Research Advisory Committee panels that apply to the advisory committee panels of the other services.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES

Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act
(HRD-83-4, 1-31-83)

Departments of Defense and Labor, General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, and Office of Management and Budget

Budget Function: Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services: Other Labor Services (505.0)

Legislative Authority: Service Contract Act of 1965 (41 U.S.C. 351 et seq.). Davis-Bacon Act (Wage Rates). Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.). Walsh-Healey Act (Government Contracts). 29 C.F.R. 4. 29 C.F.R. 4.163. Executive Order 12291. P.L. 92-473. H.R. 10238 (89th Cong.). *Descomp Inc. v. Sampson*, 377 F. Supp. 254 (D. Del. 1974).

Background

GAO reported on the problems and impacts of the Service Contract Act of 1965, as amended, and its implementing regulations and procedures as administered and enforced by the Department of Labor.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that Labor has been unable to administer the Service Contract Act efficiently and effectively because: (1) inherent problems exist in its administration; (2) wage rates and fringe benefits set under the act are generally inflationary; (3) accurate determinations of prevailing wage rates and fringe benefits cannot be made using existing data sources and the data needed to accurately determine prevailing wage rates and fringe benefits would be very costly to develop; and (4) the Fair Labor Standards Act and administrative procedures implemented through the federal procurement process could provide a measure of wage and benefit protection the act now covers. Pending proposed regulations would limit Labor's application of the act while leaving unresolved the major underlying problems in accurately developing prevailing wage rates and fringe benefits. In addition, ambiguities in the language of the act have hampered Labor's ability to develop accurate wage rates and fringe benefits for employees. Amendments to the act further complicated Labor's task by requiring Labor to issue collectively bargained wages and benefits in specific successor contractor situations and give due consideration to federal employee wages and benefits in making determinations of the prevailing wages and benefits in a locality.

Recommendations to Congress

Congress should consider repealing the Service Contract Act of 1965.

Status: Action in process.

Congress should consider amending section 6(e) of the Fair Labor Standards Act to ensure continued federal minimum wage coverage for all employees of employers providing contract services to the United States or the District of Columbia.

Status: Action not yet initiated.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy should, if the Service Contract Act is repealed, encourage federal agencies to include provisions in their procurement regulations and service contracts, similar to those already required for professional employees, to discourage wage busting of all service employees on federal service contracts. The Administrator should monitor the impact of the repeal on service contract employees. If he determines that repeal of the Service Contract Act has an adverse impact on the employees, the Administrator should develop administrative policies or legislative recommendations to deal with the problem.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *No action has been taken because implementation of this recommendation is dependent on the repeal of the Service Contract Act.*

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development (EMD-81-40, 2-11-81)

Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, and the Interior

Budget Function: Energy: Energy Supply (271.0)

Legislative Authority: Mineral Lands Leasing Act (30 U.S.C. 181 et seq.; 30 U.S.C. 351 et seq.). Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975 (90 Stat. 1083). Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. 1131 et seq.). Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1280). Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7101). Engle Act (Minerals). Land Policy and Management Act. Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (National).

Background

The use of federal lands for fossil fuels exploration has become an important issue. Managing these lands involves difficult trade-offs between the often-conflicting issues of development, conservation, and environmental protection. An examination was performed on how the exploration and development of oil and gas from federal lands could be accelerated.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that the use of federal lands for fossil fuels exploration and development is hampered by: (1) the unavailability for leasing of prospectively valuable federal oil and gas lands; (2) the imposition of stipulations on leases which restrict exploration and development; and (3) lengthy delays in the approval of federal leases and drilling permits. GAO has determined that the first two of these issues are more significant due to the indefinite duration of actions which have closed lands, the severity of stipulations on leases, the large acreages involved, and their substantial oil and gas potential.

Recommendations to Congress

Congress should determine whether it wishes to be excluded from the review and possible disapproval of decisions to close lands to mineral leasing. If not, Congress should amend section 202(e) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act to provide that the management decisions closing lands to mineral leasing and affecting smaller sized tracts should be reported to Congress. Section 202(e) should be further amended to require that the Department of the Interior submit with each report to Congress the minerals report described in section 204(c)(2) for withdrawals and any other information required in section 204(c)(2) which the Congress considers appropriate. Congress should also amend section 3 of the Engle Act so that the withdrawal information for military applications conforms with the Land Policy and Management Act's section 204(c)(2) requirements for mineral analyses.

Status: Action not yet initiated.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior should direct the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management, respectively, to establish standards and criteria for the use of restrictive stipulations, such as surface disturbance and "no surface occupancy" restrictions. Leasable lands should then be inventoried to determine the extent of the use of such stipulations and to verify if the stipulation use meets the standards and criteria. Stipulation uses which are determined to be unjustified should be removed.

Target: Department of the Interior

Status: Action not yet initiated. *On October 18, 1984, an audit liaison officer said that action was initiated to determine the status of this recommendation.*

Target: Department of Agriculture

Status: Action not yet initiated. *On October 18, 1984, an audit liaison officer said that action was initiated to determine the status of this recommendation.*

The Secretary of the Interior should: (1) establish criteria upon which "no leasing" decisions must be based and also require the Bureau of Land Management to maintain records of "no leasing" decisions adequate enough to permit periodic congressional oversight; (2) require the Bureau to inventory lands which have been closed by management decision to oil and gas leasing, and then retain closure only to the extent it can demonstrate that a continuation of the decision not to lease is based on the criteria defined above; (3) direct the Bureau to give priority to evaluating the pre-Environmental Policy Act of 1969 Defense withdrawals under the Bureau's withdrawal review program; (4) direct the Geological Survey to review the oil and gas potential of the Fish and Wildlife Service's refuges in the lower 48 states; (5) direct the Bureau to develop a withdrawal review program to include the remaining 38 states; and (6) direct the Bureau to inventory and justify lands withheld from the simultaneous leasing system.

Status: Action not yet initiated. *On October 18, 1984, an audit liaison officer said that action was initiated to determine the status of this recommendation.*

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The Nation's Unused Wood Offers Vast Potential Energy and Product Benefits (EMD-81-6, 3-3-81)

Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, and General Services Administration

Budget Function: Natural Resources and Environment: Other Natural Resources (306.0)

Legislative Authority: Wood Residue Utilization Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-554). Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (92 Stat. 3117). Energy Tax Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-618). Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.). P.L. 95-617. P.L. 95-621.

Background

Immense quantities of wood residues are wasted in the United States in the form of decaying logging residues and dead trees, unused wood processing residues, and large, untapped acreages of small, defective, and other lower value trees. Wood residues could be an important energy source. A study was made of federal policies that are contributing to this lost potential.

regional variations developed through the residue assessments.

Target: Department of Agriculture

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

Target: Department of Energy

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO identified numerous factors standing in the way of greater use of wood residues for energy and products. These barriers include inadequate data on the volume, location, accessibility, and availability of forest residues; lack of economical and effective equipment for harvesting and transportation of residues; lack of investment capital needed for harvesting and using residues; and limited awareness and acceptance of wood energy and product technology among industrial firms, utilities, and state and local bodies. Other obstacles pertain to federal forest management policies and programs, utility practices and regulations, and environmental concerns related to greater use of residues. The Forest Service and the Department of Energy have made little progress in developing a national wood residue plan. The agencies should make a number of residue assessments in operating areas which are defined in terms of key factors such as topographical features, transportation corridors, economic hauling distances, and landowner attitudes. The Forest Service should take the lead in accomplishing the needed assessments. The Department of Energy should be an active participant in the studies. The assessments must deal more with resource management problems than end-use technology questions.

The Secretaries of Agriculture and Energy should work jointly to implement an accelerated program to develop and demonstrate residue-handling equipment in cooperation with private industry.

Target: Department of Energy

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretaries of Agriculture and Energy should (1) convert all Department facilities to wood fuels for all or part of their heating/power needs where life-cycle evaluations show them to be cost effective; and (2) identify and evaluate additional opportunities to demonstrate wood-energy technologies at Department facilities in order to enhance the prospects for future economic feasibility of such technologies.

Target: Department of Energy

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretary of Agriculture should (1) demonstrate Forest Service ability to conduct tree measurement sales and convert the agency's western region to the tree measurement basis as rapidly as possible; and (2) preserve logging residues for potential future use by foregoing burning whenever possible under sound forest management practices.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretaries of Agriculture and Energy should present to Congress within two years a national wood residues plan, including proposed residue use goals and recommendations for legislation or other actions to overcome barriers to such goals. It should be supported by data on

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of General Services should assure, in implementing existing policies for conversion of their heating/power systems from oil and natural gas to alternative fuels, that wood is given equal consideration with coal in forested regions of the country. A canvass of wood conversion opportunities at all such facilities should be made to later be tested by the standard feasibility evaluation methods developed by the Forest Service and DOE. They should also issue procurement guidelines pointing out that, because of their value in meeting national energy goals, residue-based wood products be carefully considered as alternative materials for all construction and related application and related applications.

Target: Department of Defense

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

Target: General Services Administration

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

The Secretaries of Agriculture and Energy should conduct a cooperative program of assessments in at least six locations around the country. The Secretaries should select the areas they believe hold the most promise for increased use of residues based on estimates of residue availability and cost and availability of competing energy sources. Specific information to be developed through assessments should include (1) the cost of making detailed residue inventories in each assessment area, with projections of costs to make such inventories regionally and nationally; (2) the volumes of wood residues that are potentially available in each area and the costs to collect and remove them using conventional equipment; (3) the specific needs for improved equipment to lower collection and removal costs; (4) the benefits and costs of, and alternative federal roles in stimulating, greater removal and use of wood residues by modifying or initiating a number of possible forest management policies and programs on federal, state, and private lands and encouraging private investment in new or modified facilities to use wood residues; and (5) the extent of, and alternatives for reducing, additional barriers to residue use caused by utility practices and regulations, air pollution regulations, and other factors.

Target: Department of Agriculture

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

Target: Department of Energy

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Developing Alaska's Energy Resources: Actions Needed To Stimulate Research and Improve Wetlands Permit Processing

(EMD-82-44, 6-17-82)

Departments of the Army and the Interior

Budget Function: Energy: Energy Supply (271.0)

Legislative Authority: Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (P.L. 96-487). Clean Water Act of 1977 (33 U.S.C. 1344). Water Pollution Control Act. Executive Order 8979.

Background

To determine if federal agencies are advancing environmentally sound approaches to energy exploration and development, GAO evaluated: (1) the results of oil- and gas-related experience on the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge, the only federal land in Alaska where significant production has occurred; (2) the measures used in Alaska to prohibit exploratory drilling during certain months of the year and to control drilling waste disposal; (3) the adequacy of research to lessen the impacts of energy development; and (4) wetlands permitting, which is of crucial importance to energy development on all Alaskan lands.

Findings/Conclusions

Additional research is needed to evaluate the impacts of oil- and gas-related activity in Alaska as a basis for promoting environmentally sound approaches to future development without unnecessarily increasing its cost. GAO found that two costly and controversial restrictions are being widely applied to energy exploration in the Arctic; however, there has not been adequate research to support either the imposition or the removal of these restrictions. Use of site-specific research findings would allow refinement of environmental protection controls suitable to the unique characteristics of the lands on which they are applied, and this would minimize universal or blanket stipulations where they are not necessary. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been slow in processing wetlands

permits, which are required for many oil and gas projects in Alaska, and has frequently included controversial and costly conditions in its permits without requiring substantiation of their need through research findings and site-specific data.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of the Interior should utilize existing research findings and site-specific data to the maximum extent possible and, after a source of further funding is worked out, direct and use additional site-specific research in the application of stipulations to future Alaskan energy projects. This should include using such data as a basis for determining whether the seasonal drilling restriction should be continued as a general stipulation for individual tracts.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 07/85

The Secretary of the Army should only grant the state of Alaska extensions to the public comment period when they are adequately justified and use research findings and site-specific data to the maximum extent possible in determining the need for proposed stipulations in future permits.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 07/85

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Implementation of the National Minerals and Materials Policy Needs Better Coordination and Focus (RCED-84-63, 3-20-84)

Departments of Commerce, Defense, and the Interior, Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment, Executive Office of the President, and Office of Science and Technology Policy

Budget Function: Natural Resources and Environment (300.0)

Legislative Authority: National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-479; 30 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.). Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2061 et seq.). Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98 et seq.). Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970. National Materials Policy Act of 1970. S. Rept. 96-397.

Background

In response to a congressional request, GAO monitored and reviewed the administration's implementation of the National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act, which was passed to: (1) coordinate and implement a coherent national materials and minerals policy and program through the Executive Office of the President and the Cabinet; (2) promote an adequate and stable supply of minerals and materials necessary to maintain national security, economic well-being, and industrial production; and (3) assign reporting requirements to several agencies.

Findings/Conclusions

GAO found that, while the administration has started to implement the act by establishing or proposing new working groups and reconstituting others, the new groups have not been coordinated by the Cabinet Council. Moreover, they add to the number of activities that must be coordinated and exacerbate the ad hoc coordination conditions which the act was expected to replace. In addition, important mineral- and material-related actions have been taken without the coordination required by the act. Furthermore, the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment lacks the breadth of membership needed to address minerals and materials issues. Because

the council is restricted to Cabinet members, agencies on the working group are not included. Moreover, there is no formal procedure for these sub-Cabinet agencies to bring issues to the Cabinet's attention. Although the program plan emphasized the importance of the protection of national security, it neglected to offer an approach for determining which strategic materials or minerals are most critical or how vulnerable the United States is to any supply disruptions. Finally, GAO found that an assessment of national materials needs required by the act has been given low priority and has not been prepared, a report on critical materials needs related to national security is still under review, and another required report was submitted 2 years late.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should make its report assessing critical materials needs related to national security available to Congress as required by the act. The report should address the magnitude or degree of U.S. vulnerability in materials markets critical to national security and the appropriateness of the federal role proposed.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date unknown.

NON-DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTIONS

SUPPLY MANAGEMENT

Opportunities for Improved Oil Recycling Still Exist

(PLRD-82-113, 9-17-82)

Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and Office of Management and Budget

Budget Function: General Government: General Property and Records Management (804.0)

Legislative Authority: Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Federal) (P.L. 92-500). Energy Policy and Conservation Act (P.L. 94-163). Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-580). Used Oil Recycling Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-463).

Background

In response to a previous GAO recommendation, the Department of Defense (DOD) established an oil recycling and reuse policy and guidance for the military departments and defense agencies on the collection and disposition of used oils. GAO performed a followup review of how DOD activities collect and dispose of used oil.

Findings/Conclusions

Many DOD installations and activities are not following the DOD guidance. GAO found that collection and selling practices tended to mitigate against re-refining used oil, and some activities were selling used oil when they could have burned it more economically as fuel. While the services have adopted and incorporated the DOD policy into their own regulations, their failure to aggressively implement this policy and guidance has resulted in the loss of numerous opportunities to achieve better conservation and economic use of lubricating products. By improving their collection and disposal practices, DOD activities can make their used oil more suitable for re-refining and also enhance the product's market value. This can be done by: (1) collecting used oil in ways that segregate recoverable products, such as automotive and jet turbine oils, by type

and keeping them clean; (2) storing oils in bulk containers to reduce storage and handling costs; and (3) collectively disposing of used oils from installations in the same geographic area to enable DOD to offer large quantities of used oil which would make re-refining more feasible and reduce disposal costs. GAO believes that DOD activities should cease the practice of selling used oil when it can be burned more economically as fuel. It also believes that the closed-loop re-refining arrangement has excellent potential for economically improving the use of used oil at large installations.

