Reports News from the GAO http://www.gao.gov/browse/date/week Tue, 07 Feb 2012 07:50:41 -0500 GAO http://www.gao.gov/images/title_object.jpg http://www.gao.gov/ Feed provided by GAO. Click to visit. http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-309R?source=ra What GAO FoundIn 2010, 31,880—or 10 percent—of all FECA beneficiaries were long-term, full-time beneficiaries and 10,873 of those—or 34 percent—were at full retirement age, as defined under the Social Security Act. Of the $1.9 billion total in cash benefits paid to FECA beneficiaries, over half (58 percent) went to long-term, full-time beneficiaries. Of that half, long-term, full-time beneficiaries at or above full Social Security retirement age received 21 percent. This analysis covered all FECA beneficiaries, including USPS and non-USPS employees.Compared to their federal CSRS retired counterparts, non-USPS long-term, full-time FECA beneficiaries typically received higher benefits in 2010. The median annual FECA benefit of $35,614 was about 26 percent higher than the median annual annuity received by retirees, which was $28,289, after adjusting for the effects of taxes. The difference between FECA benefits and CSRS annuities is typically larger when the FECA beneficiary was injured after fewer years of service. The differences between annual FECA and Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) benefits in our comparison are largely explained by the benefit calculation formulas used for each set of benefits. The CSRS formula generally awards a smaller percentage of salary than the FECA formula for most workers, except those with long tenure.It is important to note that our finding regarding the difference in benefits levels does not allow us to conclude whether such a difference exists for USPS employees or for current or future annuitants under FERS, a population that is increasing given that FERS covers federal employees first hired in 1984 or later. USPS employees were not included in this analysis because USPS could not provide sufficient data to reliably determine its employees’ work histories for the years covered by our analysis.We examined the experiences of four states that limit state workers’ compensation benefits based on retirement age: Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, and Tennessee. State officials and attorneys in those states highlighted several aspects of their experiences with these provisions, including cost savings, legal challenges, and financial hardships for some beneficiaries. For example, a workers’ compensation board official from Kentucky stated there has been a decrease in workers’ compensation costs since the retirement-age limitation went into effect; however, their office could not attribute the savings to this provision because they lack statistical data since private insurance carriers pay the benefits rather than the state.Why GAO Did This ReportIn 2010, the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA) program paid approximately $2.8 billion in total cash and medical benefits to federal employees who sustained injuries or illnesses while performing federal duties; about $1.9 billion of that was for cash benefits. U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has the largest number of FECA beneficiaries. The Department of Labor (Labor), which oversees the program, categorizes FECA beneficiaries into groups based on their ability to work, length of time receiving benefits, and type of injury. There are some beneficiaries who have been receiving benefits for longer than 90 days, and are completely unable to work. We refer to this group as long-term, full-time beneficiaries. Because there are no time or age limits for receiving FECA benefits, long-term, full-time beneficiaries include people at or older than retirement age.We examined (1) the characteristics and associated compensation costs of long-term, full-time FECA beneficiaries, for USPS and non-USPS employees; (2) how wage compensation benefits for retirement-age, long-term, full-time FECA beneficiaries compare with federal retirees’ annuities (not including USPS employees); and (3) the experiences of states that limit state workers’ compensation benefits for workers at retirement age. For the first question, we could include USPS employees because Labor provided us with data on FECA beneficiaries for all federal agencies, including USPS. However, we could not include USPS employees in answering the second question. Our analysis required determining the work histories for FECA beneficiaries and retired annuitants, using an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) database to obtain these work histories. USPS employees are not included in the OPM database. We subsequently obtained data from USPS; however, the data were missing a significant amount of information necessary to determine the work histories employees for the years covered by our analysis. According to USPS officials, they changed data systems in 1995 and some key data were not available.For more information, contact Andrew Sherrill at (202) 512-7215 or sherrilla@gao.gov or Phillip Herr at (202) 512-2834 or herrp@gao.gov. Mon, 06 Feb 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-21?source=ra What GAO FoundOut-of-pocket costs for military families who use DOD-subsidized child care are largely driven by policies that vary by service. DOD establishes income-based fee ranges for on-installation child care, but each service sets its own fees and discounts within these parameters. As a result, in school year 2010 the per-child costs that families from the same income categories paid for on-installation care varied by service and installation. For example, the monthly per-child cost for a family with an income of $50,000 could have ranged from $335 to $518. Families’ costs for off-installation child care through private providers are also affected by policy differences among the services. All services offer subsidies for off-installation care that are intended to make families’ costs comparable to those for on-installation care. In an effort to offer benefits to more families, some services use a fixed cap to limit the subsidy amount. In school year 2010, the Air Force and Navy capped their subsidies at $200 per child per month, and families in these services had higher average monthly costs for off-installation care than Army and Marine Corps families, and also had higher costs than what they would have paid for on-installation care. For example, on average, Navy families using off-installation care paid $87 more per month than they would have paid for on-installation care, while Army families paid $63 less. Other factors, such as the number of children in care, also contributed to families’ costs for off-installation care. DOD and the services’ recent policy changes reduced differences among and within services in families’ costs for on-installation care, and DOD plans to further reduce these differences in the next 3 to 5 years. While the effects of these policy changes on individual families’ costs for