DOD Personnel Security Clearance Program

  • GAO placed the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel security clearance program on its high-risk list in 2005 and continued that designations in 2007 and again in 2009 because of a variety of long-standing problems including:
    • delays in completing end-to-end clearance processing
    • incomplete investigative reports from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the agency that supplies most of DOD's personnel security clearance investigations; and
    • the granting of some clearances by adjudicators even though required data were missing from the investigative reports used to make such determinations.

      Highlights of GAO-08-776T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-352T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-06-1070 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-09-271 (PDF)

  • While many clearances continue to experience delays, OMB, DOD, and OPM have made significant progress and met statutory requirements for initial DOD clearances completed in fiscal year 2008. GAO found that a sample of about 450,000 initial DOD clearances completed in fiscal year 2008 took an average of 87 days, well under the statutory requirement that 80 percent of initial clearances be completed within an average of 120 days.

    Highlights of GAO-09-271 (PDF), Full Report of GAO-09-261R (PDF, 40 pages)

  • However, DOD and OMB officials have noted that the existing clearance process is not likely to allow DOD and other agencies to meet the December 2009 statutory timeliness requirements, under which the executive branch is required to implement a plan requiring agencies, to the extent practical, to make a determination on 90 percent of initial personnel security clearances within 60 days, on average.

    Highlights of GAO-09-271 (PDF), Full Report of GAO-09-261R (PDF, 40 pages)

  • Recently, a number of personnel security clearance reform efforts have been undertaken, including:
    • an April 2008 initial plan issued by the Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team with members from DOD, OPM, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Office of the Director of National Intelligence that outlines a new process for determining clearance eligibility;
    • Executive Order 13467—issued in June 2008—which establishes a Performance Accountability Council to implement the initial plan; and
    • A December 2008 progress plan issued by the Joint Reform Team that updated the President on the progress made and specified plans to further reform the security clearance process

      Full Report of GAO-08-1050T (PDF, 37 pages), Full Report of GAO-09-261R (PDF, 40 pages)

  • Although initial steps have been taken to reform the personnel security clearance process, continued efforts and oversight are needed to ensure that the reform process adheres to best practices in government transformation and includes established measures that assess the progress and effectiveness of the reform efforts.

    Full Report of GAO-08-1050T (PDF, 37 pages)

^ Back to topWhat Needs to Be Done

GAO has made numerous recommendations to improve DOD's security clearance program. For example, GAO has recommended that DOD take actions such as:

  • improving the accuracy of its projected need for clearances,

    Highlights of GAO-07-310 (PDF)

  • implementing procedures to eliminate documentation problems,

    Highlights of GAO-06-1070 (PDF)

  • working with OMB and OPM to fully measure and report all of the time required to determine clearance eligibility,

    Highlights of GAO-06-1070 (PDF)

  • working with an OMB-directed interagency group to identify and implement solutions for clearance information technology problems that have resulted in clearance delays, and

    Highlights of GAO-06-1070 (PDF)

  • taking steps to develop and report measures of quality in the clearance process and include them in future reports to explicitly show how DOD is balancing quality and timeliness requirements.

    Highlights of GAO-08-350 (PDF)

GAO has also advocated that the government consider four key factors as it reforms the security clearance process. These factors are:

  • ensuring a strong requirements-determination process,
  • building quality in all clearance processes,
  • providing metrics to provide a more complete picture of clearance processes performance, and
  • providing long-term funding requirements for security clearance reform.

    Highlights of GAO-08-352T (PDF)

^ Back to topKey Reports

High-Risk Series

An Update
GAO-09-271, Jan 22, 2009

DOD Personnel Clearances

Personnel Security Clearances

Personnel Clearances

DOD Personnel Clearances

DOD Personnel Clearances

GAO Contact
portrait of Janet St. Laurent

Janet A. St. Laurent

Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

stlaurentj@gao.gov

(202) 512-4300

portrait of Brenda S. Farrell

Brenda S. Farrell

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

farrellb@gao.gov

(202) 512-3604