Recommendations to Agencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to follow the DOD guidance in the collection and disposal of used oil. The Secretary should also direct a trial of the closed-loop arrangement for re-refining used oil generated at a large user installation or several installations in close proximity to one another. If this trial shows this arrangement to be a beneficial way of utilizing used oil, it should be extended to as many locations as is feasible.

Status: Action in process. Intended completion date: 11/85


**INDEX
SECTION**



AGENCY/ORGANIZATION INDEX

The entries in this index include Federal agencies and nongovernmental corporate bodies with which the document is concerned, in alphabetic sequence. Federal departments and independent agencies stand alone. Other Federal entities are listed under their respective departments and agencies, e.g. documents related to the National Park Service will be listed under the Department of the Interior.

SAMPLE ENTRY



American Medical Association	The Nation's Unused Wood Offers Vast Potential Energy and Product Benefits (EMD-81-6)	116	DOD Can Make Further Progress in Controlling Pollution From Its Sewage Treatment Plants (NSIAD-84-5)	4
The Congress Should Mandate Formation of a Military-VA-Civilian Contingency Hospital System (HRD-80-76)		57	DOD Needs To Provide More Credible Weapon Systems Cost Estimates to the Congress (NSIAD-84-70)	92
Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment	Department of the Air Force		DOD's Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing--Better Living Conditions and Reduced Costs Possible (PLRD-82-59)	6
Implementation of the National Minerals and Materials Policy Needs Better Coordination and Focus (RCED-84-63)	Air Force Breakout Efforts Are Ineffective (PLRD-83-82)	71	Ensuring Retention of Essential Civilians Overseas During Hostilities (NSIAD-84-73)	27
Department of Agriculture	Air Force Does Not Recover All Required Costs of Modification Kits Sold to Foreign Governments (PLRD-82-111)	49	Further Improvements Needed in Department of Defense Oversight of Special Access (Carve-Out) Contracts (GGD-83-43)	63
Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development (EMD-81-40)	Air Force Uses Inaccurate Production Leadtime To Compute Spare Parts Requirements (PLRD-83-85)	34	Greater Emphasis on Occupant Responsibilities Can Reduce Military Family Housing Costs (PLRD-83-77)	8
Establishing New Federal Food-Buying Procedures Would Help Eliminate Unnecessary Special Examinations (RCED-84-150)	Air Force and Navy Trainer Aircraft Acquisition Programs (MASAD-83-22)	90	How Well Do the Military Services Perform Jointly in Combat? DOD Joint Test-and-Evaluation Program Provides Few Credible Answers (PEMD-84-3)	20
Government Could Save Millions by Revising Its Purchase Specification for Ground Beef (RCED-84-29)	Air-Launched Cruise Missile: Logistics Planning Problems and Implications for Other Weapon Systems (PLRD-82-68)	84	Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations (NSIAD-84-13)	19
Small Percentage of Military Families Eligible for Food Stamps (FPCD-83-25)	Better Planning and Funding Approach Needed for Military Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Projects in Germany (HRD-82-130)	59	Improper Use of Industrial Funds by Defense Extended the Life of Appropriations Which Otherwise Would Have Expired (AFMD-84-34)	100
The Nation's Unused Wood Offers Vast Potential Energy and Product Benefits (EMD-81-6)	Consolidation of Personal Property Shipping Offices (NSIAD-84-81)	5	Improved Energy Management in the Facility Design Process Should Reduce Operating Costs for DOD (PLRD-83-46)	69
Food Safety and Inspection Service	Continued Improvements Needed in Air Force Procedures and Practices (PLRD-83-36)	33	Improving the Air Force Modification Process Will Benefit Management of Spare Parts in the Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency (PLRD-83-3)	11
Government Could Save Millions by Revising Its Purchase Specification for Ground Beef (RCED-84-29)	DOD Can Combat Fraud Better by Strengthening Its Investigative Agencies (AFMD-83-33)	104		
Forest Service	DOD Can Increase Revenues Through Better Use of Natural Resources It Holds in Trust (PLRD-82-9)	3		
Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development (EMD-81-40)		115		

Increased Joint Avionics Standardization Could Result in Major Economies and Operational Benefits (NSIAD-84-127)	39	Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel in Case of War? (HRD-81-67)	24	Army Incentive Funds Need More Effective Targeting To Reduce Critical Personnel Shortages (FPCD-83-10)	78
Joint Major System Acquisition by the Military Services: An Elusive Strategy (NSIAD-84-22)	91	Air Force Logistics Command		Better Followup Can Reduce Equipment and Facility Problems Affecting Army Guard and Reserve Training (NSIAD-84-29)	47
Logistics Support Costs for the B-1B Aircraft Can Be Reduced (NSIAD-84-36)	67	Air Force Does Not Recover All Required Costs of Modification Kits Sold to Foreign Governments (PLRD-82-111)	49	Better Management of Threat Simulators and Aerial Targets Is Crucial to Effective Weapon Systems Performance (MASAD-83-27)	94
Military Medicine Is in Trouble: Complete Reassessment Needed (HRD-79-107)	56	Air Force Uses Inaccurate Production Leadtime To Compute Spare Parts Requirements (PLRD-83-85)	34	Better Methods for Validating and Reconciling Unfilled Materiel Orders Could Provide Substantial Economies to the Army (PLRD-82-76)	30
Navy's Progress in Improving Physical Inventory Controls and the Magnitude, Causes, and Impact of Inventory Record Inaccuracies in the Army, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency (NSIAD-84-9)	37	Continued Improvements Needed in Air Force Procedures and Practices (PLRD-83-36)	33	Better Planning and Funding Approach Needed for Military Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Projects in Germany (HRD-82-130)	59
Opportunities for Improved Oil Recycling Still Exist (PLRD-82-113)	120	Improving the Air Force Modification Process Will Benefit Management of Spare Parts in the Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency (PLRD-83-3)	11	Consolidation of Personal Property Shipping Offices (NSIAD-84-81)	5
Potential Reductions in Aircraft Operation and Maintenance Costs by Using Thrust Computing Support Equipment (PLRD-82-4)	10	The Air Force Equipment Management System Still Does Not Assure Control of Nonexpendable Equipment (NSIAD-83-20)	36	DOD Can Combat Fraud Better by Strengthening Its Investigative Agencies (AFMD-83-33)	104
Requirements and Production Capabilities Are Uncertain for Some Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts (PLRD-82-77)	14	Air Force Logistics Command: Air Logistics Center, Kelly AFB, TX		DOD Can Increase Revenues Through Better Use of Natural Resources It Holds in Trust (PLRD-82-9)	3
Some Land Attack Cruise Missile Acquisition Programs Need To Be Slowed Down (C-MASAD-81-9)	87	Air Force Does Not Recover All Required Costs of Modification Kits Sold to Foreign Governments (PLRD-82-111)	49	DOD Can Make Further Progress in Controlling Pollution From Its Sewage Treatment Plants (NSIAD-84-5)	4
Test Transfer of Consumable Supply Items to the DLA from the Military Services (NSIAD-84-82)	55	Air Force Logistics Command: Air Logistics Center, Oklahoma City, OK		DOD Needs To Provide More Credible Weapon Systems Cost Estimates to the Congress (NSIAD-84-70)	92
The Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile: Resolve Uncertainties Before Production (C-NSIAD-84-18)	82	Air Force Breakout Efforts Are Ineffective (PLRD-83-82)	71	DOD's Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing--Better Living Conditions and Reduced Costs Possible (PLRD-82-59)	6
The Air Force Equipment Management System Still Does Not Assure Control of Nonexpendable Equipment (NSIAD-83-20)	36	Air Force Scientific Advisory Board		Department of the Army's Program To Modify 155-mm. M109 Self-Propelled Howitzers to an M109A5 Configuration (NSIAD-84-60)	21
The Air Force Weapons Laboratory Should Validate Its Computer Needs and Evaluate Alternatives Before Continuing Its Cray-1 Computer Lease (AFMD-83-70)	102	Objectivity of DOD's Senior Scientific Advisory Committees Can Be Better Assured (GGD-83-76)	113	Developing Alaska's Energy Resources: Actions Needed To Stimulate Research and Improve Wetlands Permit Processing (EMD-82-44)	118
The Congress Should Mandate Formation of a Military-VA-Civilian Contingency Hospital System (HRD-80-76)	57	Military Airlift Command		Development of Fire Support Command and Control Systems by the Army and the Marine Corps (NSIAD-84-15)	2
The Defense Budget: A Look at Budgetary Resources, Accomplishments, and Problems (PLRD-83-62)	22	More Effective Use of Contract Airlift Could Reduce DOD Transportation Costs (PLRD-83-55)	40	Ensuring Retention of Essential Civilians Overseas During Hostilities (NSIAD-84-73)	27
Verifying Eligibility for Military Health Care: Some Progress Has Been Made, but Reliability Problems Remain (HRD-83-1)	60	Unused Cargo Space on Military Aircraft Returning to the United States (NSIAD-83-19)	42	Further Improvements Needed in Department of Defense Oversight of Special Access (Carve-Out) Contracts (GGD-83-43)	63
		Department of the Army			
		Army Can Better Use Its Soldiers Trained in Critical Shortage Occupations (NSIAD-84-17)	17		
		Army Has the Opportunity To Re compete DAS3 Purchases and Improve Automated Battlefield Support (IMTEC-84-20)	65		

Greater Emphasis on Occupant Responsibilities Can Reduce Military Family Housing Costs <i>(PLRD-83-77)</i>	8	Test Transfer of Consumable Supply Items to the DLA from the Military Services <i>(NSIAD-84-82)</i>	55	Make Effective Use of Its Weapon System Testing <i>(NSIAD-84-40)</i>	95
How Well Do the Military Services Perform Jointly in Combat? DOD Joint Test-and-Evaluation Program Provides Few Credible Answers <i>(PEMD-84-3)</i>	20	The Army Can Do More To Assure War Reserve Funds Are Spent Effectively <i>(NSIAD-84-50)</i>	12	Corps of Engineers Developing Alaska's Energy Resources: Actions Needed To Stimulate Research and Improve Wetlands Permit Processing <i>(EMD-82-44)</i>	118
Improper Use of Industrial Funds by Defense Extended the Life of Appropriations Which Otherwise Would Have Expired <i>(AFMD-84-34)</i>	100	The Army Needs More Comprehensive Evaluations To Make Effective Use of Its Weapon System Testing <i>(NSIAD-84-40)</i>	95	National Guard Bureau Problems in Alerting and Preparing Army Reservists for Mobilization <i>(NSIAD-84-52)</i>	26
Improved Energy Management in the Facility Design Process Should Reduce Operating Costs for DOD <i>(PLRD-83-46)</i>	69	The Army Needs To Better Plan To Meet Its Civilian Personnel Needs in Wartime <i>(NSIAD-84-107)</i>	28	U.S. Army Armament Materiel Readiness Command The Army Should Increase Its Efforts To Provide Government-Furnished Material to Contractors <i>(LCD-80-94)</i>	29
Improvements Needed in Army's Determination of Manpower Requirements for Support and Administrative Functions <i>(FPCD-79-32)</i>	16	The Army Needs To Improve Individual Soldier Training in Its Units <i>(FPCD-81-29)</i>	43	U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command Added Emphasis on Consolidation of Multiple Purchase Requests Could Result in Significant Savings <i>(NSIAD-84-143)</i>	74
Improvements Needed in Operating and Using the Army Automated Facilities Engineer Cost Accounting System <i>(AFMD-82-27)</i>	96	The Army Needs To Modify Its System for Measuring Individual Soldier Proficiency <i>(FPCD-82-28)</i>	45	U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Materiel Readiness Command The Army Should Increase Its Efforts To Provide Government-Furnished Material to Contractors <i>(LCD-80-94)</i>	29
Increased Joint Avionics Standardization Could Result in Major Economics and Operational Benefits <i>(NSIAD-84-127)</i>	39	The Army Needs To Reevaluate Its Extended Basic Training Program <i>(FPCD-82-11)</i>	44	U.S. Army Forces Command The Army's Retention of Overage Vehicles <i>(NSIAD-84-32)</i>	54
Joint Major System Acquisition by the Military Services: An Elusive Strategy <i>(NSIAD-84-22)</i>	91	The Army Should Increase Its Efforts To Provide Government-Furnished Material to Contractors <i>(LCD-80-94)</i>	29	U.S. Army Materiel Command Added Emphasis on Consolidation of Multiple Purchase Requests Could Result in Significant Savings <i>(NSIAD-84-143)</i>	74
Logistics Planning for the M1 Tank: Implications for Reduced Readiness and Increased Support Costs <i>(PLRD-81-33)</i>	83	The Army's AH-64 Helicopter and HELLFIRE Missile Retain Risks as They Enter Production <i>(C-MASAD-83-9)</i>	80	U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command The Army Can Do More To Assure War Reserve Funds Are Spent Effectively <i>(NSIAD-84-50)</i>	12
Military Medicine Is in Trouble: Complete Reassessment Needed <i>(HRD-79-107)</i>	56	The Army's Retention of Overage Vehicles <i>(NSIAD-84-32)</i>	54	The Army Should Increase Its Efforts To Provide Government-Furnished Material to Contractors <i>(LCD-80-94)</i>	29
More Effective Use of Contract Airlift Could Reduce DOD Transportation Costs <i>(PLRD-83-55)</i>	40	The Congress Should Mandate Formation of a Military-VA-Civilian Contingency Hospital System <i>(HRD-80-76)</i>	57	U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command: Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity The Army Needs More Comprehensive Evaluations To Make Effective Use of Its Weapon System Testing <i>(NSIAD-84-40)</i>	95
Navy's Progress in Improving Physical Inventory Controls and the Magnitude, Causes, and Impact of Inventory Record Inaccuracies in the Army, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency <i>(NSIAD-84-9)</i>	37	The Defense Budget: A Look at Budgetary Resources, Accomplishments, and Problems <i>(PLRD-83-62)</i>	22		
Opportunities for Improved Oil Recycling Still Exist <i>(PLRD-82-113)</i>	120	Verifying Eligibility for Military Health Care: Some Progress Has Been Made, but Reliability Problems Remain <i>(HRD-83-1)</i>	60		
Poor Design and Management Hamper Army's Basic Skills Education Program <i>(FPCD-83-19)</i>	46	Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel in Case of War? <i>(HRD-81-67)</i>	24		
Problems in Alerting and Preparing Army Reservists for Mobilization <i>(NSIAD-84-52)</i>	26	Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency The Army Needs More Comprehensive Evaluations To Make Effective Use of Its Weapon System Testing <i>(NSIAD-84-40)</i>	95		
Results of Forthcoming Critical Tests Are Needed To Confirm Army Remotely Piloted Vehicle's Readiness for Production <i>(NSIAD-84-72)</i>	81	Army Science Board Objectivity of DOD's Senior Scientific Advisory Committees Can Be Better Assured <i>(GGD-83-76)</i>	113		
		Army Systems Acquisition Review Council The Army Needs More Comprehensive Evaluations To			