off-installation care vary by family, families in services with fixed subsidy caps will likely continue to have higher average costs than families in services that do not.Military families face two main barriers to obtaining DOD-subsidized child care: lack of awareness and insufficient availability. According to DOD officials and based on GAO’s group discussions, some families remain unaware of subsidized child care, particularly off-installation care, despite DOD’s efforts to provide information at pre-deployment briefings, and through other outreach efforts. Families who are geographically isolated from an installation, such as reservists and recruiters, may be less likely to be aware of subsidized care. The individual services have taken steps to increase awareness of DOD-subsidized child care, such as establishing positions for professionals who educate families about child care options. However, even families who are informed about DOD-subsidized child care may face barriers obtaining it due to a lack of available space at on-installation centers and a scarcity of eligible child care providers off installation. The shortage of on-installation child care spaces resulted, in part, from heavy deployment demands, and DOD has responded by approving construction projects that it anticipates will provide over 21,000 new child care spaces using fiscal year 2008 through 2010 funding. DOD and the services have initiatives under way to increase the availability of eligible off-installation providers. In addition, DOD is developing an agencywide system that will provide servicemembers a central place to request both on-installation and off-installation child care. DOD plans to pilot the system in the spring of 2012 and intends to market it DOD-wide to servicemembers once it is fully implemented. The agency is in the process of contracting for the development of a marketing plan.Why GAO Did This StudyAbout a million military servicemembers serve the United States while raising a family, and many need reliable, affordable child care. Paying for high-quality child care can be challenging for these families, so the Department of Defense (DOD) offsets costs by subsidizing on-installation child care centers and offering subsidies for approved off-installation care providers. Deployments related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan increased the demand for child care. The extent of military families’ out-of-pocket child care costs for those using subsidized care are not known, and families may face barriers to obtaining DOD-subsidized care. GAO was mandated to examine: (1) the out-of-pocket child care costs paid by military families who use DOD-subsidized care; and (2) the barriers, if any, to obtaining DOD-subsidized care, and what has DOD done in response.To address these objectives, GAO reviewed DOD policies and guidance; interviewed officials from DOD, its contractor that administers DOD’s off-installation child care subsidies, and organizations that support military families; reviewed DOD fee data for school year 2009-2010 (school year 2010) and school year 2010-2011 (school year 2011); and analyzed child care costs for a random probability sample of 338 families using off-installation care in school year 2010. GAO conducted nongeneralizable discussion groups with military parents at two large military installations.GAO is not making recommendations in this report.DOD generally agreed with the report’s findings and also provided additional information on several specific points in the report.For more information, contact Kay E. Brown at (202) 512-7215 or brownke@gao.gov. Fri, 03 Feb 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-126?source=ra What GAO FoundFrom 2004 through 2009, expenditures for hospital IMD procedures increased from $16.1 billion to $19.8 billion, an increase of 4.3 percent per year—a rate equal to that of Medicare spending for other hospital procedures. While cardiac and orthopedic procedures accounted for nearly all IMD-related expenditures, orthopedic procedures accounted for most of the increase in such expenditures during this period. Utilization increased at a faster rate for orthopedic devices and accounted for the majority of changes in expenditures for IMD procedures during the period.The information GAO obtained on the amounts hospitals paid for selected IMDs showed substantial variation. For a number of reasons, the detailed information needed to accurately compare prices across hospitals—both the specific model and sale price net of discounts and rebates—was not reported by all respondents for all IMDs in our study. However, data from 31 hospitals indicated substantial variation in reported prices for cardiac devices. For example, the difference between the lowest and highest price hospitals reported paying for a particular automated implantable cardioverter defibrillator (AICD) model was $6,844. The difference between the highest and lowest price reported for another AICD model was $8,723. The price differences for the remaining two AICD models in our study fell in between $6,844 and $8,723. The median prices across the four AICD models ranged from $16,445 to $19,007. A factor particular to the IMD market that affects prices hospitals pay is the influence of physicians on hospitals’ IMD purchasing. Although physicians are not involved in price negotiations, they often express strong preferences for certain manufacturers and models of IMDs. To the extent that physicians in the same hospital have different preferences for IMDs, it may be difficult for the hospital to obtain volume discounts from particular manufacturers. Also, confidentiality clauses barring hospitals from sharing price information make it difficult to inform physicians about device costs and thereby influence their preferences. Other factors that influence IMD prices include the degree of seller competition and a hospital’s market share.These data suggest that some hospitals have substantially less bargaining power with the small group of companies that manufacture particular IMDs and consequently face challenges in obtaining more favorable prices. The lack of price transparency and the substantial variation in amounts hospitals pay for some IMDs raise questions about whether hospitals are achieving the best prices possible. Any excess or unnecessary costs that hospitals incur through IMD pricing may be passed onto the Medicare program.The Department of Health and Human Services, VA, and DOD reviewed a draft of this report and had no general comments.Why GAO Did This StudyImplantable medical devices (IMD)—including a variety of cardiac and orthopedic devices provided to Medicare beneficiaries in inpatient or outpatient hospital settings—represent a significant share of hospitals’ supply costs. Hospitals purchase IMDs directly from manufacturers or through group purchasing organizations (GPO) and their purchasing agreements often contain confidentiality clauses restricting them from revealing to third parties the prices they pay for such devices. Policymakers are concerned that the lack