Managing Homeland Security Acquisitions

Coast Guard Cutter

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

DHS has faced significant challenges in developing an effective acquisition organization that satisfies its mission needs and provides needed support to its component agencies; program offices that have been tasked with managing large-scale, mission-critical acquisitions have long been challenged in making sure that cost-effective solutions are delivered on time and within budget. As a result, the department has not been successful in acquiring and deploying key investments designed to protect the homeland. GAO’s work has highlighted the need for the department to strengthen its oversight of contractors, better manage the relationships and dependencies among related programs, and adhere to more rigorous management review and key acquisition management processes, such as requirements management, test management, and cost and schedule estimating, for a range of its acquisitions. GAO’s work has also identified concerns with the adequacy of the department’s acquisition workforce to manage its complex and varied procurement needs. Key challenges include the following:

• DHS continues to develop its acquisition oversight function and has produced and begun to implement a revised acquisition management directive. As part of the implementation process, the senior-level Acquisition Review Board (ARB) has begun to meet more frequently and has provided decision memorandums with action items to improve program performance. The acquisition oversight office has created a tracking system to monitor key program information for all acquisitions. At the component level, acquisition oversight offices have begun to update policies and staff capacity needed to oversee program activities. While these efforts are positive steps toward improving acquisition management and oversight, the department has not yet established a departmentwide requirements oversight body for all acquisitions or integrated the acquisition review and budget processes as required by DHS policy. As a result, DHS is at risk of failing to maximize resources and ultimately meet critical mission needs.
  
  Highlights of GAO-10-588SP (PDF)
• A number of management weaknesses continue to delay the successful deployment of DHS's multiyear, multibillion Secure Border Initiative—designed to employ technology and infrastructure to detect and deter illegal entry between the ports of entry. With respect to the technology component of this initiative, known as SBInet, DHS has not effectively managed and overseen its SBInet prime contractor, thus resulting in costly rework and contributing to SBInet's well-chronicled history of not delivering promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. With respect to the technology component of this initiative, known as SBInet, DHS has not effectively defined the scope of the system, developed a reliable master schedule for delivering it, or demonstrated its cost-effectiveness. DHS has also not effectively acquired the system in accordance with key life cycle management processes, such as those associated with requirements development and management, risk identification and mitigation, and test planning, documentation, and system defect disclosure and resolution.
  
  Highlights of GAO-11-6 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-10-340 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-1148T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-1164T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-1086 (PDF), and Highlights of GAO-10-158 (PDF)
• Although DHS has partially defined a strategic solution for meeting program goals, the department has not yet implemented an exit capability for the US-VISIT program—a program to use biometric and biographic information to control and monitor pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of foreign visitors at more than 300 ports of entry. In addition, DHS has not adequately defined, justified, or coordinated a strategic solution to enhance already deployed entry capabilities. DHS has established a Comprehensive Exit project within its US-VISIT program, and the US-VISIT program office has established integrated project management plans for, and has adopted an integrated approach to, interacting with and involving stakeholders in its Comprehensive Exit project. However, it has not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needs to be accomplished to deliver a comprehensive exit solution. In October 2009, DHS issued an evaluation report to congressional committees on the piloting of air exit scenarios with CBP and airlines which we found had limitations in scope, approach and reporting. The report was unable to address a number of guidelines, such as defining standards for gauging the pilots’ performance and a comprehensive methodology for selecting airports and flights, or planning data analysis to ensure that the results of the evaluation support air exit decision making, and did not fully align with the evaluation plan. The pilots also did not meet the plan’s stated purpose of operationally evaluating air exit requirements.
  
  Highlights of GAO-10-860 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-10-13 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-361 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-1065 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-632T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-499T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-278 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-248 (PDF), and Highlights of GAO-06-404 (PDF)
• The Coast Guard has taken steps to strengthen its management of the Deepwater Program—the multiyear, multibillion dollar program to modernize its fleet—but continues to face challenges. Currently, the program exceeds the 2007 cost and schedule baselines, and given revisions to performance parameters for certain assets, it is unlikely to meet system-level performance baselines. Regarding system-level performance, the 2007 baseline may not be achievable, as the Coast Guard has redefined or eliminated key performance indicators for many individual assets, while significant uncertainties surround other assets. Further, a planned analysis to reassess the overall fleet mix for Deepwater was not completed as planned, and a new analysis will include surface assets only. In the meantime, the Coast Guard and DHS are proceeding with acquisition decisions on individual assets.
  Highlights of GAO-10-790 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-09-620T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-745 (PDF), Full Report of GAO-08-270R (PDF, 22 pages), Highlights of GAO-08-531T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-874 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-05-757 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-04-380 (PDF), and Highlights of GAO-09-682 (PDF)
• Although radiation detection portal monitors are key in combating nuclear smuggling, DHS has not provided Congress with the full scope or cost estimate for the program.
  