U.S. Army Missile Command		Air Force and Navy Trainer Aircraft Acquisition Programs (MASAD-83-22)	90	DOD's Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing--Better Living Conditions and Reduced Costs Possible (PLRD-82-59)	6
The Army Should Increase Its Efforts To Provide Government-Furnished Material to Contractors (LCD-80-94)	29	Air-Launched Cruise Missile: Logistics Planning Problems and Implications for Other Weapon Systems (PLRD-82-68)	84	Defense Department's Management of Property Leased to Foreign Governments Is Still Inadequate (ID-83-6)	107
U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command		Army Can Better Use Its Soldiers Trained in Critical Shortage Occupations (NSIAD-84-17)	17	Defense Fuel Supply Center Procedures for Purchasing Strategic Petroleum Reserve Oil (RCED-84-61)	75
Added Emphasis on Consolidation of Multiple Purchase Requests Could Result in Significant Savings (NSIAD-84-143)	74	Better Followup Can Reduce Equipment and Facility Problems Affecting Army Guard and Reserve Training (NSIAD-84-29)	47	Department of Defense Progress in Resolving Contract Audits (AFMD-84-4)	105
U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Materiel Readiness Command		Better Management of Threat Simulators and Aerial Targets Is Crucial to Effective Weapon Systems Performance (MASAD-83-27)	94	Department of the Army's Program To Modify 155-mm. M109 Self-Propelled Howitzers to an M109A5 Configuration (NSIAD-84-60)	21
The Army Should Increase Its Efforts To Provide Government-Furnished Material to Contractors (LCD-80-94)	29	Better Methods for Validating and Reconciling Unfilled Materiel Orders Could Provide Substantial Economies to the Army (PLRD-82-76)	30	Development of Fire Support Command and Control Systems by the Army and the Marine Corps (NSIAD-84-15)	2
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command		Better Planning and Funding Approach Needed for Military Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Projects in Germany (HRD-82-130)	59	Dual Compensation Is Paid When Military Reservists Do Not Waive VA Disability Benefits (HRD-84-13)	77
The Army Needs To Improve Individual Soldier Training in Its Units (FPCD-81-29)	43	Cleaning Up Nuclear Facilities: An Aggressive and Unified Federal Program Is Needed (EMD-82-40)	103	Ensuring Retention of Essential Civilians Overseas During Hostilities (NSIAD-84-73)	27
The Army's Retention of Overage Vehicles (NSIAD-84-32)	54	Confusion Over Validity and Effects of Purported Petty Officer Shortage (NSIAD-84-30)	18	Establishing Goals for and Subcontracting With Small and Disadvantaged Businesses Under Public Law 95-507 (PLRD-82-95)	68
U.S. Army Troop Support Command		Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act (HRD-83-4)	114	Establishing New Federal Food-Buying Procedures Would Help Eliminate Unnecessary Special Examinations (RCED-84-150)	76
Added Emphasis on Consolidation of Multiple Purchase Requests Could Result in Significant Savings (NSIAD-84-143)	74	Consolidation of Personal Property Shipping Offices (NSIAD-84-81)	5	Excess Navy Ships Sold to Foreign Countries at Understated Prices (NSIAD-84-7)	108
U.S. Army Troop Support and Aviation Materiel Readiness Command		Continued Improvements Needed in Air Force Procedures and Practices (PLRD-83-36)	33	Export Control Regulation Could Be Reduced Without Affecting National Security (ID-82-14)	106
Added Emphasis on Consolidation of Multiple Purchase Requests Could Result in Significant Savings (NSIAD-84-143)	74	Criteria for Recording Obligations for Defense Stock Fund Purchases Should Be Changed (AFMD-83-54)	97	Federal Actions Needed To Retain Essential Defense Rail Service (PLRD-83-73)	41
The Army Should Increase Its Efforts To Provide Government-Furnished Material to Contractors (LCD-80-94)	29	DOD Can Combat Fraud Better by Strengthening Its Investigative Agencies (AFMD-83-33)	104	Further Improvements Needed in Department of Defense Oversight of Special Access (Carve-Out) Contracts (GGD-83-43)	63
U.S. Army, Europe		DOD Can Increase Revenues Through Better Use of Natural Resources It Holds in Trust (PLRD-82-9)	3	Government Could Save Millions by Revising Its Purchase Specification for Ground Beef (RCED-84-29)	73
Requisitions for M-1 Components Are Not Justified by Past Demands (NSIAD-84-118)	86	DOD Can Make Further Progress in Controlling Pollution From Its Sewage Treatment Plants (NSIAD-84-5)	4	Greater Emphasis on Occupant Responsibilities Can Reduce Military Family Housing Costs (PLRD-83-77)	8
Department of Commerce		DOD Needs Better Assessment of Military Hospitals' Capabilities To Care for Wartime Casualties (HRD-81-56)	109	How Well Do the Military Services Perform Jointly in Combat? DOD Joint Test-and-Evaluation Program Provides Few Credible Answers (PEMD-84-3)	20
Export Control Regulation Could Be Reduced Without Affecting National Security (ID-82-14)	106	DOD Needs To Provide More Credible Weapon Systems Cost Estimates to the Congress (NSIAD-84-70)	92		
Implementation of the National Minerals and Materials Policy Needs Better Coordination and Focus (RCED-84-63)	119				
Department of Defense					
Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development (EMD-81-40)	115				
Adequacy of the DOD Response to Its Inspector General's Report on the Use of Vehicles Assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Motor Pool (NSIAD-84-10)	53				

Implementation of the National Minerals and Materials Policy Needs Better Coordination and Focus (<i>RCED-84-63</i>)	119	Management of DOD's Shelf-Life Program--Better, but Still in Need of Improvement (<i>PLRD-82-84</i>)	51	Reductions in U.S. Costs To Station Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom Are Unlikely (<i>NSIAD-84-130</i>)	23
Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations (<i>NSIAD-84-13</i>)	19	Military Family Housing (<i>PLRD-83-19</i>)	7	Requirements and Production Capabilities Are Uncertain for Some Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts (<i>PLRD-82-77</i>)	14
Improper Use of Industrial Funds by Defense Extended the Life of Appropriations Which Otherwise Would Have Expired (<i>AFMD-84-34</i>)	100	Military Medicine Is in Trouble: Complete Reassessment Needed (<i>HRD-79-107</i>)	58	Results of Forthcoming Critical Tests Are Needed To Confirm Army Remotely Piloted Vehicle's Readiness for Production (<i>NSIAD-84-72</i>)	81
Improved Energy Management in the Facility Design Process Should Reduce Operating Costs for DOD (<i>PLRD-83-46</i>)	69	Millions Can Be Saved Through Better Energy Management in Federal Hospitals (<i>HRD-82-77</i>)	111	Small Percentage of Military Families Eligible for Food Stamps (<i>FPCD-83-25</i>)	79
Improved Internal Controls Are Needed To Better Assure That Obligations Will Not Be Backdated (<i>AFMD-84-14</i>)	98	More Effective Use of Contract Air-lift Could Reduce DOD Transportation Costs (<i>PLRD-83-55</i>)	40	Some Land Attack Cruise Missile Acquisition Programs Need To Be Slowed Down (<i>C-MASAD-81-9</i>)	87
Improvements Needed in Army's Determination of Manpower Requirements for Support and Administrative Functions (<i>FPCD-79-32</i>)	16	National Defense-Related Silver Needs Should Be Reevaluated and Alternative Disposal Methods Explored (<i>EMD-82-24</i>)	50	Status of the CG-47 Cruiser and DDG-51 Destroyer Shipbuilding Programs (<i>C-MASAD-83-11</i>)	89
Improvements Needed in DOD System for Controlling Material Shipments to DLA Depots and Customers (<i>PLRD-82-81</i>)	31	Navy Can Improve Management of Nonaviation Depot-Level Repairable Spares (<i>NSIAD-84-150</i>)	13	Test Transfer of Consumable Supply Items to the DLA from the Military Services (<i>NSIAD-84-82</i>)	55
Improvements Needed in Operating and Using the Army Automated Facilities Engineer Cost Accounting System (<i>AFMD-82-27</i>)	96	Navy Can Improve Management of Shipyard Labor Resources Through Better Work Measurement Practices (<i>NSIAD-84-96</i>)	48	The Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile: Resolve Uncertainties Before Production (<i>C-NSIAD-84-18</i>)	82
Improving the Air Force Modification Process Will Benefit Management of Spare Parts in the Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency (<i>PLRD-83-3</i>)	11	Navy Needs To Increase S-3A Readiness To Ensure Effective Use of Planned Weapon System Improvements (<i>C-MASAD-83-6</i>)	88	The Air Force Equipment Management System Still Does Not Assure Control of Nonexpendable Equipment (<i>NSIAD-83-20</i>)	36
Increased Joint Avionics Standardization Could Result in Major Economics and Operational Benefits (<i>NSIAD-84-127</i>)	39	Navy's Progress in Improving Physical Inventory Controls and the Magnitude, Causes, and Impact of Inventory Record Inaccuracies in the Army, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency (<i>NSIAD-84-9</i>)	37	The Air Force Weapons Laboratory Should Validate Its Computer Needs and Evaluate Alternatives Before Continuing Its Cray-1 Computer Lease (<i>AFMD-83-70</i>)	102
Intermediate-Level Maintenance for Navy Tactical Missiles Can Be Better Managed (<i>NSIAD-84-64</i>)	85	Need for Central Adjudication Facility for Security Clearances for Navy Personnel (<i>GGD-83-66</i>)	64	The Army Can Do More To Assure War Reserve Funds Are Spent Effectively (<i>NSIAD-84-50</i>)	12
Internal Controls Can Be Improved To Help Ensure Proper and Correct Military Retirement Payments (<i>AFMD-84-7</i>)	99	Objectivity of DOD's Senior Scientific Advisory Committees Can Be Better Assured (<i>GGD-83-76</i>)	113	The Army Needs More Comprehensive Evaluations To Make Effective Use of Its Weapon System Testing (<i>NSIAD-84-40</i>)	95
Joint Major System Acquisition by the Military Services: An Elusive Strategy (<i>NSIAD-84-22</i>)	91	Opportunities Exist To Reduce Operating Costs of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools (<i>HRD-82-86</i>)	62	The Army Needs To Better Plan To Meet Its Civilian Personnel Needs in Wartime (<i>NSIAD-84-107</i>)	28
Logistics Planning for the M1 Tank: Implications for Reduced Readiness and Increased Support Costs (<i>PLRD-81-33</i>)	83	Opportunities for Improved Oil Recycling Still Exist (<i>PLRD-82-113</i>)	120	The Army Needs To Improve Individual Soldier Training in Its Units (<i>FPCD-81-29</i>)	43
Logistics Support Costs for the B-1B Aircraft Can Be Reduced (<i>NSIAD-84-36</i>)	67	Poor Design and Management Hamper Army's Basic Skills Education Program (<i>FPCD-83-19</i>)	46	The Army Needs To Modify Its System for Measuring Individual Soldier Proficiency (<i>FPCD-82-28</i>)	45
Management Control of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools Needs To Be Strengthened (<i>HRD-83-3</i>)	1	Potential Reductions in Aircraft Operation and Maintenance Costs by Using Thrust Computing Support Equipment (<i>PLRD-82-4</i>)	10	The Army Should Increase Its Efforts To Provide Government-Furnished Material to Contractors (<i>LCD-80-94</i>)	29
		Problems in Alerting and Preparing Army Reservists for Mobilization (<i>NSIAD-84-52</i>)	26	The Army's AH-64 Helicopter and HELLFIRE Missile Retain Risks as They Enter Production (<i>C-MASAD-83-9</i>)	80

The Army's Retention of Overage Vehicles
(*NSIAD-84-32*) 54

The Congress Should Mandate Formation of a Military-VA-Civilian Contingency Hospital System
(*HRD-80-76*) 57

The Defense Budget: A Look at Budgetary Resources, Accomplishments, and Problems
(*PLRD-83-62*) 22

The Nation's Unused Wood Offers Vast Potential Energy and Product Benefits
(*EMD-81-6*) 116

The Navy Can Reduce Its Stated Requirements for F/A-18 Weapons Tactics Trainers
(*NSIAD-84-84*) 15

Unresolved Issues Concerning the Disposal of Stockpile Silver
(*RCED-83-7*) 52

Unused Cargo Space on Military Aircraft Returning to the United States
(*NSIAD-83-19*) 42

Verifying Eligibility for Military Health Care: Some Progress Has Been Made, but Reliability Problems Remain
(*HRD-83-1*) 60

Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel in Case of War?
(*HRD-81-67*) 24

Defense Contract Audit Agency
Department of Defense Progress in Resolving Contract Audits
(*AFMD-84-4*) 105

Defense Intelligence Agency
Better Management of Threat Simulators and Aerial Targets Is Crucial to Effective Weapon Systems Performance
(*MASAD-83-27*) 94

Further Improvements Needed in Department of Defense Oversight of Special Access (Carve-Out) Contracts
(*GGD-83-43*) 63

Defense Investigative Service
Further Improvements Needed in Department of Defense Oversight of Special Access (Carve-Out) Contracts
(*GGD-83-43*) 63

Defense Logistics Agency
Contract Pricing in the Meals-Ready-To-Eat Program
(*NSIAD-83-29*) 72

Improvements Needed in DOD System for Controlling Material Shipments to DLA Depots and Customers
(*PLRD-82-81*) 31

Improving the Air Force Modification Process Will Benefit Management of Spare Parts in the Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency
(*PLRD-83-3*) 11

Navy's Progress in Improving Physical Inventory Controls and the Magnitude, Causes, and Impact of Inventory Record Inaccuracies in the Army, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency
(*NSIAD-84-9*) 37

Test Transfer of Consumable Supply Items to the DLA from the Military Services
(*NSIAD-84-82*) 55

Defense Logistics Agency: Defense Fuel Supply Center
Defense Fuel Supply Center Procedures for Purchasing Strategic Petroleum Reserve Oil
(*RCED-84-61*) 75

Defense Logistics Agency: Defense Personnel Support Center
Contract Pricing in the Meals-Ready-To-Eat Program
(*NSIAD-83-29*) 72

Defense Science Board
Objectivity of DOD's Senior Scientific Advisory Committees Can Be Better Assured
(*GGD-83-76*) 113

Defense Security Assistance Agency
Defense Department's Management of Property Leased to Foreign Governments Is Still Inadequate
(*ID-83-6*) 107

Dependents Schools
Management Control of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools Needs To Be Strengthened
(*HRD-83-3*) 1

Opportunities Exist To Reduce Operating Costs of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools
(*HRD-82-86*) 62

Office of Inspector General
Department of Defense Progress in Resolving Contract Audits
(*AFMD-84-4*) 105

Office of the Secretary
Adequacy of the DOD Response to Its Inspector General's Report on the Use of Vehicles Assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Motor Pool
(*NSIAD-84-10*) 53

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering: Office of Defense Test and Evaluation
Better Management of Threat Simulators and Aerial Targets Is Crucial to Effective Weapon Systems Performance
(*MASAD-83-27*) 94

Department of Energy
Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development
(*EMD-81-40*) 115

Cleaning Up Nuclear Facilities: An Aggressive and Unified Federal Program Is Needed
(*EMD-82-40*) 103

Defense Fuel Supply Center Procedures for Purchasing Strategic Petroleum Reserve Oil
(*RCED-84-61*) 75

The Nation's Unused Wood Offers Vast Potential Energy and Product Benefits
(*EMD-81-6*) 116

Department of Health and Human Services
Millions Can Be Saved Through Better Energy Management in Federal Hospitals
(*HRD-82-77*) 111

The Congress Should Mandate Formation of a Military-VA-Civilian Contingency Hospital System
(*HRD-80-76*) 57

Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel in Case of War?
(*HRD-81-67*) 24

Health Services Administration: Indian Health Service
Millions Can Be Saved Through Better Energy Management in Federal Hospitals
(*HRD-82-77*) 111