of price transparency inhibits competition in the device market, leading to higher costs for hospitals, and ultimately higher Medicare spending. GAO was asked to examine (1) Medicare spending and utilization trends for procedures involving IMDs provided to beneficiaries, and (2) what available information shows about the prices hospitals pay for IMDs and any factors particular to the IMD market that influence those prices. GAO analyzed the most recently available Medicare inpatient and outpatient hospital claims from fiscal years 2004 through 2009. GAO requested price information on five devices from 60 hospitals, 6 GPOs, Department of Defense (DOD) medical centers, and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health system. GAO interviewed officials from GPOs, device manufacturers, large hospital systems, and small hospitals about the factors that affect the prices hospitals pay for IMDs.For more information, contact James C. Cosgrove at (202) 512-7114 or cosgrovej@gao.gov. Fri, 03 Feb 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-382T?source=ra What GAO Found DHS’s primary strategic planning effort in recent years has been the QHSR. In September 2011, GAO reported on the extent to which DHS consulted with stakeholders in developing the QHSR. DHS solicited input from various stakeholder groups in conducting the first QHSR, but DHS officials, several stakeholders GAO contacted, and other reviewers of the QHSR noted concerns with time frames provided for stakeholder consultations and outreach to nonfederal stakeholders. Specifically, DHS consulted with stakeholders—federal agencies; department and component officials; state, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; academics; and policy experts—through various mechanisms, such as the solicitation of papers to help frame the QHSR. DHS and these stakeholders identified benefits from these consultations, such as DHS receiving varied perspectives. However, stakeholders also identified challenges in the consultation process, such as concerns about the limited time frames for providing input into the QHSR or BUR and the need to examine additional mechanisms for including more nonfederal stakeholders in consultations. By providing more time for obtaining feedback and examining mechanisms to obtain nonfederal stakeholders’ input, DHS could strengthen its management of stakeholder consultations and be better positioned to review and incorporate, as appropriate, stakeholders’ input during future reviews. DHS considered various factors in identifying high-priority BUR initiatives for implementation in fiscal year 2012 but did not include risk information as one of these factors, as called for in GAO’s prior work and DHS’s risk-management guidance. Through the BUR, DHS identified 43 initiatives aligned with the QHSR mission areas to serve as mechanisms for implementing those mission areas. According to DHS officials, DHS did not consider risk information in prioritizing initiatives because of differences among the initiatives that made it difficult to compare risks across them, among other things. In September 2011, GAO reported that consideration of risk information during future implementation efforts could help strengthen DHS’s prioritization of mechanisms for implementing the QHSR. Further, GAO reported that DHS established performance measures for most of the QHSR objectives and had plans to develop additional measures. However, with regard to specific programs, GAO’s work has shown that a number of programs and efforts lack outcome goals and measures, hindering the department’s ability to effectively assess results. In 2003, GAO designated the transformation of DHS as high risk because DHS had to transform 22 agencies—several with major management challenges—into one department, and failure to effectively address DHS’s management and mission risks could have serious consequences for U.S. national and economic security. DHS has taken action to implement, transform, and strengthen its management functions, such as developing a strategy for addressing this high-risk area and putting in place common policies, procedures, and systems within individual management functions, such as human capital, that help to integrate its component agencies. However, DHS needs to demonstrate measurable, sustainable progress in implementing its strategy and corrective actions to address its management challenges. Why GAO Did This StudyThe Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) requires that beginning in fiscal year 2009 and every 4 years thereafter the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conduct a review that provides a comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy of the United States. In February 2010, DHS issued its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) report, outlining a strategic framework for homeland security. In July 2010 DHS issued a report on the results of its Bottom-Up Review (BUR), a departmentwide assessment to implement the QHSR strategy by aligning DHS’s programmatic activities, such as inspecting cargo at ports of entry, and its organizational structure with the missions and goals identified in the QHSR. This testimony addresses DHS’s efforts to (1) strategically plan its homeland security missions through the QHSR, (2) set strategic priorities and measure performance, and (3) build a unified department. This testimony is based on GAO reports issued in December 2010, February 2011, and September 2011.What GAO RecommendsGAO made recommendations in prior reports for DHS to, among other things, provide more time for consulting with stakeholders during the QHSR process, examine additional mechanisms for obtaining input from nonfederal stakeholders, and examine how risk information could be used in prioritizing future QHSR initiatives. DHS concurred and has actions planned or underway to address them.For more information, contact David C. Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. Fri, 03 Feb 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-436T?source=ra What GAO FoundGAO identified 56 contracts and task orders that were active during fiscal year 2010 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2011 under which contracting offices obligated roughly $35.2 million on Arlington’s behalf. These contracts supported cemetery operations, construction and facility maintenance, and new efforts to enhance information-technology systems for the automation of burial operations. The Army has taken a number of steps since June 2010 at different levels to provide for more effective management and oversight of contracts, establishing new support relationships, formalizing policies and procedures, and increasing the use of dedicated contracting staff to manage and improve its acquisition processes. However, GAO found that ANCP does not maintain complete data on its contracts, responsibilities for contracting support are not yet fully defined, and dedicated contract staffing arrangements still need to be determined. The success of Arlington’s acquisition