Telecommunications
Agencies Are Generally Following Sound Transition Planning Practices, and GSA Is Taking Action to Resolve Challenges
GAO-08-759, Jul 28, 2008
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The General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for ensuring that federal agencies have access to the telecommunications needed to meet mission requirements. GSA's current telecommunications program, called FTS2001, has contracts in place that will expire by June 2010. Thus, agencies face the difficult task of transitioning their services to a successor program, known as Networx. GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which agencies are following sound transition planning practices and (2) the actions GSA is taking to identify and resolve common transition challenges affecting agencies. In performing this work, GAO selected six agencies based on, among other things, their FTS2001 charges; reviewed transition planning at these agencies and GSA; and analyzed GSA documentation of actions to address transition challenges.
Selected agencies--the Departments of Homeland Security, Commerce, and Agriculture and the Small Business Administration, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission--are generally following sound transition planning practices previously identified by GAO. For example, all have established telecommunications inventories, and most have established transition plans that include transition preparation tasks and time lines. However, other key practices are not being fully implemented at three agencies. For example, Commerce does not plan to clearly define all key transition roles and responsibilities, Homeland Security does not plan to identify local and regional points of contact, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not plan to establish measures of success based on its transition objectives. With limited time available to finalize planning and begin transitions, agencies that do not address gaps in their planning or follow through on plans risk delaying their transitions and increase the likelihood of incurring unnecessary costs. As facilitator for all transition management activities, GSA has identified numerous common challenges that agencies face in making the transition to Networx, and it is taking action to resolve them. GSA uses various forums to identify these challenges, which include ensuring cooperation from incumbent contractors, defining agencies' responsibilities for information security during the transition, and the use of a transition inventory application developed by GSA. To resolve these challenges, GSA has, among other things, modified FTS2001 contracts to help ensure contractor cooperation, developed guidance to clarify information security responsibilities, and established support teams to assist agencies in using the inventory application developed by GSA. GSA's actions should reduce the likelihood that these challenges will hinder transition efforts.
Status Legend:
Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
- In Process
- Open
- Closed - implemented
- Closed - not implemented
Recommendations for Executive Action
Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the department's Chief Information Officer to address the gaps in its transition planning. Specifically, the Chief Information Officer should establish goals and measures of success for the department's transition efforts to help managers assess progress.
Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open
Comments: DHS's 60 day letter (dated March 16, 2011) states that their FTS2001 Service Disconnects have met or exceeded monthly GSA goals. However, DHS has not provided documented goals and measures of success for the Networx transition.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the department's Chief Information Officer to address the gaps in its transition planning. Specifically, the Chief Information Officer should include in the department's planning efforts the identification of human capital resources needed to conduct an effective transition.
Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Closed - Not Implemented
Comments: In June 2008 we recommended that DHS include in the department's planning efforts the identification of human capital resources needed to conduct an effective transition. While DHS's 60 day response letter (dated March 16, 2011) indicates that the department has exceeded its established target of FTS2001 Service disconnects; the letter adds that DHS did not identify staffing for transition efforts not related to the One Net acquisition. Because human resource planning was identified as an important step in pre-transition planning, and DHS reported that as of February 2011 its transition was about 85% complete, GAO is closing this recommendation as Not Implemented.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the department's Chief Information Officer to address the gaps in its transition planning. Specifically, the Chief Information Officer should identify local and regional points of contact.
Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Closed - Not Implemented
Comments: In June 2008, we recommended that DHS identify local points of contact as an important step to prepare for the upcoming transition to a new telecommunications contract. DHS's 60 day response letter (dated March 16, 2011) reiterated the Department's non-concurrence with this recommendation, due to the Department's reliance to its components to adequately manage individual transition activities. Because the identification of local contacts was identified as an important step in pre-transition planning and DHS reported that as of February 2011 its transition was about 85% complete, GAO is closing this recommendation as non-implemented.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the department's Chief Information Officer to address the gaps in its transition planning. Specifically, the Chief Information Officer should clearly define the roles of asset management, legal expertise, human capital management, and information security expertise for the department's transition.
Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Closed - Not Implemented
Comments: In June 2008 we recommended that DHS include in the department's planning efforts the identification of human capital resources needed to conduct an effective transition. While DHS's 60 day response letter (March 2011) and agency comments to GAO (June 2008) indicate that the department has exceeded its established target of FTS2001 Service disconnects; the letter adds that DHS did not identify staffing for transition efforts not related to the One Net acquisition. Our previous work in this area suggests that identifying human capital resources during the planning phase is critical to a successful telecommunications transition. However, the identification of human capital capabilities was identified as an important step in pre-transition planning, and DHS reported that as of February 2011, its transition was 85% complete. As a result, GAO is closing this recommendation as Not Implemented.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the department's Chief Information Officer to address the gaps in its transition planning. Specifically, the Chief Information Officer should evaluate the costs and benefits of new technology or alternatives to meeting its telecommunications needs.
Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open
Comments: DHS's 60 day response (dated March 16, 2011) states that DHS successfully executed the OneNet fair opportunity process for Networx Enterprise. However, GAO has yet to receive a cost-benefit analysis for OneNet or other evidence that DHS evaluated the costs and benefits of new technologies.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the department's Chief Information Officer to address the gaps in its transition planning. Specifically, the Chief Information Officer should document the department's processes for maintaining telecommunications inventories.
Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open
Comments: DHS's 60 day response (dated Mar 16, 2011) indicates that DHS instructed its components to use the GSA Transition Baseline Inventory (TBI) and that the components continue to do so. However, DHS has not provided documentation of DHS policy instructing components to use the GSA TBI.
Recommendation: The Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission should direct the commission's Chief Information Officer to evaluate the costs and benefits of new technology or alternatives to meeting its telecommunications needs.
Agency Affected: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Status: Open
Comments: Action on this recommendation is still ongoing. GAO will contiue to monitor actions taken on this recommendation.
Recommendation: The Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission should direct the commission's Chief Information Officer to establish measures of success based on the transition objectives that the agency plans to develop.
Agency Affected: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Status: Open
Comments: Action on this recommendation is still ongoing. GAO will contiue to monitor actions taken on this recommendation.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Commerce should direct the department's Chief Information Officer to define the roles of asset and human capital management for the department's transition.
Agency Affected: Department of Commerce
Status: Closed - Implemented
Comments: In June 2008, GAO found that, among other things, Commerce did not define the role of human capital management for the department?s transition to the Networx telecommunications contracts. As a result, GAO recommended that Commerce define the role of human capital management for its upcoming transition. In July 2009, Commerce provided GAO with an updated charter for their Network Transition Team (NTT), which defines the role of human capital management. Specifically, this charter indicates that each bureau within Commerce has identified a point of contact whom is responsible for human capital management including coordination of all resources required for bureau specific transition efforts. By defining the role of human capital management for the Networx transition, Commerce should be able to assign appropriate personnel and update them on transition progress and issues, and subsequently reduce the risk of extending their transition to the new contracts. In June 2008, GAO found that, among other things, Commerce did not define the role of and responsibility for asset management for the department?s transition to the Networx telecommunications contracts. As a result, GAO recommended that Commerce define the role of asset management for its upcoming transition. In July 2009, Commerce provided GAO with an updated charter for their Network Transition Team (NTT), which states that the role of asset management for the transition belongs to each bureau within Commerce. Further, as identified in the NTT Charter, Commerce?s Designated Agency Representative (DAR) policy indicates that each bureau DAR is responsible for telecommunications assets. By defining the role of asset management for the Networx transition, Commerce should be able to assign appropriate personnel and update them on transition progress and issues, and subsequently reduce the risk of extending their transition to the new contracts.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the department's Chief Information Officer to address the gaps in its transition planning. Specifically, the Chief Information Officer should perform a transition risk assessment that addresses risks to mission-critical systems, continuity of operations plans, and risks to information security.
Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open
Comments: DHS's 60 day letter (dated March 16, 2011) states that their FTS2001 Service Disconnects have met or exceeded monthly GSA goals. GAO has not received a transition risk assessment that addresses risks to mission-critical systems, continuity of operations plans, and risks to information security.