Combating Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Radiological Threats

DOE Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background Radiation Survey

Source: Department of Energy.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may attempt to smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United States, or try to use chemical or biological agents, to attack the homeland. If terrorists were to succeed in attacking the United States with such materials, the consequences could be devastating to the government’s national and economic interests. Although preventing chemical, biological, nuclear, and radioactive material from being smuggled into or used in the United States has become a key national security objective, DHS’s efforts to mitigate this threat have largely been limited to deploying radiation detection capabilities at ports of entry and monitoring for possible aerosol-based attacks. Specific challenges include the following:

• Since December 2010, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has issued both a strategic plan to guide the development of the global nuclear detection architecture and an annual report on the current status of the architecture. The overall mission of the global nuclear detection architecture is to use an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. The new strategic plan addressed some key components of what we previously recommended be included in a strategic plan, such as identifying the roles and responsibilities for meeting strategic objectives. However, neither the plan nor the annual report identifies funding needed to achieve the strategic plan’s objectives or employs monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic progress and identify needed improvements. DHS officials informed us that they will address these missing elements in an implementation plan, which they plan to issue before the end of 2011.
  Highlights of GAO-11-869t (PDF)
• DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have coordinated with each other and with other federal departments to develop chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) risk assessments, but neither department has written procedures for developing these assessments. GAO’s best practices for interagency collaboration and federal standards for internal control indicate that agencies can best enhance and sustain coordination by adopting key practices, such as defining desired common outcomes, agreeing on roles and responsibilities, and developing written policies and procedures to help ensure that management directives are enforced. Such practices and standards could help DHS and HHS institutionalize their agreements on these sensitive and technical issues to better ensure coordination, collaboration, and continuity beyond the tenure of any given official or individual office.
  Highlights of GAO-11-606 (PDF)
• In 2007, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) canceled the acquisition phase of the cargo advanced automated radiography system (CAARS) program and replaced it with a research and development program. A number of factors have contributed to issues with CAARS, including lack of collaboration between DNDO and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) regarding operating requirements at ports of entry, lack of oversight, slow development of program-specific algorithms, and misleading information provided in budget requests regarding whether a cost-benefit analysis would be performed.
  Highlights of GAO-10-1041t (PDF)
• The National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) within DHS is to help provide early detection and situational awareness by integrating information and supporting an interagency biosurveillance community. To carry out its mission, NBIC has made efforts to acquire data from its federal partners, obtain analytical expertise from other agencies, establish governance bodies to develop and oversee the community of federal partners, and provide information technologies to support data collection, analysis, and communication. However, NBIC does not receive the kind of data it has identified as most critical for supporting its early detection mission-particularly, data generated at the earliest stages of an event. Further, NBIC is not fully equipped to carry out its mission because it lacks key resources-data and personnel-from its partner agencies.
  
  Highlights of GAO-10-171 (PDF)
• A terrorist's use of a radiological dispersal device or improvised nuclear device to release radioactive materials into the environment could have devastating consequences. FEMA, the DHS agency responsible for developing a comprehensive emergency management system, has not developed a national disaster recovery strategy, as required by law, or issued specific guidance to coordinate federal, state, and local government recovery planning for radiological dispersal device or improvised nuclear device incidents, as directed by executive guidance.
  
  Highlights of GAO-10-204 (PDF)
• DHS, through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is responsible for developing a comprehensive emergency management system to respond to and recover from natural disasters and terrorist attacks, including use of radiological dispersal devices and improvised nuclear devices. However, the federal government has not sufficiently planned to undertake these activities. For example, FEMA has not issued a national disaster recovery strategy or plans for radiological dispersal device and improvised nuclear device incidents as required by law.
  
  Highlights of GAO-09-996T (PDF)
• Although efforts are under way to establish the National Biosurveillance Integration Center, it is unclear what operations the center will be capable of carrying out once established.
  
  Highlights of GAO-08-960T (PDF)
• Local first responders do not have tools that can accurately and quickly identify the release of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear material in an urban environment. While DHS and other agencies have undertaken initiatives to improve first responders’ tools, these tools have many limitations for identifying chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials released in urban environments, the extent of their dispersion, and their effect on urban populations. Additionally, DHS has adopted few performance standards for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear detection equipment.
  Highlights of GAO-08-180 (PDF)

^ Back to topWhat Needs to Be Done

• DHS needs to establish time frames and milestones to better ensure timely development and interagency agreement on written procedures for development of DHS’s CBRN risk assessments.
  Highlights of GAO-11-606 (PDF)
• NBIC needs to work with its interagency advisory body to develop a strategy for addressing barriers to collaboration-such as the lack of clear mission, roles, and procedures-and to develop accountability mechanisms to monitor these efforts.
  
  Highlights of GAO-10-171 (PDF)
• FEMA needs to prepare a national recovery strategy that clarifies federal roles for cleaning up areas contaminated by attacks using radiological dispersal devices or improvised nuclear devices, and schedule additional exercises to assess recovery preparedness.
  
  Highlights of GAO-10-204(PDF)
• DHS should complete the development, testing, and deployment of the next generation biological detection equipment as quickly as possible.
  
  Highlights of GAO-08-960T
• In order to guide and inform first responders on their purchases of chemical, biological, and radiological detection equipment, DHS needs to ensure testing and validation of manufacturers’ claims about chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear detection equipment’s sensitivity and specificity.
  
  Highlights of GAO-08-180 (PDF)
• DHS needs to reach agreement with agencies regarding who will have the responsibility to develop, certify, and independently test first responders’ equipment for detecting hazardous material releases.
  
  Highlights of GAO-08-180 (PDF)
• DNDO should finalize a draft memorandum clarifying roles and responsibilities among DHS agencies in developing technology; engage in departmental oversight processes; separate acquisitions from research and development functions; determine technological readiness levels previous to the acquisition phase; and rigorously test devices using agency operational tactics before moving on to acquisition.
  Full Report of GAO-10-1041T (PDF)

^ Back to topKey Reports

Nuclear Detection

National Preparedness

Homeland Security

Combating Nuclear Terrorism

Combating Nuclear Terrorism

Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Biosurveillance

Biosurveillance