outcomes will depend on continued management focus from ANCP and its contracting partners to ensure sustained attention to contract management and institutionalize progress made to date. GAO made three recommendations to continue improvements in contract management. The Department of Defense (DOD) partially concurred and noted actions in progress to address these areas.The Army has taken positive steps and implemented improvements to address other management deficiencies and to provide information and assistance to families. It has implemented improvements across a broad range of areas at Arlington, including developing procedures for ensuring accountability over remains and improving its capability to respond to the public and to families’ inquiries. Nevertheless, the Army has remaining management challenges in several areas—managing information-technology investments, updating workforce plans, developing an organizational assessment program, coordinating with key partners, developing a strategic plan, and developing guidance for providing assistance to families. GAO made six recommendations to help address these areas. DOD concurred or partially concurred and has begun to take some corrective actions.A transfer of jurisdiction for the Army’s two national cemeteries to VA is feasible based on historical precedent for the national cemeteries and examples of other reorganization efforts in the federal government. However, several factors may affect the advisability of making such a change, including the potential costs and benefits, potential transition challenges, and the potential effect on Arlington’s unique characteristics. In addition, given that the Army has taken steps to address deficiencies at Arlington and has improved its management, it may be premature to move forward with a change in jurisdiction, particularly if other options for improvement exist that entail less disruption. GAO identified opportunities for enhancing collaboration between the Army and VA that could leverage their strengths and potentially lead to improvements at all national cemeteries. GAO recommended that the Army and VA develop a mechanism to formalize collaboration between these organizations. DOD and VA concurred with this recommendation.Why GAO Did This StudyArlington National Cemetery (Arlington) is the final resting place for many of our nation’s military servicemembers, their family members, and others. In June 2010, the Army Inspector General identified problems at the cemetery, including deficiencies in contracting and management, burial errors, and a failure to notify next of kin of errors. In response, the Secretary of the Army issued guidance creating the position of the Executive Director of the Army National Cemeteries Program (ANCP) to manage Arlington and requiring changes to address the deficiencies and improve cemetery operations. In response to Public Law 111-339, GAO assessed several areas, including (1) actions taken to improve contract management and oversight, (2) the Army’s efforts to address identified management deficiencies and provide information and assistance to families regarding efforts to detect and correct burial errors, and (3) factors affecting the feasibility and advisability of transferring jurisdiction for the Army’s national cemeteries to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The information in this testimony summarizes GAO’s recent reports on Arlington contracting (GAO-12-99) and management (GAO-12-105). These reports are based on, among other things, analyzing guidance, policies, plans, contract files, and other documentation from the Army, Arlington, and other organizations and interviews with Army and VA officials.What GAO RecommendsIn the reports, GAO made several recommendations to help Arlington sustain progress made to date.For more information, contact Belva Martin at (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov or Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Fri, 03 Feb 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-340?source=ra What GAO FoundDOD’s reports to Congress on estimated weapon system O&S costs are often inconsistent and sometimes unreliable, limiting visibility needed for effective oversight of these costs. The SAR statute requires that life-cycle cost reporting for major weapon systems be uniform, to the extent practicable, across the department, but GAO found a number of inconsistent practices in how program offices were reporting life-cycle O&S cost estimates in the SAR. Program offices were inconsistent in (1) the explanatory information they included with the cost estimates; (2) the source of the cost estimate they cited as the basis for the reported costs; (3) the unit of measure they used to portray average costs; (4) the frequency with which they updated reported costs; and (5) the reporting of costs for an antecedent system being replaced by the new weapon system. For example, 35 (42 percent) of the 84 programs that reported O&S costs in the 2010 SAR did not cite a source of these data, contrary to DOD’s guidance, and 57 (68 percent) of the programs did not report O&S costs for an antecedent system. Also, O&S cost submissions in the SAR did not always incorporate best practices for presenting cost estimates, such as tracking cost changes over time and identifying cost drivers. In addition, 11 systems did not provide O&S cost estimates in the 2010 SAR.Although SARs are intended to provide Congress with authoritative program information on major weapon systems, 7 of the 15 sample programs GAO reviewed submitted unreliable O&S cost estimate data in the 2007, 2009, or 2010 SARs. For example, an Air Force program underreported O&S costs by $2.1 billion (fiscal year 2002 dollars), or 18 percent. While some of the program offices did not provide an explanation for the errors in the submitted data, others cited specific reasons. For example, one Navy program office underreported O&S costs in the SAR and explained that it excluded certain costs that were not under its control, such as externally funded spare parts and military personnel. However, excluding such costs is contrary to the SAR statute. An Air Force program reported current and projected funding for the program rather than estimated life-cycle O&S costs. This practice also had the effect of underreporting these costs.DOD’s reports to Congress on estimated weapon system O&S costs were often inconsistent and sometimes unreliable due to a lack of (1) detailed implementation guidance for reporting these costs and (2) an effective process for reviewing the O&S cost sections of the SAR before final submission to Congress. DOD’s guidance collectively provides minimal instructions for O&S cost reporting. The guidance also does not incorporate some of the best practices GAO has identified for presenting cost estimates. Further, although the SAR data submitted by program offices are subject to multiple reviews within the military services and by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, this review process has not provided assurance that O&S costs