Public Health Service
Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel in Case of War?
(*HRD-81-67*) 24

Department of the Interior
Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development
(*EMD-81-40*) 115

Developing Alaska's Energy Resources: Actions Needed To Stimulate Research and Improve Wetlands Permit Processing
(*EMD-82-44*) 118

Implementation of the National Minerals and Materials Policy Needs Better Coordination and Focus
(*RCED-84-63*) 119

National Defense-Related Silver Needs Should Be Reevaluated and Alternative Disposal Methods Explored (EMD-82-24)	50	DOD's Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing--Better Living Conditions and Reduced Costs Possible (PLRD-82-59)	6	Need for Central Adjudication Facility for Security Clearances for Navy Personnel (GGD-83-66)	64
Unresolved Issues Concerning the Disposal of Stockpile Silver (RCED-83-7)	52	Ensuring Retention of Essential Civilians Overseas During Hostilities (NSIAD-84-73)	27	Objectivity of DOD's Senior Scientific Advisory Committees Can Be Better Assured (GGD-83-76)	113
Bureau of Land Management		Excess Navy Ships Sold to Foreign Countries at Understated Prices (NSIAD-84-7)	108	Opportunities for Improved Oil Recycling Still Exist (PLRD-82-113)	120
Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development (EMD-81-40)	115	Further Improvements Needed in Department of Defense Oversight of Special Access (Carve-Out) Contracts (GGD-83-43)	63	Potential Reductions in Aircraft Operation and Maintenance Costs by Using Thrust Computing Support Equipment (PLRD-82-4)	10
Geological Survey		Greater Emphasis on Occupant Responsibilities Can Reduce Military Family Housing Costs (PLRD-83-77)	8	Requirements and Production Capabilities Are Uncertain for Some Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts (PLRD-82-77)	14
Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development (EMD-81-40)	115	How Well Do the Military Services Perform Jointly in Combat? DOD Joint Test-and-Evaluation Program Provides Few Credible Answers (PEMD-84-3)	20	Some Land Attack Cruise Missile Acquisition Programs Need To Be Slowed Down (C-MASAD-81-9)	87
United States Fish and Wildlife Service		Improper Use of Industrial Funds by Defense Extended the Life of Appropriations Which Otherwise Would Have Expired (AFMD-84-34)	100	Status of the CG-47 Cruiser and DDG-51 Destroyer Shipbuilding Programs (C-MASAD-83-11)	89
Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development (EMD-81-40)	115	Improved Energy Management in the Facility Design Process Should Reduce Operating Costs for DOD (PLRD-83-46)	69	Test Transfer of Consumable Supply Items to the DLA from the Military Services (NSIAD-84-82)	55
Department of Labor		Increased Joint Avionics Standardization Could Result in Major Economics and Operational Benefits (NSIAD-84-127)	39	The Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile: Resolve Uncertainties Before Production (C-NSIAD-84-18)	82
Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act (HRD-83-4)	114	Intermediate-Level Maintenance for Navy Tactical Missiles Can Be Better Managed (NSIAD-84-64)	85	The Congress Should Mandate Formation of a Military-VA-Civilian Contingency Hospital System (HRD-80-76)	57
Department of the Navy		Joint Major System Acquisition by the Military Services: An Elusive Strategy (NSIAD-84-22)	91	The Defense Budget: A Look at Budgetary Resources, Accomplishments, and Problems (PLRD-83-62)	22
Air Force and Navy Trainer Aircraft Acquisition Programs (MASAD-83-22)	90	Military Medicine Is in Trouble: Complete Reassessment Needed (HRD-79-107)	56	The Navy Can Reduce Its Stated Requirements for F/A-18 Weapons Tactics Trainers (NSIAD-84-84)	15
Air-Launched Cruise Missile: Logistics Planning Problems and Implications for Other Weapon Systems (PLRD-82-68)	84	More Effective Use of Contract Airlift Could Reduce DOD Transportation Costs (PLRD-83-55)	40	The Navy Should Improve Its Management of Defective Government-Furnished Materials (PLRD-82-115)	32
Better Management of Threat Simulators and Aerial Targets Is Crucial to Effective Weapon Systems Performance (MASAD-83-27)	94	Navy Can Improve Management of Nonaviation Depot-Level Repairable Spares (NSIAD-84-150)	13	Verifying Eligibility for Military Health Care: Some Progress Has Been Made, but Reliability Problems Remain (HRD-83-1)	60
Confusion Over Validity and Effects of Purported Petty Officer Shortage (NSIAD-84-30)	18	Navy Can Improve Management of Shipyard Labor Resources Through Better Work Measurement Practices (NSIAD-84-96)	48	Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel in Case of War? (HRD-81-67)	24
Consolidation of Personal Property Shipping Offices (NSIAD-84-81)	5	Navy Needs To Increase S-3A Readiness To Ensure Effective Use of Planned Weapon System Improvements (C-MASAD-83-6)	88		
DOD Can Combat Fraud Better by Strengthening Its Investigative Agencies (AFMD-83-33)	104	Navy's Progress in Improving Physical Inventory Controls and the Magnitude, Causes, and Impact of Inventory Record Inaccuracies in the Army, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency (NSIAD-84-9)	37	Naval Research Advisory Committee	
DOD Can Increase Revenues Through Better Use of Natural Resources It Holds in Trust (PLRD-82-9)	3			Objectivity of DOD's Senior Scientific Advisory Committees Can Be Better Assured (GGD-83-76)	113
DOD Can Make Further Progress in Controlling Pollution From Its Sewage Treatment Plants (NSIAD-84-5)	4				
DOD Needs To Provide More Credible Weapon Systems Cost Estimates to the Congress (NSIAD-84-70)	92				

Naval Sea Systems Command				
Navy Can Improve Management of Shipyard Labor Resources Through Better Work Measurement Practices (<i>NSIAD-84-96</i>)	48			
Department of State				
Export Control Regulation Could Be Reduced Without Affecting National Security (<i>ID-82-14</i>)	106			
Reductions in U.S. Costs To Station Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom Are Unlikely (<i>NSIAD-84-130</i>)	23			
Department of Transportation				
Federal Actions Needed To Retain Essential Defense Rail Service (<i>PLRD-83-73</i>)	41			
Department of the Treasury				
Export Control Regulation Could Be Reduced Without Affecting National Security (<i>ID-82-14</i>)	106			
Environmental Protection Agency				
Cleaning Up Nuclear Facilities: An Aggressive and Unified Federal Program Is Needed (<i>EMD-82-40</i>)	103			
The Nation's Unused Wood Offers Vast Potential Energy and Product Benefits (<i>EMD-81-6</i>)	116			
Executive Office of the President				
Implementation of the National Minerals and Materials Policy Needs Better Coordination and Focus (<i>RCED-84-63</i>)	119			
Federal Emergency Management Agency				
National Defense-Related Silver Needs Should Be Reevaluated and Alternative Disposal Methods Explored (<i>EMD-82-24</i>)	50			
The Congress Should Mandate Formation of a Military-VA-Civilian Contingency Hospital System (<i>HRD-80-76</i>)	57			
Unresolved Issues Concerning the Disposal of Stockpile Silver (<i>RCED-83-7</i>)	52			
Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel in Case of War? (<i>HRD-81-67</i>)	24			
General Electric Co. Management and Technical Services Co.				
Army Has the Opportunity To Re compete DAS3 Purchases and Improve Automated Battlefield Support (<i>IMTEC-84-20</i>)	65			
General Services Administration				
Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act (<i>HRD-83-4</i>)	114			
Contracting for Computer Teleprocessing Services Can Be Improved (<i>AFMD-83-60</i>)	66			
Establishing Goals for and Subcontracting With Small and Disadvantaged Businesses Under Public Law 95-507 (<i>PLRD-82-95</i>)	68			
National Defense-Related Silver Needs Should Be Reevaluated and Alternative Disposal Methods Explored (<i>EMD-82-24</i>)	50			
The Nation's Unused Wood Offers Vast Potential Energy and Product Benefits (<i>EMD-81-6</i>)	116			
National Aeronautics and Space Administration				
Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act (<i>HRD-83-4</i>)	114			
Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations (<i>NSIAD-84-13</i>)	19			
Nuclear Regulatory Commission				
Cleaning Up Nuclear Facilities: An Aggressive and Unified Federal Program Is Needed (<i>EMD-82-40</i>)	103			
Office of Federal Procurement Policy				
Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act (<i>HRD-83-4</i>)	114			
Establishing Goals for and Subcontracting With Small and Disadvantaged Businesses Under Public Law 95-507 (<i>PLRD-82-95</i>)	68			
Office of Management and Budget				
Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act (<i>HRD-83-4</i>)	114			
Opportunities for Improved Oil Recycling Still Exist (<i>PLRD-82-113</i>)	120			
Office of Science and Technology Policy				
Implementation of the National Minerals and Materials Policy Needs Better Coordination and Focus (<i>RCED-84-63</i>)	119			
Right-Away Foods Corp.				
Contract Pricing in the Meals-Ready-To-Eat Program (<i>NSIAD-83-29</i>)	72			
Selective Service System				
Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel in Case of War? (<i>HRD-81-67</i>)	24			
Small Business Administration				
Establishing Goals for and Subcontracting With Small and Disadvantaged Businesses Under Public Law 95-507 (<i>PLRD-82-95</i>)	68			
United States Marine Corps				
Development of Fire Support Command and Control Systems by the Army and the Marine Corps (<i>NSIAD-84-15</i>)	2			
Requirements and Production Capabilities Are Uncertain for Some Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts (<i>PLRD-82-77</i>)	14			
Test Transfer of Consumable Supply Items to the DLA from the Military Services (<i>NSIAD-84-82</i>)	55			
Veterans Administration				
Dual Compensation Is Paid When Military Reservists Do Not Waive VA Disability Benefits (<i>HRD-84-13</i>)	77			
Establishing New Federal Food-Buying Procedures Would Help Eliminate Unnecessary Special Examinations (<i>RCED-84-150</i>)	76			
Government Could Save Millions by Revising Its Purchase Specification for Ground Beef (<i>RCED-84-29</i>)	73			
Internal Controls Can Be Improved To Help Ensure Proper and Correct Military Retirement Payments (<i>AFMD-84-7</i>)	99			
Millions Can Be Saved Through Better Energy Management in Federal Hospitals (<i>HRD-82-77</i>)	111			
The Congress Should Mandate Formation of a Military-VA-Civilian Contingency Hospital System (<i>HRD-80-76</i>)	57			

BUDGET FUNCTION INDEX

Entries are arranged by official OMB Budget Function Codes. Also included are some codes added by GAO to capture areas not covered by the OMB codes. In particular, all codes of 990.0 and higher were added by GAO.

SAMPLE ENTRY

Budget Function — **051.1 Weapons Systems**
 Title — **Requisitions for M-1 Components Are Not Justified by Past Demands**
 Report Number — **(NSIAD-84-118)**

Page Number — **86**

050.0 National Defense			
051.0 Department of Defense - Military (Except Procurement and Contracting)			
Air Force Uses Inaccurate Production Leadtime To Compute Spare Parts Requirements (PLRD-83-85)	34	Development of Fire Support Command and Control Systems by the Army and the Marine Corps (NSIAD-84-15)	2
Army Can Better Use Its Soldiers Trained in Critical Shortage Occupations (NSIAD-84-17)	17	Dual Compensation Is Paid When Military Reservists Do Not Waive VA Disability Benefits (HRD-84-13)	77
Better Followup Can Reduce Equipment and Facility Problems Affecting Army Guard and Reserve Training (NSIAD-84-29)	47	Ensuring Retention of Essential Civilians Overseas During Hostilities (NSIAD-84-73)	27
Better Methods for Validating and Reconciling Unfilled Materiel Orders Could Provide Substantial Economies to the Army (PLRD-82-76)	30	Federal Actions Needed To Retain Essential Defense Rail Service (PLRD-83-73)	41
Confusion Over Validity and Effects of Purported Petty Officer Shortage (NSIAD-84-30)	18	Greater Emphasis on Occupant Responsibilities Can Reduce Military Family Housing Costs (PLRD-83-77)	8
Consolidation of Personal Property Shipping Offices (NSIAD-84-81)	5	How Well Do the Military Services Perform Jointly in Combat? DOD Joint Test-and-Evaluation Program Provides Few Credible Answers (PEMD-84-3)	20
Continued Improvements Needed in Air Force Procedures and Practices (PLRD-83-36)	33	Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations (NSIAD-84-13)	19
DOD Can Increase Revenues Through Better Use of Natural Resources It Holds in Trust (PLRD-82-9)	3	Improvements Needed in Army's Determination of Manpower Requirements for Support and Administrative Functions (FPCD-79-32)	16
DOD Can Make Further Progress in Controlling Pollution From Its Sewage Treatment Plants (NSIAD-84-5)	4	Improvements Needed in DOD System for Controlling Material Shipments to DLA Depots and Customers (PLRD-82-81)	31
DOD's Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing--Better Living Conditions and Reduced Costs Possible (PLRD-82-59)	6	Improving the Air Force Modification Process Will Benefit Management of Spare Parts in the Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency (PLRD-83-3)	11
Department of the Army's Program To Modify 155-mm. M109 Self-Propelled Howitzers to an M109A5 Configuration (NSIAD-84-60)	21	Increased Joint Avionics Standardization Could Result in Major Economies and Operational Benefits (NSIAD-84-127)	39
		Management Control of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools Needs To Be Strengthened (HRD-83-3)	1
		Military Family Housing (PLRD-83-19)	7
		More Effective Use of Contract Air-lift Could Reduce DOD Transportation Costs (PLRD-83-55)	40
		Navy Can Improve Management of Nonaviation Depot-Level Repairable Spares (NSIAD-84-150)	13
		Navy's Progress in Improving Physical Inventory Controls and the Magnitude, Causes, and Impact of Inventory Record Inaccuracies in the Army, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency (NSIAD-84-9)	37
		Poor Design and Management Hamper Army's Basic Skills Education Program (FPCD-83-19)	46
		Potential Reductions in Aircraft Operation and Maintenance Costs by Using Thrust Computing Support Equipment (PLRD-82-4)	10
		Problems in Alerting and Preparing Army Reservists for Mobilization (NSIAD-84-52)	26
		Reductions in U.S. Costs To Station Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom Are Unlikely (NSIAD-84-130)	23
		Requirements and Production Capabilities Are Uncertain for Some Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts (PLRD-82-77)	14
		The Air Force Equipment Management System Still Does Not Assure Control of Nonexpendable Equipment (NSIAD-83-20)	36

