Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Coast Guard manage the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program, which requires maritime workers to complete background checks and obtain a biometric identification card to gain unescorted access to secure areas of regulated maritime facilities. As requested, GAO evaluated the extent to which (1) TWIC processes for enrollment, background checking, and use are designed to provide reasonable assurance that unescorted access to these facilities is limited to qualified individuals; and (2) the effectiveness of TWIC has been assessed. GAO reviewed program documentation, such as the concept of operations, and conducted site visits to four TWIC centers, conducted covert tests at several selected U.S. ports chosen for their size in terms of cargo volume, and interviewed agency officials. The results of these visits and tests are not generalizable but provide insights and perspective about the TWIC program. This is a public version of a sensitive report. Information DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted.

Internal control weaknesses governing the enrollment, background checking, and use of TWIC potentially limit the program's ability to provide reasonable assurance that access to secure areas of Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)-regulated facilities is restricted to qualified individuals. To meet the stated program purpose, TSA designed TWIC program processes to facilitate the issuance of TWICs to maritime workers. However, TSA did not assess the internal controls designed and in place to determine whether they provided reasonable assurance that the program could meet defined mission needs for limiting access to only qualified individuals. GAO found that internal controls in the enrollment and background checking processes are not designed to provide reasonable assurance that (1) only qualified individuals can acquire TWICs; (2) adjudicators follow a process with clear criteria for applying discretionary authority when applicants are found to have extensive criminal convictions; or (3) once issued a TWIC, TWIC-holders have maintained their eligibility. Further, internal control weaknesses in TWIC enrollment, background checking, and use could have contributed to the breach of MTSA-regulated facilities during covert tests conducted by GAO's investigators. During covert tests of TWIC use at several selected ports, GAO's investigators were successful in accessing ports using counterfeit TWICs, authentic TWICs acquired through fraudulent means, and false business cases (i.e., reasons for requesting access). Conducting a control assessment of the TWIC program's processes to address existing weaknesses could better position DHS to achieve its objectives in controlling unescorted access to the secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels. DHS has not assessed the TWIC program's effectiveness at enhancing security or reducing risk for MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels. Further, DHS has not demonstrated that TWIC, as currently implemented and planned, is more effective than prior approaches used to limit access to ports and facilities, such as using facility specific identity credentials with business cases. Conducting an effectiveness assessment that further identifies and assesses TWIC program security risks and benefits could better position DHS and policymakers to determine the impact of TWIC on enhancing maritime security. Further, DHS did not conduct a risk-informed cost-benefit analysis that considered existing security risks, and it has not yet completed a regulatory analysis for the upcoming rule on using TWIC with card readers. Conducting a regulatory analysis using the information from the internal control and effectiveness assessments as the basis for evaluating the costs, benefits, security risks, and corrective actions needed to implement the TWIC program, could help DHS ensure that the TWIC program is more effective and cost-efficient than existing measures or alternatives at enhancing maritime security. Among other things, GAO recommends that DHS assess TWIC program internal controls to identify needed corrective actions, assess TWIC's effectiveness, and use the information to identify effective and cost-efficient methods for meeting program objectives. DHS concurred with all of the recommendations.

Status Legend:

Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

• In Process
• Open
• Closed - implemented
• Closed - not implemented

Recommendations for Executive Action

Recommendation: To identify effective and cost-efficient methods for meeting TWIC program objectives, and assist in determining whether the benefits of continuing to implement and operate the TWIC program in its present form and planned use with readers surpass the costs, the Secretary of Homeland Security should perform an internal control assessment of the TWIC program by (1) analyzing existing controls, (2) identifying related weaknesses and risks, and (3) determining cost-effective actions needed to correct or compensate for those weaknesses so that reasonable assurance of meeting TWIC program objectives can be achieved. This assessment should consider weaknesses we identified in this report among other things, and include: (1) strengthening the TWIC program's controls for preventing and detecting identity fraud, such as requiring certain biographic information from applicants and confirming the information to the extent needed to positively identify the individual, or implementing alternative mechanisms to positively identify individuals; (2) defining the term extensive criminal history for use in the adjudication process and ensuring that adjudicators follow a clearly defined and consistently applied process, with clear criteria, in considering the approval or denial of a TWIC for individuals with extensive criminal convictions not defined as permanent or interim disqualifying offenses; and (3) identifying mechanisms for detecting whether TWIC holders continue to meet TWIC disqualifying criminal offense and immigration-related eligibility requirements after TWIC issuance to prevent unqualified individuals from retaining and using authentic TWICs.

Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security

Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To identify effective and cost-efficient methods for meeting TWIC program objectives, and assist in determining whether the benefits of continuing to implement and operate the TWIC program in its present form and planned use with readers surpass the costs, the Secretary of Homeland Security should conduct an effectiveness assessment that includes addressing internal control weaknesses and, at a minimum, evaluates whether use of TWIC in its present form and planned use with readers would enhance the posture of security beyond efforts already in place given costs and program risks.

Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security

Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To identify effective and cost-efficient methods for meeting TWIC program objectives, and assist in determining whether the benefits of continuing to implement and operate the TWIC program in its present form and planned use with readers surpass the costs, the Secretary of Homeland Security should use the information from the internal control and effectiveness assessments as the basis for evaluating the costs, benefits, security risks, and corrective actions needed to implement the TWIC program in a manner that will meet stated mission needs and mitigate existing security risks as part of conducting the regulatory analysis on implementing a new regulation on the use of TWIC with biometric card readers.

Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security

Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To identify effective and cost-efficient methods for meeting TWIC program objectives, and assist in determining whether the benefits of continuing to implement and operate the TWIC program in its present form and planned use with readers surpass the costs, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to design effective methods for collecting, cataloguing, and querying TWIC-related compliance issues to provide the Coast Guard with the enforcement information needed to assess trends in compliance with the TWIC program and identify associated vulnerabilities.

Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security

Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.