Managing Weapon System Programs

Since 1990, GAO has designated DOD's management of major weapon system acquisitions a high-risk area. Congress and DOD have continually explored ways to improve acquisition outcomes without much to show for their efforts.

Highlights of GAO-09-271 (PDF)

• DOD's major weapon system programs continue to take longer, cost more, and deliver fewer quantities and capabilities than originally planned. The total acquisition cost of DOD's 2007 portfolio of major programs has grown by nearly $300 billion over initial estimates.

  Highlights of GAO-08-467SP (PDF)

• Over the next 5 years, DOD plans to invest about $357 billion on major defense acquisition programs. Every dollar wasted during the development and acquisition of weapon systems is less money available for other priorities.
• At the strategic level, DOD's processes for identifying warfighter needs, allocating resources, and developing and procuring weapon systems—which together define DOD's overall weapon system investment strategy—are fragmented and broken.

  Highlights of GAO-08-1159T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-388 (PDF)

• At the program level, weapon system programs are initiated without sufficient knowledge about system requirements, technology, and design maturity. Lacking such knowledge, managers rely on assumptions that are consistently too optimistic, exposing programs to significant and unnecessary risks, and ultimately cost growth and schedule delays.

  Highlights of GAO-08-1159T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-467SP (PDF)

^ Back to topWhat Needs to Be Done

Across-the-board improvements in DOD's acquisition outcomes require fundamental changes to its requirements, funding, and acquisition systems. This involves (1) maintaining the right mix of programs to invest in by making better decisions as to which programs should be pursued given existing and expected funding and, more importantly, deciding which programs should not be pursued; (2) ensuring that programs that are started are executable by matching requirements with resources and locking in those requirements; and (3) making it clear that programs will then be executed based on knowledge and holding program managers responsible for that execution.

Highlights of GAO-08-1159T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-467SP (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-619 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-388 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-06-110 (PDF)

^ Back to topKey Reports

Defense Acquisitions

Defense Acquisitions

Defense Acquisitions

Defense Acquisitions

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