The Army Can Do More To Assure War Reserve Funds Are Spent Effectively (NSIAD-84-50)	12	Logistics Support Costs for the B-1B Aircraft Can Be Reduced (NSIAD-84-36)	67	051.3 Military Pay	
The Army Needs To Better Plan To Meet Its Civilian Personnel Needs in Wartime (NSIAD-84-107)	28	Navy Needs To Increase S-3A Readiness To Ensure Effective Use of Planned Weapon System Improvements (C-MASAD-83-6)	88	Army Incentive Funds Need More Effective Targeting To Reduce Critical Personnel Shortages (FPCD-83-10)	78
The Army Needs To Improve Individual Soldier Training in Its Units (FPCD-81-29)	43	Requisitions for M-1 Components Are Not Justified by Past Demands (NSIAD-84-118)	86	Military Medicine Is in Trouble: Complete Reassessment Needed (HRD-79-107)	56
The Army Needs To Modify Its System for Measuring Individual Soldier Proficiency (FPCD-82-28)	45	Results of Forthcoming Critical Tests Are Needed To Confirm Army Remotely Piloted Vehicle's Readiness for Production (NSIAD-84-72)	81	Small Percentage of Military Families Eligible for Food Stamps (FPCD-83-25)	79
The Army Needs To Reevaluate Its Extended Basic Training Program (FPCD-82-11)	44	Some Land Attack Cruise Missile Acquisition Programs Need To Be Slowed Down (C-MASAD-81-9)	87	054.0 Defense-Related Activities	
The Army Should Increase Its Efforts To Provide Government-Furnished Material to Contractors (LCD-80-94)	29	Status of the CG-47 Cruiser and DDG-51 Destroyer Shipbuilding Programs (C-MASAD-83-11)	89	Adequacy of the DOD Response to Its Inspector General's Report on the Use of Vehicles Assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Motor Pool (NSIAD-84-10)	53
The Defense Budget: A Look at Budgetary Resources, Accomplishments, and Problems (PLRD-83-62)	22	The Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile: Resolve Uncertainties Before Production (C-NSIAD-84-18)	82	Air Force Does Not Recover All Required Costs of Modification Kits Sold to Foreign Governments (PLRD-82-111)	49
The Navy Can Reduce Its Stated Requirements for F/A-18 Weapons Tactics Trainers (NSIAD-84-84)	15	The Army Needs More Comprehensive Evaluations To Make Effective Use of Its Weapon System Testing (NSIAD-84-40)	95	Better Planning and Funding Approach Needed for Military Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Projects in Germany (HRD-82-130)	59
The Navy Should Improve Its Management of Defective Government-Furnished Materials (PLRD-82-115)	32	The Army's AH-64 Helicopter and HELLFIRE Missile Retain Risks as They Enter Production (C-MASAD-83-9)	80	Further Improvements Needed in Department of Defense Oversight of Special Access (Carve-Out) Contracts (GGD-83-43)	63
Unused Cargo Space on Military Aircraft Returning to the United States (NSIAD-83-19)	42	051.2 Department of Defense - Procurement and Contracts		Management of DOD's Shelf-Life Program--Better, but Still in Need of Improvement (PLRD-82-84)	51
Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel in Case of War? (HRD-81-67)	24	Air Force Breakout Efforts Are Ineffective (PLRD-83-82)	71	Military Medicine Is in Trouble: Complete Reassessment Needed (HRD-79-107)	56
051.1 Weapons Systems		Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act (HRD-83-4)	114	National Defense-Related Silver Needs Should Be Reevaluated and Alternative Disposal Methods Explored (EMD-82-24)	50
Air Force and Navy Trainer Aircraft Acquisition Programs (MASAD-83-22)	90	Contract Pricing in the Meals-Ready-To-Eat Program (NSIAD-83-29)	72	Navy Can Improve Management of Shipyard Labor Resources Through Better Work Measurement Practices (NSIAD-84-96)	48
Air-Launched Cruise Missile: Logistics Planning Problems and Implications for Other Weapon Systems (PLRD-82-68)	84	Contracting for Computer Teleprocessing Services Can Be Improved (AFMD-83-60)	66	Need for Central Adjudication Facility for Security Clearances for Navy Personnel (GGD-83-66)	64
Better Management of Threat Simulators and Aerial Targets Is Crucial to Effective Weapon Systems Performance (MASAD-83-27)	94	Establishing Goals for and Subcontracting With Small and Disadvantaged Businesses Under Public Law 95-507 (PLRD-82-95)	68	Opportunities Exist To Reduce Operating Costs of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools (HRD-82-86)	62
DOD Needs To Provide More Credible Weapon Systems Cost Estimates to the Congress (NSIAD-84-70)	92	Establishing New Federal Food-Buying Procedures Would Help Eliminate Unnecessary Special Examinations (RCED-84-150)	76	Test Transfer of Consumable Supply Items to the DLA from the Military Services (NSIAD-84-82)	55
Intermediate-Level Maintenance for Navy Tactical Missiles Can Be Better Managed (NSIAD-84-64)	85	Government Could Save Millions by Revising Its Purchase Specification for Ground Beef (RCED-84-29)	73	The Army's Retention of Overage Vehicles (NSIAD-84-32)	54
Joint Major System Acquisition by the Military Services: An Elusive Strategy (NSIAD-84-22)	91	Improved Energy Management in the Facility Design Process Should Reduce Operating Costs for DOD (PLRD-83-46)	69	The Congress Should Mandate Formation of a Military-VA-Civilian Contingency Hospital System (HRD-80-76)	57
Logistics Planning for the M1 Tank: Implications for Reduced Readiness and Increased Support Costs (PLRD-81-33)	83	Logistics Support Costs for the B-1B Aircraft Can Be Reduced (NSIAD-84-36)	67	Unresolved Issues Concerning the Disposal of Stockpile Silver (RCED-83-7)	52

Budget Function Index

700.0 Veterans Benefits and Services

Verifying Eligibility for Military Health Care: Some Progress Has Been Made, but Reliability Problems Remain
(HRD-83-1) 60

150.0 International Affairs

151.0 Foreign Economic and Financial Assistance
Establishing New Federal Food-Buying Procedures Would Help Eliminate Unnecessary Special Examinations
(RCED-84-150) 76

The Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile: Resolve Uncertainties Before Production
(C-NSIAD-84-18) 82

152.0 Military Assistance

Added Emphasis on Consolidation of Multiple Purchase Requests Could Result in Significant Savings
(NSIAD-84-143) 74

Defense Department's Management of Property Leased to Foreign Governments Is Still Inadequate
(ID-83-6) 107

153.0 Conduct of Foreign Affairs

Excess Navy Ships Sold to Foreign Countries at Understated Prices
(NSIAD-84-7) 108

Export Control Regulation Could Be Reduced Without Affecting National Security
(ID-82-14) 106

250.0 General Science, Space, and Technology

253.0 Space Flight
Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations
(NSIAD-84-13) 19

270.0 Energy

271.0 Energy Supply
Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development
(EMD-81-40) 115

Developing Alaska's Energy Resources: Actions Needed To Stimulate Research and Improve Wetlands Permit Processing
(EMD-82-44) 118

272.0 Energy Conservation

Improved Energy Management in the Facility Design Process Should Reduce Operating Costs for DOD
(PLRD-83-46) 69

Millions Can Be Saved Through Better Energy Management in Federal Hospitals
(HRD-82-77) 111

274.0 Emergency Energy Preparedness
Defense Fuel Supply Center Procedures for Purchasing Strategic Petroleum Reserve Oil
(RCED-84-61) 75

276.0 Energy Information, Policy, and Regulation
Cleaning Up Nuclear Facilities: An Aggressive and Unified Federal Program Is Needed
(EMD-82-40) 103

300.0 Natural Resources and Environment

Implementation of the National Minerals and Materials Policy Needs Better Coordination and Focus
(RCED-84-63) 119

302.0 Conservation and Land Management

Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development
(EMD-81-40) 115

304.0 Pollution Control and Abatement

DOD Can Make Further Progress in Controlling Pollution From Its Sewage Treatment Plants
(NSIAD-84-5) 4

306.0 Other Natural Resources

National Defense-Related Silver Needs Should Be Reevaluated and Alternative Disposal Methods Explored
(EMD-82-24) 50

The Nation's Unused Wood Offers Vast Potential Energy and Product Benefits
(EMD-81-6) 116

Unresolved Issues Concerning the Disposal of Stockpile Silver
(RCED-83-7) 52

350.0 Agriculture

Small Percentage of Military Families Eligible for Food Stamps
(FPCD-83-25) 79

351.0 Farm Income Stabilization

Government Could Save Millions by Revising Its Purchase Specification for Ground Beef
(RCED-84-29) 73

352.0 Agricultural Research and Services

Establishing New Federal Food-Buying Procedures Would Help Eliminate Unnecessary Special Examinations
(RCED-84-150) 76

500.0 Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services

501.0 Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education
Management Control of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools Needs To Be Strengthened
(HRD-83-3) 1

Opportunities Exist To Reduce Operating Costs of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools
(HRD-82-86) 62

505.0 Other Labor Services

Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act
(HRD-83-4) 114

550.0 Health

551.0 Health Care Services
Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel in Case of War?
(HRD-81-67) 24

551.3 Health Planning and Construction

Better Planning and Funding Approach Needed for Military Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Projects in Germany
(HRD-82-130) 59

DOD Needs Better Assessment of Military Hospitals' Capabilities To Care for Wartime Casualties
(HRD-81-56) 109

Millions Can Be Saved Through Better Energy Management in Federal Hospitals
(HRD-82-77) 111

The Congress Should Mandate Formation of a Military-VA-Civilian Contingency Hospital System
(HRD-80-76) 57

600.0 Income Security

604.0 Housing Assistance and Other Income Supplements
Small Percentage of Military Families Eligible for Food Stamps
(FPCD-83-25) 79

700.0 Veterans Benefits and Services

701.0 Income Security for Veterans
Dual Compensation Is Paid When Military Reservists Do Not Waive VA Disability Benefits
(HRD-84-13) 77

703.0 Hospital and Medical Care for Veterans

Millions Can Be Saved Through Better Energy Management in Federal Hospitals
(HRD-82-77) 111

800.0 General Government

802.0 Executive Direction and Management

Objectivity of DOD's Senior Scientific Advisory Committees Can Be Better Assured
(GGD-83-76) 113

803.0 Tax Administration

Implementation of the National Minerals and Materials Policy Needs Better Coordination and Focus
(RCED-84-63) 119

804.0 General Property and Records Management

Opportunities for Improved Oil Recycling Still Exist
(PLRD 82-113) 120

Department of Defense Progress in Resolving Contract Audits
(AFMD-84-4) 105

988.0 Regulatory Accounting Rules and Financial Reporting

Criteria for Recording Obligations for Defense Stock Fund Purchases Should Be Changed
(AFMD-83-54) 97

Improper Use of Industrial Funds by Defense Extended the Life of Appropriations Which Otherwise Would Have Expired
(AFMD-84-34) 100

Improved Internal Controls Are Needed To Better Assure That Obligations Will Not Be Backdated
(AFMD-84-14) 98

990.1 Automatic Data Processing

Army Has the Opportunity To Recomplete DAS3 Purchases and Improve Automated Battlefield Support
(IMTEC-84-20) 65

Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act
(HRD-83-4) 114

The Air Force Weapons Laboratory Should Validate Its Computer Needs and Evaluate Alternatives Before Continuing Its Cray-1 Computer Lease
(AFMD-83-70) 102

990.4 Procurement - Other Than Defense

Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act
(HRD-83-4) 114

998.0 Financial Management and Information Systems

998.1 Accounting Systems in Operation

Improvements Needed in Operating and Using the Army Automated Facilities Engineer Cost Accounting System
(AFMD-82-27) 96

Internal Controls Can Be Improved To Help Ensure Proper and Correct Military Retirement Payments
(AFMD-84-7) 99

998.2 Review and Approval of Accounting Systems

Improvements Needed in Operating and Using the Army Automated Facilities Engineer Cost Accounting System
(AFMD-82-27) 96


998.3 Internal Audit

DOD Can Combat Fraud Better by Strengthening Its Investigative Agencies
(AFMD-83-33) 104

CONGRESSIONAL INDEX

Includes entries under relevant House, Senate, and Joint committees and subcommittees.

SAMPLE ENTRY



House Committees					
House Committee on Agriculture		The Defense Budget: A Look at Budgetary Resources, Accomplishments, and Problems (PLRD-83-62)	22	the Use of Vehicles Assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Motor Pool (NSIAD-84-10)	53
The Nation's Unused Wood Offers Vast Potential Energy and Product Benefits (EMD-81-6)	116			Air Force Does Not Recover All Required Costs of Modification Kits Sold to Foreign Governments (PLRD-82-111)	49
Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations, and Nutrition Subcommittee		Agriculture and Related Agencies Subcommittee		Air Force Uses Inaccurate Production Leadtime to Compute Spare Parts Requirements (PLRD-83-85)	34
Small Percentage of Military Families Eligible for Food Stamps (FPCD-83-25)	79	Government Could Save Millions by Revising Its Purchase Specification for Ground Beef (RCED-84-29)	73	Air Force and Navy Trainer Aircraft Acquisition Programs (MASAD-83-22)	90
Livestock, Dairy and Poultry Subcommittee		Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agencies Subcommittee		Air-Launched Cruise Missile: Logistics Planning Problems and Implications for Other Weapon Systems (PLRD-82-68)	84
Government Could Save Millions by Revising Its Purchase Specification for Ground Beef (RCED-84-29)	73	Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development (EMD-81-40)	115	Army Has the Opportunity To Recompete DAS3 Purchases and Improve Automated Battlefield Support (IMTEC-84-20)	85
House Committee on Appropriations		Establishing New Federal Food-Buying Procedures Would Help Eliminate Unnecessary Special Examinations (RCED-84-150)	76	Army Incentive Funds Need More Effective Targeting To Reduce Critical Personnel Shortages (FPCD-83-10)	78
Better Methods for Validating and Reconciling Unfilled Materiel Orders Could Provide Substantial Economies to the Army (PLRD-82-76)	30	Small Percentage of Military Families Eligible for Food Stamps (FPCD-83-25)	79	Better Followup Can Reduce Equipment and Facility Problems Affecting Army Guard and Reserve Training (NSIAD-84-29)	47
DOD Needs Better Assessment of Military Hospitals' Capabilities To Care for Wartime Casualties (HRD-81-56)	109	Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Subcommittee		Better Management of Threat Simulators and Aerial Targets Is Crucial to Effective Weapon Systems Performance (MASAD-83-27)	94
Improvements Needed in DOD System for Controlling Material Shipments to DLA Depots and Customers (PLRD-82-81)	31	Export Control Regulation Could Be Reduced Without Affecting National Security (ID-82-14)	106	Better Methods for Validating and Reconciling Unfilled Materiel Orders Could Provide Substantial Economies to the Army (PLRD-82-76)	30
Improving the Air Force Modification Process Will Benefit Management of Spare Parts in the Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency (PLRD-83-3)	11	Defense Subcommittee		Confusion Over Validity and Effects of Purported Petty Officer Shortage (NSIAD-84-30)	18
Requisitions for M-1 Components Are Not Justified by Past Demands (NSIAD-84-118)	86	Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development (EMD-81-40)	115	Consolidation of Personal Property Shipping Offices (NSIAD-84-81)	5
Some Land Attack Cruise Missile Acquisition Programs Need To Be Slowed Down (C-MASAD-81-9)	87	Added Emphasis on Consolidation of Multiple Purchase Requests Could Result in Significant Savings (NSIAD-84-143)	74		
		Adequacy of the DOD Response to Its Inspector General's Report on			

