Enhancing Border Security, Immigration, and Trade

Figure 4: U.S. Port of Entry at San Ysidro, California 

Source: GAO.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated how weak border security measures could be exploited to a tragic end. While federal agencies have taken a number of steps to strengthen border security, such as enhancing passport and visa security procedures and deploying additional personnel and technology overseas and at the borders, challenges remain. DHS also faces obstacles in identifying and removing millions of undocumented aliens from the country, denying unauthorized aliens the ability to obtain employment, and providing immigration services to eligible aliens in a timely fashion. Furthermore, DHS must balance these security responsibilities with challenges associated with its legacy customs revenue and trade functions as imports continue to significantly increase. Key challenges include the following:

• Since fiscal year 2006, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the principle DHS component responsible for overstay enforcement, has allocated about 3 percent of its investigative work hours to overstay investigations and its Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit, which prioritizes and investigates possible overstays, has arrested approximately 8,100 overstays. ICE has expressed an intention to augment the resources it dedicates to overstay enforcement efforts moving forward. Further, in the absence of a biometric entry and exit system, DHS uses various methods for identifying overstays, primarily biographic data, and sharing of overstay information; however, DHS faces challenges in collecting departure data and does not share information about all categories of suspected overstays among its components. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the DHS component charged with inspecting all people who enter the United States, does not provide a standard mechanism for nonimmigrants departing the United States through land ports of entry to remit their arrival and departure forms. CBP officials stated that establishing such a mechanism could help the agency increase its collection of departure data, but could also result in costs related to, for example, physical modifications to land ports of entry. Moreover, DHS creates electronic alerts for certain categories of overstays, such as those who overstay by more than 90 days, but does not create alerts for those who overstay by less than 90 days to focus efforts on more egregious overstay violators, as identified by CBP. Expanding the categories of overstays assigned an alert to the extent that benefits outweigh costs could improve the chance that these individuals are identified as overstays during subsequent encounters with federal officials, such as when they apply for readmission to the United States.
  Highlights of GAO-11-411 (PDF)
• According to a majority of selected northern border security partners GAO interviewed, DHS improved northern border security coordination through interagency forums and joint operations, which were beneficial in establishing a common understanding of security and helping to achieve an integrated and effective law enforcement response. However, numerous partners cited challenges related to the inability to resource the increasing number of interagency forums and raised concerns that some efforts may be overlapping. Border Patrol—a component of DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection—reported that 32 of the nearly 4,000 northern border miles in fiscal year 2010 had reached an acceptable level of security and that there is a high reliance on law enforcement support from outside the border zone. However, the extent of partner law enforcement resources available to address border security vulnerabilities is not reflected in Border Patrol's processes for assessing border security and resource requirements.
  Highlights of GAO-11-97 (PDF)
• Illegal cross-border activity remains a significant threat to federal lands. Information sharing and communication among DHS, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Agriculture have increased in recent years, but critical gaps remain in implementing interagency agreements. Further, there has been little interagency coordination to share intelligence assessments of border security threats to federal lands and develop budget requests, strategies, and joint operations to address these threats.
  Highlights of GAO-11-77 (PDF)
• U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has taken several steps to improve the accuracy of the E-Verify system-- a system to electronically verify work eligibility and operated by USCIS and the Social Security Administration (SSA)-- including expanding the number of databases queried through E-Verify and instituting quality control procedures. However, E-Verify remains vulnerable to identity theft and employer fraud. USCIS has also taken steps to minimize risks to the privacy of personal information for new employees who are processed through E-Verify by, among other things, publishing privacy notices for the E-Verify program. However, employees are limited in their ability to identify the source of and how to correct information in DHS databases that may have led to an erroneous tentative nonconfirmations. Additionally, USCIS and SSA have taken actions to prepare for possible mandatory implementation of E-Verify for all employers nationwide by addressing key practices for effectively managing E-Verify system capacity and availability and coordinating with each other in operating E-Verify. However, USCIS's lifecycle cost estimates for E-Verify do not reliably depict current costs and SSA's estimates do not consider the risk associated with changes in SSA's E-Verify workload.
  Highlights of GAO-11-146 (PDF)
• The U.S. Border Patrol, part of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), operates checkpoints on U.S. roads, mainly in the southwest border states where most illegal entries occur. Checkpoints have contributed to the Border Patrol’s ability to seize illegal drugs, apprehend illegal aliens, and screen potential terrorists; however, several factors have impeded higher levels of performance. For example, the Border Patrol established three performance measures to report the results of checkpoint operations, and while they provide some insight into checkpoint activity, they do not indicate if checkpoints are operating efficiently and effectively. In addition, GAO found that a lack of management oversight and unclear checkpoint data collection guidance resulted in the overstatement of checkpoint performance results in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 agency performance reports, as well as inconsistent data collection practices at checkpoints. These factors hindered management’s ability to monitor the need for program improvement.
  Highlights of GAO-09-824 (PDF)
• A number of management weaknesses continue to delay the successful deployment of DHS's multiyear, multibillion Secure Border Initiative—designed to employ technology and infrastructure to detect and deter illegal entry between the ports of entry. With respect to the technology component of this initiative, known as SBInet, DHS has not effectively defined the scope of the system, developed a reliable master schedule for delivering it, or demonstrated its cost-effectiveness. Also, DHS has also not effectively acquired the system in accordance with key life cycle management processes, such as those associated with requirements development and management, risk identification and mitigation, and test planning, documentation, and system defect disclosure and resolution. In addition, DHS has largely defined but has not adequately implemented the full range of controls that is reflected in relevant guidance and related best practices and is needed to effectively manage and oversee its SBInet prime contractor. DHS has not effectively monitored the SBInet prime contractor’s progress in meeting cost and schedule expectations. The deployment of tactical infrastructure projects along the southwest border is nearing completion, but delays persist, due mainly to property acquisition issues. Despite the investment in tactical infrastructure, its impact on security the border has not been measured because DHS has not assess the impact o the tactical infrastructure on gains or losses in the level of effective control.
  