are reported consistently and reliably. In the absence of improvements to the SAR guidance and to the review process, deficiencies in reporting O&S costs are likely to continue. Improved reporting of O&S costs in the SAR could help to place more emphasis on assessing, managing, and controlling long-term weapon system O&S costs.Why GAO Did This StudyWith the nation facing fiscal challenges and the potential for tighter defense budgets, Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) have placed more attention on controlling the billions of dollars spent annually on weapon system operating and support (O&S) costs. These costs include, costs for repair parts, maintenance, and personnel, and account for about 70 percent of the total costs of a weapon system over its life cycle. The selected acquisition report (SAR) is DOD’s key recurring status report on the cost, schedule, and performance of major defense acquisition programs and is intended to provide authoritative information for congressional oversight of these programs. Oversight of O&S costs is important because many of the key decisions affecting these life-cycle costs are made during the acquisition process. GAO reviewed weapon system O&S cost estimates that DOD submits in the SAR. Specifically, GAO determined the extent to which the SARs provide consistent and reliable O&S cost estimate information that enables effective oversight of these weapon system costs. To conduct its review, GAO analyzed SAR data for 84 major systems that submitted O&S cost estimates in the 2010 SAR and selected a nonprobability sample of 15 systems for more in-depth review.What GAO RecommendsTo enhance visibility of weapon system O&S costs during acquisition, GAO recommends that DOD improve its guidance to program offices on cost reporting and also improve its process for reviewing these costs prior to final submission of the SAR to Congress. DOD concurred with GAO’s recommendations.For more information, contact Cary B. Russell at (404) 679-1808 or russellc@gao.gov. Thu, 02 Feb 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-430T?source=ra What GAO FoundIn a series of reviews, GAO found that OPM’s retirement modernization efforts were hindered by weaknesses in key management practices that are essential to successful IT modernization projects. For example, in 2005, GAO made recommendations to address weaknesses in the following areas:Project management: While OPM had defined major components of its retirement modernization effort, it had not identified the dependencies among them, increasing the risk that delays in one activity could have unforeseen impacts on the progress of others.Risk management: OPM did not have a process for identifying and tracking project risks and mitigation strategies on a regular basis. Thus, OPM lacked a mechanism to address potential problems that could adversely impact the cost, schedule, and quality of the modernization effort.Organizational change management: OPM had not adequately prepared its staff for changes to job responsibilities resulting from the modernization by developing a detailed transition plan. This could lead to confusion about roles and responsibilities and hinder effective system implementation.In 2008, as OPM was on the verge of deploying an automated retirement processing system, GAO reported deficiencies in and made recommendations to address additional management capabilities:Testing: The results of tests 1 month prior to the deployment of a major system component revealed that it had not performed as intended. These defects, along with a compressed testing schedule, increased the risk that the system would not work as intended upon deployment.Cost estimating: The cost estimate OPM developed was not fully reliable. This meant that the agency did not have a sound basis for formulating budgets or developing a program baseline.Progress reporting: The baseline against which OPM was measuring the progress of the program did not reflect the full scope of the project; this increased the risk that variances from planned performance would not be detected.In 2009, GAO reported that OPM continued to have deficiencies in its cost estimating, progress reporting, and testing practices and made recommendations to address these deficiencies, as well as additional weaknesses in the planning and oversight of the modernization effort. OPM agreed with these recommendations and began to address them, but the agency terminated the modernization effort in February 2011.More recently, in January 2012, OPM released a new plan to improve retirement processing that aims at targeted, incremental improvements rather than a largescale modernization. Specifically, OPM plans to hire new claims-processing staff, take steps to identify potential process improvements, and work with other agencies to improve data quality. Further, OPM intends to make IT improvements that allow retirees to access and update their accounts and automate the retirement application process. However, the plan reflects a less ambitious retirement processing timeliness goal and does not address improving or eliminating the legacy systems that support retirement processing.Why GAO Did This StudyThe Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is the central human resources agency for the federal government and, as such, is responsible for ensuring that the government has an effective civilian workforce. As part of its mission, OPM defines recruiting and hiring processes and procedures; provides federal employees with various benefits, such as health benefits; and administers the retirement program for federal employees. OPM’s use of information technology (IT) is critical in carrying out its responsibilities; in fiscal year 2011 the agency invested $79 million in IT systems and services. For over 2 decades, OPM has been attempting to modernize its federal employeeretirement process by automating paper-based processes and replacing antiquated information systems. However, these efforts have been unsuccessful, and OPM canceled its most recent large-scale retirement modernization effort in February 2011.GAO was asked to summarize its work on challenges OPM has faced in attempting to modernize the federal employee retirement process. To do this, GAO relied on previously published work in addition to reviewing OPM’s recent plan for retirement services.What GAO RecommendsGAO is not making new recommendations at this time. GAO has previously made numerous recommendations to address IT management challenges OPM has faced in carrying out its retirement modernization efforts. Fully addressing these challenges remains key to the success of OPM’s efforts.For more information, contact Valerie C. Melvin at (202) 512-6304 or melvinv@gao.gov. Wed, 01 Feb 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-321R?source=ra What GAO FoundIran’s involvement in illicit nuclear activities, support for terrorism, and abuse of human rights has led the United States, as well as other nations, to impose sanctions in an attempt to curb these activities. According to the