Continued Improvements Needed in Air Force Procedures and Practices (PLRD-83-36)	33	Improper Use of Industrial Funds by Defense Extended the Life of Appropriations Which Otherwise Would Have Expired (AFMD-84-34)	100	Better Work Measurement Practices (NSIAD-84-96)	48
Contract Pricing in the Meals-Ready-To-Eat Program (NSIAD-83-29)	72	Improved Internal Controls Are Needed To Better Assure That Obligations Will Not Be Backdated (AFMD-84-14)	98	Navy Needs To Increase S-3A Readiness To Ensure Effective Use of Planned Weapon System Improvements (C-MASAD-83-6)	88
Criteria for Recording Obligations for Defense Stock Fund Purchases Should Be Changed (AFMD-83-54)	97	Improvements Needed in Army's Determination of Manpower Requirements for Support and Administrative Functions (FPCD-79-32)	16	Navy's Progress in Improving Physical Inventory Controls and the Magnitude, Causes, and Impact of Inventory Record Inaccuracies in the Army, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency (NSIAD-84-9)	37
DOD Can Combat Fraud Better by Strengthening Its Investigative Agencies (AFMD-83-33)	104	Improvements Needed in DOD System for Controlling Material Shipments to DLA Depots and Customers (PLRD-82-81)	31	Need for Central Adjudication Facility for Security Clearances for Navy Personnel (GGD-83-66)	64
DOD Can Increase Revenues Through Better Use of Natural Resources It Holds in Trust (PLRD-82-9)	3	Improvements Needed in Operating and Using the Army Automated Facilities Engineer Cost Accounting System (AFMD-82-27)	96	Objectivity of DOD's Senior Scientific Advisory Committees Can Be Better Assured (GGD-83-76)	113
DOD Needs Better Assessment of Military Hospitals' Capabilities To Care for Wartime Casualties (HRD-81-56)	109	Increased Joint Avionics Standardization Could Result in Major Economies and Operational Benefits (NSIAD-84-127)	39	Opportunities Exist To Reduce Operating Costs of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools (HRD-82-86)	62
Defense Department's Management of Property Leased to Foreign Governments Is Still Inadequate (ID-83-6)	107	Intermediate-Level Maintenance for Navy Tactical Missiles Can Be Better Managed (NSIAD-84-64)	85	Opportunities for Improved Oil Recycling Still Exist (PLRD-82-113)	120
Department of Defense Progress in Resolving Contract Audits (AFMD-84-4)	105	Internal Controls Can Be Improved To Help Ensure Proper and Correct Military Retirement Payments (AFMD-84-7)	99	Poor Design and Management Hamper Army's Basic Skills Education Program (FPCD-83-19)	46
Department of the Army's Program To Modify 155-mm. M109 Self-Propelled Howitzers to an M109A5 Configuration (NSIAD-84-60)	21	Logistics Planning for the M1 Tank: Implications for Reduced Readiness and Increased Support Costs (PLRD-81-33)	83	Potential Reductions in Aircraft Operation and Maintenance Costs by Using Thrust Computing Support Equipment (PLRD-82-4)	10
Development of Fire Support Command and Control Systems by the Army and the Marine Corps (NSIAD-84-15)	2	Logistics Support Costs for the B-1B Aircraft Can Be Reduced (NSIAD-84-36)	67	Problems in Alerting and Preparing Army Reservists for Mobilization (NSIAD-84-52)	26
Dual Compensation Is Paid When Military Reservists Do Not Waive VA Disability Benefits (HRD-84-13)	77	Management Control of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools Needs To Be Strengthened (HRD-83-3)	1	Reductions in U.S. Costs To Station Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom Are Unlikely (NSIAD-84-130)	23
Ensuring Retention of Essential Civilians Overseas During Hostilities (NSIAD-84-73)	27	Management of DOD's Shelf-Life Program--Better, but Still in Need of Improvement (PLRD-82-84)	51	Requirements and Production Capabilities Are Uncertain for Some Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts (PLRD-82-77)	14
Establishing Goals for and Subcontracting With Small and Disadvantaged Businesses Under Public Law 95-507 (PLRD-82-95)	68	Military Family Housing (PLRD-83-19)	7	Requisitions for M-1 Components Are Not Justified by Past Demands (NSIAD-84-118)	86
Establishing New Federal Food-Buying Procedures Would Help Eliminate Unnecessary Special Examinations (RCED-84-150)	76	Military Medicine Is in Trouble: Complete Reassessment Needed (HRD-79-107)	56	Results of Forthcoming Critical Tests Are Needed To Confirm Army Remotely Piloted Vehicle's Readiness for Production (NSIAD-84-72)	81
Excess Navy Ships Sold to Foreign Countries at Understated Prices (NSIAD-84-7)	108	More Effective Use of Contract Airlift Could Reduce DOD Transportation Costs (PLRD-83-55)	40	Some Land Attack Cruise Missile Acquisition Programs Need To Be Slowed Down (C-MASAD-81-9)	87
Federal Actions Needed To Retain Essential Defense Rail Service (PLRD-83-73)	41	National Defense-Related Silver Needs Should Be Reevaluated and Alternative Disposal Methods Explored (EMD-82-24)	50	Status of the CG-47 Cruiser and DDG-51 Destroyer Shipbuilding Programs (C-MASAD-83-11)	89
Implementation of the National Minerals and Materials Policy Needs Better Coordination and Focus (RCED-84-63)	119	Navy Can Improve Management of Nonaviation Depot-Level Repairable Spares (NSIAD-84-150)	13	Test Transfer of Consumable Supply Items to the DLA from the Military Services (NSIAD-84-82)	55
Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations (NSIAD-84-13)	19	Navy Can Improve Management of Shipyard Labor Resources Through			

The Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile: Resolve Uncertainties Before Production (C-NSIAD-84-18)	82	Been Made, but Reliability Problems Remain (HRD-83-1)	60	Military Construction Subcommittee Better Planning and Funding Approach Needed for Military Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Projects in Germany (HRD-82-130)	59
The Air Force Equipment Management System Still Does Not Assure Control of Nonexpendable Equipment (NSIAD-83-20)	36	Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel in Case of War? (HRD-81-67)	24	DOD Can Make Further Progress in Controlling Pollution From Its Sewage Treatment Plants (NSIAD-84-5)	4
The Air Force Weapons Laboratory Should Validate Its Computer Needs and Evaluate Alternatives Before Continuing Its Cray-1 Computer Lease (AFMD-83-70)	102	Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Subcommittee Army Can Better Use Its Soldiers Trained in Critical Shortage Occupations (NSIAD-84-17)	17	DOD's Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing--Better Living Conditions and Reduced Costs Possible (PLRD-82-59)	6
The Army Can Do More To Assure War Reserve Funds Are Spent Effectively (NSIAD-84-50)	12	Energy and Water Development Subcommittee Cleaning Up Nuclear Facilities: An Aggressive and Unified Federal Program Is Needed (EMD-82-40)	103	Greater Emphasis on Occupant Responsibilities Can Reduce Military Family Housing Costs (PLRD-83-77)	8
The Army Needs More Comprehensive Evaluations To Make Effective Use of Its Weapon System Testing (NSIAD-84-40)	95	Millions Can Be Saved Through Better Energy Management in Federal Hospitals (HRD-82-77)	111	Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations (NSIAD-84-13)	19
The Army Needs To Better Plan To Meet Its Civilian Personnel Needs in Wartime (NSIAD-84-107)	28	The Nation's Unused Wood Offers Vast Potential Energy and Product Benefits (EMD-81-6)	116	Improved Energy Management in the Facility Design Process Should Reduce Operating Costs for DOD (PLRD-83-46)	69
The Army Needs To Improve Individual Soldier Training in Its Units (FPCD-81-29)	43	HUD-Independent Agencies Subcommittee Dual Compensation Is Paid When Military Reservists Do Not Waive VA Disability Benefits (HRD-84-13)	77	House Committee on Armed Services Added Emphasis on Consolidation of Multiple Purchase Requests Could Result in Significant Savings (NSIAD-84-143)	74
The Army Needs To Modify Its System for Measuring Individual Soldier Proficiency (FPCD-82-28)	45	Establishing New Federal Food-Buying Procedures Would Help Eliminate Unnecessary Special Examinations (RCED-84-150)	76	Air Force Does Not Recover All Required Costs of Modification Kits Sold to Foreign Governments (PLRD-82-111)	49
The Army Needs To Reevaluate Its Extended Basic Training Program (FPCD-82-11)	44	Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations (NSIAD-84-13)	19	Air Force and Navy Trainer Aircraft Acquisition Programs (MASAD-83-22)	90
The Army Should Increase Its Efforts To Provide Government-Furnished Material to Contractors (LCD-80-94)	29	Interior Subcommittee Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development (EMD-81-40)	115	Air-Launched Cruise Missile: Logistics Planning Problems and Implications for Other Weapon Systems (PLRD-82-68)	84
The Army's AH-64 Helicopter and HELLFIRE Missile Retain Risks as They Enter Production (C-MASAD-83-9)	80	Defense Fuel Supply Center Procedures for Purchasing Strategic Petroleum Reserve Oil (RCED-84-61)	75	Army Has the Opportunity To Re compete DAS3 Purchases and Improve Automated Battlefield Support (IMTEC-84-20)	65
The Army's Retention of Overage Vehicles (NSIAD-84-32)	54	Developing Alaska's Energy Resources: Actions Needed To Stimulate Research and Improve Wetlands Permit Processing (EMD-82-44)	118	Better Followup Can Reduce Equipment and Facility Problems Affecting Army Guard and Reserve Training (NSIAD-84-29)	47
The Congress Should Mandate Formation of a Military-VA-Civilian Contingency Hospital System (HRD-80-76)	57	Implementation of the National Minerals and Materials Policy Needs Better Coordination and Focus (RCED-84-63)	119	Better Management of Threat Simulators and Aerial Targets Is Crucial to Effective Weapon Systems Performance (MASAD-83-27)	94
The Defense Budget: A Look at Budgetary Resources, Accomplishments, and Problems (PLRD-83-62)	22	Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Subcommittee Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act (HRD-83-4)	114	Better Methods for Validating and Reconciling Unfilled Materiel Orders Could Provide Substantial Economics to the Army (PLRD-82-76)	30
The Navy Can Reduce Its Stated Requirements for F/A-18 Weapons Tactics Trainers (NSIAD-84-84)	15			Better Planning and Funding Approach Needed for Military Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Projects in Germany (HRD-82-130)	59
The Navy Should Improve Its Management of Defective Government-Furnished Materials (PLRD-82-115)	32				
Unresolved Issues Concerning the Disposal of Stockpile Silver (RCED-83-7)	52				
Unused Cargo Space on Military Aircraft Returning to the United States (NSIAD-83-19)	42				
Verifying Eligibility for Military Health Care: Some Progress Has					

Cleaning Up Nuclear Facilities: An Aggressive and Unified Federal Program Is Needed (EMD-82-40)	103	Requirements for Support and Administrative Functions (FPCD-79-32)	16	Opportunities for Improved Oil Recycling Still Exist (PLRD-82-113)	120
Confusion Over Validity and Effects of Purported Petty Officer Shortage (NSIAD-84-30)	18	Improvements Needed in Operating and Using the Army Automated Facilities Engineer Cost Accounting System (AFMD-82-27)	96	Potential Reductions in Aircraft Operation and Maintenance Costs by Using Thrust Computing Support Equipment (PLRD-82-4)	10
Consolidation of Personal Property Shipping Offices (NSIAD-84-81)	5	Increased Joint Avionics Standardization Could Result in Major Economies and Operational Benefits (NSIAD-84-127)	39	Problems in Alerting and Preparing Army Reservists for Mobilization (NSIAD-84-52)	26
Criteria for Recording Obligations for Defense Stock Fund Purchases Should Be Changed (AFMD-83-54)	97	Intermediate-Level Maintenance for Navy Tactical Missiles Can Be Better Managed (NSIAD-84-64)	85	Reductions in U.S. Costs To Station Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom Are Unlikely (NSIAD-84-130)	23
DOD Can Increase Revenues Through Better Use of Natural Resources It Holds in Trust (PLRD-82-9)	3	Internal Controls Can Be Improved To Help Ensure Proper and Correct Military Retirement Payments (AFMD-84-7)	99	Requirements and Production Capabilities Are Uncertain for Some Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts (PLRD-82-77)	14
DOD Can Make Further Progress in Controlling Pollution From Its Sewage Treatment Plants (NSIAD-84-5)	4	Logistics Planning for the M1 Tank: Implications for Reduced Readiness and Increased Support Costs (PLRD-81-33)	83	Requisitions for M-1 Components Are Not Justified by Past Demands (NSIAD-84-118)	86
DOD's Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing--Better Living Conditions and Reduced Costs Possible (PLRD-82-59)	6	Logistics Support Costs for the B-1B Aircraft Can Be Reduced (NSIAD-84-36)	67	Results of Forthcoming Critical Tests Are Needed To Confirm Army Remotely Piloted Vehicle's Readiness for Production (NSIAD-84-72)	81
Department of the Army's Program To Modify 155-mm. M109 Self-Propelled Howitzers to an M109A5 Configuration (NSIAD-84-60)	21	Management of DOD's Shelf-Life Program--Better, but Still in Need of Improvement (PLRD-82-84)	51	Some Land Attack Cruise Missile Acquisition Programs Need To Be Slowed Down (C-MASAD-81-9)	87
Development of Fire Support Command and Control Systems by the Army and the Marine Corps (NSIAD-84-15)	2	Military Family Housing (PLRD-83-19)	7	Status of the CG-47 Cruiser and DDG-51 Destroyer Shipbuilding Programs (C-MASAD-83-11)	89
Dual Compensation Is Paid When Military Reservists Do Not Waive VA Disability Benefits (HRD-84-13)	77	Military Medicine Is in Trouble: Complete Reassessment Needed (HRD-79-107)	56	Test Transfer of Consumable Supply Items to the DLA from the Military Services (NSIAD-84-82)	55
Ensuring Retention of Essential Civilians Overseas During Hostilities (NSIAD-84-73)	27	More Effective Use of Contract Air-lift Could Reduce DOD Transportation Costs (PLRD-83-55)	40	The Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile: Resolve Uncertainties Before Production (C-NSIAD-84-18)	82
Establishing Goals for and Subcontracting With Small and Disadvantaged Businesses Under Public Law 95-507 (PLRD-82-95)	68	Navy Can Improve Management of Nonaviation Depot-Level Repairable Spares (NSIAD-84-150)	13	The Air Force Equipment Management System Still Does Not Assure Control of Nonexpendable Equipment (NSIAD-83-20)	36
Excess Navy Ships Sold to Foreign Countries at Understated Prices (NSIAD-84-7)	108	Navy Can Improve Management of Shipyard Labor Resources Through Better Work Measurement Practices (NSIAD-84-96)	48	The Air Force Weapons Laboratory Should Validate Its Computer Needs and Evaluate Alternatives Before Continuing Its Cray-1 Computer Lease (AFMD-83-70)	102
Federal Actions Needed To Retain Essential Defense Rail Service (PLRD-83-73)	41	Navy Needs To Increase S-3A Readiness To Ensure Effective Use of Planned Weapon System Improvements (C-MASAD-83-6)	88	The Army Can Do More To Assure War Reserve Funds Are Spent Effectively (NSIAD-84-50)	12
Greater Emphasis on Occupant Responsibilities Can Reduce Military Family Housing Costs (PLRD-83-77)	8	Navy's Progress in Improving Physical Inventory Controls and the Magnitude, Causes, and Impact of Inventory Record Inaccuracies in the Army, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency (NSIAD-84-9)	37	The Army Needs To Better Plan To Meet Its Civilian Personnel Needs in Wartime (NSIAD-84-107)	28
Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations (NSIAD-84-13)	19	Need for Central Adjudication Facility for Security Clearances for Navy Personnel (GGD-83-66)	64	The Army Needs To Improve Individual Soldier Training in Its Units (FPCD-81-29)	43
Improper Use of Industrial Funds by Defense Extended the Life of Appropriations Which Otherwise Would Have Expired (AFMD-84-34)	100	Opportunities Exist To Reduce Operating Costs of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools (HRD-82-86)	62	The Army Needs To Modify Its System for Measuring Individual Soldier Proficiency (FPCD-82-28)	45
Improved Internal Controls Are Needed To Better Assure That Obligations Will Not Be Backdated (AFMD-84-14)	98			The Army Needs To Reevaluate Its Extended Basic Training Program (FPCD-82-11)	44