  Highlights of GAO-11-6 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-10-340 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-09-896 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-1148T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-1164T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-10-158 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-1086 (PDF)
• DHS has not yet implemented an exit capability for its US-VISIT program—a program to use biometric and biographic information to control and monitor pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of foreign visitors at more than 300 ports of entry, and has not adequately defined, justified, or coordinated a strategic solution to enhance already deployed entry capabilities. DHS has established a Comprehensive Exit project within its US-VISIT program and the US-VISIT program office has established integrated project management plans for, and has adopted an integrated approach to, interacting with and involving stakeholders in its Comprehensive Exit project. However, it has not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needs to be accomplished to deliver a comprehensive exit solution.
  
  Highlights of GAO-08-361 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-1065 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-632T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-499T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-278 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-248 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-06-404 (PDF)

^ Back to topWhat Needs to Be Done

• DHS needs to establish a mechanism for collecting departure forms at land borders and alerts for additional categories of overstays, if benefits outweigh costs.
  Highlights of GAO-11-411 (PDF)
• DHS needs to provide guidance and oversight for interagency forums established or sponsored by its components, and CBP needs to develop policy and guidance necessary to identify, assess, and integrate the available partner resources in northern border sector security assessments and resource planning documents.
  Highlights of GAO-11-97 (PDF)
• The Departments of the Homeland Security, Interior and Agriculture should further implement interagency agreements.
  Highlights of GAO-11-177 (PDF)
• DHS should develop procedures to help employees correct inaccurate personal information, USCIS should develop reliable cost estimates for E-Verify, and SSA should assess risks associated with its E-Verify workload costs.
  Highlights of GAO-11-146 (PDF)
• CBP needs to establish milestones for determining the feasibility of a checkpoint performance model that would allow the Border Patrol to compare apprehensions and seizures to the level of illegal activity passing through the checkpoint undetected and establish internal controls for management oversight of the accuracy, consistency, and completeness of checkpoint performance data.
  Highlights of GAO-09-824 (PDF)
• DHS needs to limit investment in SBInet until it can demonstrate what, if any, future investment in system capabilities and deployments represents a prudent, responsible, and affordable use of resources. Also, DHS needs to take steps to ensure that the deployment, acceptance, and operational evaluation of the near-term system projects are managed effectively by making improvements to key program management disciplines, such as periodic milestone reviews, requirements management, and risk management, and it needs to take steps to improve the content, review, and approval of test planning documentation, and the analysis, disclosure, and resolution of system problems. In addition, DHS needs to revise and implement policies and procedures related to contractor deliverables and technical reviews, and improve earned value management baselines and data. CBP also needs to conduct a cost-effective evaluation of the impact of the tactical infrastructure's contribution to border security.
  
  Highlights of GAO-11-6 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-10-340 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-09-896 (PDF) and Highlights of GAO-08-1086 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-10-158 (PDF)
• DHS needs to ensure that the strategic solution components for US-VISIT, including the solution for controlling and monitoring the exit of foreign visitors, is well-defined, economically justified, effectively coordinated with related programs, and managed in accordance with key acquisition practices. In particular, DHS needs to develop and maintain an integrated master schedule for the Comprehensive Exit project.
  
  Highlights of GAO-10-13 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-361 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-1065 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-632T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-499T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-278 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-248 (PDF), and Highlights of GAO-06-404 (PDF)

^ Back to topKey Reports

USCIS Transformation

Transportation

Supply Chain Security

Supply Chain Security

Secure Border Initiative

Secure Border Initiative

Secure Border Initiative

Secure Border Initiative

Secure Border Initiative

Overstay Enforcement

Northern Border Security

Medicare

International Trade

Intellectual Property

Information Technology

Information Technology

Immigration Enforcement

Homeland Security

Homeland Security

Homeland Security

Employment Verification

Defense Health Care

Border Security

Border Security

Border Security

Border Patrol

Antidumping and Countervailing Duties

Alien Detention Standards

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