  Full Report of GAO-08-1108R (PDF, 52 pages)
• Despite significant problems encountered in developing and implementing Secure Flight—a program to assume from air carriers the function of matching passenger information against terrorist watch-list records—TSA has instilled much more disciple and rigor into the program’s development. However, challenges remain that may hinder the program’s progress, including unreliable cost and schedule estimates, incomplete performance testing, and limited definition and testing of security requirements.
  Highlights of GAO-08-1024T (PDF) and Highlights of GAO-08-456T (PDF)
• DHS has not adequately defined and effectively implemented key practices for managing its investments, including its process for reviewing and selecting among competing projects, ensuring that investments are aligned with the department’s corporate blueprint for systems modernization, controlling investments throughout their life cycles, and evaluating the outcomes of acquisition methods and contracts.
  Highlights of GAO-09-29 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-1164T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-263 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-990 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-564 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-424 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-06-996 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-06-598T (PDF), and Highlights of GAO-05-179 (PDF)
• While DHS has taken initial steps needed to develop an acquisition workforce, much work remains to fill critical positions with qualified, trained acquisition professionals.
  Highlights of GAO-09-30 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-1164T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-06-996 (PDF), and Highlights of GAO-05-179 (PDF)

^ Back to topWhat Needs to Be Done

• DHS should revise contractor deliverable review practices, ensure that applicable entry and exit criteria for each technical review are used and satisfied, and correct anomalies in contractor-delivered monthly earned value management reports, among other things. DHS also needs to limit investment in SBInet until it can demonstrate what, if any, future investment in system capabilities and deployments represents a prudent, responsible, and affordable use of resources. Further, DHS needs to take steps to ensure that the deployment, acceptance, and operational evaluation of the near-term system projects are managed effectively by making improvements to key program management disciplines, such as periodic milestone reviews, requirements management, and risk management, and it needs to take steps to improve the content, review, and approval of test planning documentation, and the analysis, disclosure, and resolution of system problems.
  
  Highlights of GAO-11-6 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-10-340 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-1086 (PDF)
• Due to limitations in its air exit scenarios, DHS needs to identify additional sources of information beyond these pilots to inform a strategic air exit solution decision. DHS needs to define, justify, and coordinate its future investment in US-VISIT capabilities, including a proposed exit capability, and implement effective management controls for acquiring and investing in these capabilities. In particular, DHS needs to develop and maintain an integrated master schedule for the Comprehensive Exit project.
  
  Highlights of GAO-10-860 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-10-13 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-361 (PDF), and Highlights of GAO-07-1065 (PDF)
• While the Coast Guard has restructured and increased accountability for its Deepwater program, it must ensure that it effectively implements its more disciplined acquisition approach and that it develops an adequate acquisition workforce to manage the program. It also needs to complete an overall assessment that clarifies the quantities, mix, and cost of assets needed to meet requirements, given that the current Deepwater baseline is no longer feasible.
  
  Highlights of GAO-10-790 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-745 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-531T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-874 (PDF), and Highlights of GAO-09-682 (PDF)
• DHS needs to revise cost estimates to reflect the monitors’ design and development, sustainment, maintenance, deployment, and procurement needs and plans.
  
  Full Report of GAO-08-1108R (PDF, 52 pages)
• TSA needs to ensure that its cost and schedule estimates are consistent with best practices, appropriately plan for system end-to-end testing, and ensure that information-security requirements are fully implemented and tested for the Secure Flight program.
  
  Highlights of GAO-08-1024T (PDF) and Highlights of GAO-08-456T (PDF)
• DHS should routinely assess requirements for major, complex investments to ensure they are well-defined; develop measurable standards linked to these requirements; and, at a departmentwide level, systematically evaluate the outcomes of major investments and relevant contracting methods.
  
  Highlights of GAO-08-263 (PDF)
• DHS needs to assess the risk of using contractors for services as part of the acquisition-planning process; and define contract requirements to clearly describe roles, responsibilities, and limitations of contractors performing such services as part of the acquisition-planning process.
  
  Highlights of GAO-07-990 (PDF)
• DHS needs to define and implement effective investment management processes and practices for both individual programs and projects and for portfolios of programs and projects, and it needs to fully define an enterprise architecture (corporate blueprint) for achieving DHS mission priorities and ensure that each investment aligns to this blueprint.
  
  Highlights of GAO-07-424 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-564 (PDF), and Highlights of GAO-06-598T (PDF)

^ Back to topKey Reports

Secure Border Initiative

Secure Border Initiative

Secure Border Initiative

Secure Border Initiative

Medicare

Homeland Security

Homeland Security

Homeland Security

Department of Homeland Security

Department of Homeland Security

Department of Homeland Security

Department of Homeland Security

Defense Health Care

Coast Guard