Department of State (State), the sanctions are intended to, among other things, target sectors of the Iranian economy that are relevant to Iran’s proliferation activities and block the transfer of weapons and technology related to Iran’s missile and nuclear programs. One of the measures enacted by the United States, intended to limit resources available for proliferation and support for terrorism, imposes sanctions on firms that sell refined petroleum products to Iran.According to the Department of Energy (DOE), Iran has limited refinery capacity and has been reliant on imports of refined petroleum products to meet domestic demand for gasoline. Foreign commercial activity in Iran’s energy sector has also declined in recent years, limiting Iran’s ability to produce gasoline to meet demand, much less to export refined petroleum products on world markets. However, according to State and DOE officials, Iran has attempted to reduce its dependence on foreign refined petroleum products by reducing gasoline subsidies to its citizens in order to reduce demand, converting petrochemical facilities to produce gasoline, as well as expediting the construction of new refineries or the expansion of current refineries. In 2009, Iran imported approximately 130,000 barrels of gasoline per day, but, according to DOE, in 2010 the amount of gasoline shipped to Iran declined to an estimated 78,000 barrels per day, and by July 2011 it had declined to 50,000 barrels per day, according to "Petroleum Intelligence Weekly."The United States has imposed multiple sanctions through various legislation and executive orders, including the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA). On July 1, 2010, the President signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) of 2010, which amends ISA, among other provisions. ISA, as amended, provides for sanctions to be imposed against persons, including foreign firms, who engage in certain activities in Iran’s energy sector, including selling or providing Iran with refined petroleum products. In 2010, we identified, in open sources, 16 firms that reported having sold refined petroleum products to Iran from January 1, 2009, to June 30, 2010. This report updates the findings of the 2010 report.As Congress requested, this report (1) provides a list of firms reported to have sold refined petroleum products to Iran from July 1, 2010, through December 31, 2011, and firms reported to have stopped sales to Iran since the 2010 report, and (2) identifies which of those firms have contracts with the U.S. government. We defined the sale of refined petroleum products as receiving payment for the provision of any such products through direct sale, shipment, or brokering (i.e., trading) of these products to Iran.Why GAO Did This StudyBased on open source information, four firms—Petróleos de Venezuela S.A., China Oil, Unipec, and Zhuhai Zhenrong—were reported to have sold refined petroleum products to Iran between July 1, 2010, and December 31, 2011. Of the four firms, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. was not identified in our 2010 report. According to open sources, the number of firms selling refined petroleum products to Iran has decreased since the release of our 2010 report. Eleven of the 16 firms that we listed in our 2010 report were reported in open sources and/or indicated in letters to us that they had stopped sales of refined petroleum products to Iran, and we did not find any open sources that reported the firms having sold refined petroleum products to Iran since June 30, 2010. For two firms that our 2010 report listed as having been reported to have sold refined petroleum products to Iran—Emirates National Oil Company and Hin Leong Trading Corporation—we did not find sufficient open source information that reported whether the firms had continued or ceased sales of refined petroleum products to Iran since June 30, 2010. According to DOE and open source reports, as well as a State official, sanctions have made it difficult for Iran to import gasoline as many suppliers of refined petroleum products stopped shipments after the passage of CISADA. According to DOE and State officials, Iran has attempted to increase its ability to refine its own gasoline and to reduce domestic demand.The U.S. government did not have contracts with the three Chinese firms or Petróleos de Venezuela S.A., which were reported in open sources to have sold Iran refined petroleum products between July 1, 2010, and December 31, 2011.For more information, contact Thomas Melito at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Wed, 01 Feb 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-208G?source=ra This publication supersedes PEMD-10.1.4, Designing Evaluations, May 1, 1991. GAO assists congressional decision makers in their deliberations by furnishing them with analytical information on issues and options. Many diverse methodologies are needed to develop sound and timely answers to the questions the Congress asks. To provide GAO evaluators with basic information about the more commonly used methodologies, GAO’s policy guidance includes documents such as methodology transfer papers and technical guides.This methodology transfer paper addresses the logic of program evaluation designs. It introduces key issues in planning evaluation studies of federal programs to best meet decision makers’ needs while accounting for the constraints evaluators face. It describes different types of evaluations for answering varied questions about program performance, the process of designing evaluation studies, and key issues to consider toward ensuring overall study quality.To improve federal program effectiveness, accountability and service delivery, the Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), establishing a statutory framework for performance management and accountability, including the requirement that federal agencies set goals and report annually on progress towards those goals and program evaluation findings. In response to this and related management reforms, federal agencies have increased their attention to conducting program evaluations. The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 raised the visibility of performance information by requiring quarterly reviews of progress towards agency and governmentwide priority goals. Designing Evaluations is a guide to successfully completing evaluation design tasks. It should help GAO evaluators—and others interested in assessing federal programs and policies—plan useful evaluations and become educated consumers of evaluations.Designing Evaluations is one of a series of papers whose purpose is to provide guides to various aspects of audit and evaluation methodology and indicate where more detailed information is available. It is based on GAO studies and policy documents and program evaluation literature. To ensure the guide’s competence and usefulness, drafts were reviewed by selected GAO, federal and state agency evaluators, and evaluation authors and practitioners from professional consulting firms. This paper updates