The Army Should Increase Its Efforts To Provide Government-Furnished Material to Contractors (LCD-80-94) 29

The Army's AH-64 Helicopter and HELLFIRE Missile Retain Risks as They Enter Production (C-MASAD-83-9) 80

The Congress Should Mandate Formation of a Military-VA-Civilian Contingency Hospital System (HRD-80-76) 57

The Navy Can Reduce Its Stated Requirements for F/A-18 Weapons Tactics Trainers (NSIAD-84-84) 15

The Navy Should Improve Its Management of Defective Government-Furnished Materials (PLRD-82-115) 32

Unresolved Issues Concerning the Disposal of Stockpile Silver (RCED-83-7) 52

Unused Cargo Space on Military Aircraft Returning to the United States (NSIAD-83-19) 42

Verifying Eligibility for Military Health Care: Some Progress Has Been Made, but Reliability Problems Remain (HRD-83-1) 60

Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel in Case of War? (HRD-81-67) 24

Investigations Subcommittee

Air Force Breakout Efforts Are Ineffective (PLRD-83-82) 71

Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee

Improved Energy Management in the Facility Design Process Should Reduce Operating Costs for DOD (PLRD-83-46) 69

Military Personnel Subcommittee

Poor Design and Management Hamper Army's Basic Skills Education Program (FPCD-83-19) 46

Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee

Army Can Better Use Its Soldiers Trained in Critical Shortage Occupations (NSIAD-84-17) 17

House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs

National Defense-Related Silver Needs Should Be Reevaluated and Alternative Disposal Methods Explored (EMD-82-24) 50

House Committee on Education and Labor

Labor-Management Relations Subcommittee

Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act (HRD-83-4) 114

House Committee on Energy and Commerce

Defense Fuel Supply Center Procedures for Purchasing Strategic Petroleum Reserve Oil (RCED-84-61) 75

Millions Can Be Saved Through Better Energy Management in Federal Hospitals (HRD-82-77) 111

Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee

Cleaning Up Nuclear Facilities: An Aggressive and Unified Federal Program Is Needed (EMD-82-40) 109

House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Defense Department's Management of Property Leased to Foreign Governments Is Still Inadequate (ID-83-6) 107

Export Control Regulation Could Be Reduced Without Affecting National Security (ID-82-14) 106

House Committee on Government Operations

Added Emphasis on Consolidation of Multiple Purchase Requests Could Result in Significant Savings (NSIAD-84-143) 74

Air Force Uses Inaccurate Production Leadtime To Compute Spare Parts Requirements (PLRD-83-85) 34

Army Has the Opportunity To Recompete DAS3 Purchases and Improve Automated Battlefield Support (IMTEC-84-20) 65

Better Methods for Validating and Reconciling Unfilled Materiel Orders Could Provide Substantial Economies to the Army (PLRD-82-76) 30

Continued Improvements Needed in Air Force Procedures and Practices (PLRD-83-36) 33

Contract Pricing in the Meals-Ready-To-Eat Program (NSIAD-83-29) 72

DOD Can Combat Fraud Better by Strengthening Its Investigative Agencies (AFMD-83-33) 104

Department of Defense Progress in Resolving Contract Audits (AFMD-84-4) 105

Establishing Goals for and Subcontracting With Small and

Disadvantaged Businesses Under Public Law 95-507 (PLRD-82-95) 68

How Well Do the Military Services Perform Jointly in Combat? DOD Joint Test-and-Evaluation Program Provides Few Credible Answers (PEMD-84-3) 20

Implementation of the National Minerals and Materials Policy Needs Better Coordination and Focus (RCED-84-63) 119

Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations (NSIAD-84-13) 19

Improvements Needed in DOD System for Controlling Material Shipments to DLA Depots and Customers (PLRD-82-81) 31

Improving the Air Force Modification Process Will Benefit Management of Spare Parts in the Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency (PLRD-83-3) 11

Objectivity of DOD's Senior Scientific Advisory Committees Can Be Better Assured (GGD-83-76) 113

The Army Needs More Comprehensive Evaluations To Make Effective Use of Its Weapon System Testing (NSIAD-84-40) 95

Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee

Further Improvements Needed in Department of Defense Oversight of Special Access (Carve-Out) Contracts (GGD-83-43) 63

Legislation and National Security Subcommittee

Air Force Breakout Efforts Are Ineffective (PLRD-83-82) 71

Air Force Does Not Recover All Required Costs of Modification Kits Sold to Foreign Governments (PLRD-82-111) 49

Increased Joint Avionics Standardization Could Result in Major Economies and Operational Benefits (NSIAD-84-127) 39

Management Control of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools Needs To Be Strengthened (HRD-83-3) 1

House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs

Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development (EMD-81-40) 115

Developing Alaska's Energy Resources: Actions Needed To

Air-Launched Cruise Missile: Logistics Planning Problems and Implications for Other Weapon Systems (PLRD-82-68)	84	Development of Fire Support Command and Control Systems by the Army and the Marine Corps (NSIAD-84-15)	2	Intermediate-Level Maintenance for Navy Tactical Missiles Can Be Better Managed (NSIAD-84-64)	85
Army Can Better Use Its Soldiers Trained in Critical Shortage Occupations (NSIAD-84-17)	17	Dual Compensation Is Paid When Military Reservists Do Not Waive VA Disability Benefits (HRD-84-13)	77	Internal Controls Can Be Improved To Help Ensure Proper and Correct Military Retirement Payments (AFMD-84-7)	99
Army Has the Opportunity To Recompete DAS3 Purchases and Improve Automated Battlefield Support (IMTEC-84-20)	65	Ensuring Retention of Essential Civilians Overseas During Hostilities (NSIAD-84-73)	27	Logistics Planning for the M1 Tank: Implications for Reduced Readiness and Increased Support Costs (PLRD-81-33)	63
Army Incentive Funds Need More Effective Targeting To Reduce Critical Personnel Shortages (FPCD-83-10)	78	Establishing Goals for and Subcontracting With Small and Disadvantaged Businesses Under Public Law 95-507 (PLRD-82-95)	68	Logistics Support Costs for the B-1B Aircraft Can Be Reduced (NSIAD-84-36)	67
Better Followup Can Reduce Equipment and Facility Problems Affecting Army Guard and Reserve Training (NSIAD-84-29)	47	Establishing New Federal Food-Buying Procedures Would Help Eliminate Unnecessary Special Examinations (RCED-84-150)	76	Management Control of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools Needs To Be Strengthened (HRD-83-3)	1
Better Management of Threat Simulators and Aerial Targets Is Crucial to Effective Weapon Systems Performance (MASAD-83-27)	94	Excess Navy Ships Sold to Foreign Countries at Understated Prices (NSIAD-84-7)	108	Management of DOD's Shelf-Life Program--Better, but Still in Need of Improvement (PLRD-82-84)	51
Better Methods for Validating and Reconciling Unfilled Materiel Orders Could Provide Substantial Economies to the Army (PLRD-82-76)	30	Federal Actions Needed To Retain Essential Defense Rail Service (PLRD-83-73)	41	Military Family Housing (PLRD-83-19)	7
Confusion Over Validity and Effects of Purported Petty Officer Shortage (NSIAD-84-30)	18	Implementation of the National Minerals and Materials Policy Needs Better Coordination and Focus (RCED-84-63)	119	Military Medicine Is in Trouble: Complete Reassessment Needed (HRD-79-107)	56
Consolidation of Personal Property Shipping Offices (NSIAD-84-81)	5	Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations (NSIAD-84-13)	19	More Effective Use of Contract Airlift Could Reduce DOD Transportation Costs (PLRD-83-55)	40
Continued Improvements Needed in Air Force Procedures and Practices (PLRD-83-36)	33	Improper Use of Industrial Funds by Defense Extended the Life of Appropriations Which Otherwise Would Have Expired (AFMD-84-34)	100	National Defense-Related Silver Needs Should Be Reevaluated and Alternative Disposal Methods Explored (EMD-82-24)	50
Contract Pricing in the Meals-Ready-To-Eat Program (NSIAD-83-29)	72	Improved Internal Controls Are Needed To Better Assure That Obligations Will Not Be Backdated (AFMD-84-14)	98	Navy Can Improve Management of Nonaviation Depot-Level Repairable Spares (NSIAD-84-150)	13
Criteria for Recording Obligations for Defense Stock Fund Purchases Should Be Changed (AFMD-83-54)	97	Improvements Needed in Army's Determination of Manpower Requirements for Support and Administrative Functions (FPCD-79-32)	16	Navy Can Improve Management of Shipyard Labor Resources Through Better Work Measurement Practices (NSIAD-84-96)	48
DOD Can Combat Fraud Better by Strengthening Its Investigative Agencies (AFMD-83-33)	104	Improvements Needed in DOD System for Controlling Material Shipments to DLA Depots and Customers (PLRD-82-81)	31	Navy Needs To Increase S-3A Readiness To Ensure Effective Use of Planned Weapon System Improvements (C-MASAD-83-6)	88
DOD Can Increase Revenues Through Better Use of Natural Resources It Holds in Trust (PLRD-82-9)	3	Improvements Needed in Operating and Using the Army Automated Facilities Engineer Cost Accounting System (AFMD-82-27)	96	Navy's Progress in Improving Physical Inventory Controls and the Magnitude, Causes, and Impact of Inventory Record Inaccuracies in the Army, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency (NSIAD-84-9)	37
DOD Needs Better Assessment of Military Hospitals' Capabilities To Care for Wartime Casualties (HRD-81-56)	109	Improving the Air Force Modification Process Will Benefit Management of Spare Parts in the Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency (PLRD-83-3)	11	Need for Central Adjudication Facility for Security Clearances for Navy Personnel (GGD-83-66)	64
Defense Department's Management of Property Leased to Foreign Governments Is Still Inadequate (ID-83-6)	107	Improving the Air Force Modification Process Will Benefit Management of Spare Parts in the Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency (PLRD-83-3)	11	Objectivity of DOD's Senior Scientific Advisory Committees Can Be Better Assured (GGD-83-76)	113
Department of Defense Progress in Resolving Contract Audits (AFMD-84-4)	105	Increased Joint Avionics Standardization Could Result in Major Economics and Operational Benefits (NSIAD-84-127)	39	Opportunities Exist To Reduce Operating Costs of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools (HRD-82-86)	62

Opportunities for Improved Oil Recycling Still Exist (PLRD-82-113)	120	The Army Needs To Improve Individual Soldier Training in Its Units (FPCD-81-29)	43	Establishing New Federal Food-Buying Procedures Would Help Eliminate Unnecessary Special Examinations (RCED-84-150)	76
Poor Design and Management Hamper Army's Basic Skills Education Program (FPCD-83-19)	46	The Army Needs To Modify Its System for Measuring Individual Soldier Proficiency (FPCD-82-28)	45	Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations (NSIAD-84-13)	19
Potential Reductions in Aircraft Operation and Maintenance Costs by Using Thrust Computing Support Equipment (PLRD-82-4)	10	The Army Needs To Reevaluate Its Extended Basic Training Program (FPCD-82-11)	44	Interior Subcommittee	
Problems in Alerting and Preparing Army Reservists for Mobilization (NSIAD-84-52)	26	The Army Should Increase Its Efforts To Provide Government-Furnished Material to Contractors (LCD-80-94)	29	Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development (EMD-81-40)	115
Reductions in U.S. Costs To Station Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom Are Unlikely (NSIAD-84-130)	23	The Army's AH-64 Helicopter and HELLFIRE Missile Retain Risks as They Enter Production (C-MASAD-83-9)	80	Defense Fuel Supply Center Procedures for Purchasing Strategic Petroleum Reserve Oil (RCED-84-61)	75
Requirements and Production Capabilities Are Uncertain for Some Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts (PLRD-82-77)	14	The Army's Retention of Overage Vehicles (NSIAD-84-32)	54	Developing Alaska's Energy Resources: Actions Needed To Stimulate Research and Improve Wetlands Permit Processing (EMD-82-44)	118
Requisitions for M-1 Components Are Not Justified by Past Demands (NSIAD-84-118)	86	The Congress Should Mandate Formation of a Military-VA-Civilian Contingency Hospital System (HRD-80-76)	57	Implementation of the National Minerals and Materials Policy Needs Better Coordination and Focus (RCED-84-63)	119
Results of Forthcoming Critical Tests Are Needed To Confirm Army Remotely Piloted Vehicle's Readiness for Production (NSIAD-84-72)	81	The Defense Budget: A Look at Budgetary Resources, Accomplishments, and Problems (PLRD-83-62)	22	Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Subcommittee	
Some Land Attack Cruise Missile Acquisition Programs Need To Be Slowed Down (C-MASAD-81-9)	87	The Navy Can Reduce Its Stated Requirements for F/A-18 Weapons Tactics Trainers (NSIAD-84-84)	15	Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act (HRD-83-4)	114
Status of the CG-47 Cruiser and DDG-51 Destroyer Shipbuilding Programs (C-MASAD-83-11)	89	The Navy Should Improve Its Management of Defective Government-Furnished Materials (PLRD-82-115)	32	Military Construction Subcommittee	
Test Transfer of Consumable Supply Items to the DLA from the Military Services (NSIAD-84-82)	55	Unresolved Issues Concerning the Disposal of Stockpile Silver (RCED-83-7)	52	Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development (EMD-81-40)	115
The Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile: Resolve Uncertainties Before Production (C-NSIAD-84-18)	82	Unused Cargo Space on Military Aircraft Returning to the United States (NSIAD-83-19)	42	Better Planning and Funding Approach Needed for Military Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Projects in Germany (HRD-82-130)	59
The Air Force Equipment Management System Still Does Not Assure Control of Nonexpendable Equipment (NSIAD-83-20)	36	Verifying Eligibility for Military Health Care: Some Progress Has Been Made, but Reliability Problems Remain (HRD-83-1)	60	DOD Can Make Further Progress in Controlling Pollution From Its Sewage Treatment Plants (NSIAD-84-5)	4
The Air Force Weapons Laboratory Should Validate Its Computer Needs and Evaluate Alternatives Before Continuing Its Cray-1 Computer Lease (AFMD-83-70)	102	Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel in Case of War? (HRD-81-67)	24	DOD's Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing--Better Living Conditions and Reduced Costs Possible (PLRD-82-59)	6
The Army Can Do More To Assure War Reserve Funds Are Spent Effectively (NSIAD-84-50)	12	Energy and Water Development Subcommittee		Greater Emphasis on Occupant Responsibilities Can Reduce Military Family Housing Costs (PLRD-83-77)	8
The Army Needs More Comprehensive Evaluations To Make Effective Use of Its Weapon System Testing (NSIAD-84-40)	95	Cleaning Up Nuclear Facilities: An Aggressive and Unified Federal Program Is Needed (EMD-82-40)	103	Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations (NSIAD-84-13)	19
The Army Needs To Better Plan To Meet Its Civilian Personnel Needs in Wartime (NSIAD-84-107)	28	Millions Can Be Saved Through Better Energy Management in Federal Hospitals (HRD-82-77)	111	Improved Energy Management in the Facility Design Process Should Reduce Operating Costs for DOD (PLRD-83-46)	69
		The Nation's Unused Wood Offers Vast Potential Energy and Product Benefits (EMD-81-6)	116	Senate Committee on Armed Services	
		HUD-Independent Agencies Subcommittee		Added Emphasis on Consolidation of Multiple Purchase Requests Could Result in Significant Savings (NSIAD-84-143)	74
		Dual Compensation Is Paid When Military Reservists Do Not Waive VA Disability Benefits (HRD-84-13)	77		