a 1991 version issued by GAO’s prior Program Evaluation and Methodology Division. It supersedes that earlier version and incorporates changes in federal program evaluation and performance measurement since GPRA was implemented. Wed, 01 Feb 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-316R?source=ra What GAO FoundSince the fall of 2010, State has sanctioned 13 foreign firms under the ISA—2 for investments in Iran’s energy sector and 11 for supplying refined petroleum products.State imposed various sanctions on each firm, listed 10 in EPLS making them ineligible to receive U.S. government contracts, and was in the process of listing the remaining 3 firms in EPLS at the time of this report. To enforce the ISA, State has increased its staff to review available information on companies’ activities in Iran’s energy sector, including information indicating whether affiliated parent companies should be held accountable, relying heavily on the intelligence community and U.S. embassies to corroborate the information. The final decision on whether to apply sanctions is made by the Secretary of State or a delegee after the information and evidence of potentially sanctionable activity is vetted through State and other agencies when applicable. In addition to sanctions, State officials told us that they have been successful in persuading firms to end their business dealings with Iran, and that the number of foreign firms involved in Iran’s energy sector has declined. However, they acknowledged that some firms are still operating in Iran’s energy sector, and they are continuing their efforts to enforce the ISA.In September 2010, the administration revised the FAR, as required by CISADA, to include a requirement for prospective contractors to certify that they or any firm owned or controlled by them are not engaging in activities for which sanctions may be imposed under section 5 of the ISA. The certification was subsequently added to the governmentwide electronic system for maintaining various certifications and representations that are required for contractors to do business with the government. The FAR was also revised to include remedies upon determination of false certification and procedures for obtaining waivers to the certification requirement, which would be needed if it was in the national interest for an agency to contract with a firm that has engaged in sanctionable activity.However, none of the 13 firms sanctioned by State under the ISA held government contracts or were registered to respond to solicitations for contracts, or submitted an offer after the certification requirement went into effect, so there is no evidence of false certifications or the need for waivers.Why GAO Did This StudyIt is the policy of the United States to deter Iran from developing its nuclear program, supporting terrorism, and abusing human rights by limiting the development of Iran’s energy sector, which is vital to its economy and government. The Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA), as amended, provides for sanctions against firms determined to have made certain investments in Iran’s energy sector.While the ISA applies to all firms, U.S. firms were already prohibited from investing in Iran under a U.S. trade embargo, and the ISA was enacted to encourage foreign firms to withdraw from the Iranian market. However, no sanctions have been imposed under the ISA by any prior administration.The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) amended the ISA by expanding the energy-related activities for which sanctions could be applied to include firms determined to have provided to Iran or invested in Iran’s development of refined petroleum products.Sanctions include excluding firms from receiving U.S. government contracts. CISADA also directed that the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) be revised to require firms seeking U.S. government contracts to certify that neither they nor any firms owned or controlled by them are engaged in activities for which sanctions may be imposed under section 5 of the ISA. If a contractor submits a false certification, agencies may terminate the contract, or suspend or debar the contractor, in accordance with procedures in the FAR, from government contracts. The certification requirement may be waived in the interest of national security. The Department of State (State) is responsible for enforcing the energy-related sanctions under the ISA, as amended.In response to your request, this report (1) identifies State actions and processes to enforce energy sector-related sanctions under the ISA and (2) describes the implementation of the contractor certification requirement and identifies any indications of false certifications or the need for waivers of the certification requirements. We are issuing a separate report covering firms identified in open sources as selling refined petroleum products to Iran from July 2010 through December 2011.For more information, contact Belva M. Martin at (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov. Wed, 01 Feb 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-59?source=ra What GAO FoundThe 2011 Information Reporting and Document Matching (IRDM) cost estimate, used to justify the program’s projected budgets of $115 million for fiscal years 2012 through 2016, generally does not meet best practices for reliability. The cost estimate did not fully meet any of the four best practices for a reliable cost estimate.For example, the cost estimate minimally meets best practices for a well documented estimate because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) did not provide detailed support for staff resources, and the cost estimate documentation only justified about 6 out of the 86 requested full time equivalent staff for IRDM, among other things. If documentation does not provide source data or cannotexplain the calculations underlying the cost elements, the estimate’s credibility may suffer. Although IRS has an independent office of cost estimators that can develop and update cost estimates using cost modeling software that generally follows GAO’s best practices, this office did not develop the 2011 IRDM cost estimate. IRS policy does not require project teams to work with the office to update cost estimates. Additionally, IRS’s cost estimation guidance for project managers is inconsistent regarding how cost estimates should be related to a budget, an inconsistency that could lead to budget requests that do not accurately estimate program funding needs.The IRDM program’s earned value management (EVM) data did not meet data reliability criteria in the areas GAO reviewed. For example, the IRDM project schedule was not properly sequenced—meaning activities were not properly linked in the order in which they are to be carried out. In addition, surveillance was not conducted on IRDM’s EVM system, as required by the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of the Treasury. Surveillance involves having qualified staff review an EVM system. Because IRDM’s 2011 cost estimate is