Air Force Does Not Recover All Required Costs of Modification Kits Sold to Foreign Governments (PLRD-82-111)	49	Ensuring Retention of Essential Civilians Overseas During Hostilities (NSIAD-84-73)	27	More Effective Use of Contract Airlift Could Reduce DOD Transportation Costs (PLRD-83-55)	40
Air Force and Navy Trainer Aircraft Acquisition Programs (MASAD-83-22)	90	Establishing Goals for and Subcontracting With Small and Disadvantaged Businesses Under Public Law 95-507 (PLRD-82-95)	68	Navy Can Improve Management of Nonaviation Depot-Level Repairable Spares (NSIAD-84-150)	13
Air-Launched Cruise Missile: Logistics Planning Problems and Implications for Other Weapon Systems (PLRD-82-68)	84	Excess Navy Ships Sold to Foreign Countries at Understated Prices (NSIAD-84-7)	108	Navy Can Improve Management of Shipyard Labor Resources Through Better Work Measurement Practices (NSIAD-84-96)	48
Army Incentive Funds Need More Effective Targeting To Reduce Critical Personnel Shortages (FPCD-83-10)	78	Federal Actions Needed To Retain Essential Defense Rail Service (PLRD-83-73)	41	Navy Needs To Increase S-3A Readiness To Ensure Effective Use of Planned Weapon System Improvements (C-MASAD-83-6)	88
Better Followup Can Reduce Equipment and Facility Problems Affecting Army Guard and Reserve Training (NSIAD-84-29)	47	Greater Emphasis on Occupant Responsibilities Can Reduce Military Family Housing Costs (PLRD-83-77)	8	Navy's Progress in Improving Physical Inventory Controls and the Magnitude, Causes, and Impact of Inventory Record Inaccuracies in the Army, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency (NSIAD-84-9)	37
Better Management of Threat Simulators and Aerial Targets Is Crucial to Effective Weapon Systems Performance (MASAD-83-27)	94	Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations (NSIAD-84-13)	19	Need for Central Adjudication Facility for Security Clearances for Navy Personnel (GGD-83-66)	64
Better Methods for Validating and Reconciling Unfilled Materiel Orders Could Provide Substantial Economies to the Army (PLRD-82-76)	30	Improper Use of Industrial Funds by Defense Extended the Life of Appropriations Which Otherwise Would Have Expired (AFMD-84-34)	100	Opportunities Exist To Reduce Operating Costs of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools (HRD-82-86)	62
Better Planning and Funding Approach Needed for Military Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Projects in Germany (HRD-82-130)	59	Improved Internal Controls Are Needed To Better Assure That Obligations Will Not Be Backdated (AFMD-84-14)	98	Opportunities for Improved Oil Recycling Still Exist (PLRD-82-113)	120
Cleaning Up Nuclear Facilities: An Aggressive and Unified Federal Program Is Needed (EMD-82-40)	103	Improvements Needed in Army's Determination of Manpower Requirements for Support and Administrative Functions (FPCD-79-32)	16	Potential Reductions in Aircraft Operation and Maintenance Costs by Using Thrust Computing Support Equipment (PLRD-82-4)	10
Confusion Over Validity and Effects of Purported Petty Officer Shortage (NSIAD-84-30)	18	Improvements Needed in Operating and Using the Army Automated Facilities Engineer Cost Accounting System (AFMD-82-27)	96	Problems in Alerting and Preparing Army Reservists for Mobilization (NSIAD-84-52)	26
Consolidation of Personal Property Shipping Offices (NSIAD-84-81)	5	Increased Joint Avionics Standardization Could Result in Major Economics and Operational Benefits (NSIAD-84-127)	39	Reductions in U.S. Costs To Station Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom Are Unlikely (NSIAD-84-130)	23
Criteria for Recording Obligations for Defense Stock Fund Purchases Should Be Changed (AFMD-83-54)	97	Intermediate-Level Maintenance for Navy Tactical Missiles Can Be Better Managed (NSIAD-84-64)	85	Requirements and Production Capabilities Are Uncertain for Some Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts (PLRD-82-77)	14
DOD Can Increase Revenues Through Better Use of Natural Resources It Holds in Trust (PLRD-82-9)	3	Internal Controls Can Be Improved To Help Ensure Proper and Correct Military Retirement Payments (AFMD-84-7)	99	Requisitions for M-1 Components Are Not Justified by Past Demands (NSIAD-84-118)	86
DOD Can Make Further Progress in Controlling Pollution From Its Sewage Treatment Plants (NSIAD-84-5)	4	Logistics Planning for the M1 Tank: Implications for Reduced Readiness and Increased Support Costs (PLRD-81-33)	83	Results of Forthcoming Critical Tests Are Needed To Confirm Army Remotely Piloted Vehicle's Readiness for Production (NSIAD-84-72)	81
DOD's Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing--Better Living Conditions and Reduced Costs Possible (PLRD-82-59)	6	Logistics Support Costs for the B-1B Aircraft Can Be Reduced (NSIAD-84-36)	67	Some Land Attack Cruise Missile Acquisition Programs Need To Be Slowed Down (C-MASAD-81-9)	87
Department of the Army's Program To Modify 155-mm. M109 Self-Propelled Howitzers to an M109A5 Configuration (NSIAD-84-60)	21	Management of DOD's Shelf-Life Program--Better, but Still in Need of Improvement (PLRD-82-84)	51	Status of the CG-47 Cruiser and DDG-51 Destroyer Shipbuilding Programs (C-MASAD-83-11)	89
Development of Fire Support Command and Control Systems by the Army and the Marine Corps (NSIAD-84-15)	2	Military Family Housing (PLRD-83-19)	7		
Dual Compensation Is Paid When Military Reservists Do Not Waive VA Disability Benefits (HRD-84-13)	77	Military Medicine Is in Trouble: Complete Reassessment Needed (HRD-79-107)	56		

Test Transfer of Consumable Supply Items to the DLA from the Military Services (<i>NSIAD-84-82</i>)	55	Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee	Dual Compensation Is Paid When Military Reservists Do Not Waive VA Disability Benefits (<i>HRD-84-13</i>)	77		
The Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile: Resolve Uncertainties Before Production (<i>C-NSIAD-84-18</i>)	82	Army Can Better Use Its Soldiers Trained in Critical Shortage Occupations (<i>NSIAD-84-17</i>)	17	Improved Internal Controls Are Needed To Better Assure That Obligations Will Not Be Backdated (<i>AFMD-84-14</i>)	98	
The Air Force Equipment Management System Still Does Not Assure Control of Nonexpendable Equipment (<i>NSIAD-83-20</i>)	36	Management Control of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools Needs To Be Strengthened (<i>HRD-83-3</i>)	1	Logistics Planning for the M1 Tank: Implications for Reduced Readiness and Increased Support Costs (<i>PLRD-81-33</i>)	83	
The Air Force Weapons Laboratory Should Validate Its Computer Needs and Evaluate Alternatives Before Continuing Its Cray-1 Computer Lease (<i>AFMD-83-70</i>)	102	Poor Design and Management Hamper Army's Basic Skills Education Program (<i>FPCD-83-19</i>)	46	Navy's Progress in Improving Physical Inventory Controls and the Magnitude, Causes, and Impact of Inventory Record Inaccuracies in the Army, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency (<i>NSIAD-84-9</i>)	37	
The Army Can Do More To Assure War Reserve Funds Are Spent Effectively (<i>NSIAD-84-50</i>)	12	Military Construction Subcommittee	Improved Energy Management in the Facility Design Process Should Reduce Operating Costs for DOD (<i>PLRD-83-46</i>)	69	Requisitions for M-1 Components Are Not Justified by Past Demands (<i>NSIAD-84-118</i>)	86
The Army Needs To Better Plan To Meet Its Civilian Personnel Needs in Wartime (<i>NSIAD-84-107</i>)	28	Military Construction and Stockpiles Subcommittee	Requisitions for M-1 Components Are Not Justified by Past Demands (<i>NSIAD-84-118</i>)	86	Results of Forthcoming Critical Tests Are Needed To Confirm Army Remotely Piloted Vehicle's Readiness for Production (<i>NSIAD-84-72</i>)	81
The Army Needs To Improve Individual Soldier Training in Its Units (<i>FPCD-81-29</i>)	43	Preparedness Subcommittee	Poor Design and Management Hamper Army's Basic Skills Education Program (<i>FPCD-83-19</i>)	46	Test Transfer of Consumable Supply Items to the DLA from the Military Services (<i>NSIAD-84-82</i>)	55
The Army Needs To Modify Its System for Measuring Individual Soldier Proficiency (<i>FPCD-82-28</i>)	45	Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs	Export Control Regulation Could Be Reduced Without Affecting National Security (<i>ID-82-14</i>)	106	The Army Should Increase Its Efforts To Provide Government-Furnished Material to Contractors (<i>LCD-80-94</i>)	29
The Army Needs To Reevaluate Its Extended Basic Training Program (<i>FPCD-82-11</i>)	44	National Defense-Related Silver Needs Should Be Reevaluated and Alternative Disposal Methods Explored (<i>EMD-82-24</i>)	50	The Army's AH-64 Helicopter and HELLFIRE Missile Retain Risks as They Enter Production (<i>C-MASAD-83-9</i>)	80	
The Army Should Increase Its Efforts To Provide Government-Furnished Material to Contractors (<i>LCD-80-94</i>)	29	Senate Committee on Budget	Air Force Does Not Recover All Required Costs of Modification Kits Sold to Foreign Governments (<i>PLRD-82-111</i>)	49	The Navy Can Reduce Its Stated Requirements for F/A-18 Weapons Tactics Trainers (<i>NSIAD-84-84</i>)	15
The Army's AH-64 Helicopter and HELLFIRE Missile Retain Risks as They Enter Production (<i>C-MASAD-83-9</i>)	80	Better Management of Threat Simulators and Aerial Targets Is Crucial to Effective Weapon Systems Performance (<i>MASAD-83-27</i>)	94	Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation	Implications of Joint NASA/DOD Participation in Space Shuttle Operations (<i>NSIAD-84-13</i>)	19
The Congress Should Mandate Formation of a Military-VA-Civilian Contingency Hospital System (<i>HRD-80-76</i>)	57	Better Methods for Validating and Reconciling Unfilled Materiel Orders Could Provide Substantial Economies to the Army (<i>PLRD-82-76</i>)	30	Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources	Actions Needed To Increase Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development (<i>EMD-81-40</i>)	115
The Navy Can Reduce Its Stated Requirements for F/A-18 Weapons Tactics Trainers (<i>NSIAD-84-84</i>)	15	Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act (<i>HRD-83-4</i>)	114	Cleaning Up Nuclear Facilities: An Aggressive and Unified Federal Program Is Needed (<i>EMD-82-40</i>)	103	
The Navy Should Improve Its Management of Defective Government-Furnished Materials (<i>PLRD-82-115</i>)	32	DOD Can Combat Fraud Better by Strengthening Its Investigative Agencies (<i>AFMD-83-33</i>)	104	Defense Fuel Supply Center Procedures for Purchasing Strategic Petroleum Reserve Oil (<i>RCED-84-61</i>)	75	
Unresolved Issues Concerning the Disposal of Stockpile Silver (<i>RCED-83-7</i>)	52			Developing Alaska's Energy Resources: Actions Needed To Stimulate Research and Improve Wetlands Permit Processing (<i>EMD-82-44</i>)	118	
Unused Cargo Space on Military Aircraft Returning to the United States (<i>NSIAD-83-19</i>)	42					
Verifying Eligibility for Military Health Care: Some Progress Has Been Made, but Reliability Problems Remain (<i>HRD-83-1</i>)	60					
Will There Be Enough Trained Medical Personnel in Case of War? (<i>HRD-81-67</i>)	24					

Millions Can Be Saved Through Better Energy Management in Federal Hospitals (HRD-82-77)	111	Developing Alaska's Energy Resources: Actions Needed To Stimulate Research and Improve Wetlands Permit Processing (EMD-82-44)	118	Senate Select Committee on Small Business	
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works		Establishing Goals for and Subcontracting With Small and Disadvantaged Businesses Under Public Law 95-507 (PLRD-82-95)	68	Establishing Goals for and Subcontracting With Small and Disadvantaged Businesses Under Public Law 95-507 (PLRD-82-95)	68
Cleaning Up Nuclear Facilities: An Aggressive and Unified Federal Program Is Needed (EMD-82-40)	103	How Well Do the Military Services Perform Jointly in Combat? DOD Joint Test-and-Evaluation Program Provides Few Credible Answers (PEMD-84-3)	20		
Developing Alaska's Energy Resources: Actions Needed To Stimulate Research and Improve Wetlands Permit Processing (EMD-82-44)	118	Implementation of the National Minerals and Materials Policy Needs Better Coordination and Focus (RCED-84-63)	119		
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations		Improvements Needed in DOD System for Controlling Material Shipments to DLA Depots and Customers (PLRD-82-81)	31		
Defense Department's Management of Property Leased to Foreign Governments Is Still Inadequate (ID-83-6)	107	Improving the Air Force Modification Process Will Benefit Management of Spare Parts in the Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency (PLRD-83-3)	11		
Foreign Assistance Subcommittee		Joint Major System Acquisition by the Military Services: An Elusive Strategy (NSIAD-84-22)	91		
Air Force Does Not Recover All Required Costs of Modification Kits Sold to Foreign Governments (PLRD-82-111)	49	Objectivity of DOD's Senior Scientific Advisory Committees Can Be Better Assured (GGD-83-76)	113		
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs		The Army Needs More Comprehensive Evaluations To Make Effective Use of Its Weapon System Testing (NSIAD-84-40)	95		
Added Emphasis on Consolidation of Multiple Purchase Requests Could Result in Significant Savings (NSIAD-84-143)	74	Governmental Efficiency and the District of Columbia Subcommittee			
Adequacy of the DOD Response to Its Inspector General's Report on the Use of Vehicles Assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Motor Pool (NSIAD-84-10)	53	Government Could Save Millions by Revising Its Purchase Specification for Ground Beef (RCED-84-29)	73		
Air Force Uses Inaccurate Production Leadtime To Compute Spare Parts Requirements (PLRD-83-85)	34	Overight of Government Management Subcommittee			
Better Management of Threat Simulators and Aerial Targets Is Crucial to Effective Weapon Systems Performance (MASAD-83-27)	94	Management Control of the Department of Defense Overseas Dependents Schools Needs To Be Strengthened (HRD-83-3)	1		
Better Methods for Validating and Reconciling Unfilled Materiel Orders Could Provide Substantial Economies to the Army (PLRD-82-76)	30	Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources			
Continued Improvements Needed in Air Force Procedures and Practices (PLRD-83-36)	33	Labor Subcommittee			
Contract Pricing in the Meals-Ready-To-Eat Program (NSIAD-83-29)	72	Congress Should Consider Repeal of the Service Contract Act (HRD-83-4)	114		
DOD Can Combat Fraud Better by Strengthening Its Investigative Agencies (AFMD-83-33)	104	Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs			
DOD Needs To Provide More Credible Weapon Systems Cost Estimates to the Congress (NSIAD-84-70)	92	Dual Compensation Is Paid When Military Reservists Do Not Waive VA Disability Benefits (HRD-84-13)	77		



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