based on unreliable EVM data, it does not provide adequate support for IRDM’s budget requests. Until IRS addresses deficiencies in the EVM data, it cannot provide a reliable cost estimate for IRDM.Why GAO Did This StudyThe Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began developing the Information Reporting and Document Matching (IRDM) program in fiscal year 2009 to enhance IRS’s ability to automatically compare different sources of tax information and thus improve its capacity to identify and address taxpayer noncompliance. GAO’s May 2011 report recommended that IRS follow best practices from the GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide if IRS updated the cost estimate for building IRDM systems. IRS provided a new cost estimate for IRDM in August 2011. In this report, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the IRDM funding request is supported by a reliable cost estimate and, if not reliably supported, why not; and (2) IRS’s practices for capturing data on IRDM’s actual costs and comparing them to estimated costs—known as earned value management (EVM)—generate reliable performance data. GAO compared IRS’s 2011 IRDM cost estimate to criteria in GAO’s cost guide and analyzed IRDM’s earned value management data.What GAO RecommendsGAO recommends that IRS ensure that IRDM has a reliable cost estimate, require certain project teams to work with its Estimation Program Office, improve cost estimation guidance, and improve the reliability of IRDM’s EVM data. IRS agreed with one, partially agreed with one, and disagreed with two of GAO’s recommendations. GAO generally disagrees with IRS’s concerns, and still believes the recommendations have merit.For more information, contact Michael Brostek at (202) 512-9110 or brostekm@gao.gov. Tue, 31 Jan 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-311?source=ra What GAO FoundThe Air Force has not fully implemented the recommendations from GAO’s 2009 report. With regard to GAO’s recommendation that the military services should formally assign ASA duties to the units that consistently conduct them and ensure that the readiness of those units is fully assessed, the Air Force did so. However, the National Guard Bureau is considering reversing that action because it believes that the recommendation can be better addressed through the Air Force’s standard deployment process. The Air Force has also not established a timetable to implement ASA as a steady-state mission; has not developed and implemented a plan to recapitalize the aging fighter aircraft that conduct ASA operations before the end of their service lives; and, when ASA units are deployed to support other ongoing operations, the Air Force continues to identify replacement units to perform the ASA mission on an ad hoc basis. All of the above were related to recommendations GAO made to the Air Force in its 2009 report. Separately, GAO found considerable confusion about the capabilities associated with ASA operations in part because, in September 2011, NORAD stopped using the term “air sovereignty alert” and created a new term, “aerospace control alert” (ACA), without clearly defining ACA or the missions that are now included within it.DOD has taken a series of actions for ASA operations that are consistent with a risk-based management approach. However, several key actions have yet to be taken that would enable the department to better balance risk and costs. Risk-based management includes conducting routine risk assessments that evaluate threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality of assets, as recommended in GAO’s 2009 report, and selecting between alternative courses of action to mitigate risk and make decisions about allocating resources. Although threats to the nation’s air sovereignty continue to emerge and evolve, GAO found that DOD is unable to measure the extent to which ASA helps to achieve the department’s homeland-defense goal of securing the United States from direct attack because DOD has not established performance measures. NORAD has not conducted routine risk assessments of ASA operations. DOD has also yet to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for two of the three alternatives to current ASA operations that GAO evaluated. Adopting a more-rigorous risk-based management approach—including balancing risk and costs—would help policymakers within DOD and elsewhere more effectively allocate finite DOD resources.Weak internal controls limit the ability of the Air Force and National Guard Bureau to accurately identify ASA expenditures. GAO analyzed the fiscal year 2010 expenditure information that the Air Force and National Guard Bureau submitted to Congress along with DOD’s fiscal year 2012 budget justification and found the reported expenditures of more than $246 million to be inaccurate. For example, GAO found that the Air Force overstated ASA flying-hour expenditures by at least $22 million and included expenditures related to national special-security events, which are not part of ASA operations. GAO found that the Air Force’s ability to identify ASA expenditures is limited by unclear roles and responsibilities for programming and budgeting and a lack of guidance on defining and tracking ASA expenditures. These types of internal controls are important to ensuring basic accountability, maintaining funds control, and preventing fraud and abuse.Why GAO Did This StudyIn the 11 years since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has put forth extensive efforts to protect the nation’s aviation sector and airspace. These efforts include air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations, for which the Air Force provides personnel and fully fueled, fully armed aircraft sitting on constant alert at 18 sites across the United States. In 2009, GAO found shortcomings in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) management of ASA operations, leading to a number of GAO recommendations. For this report, GAO examined the extent to which (1) the Air Force has implemented GAO’s 2009 recommendations, (2) DOD has implemented a risk-based management approach for ASA operations, and (3) the Air Force has accurately identified expenditures for ASA operations. To do so, GAO analyzed relevant strategies, planning documents, guidance, and expenditure data; and interviewed North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Air Force, National Guard Bureau, and other DOD officials.What GAO RecommendsCongress may wish to consider requiring the Air Force to fully implement GAO’s 2009 recommendations. In addition, GAO recommends that DOD improve its risk management of ASA operations and improve the Air Force’s ability to accurately identify ASA expenditures. DOD fully or partially agreed with all of GAO’s recommendations.For more information, contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Tue, 31 Jan 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-255?source=ra What GAO FoundSupport function costs at NNSA and Science sites for fiscal years 2007 through 2011 are not fully known because DOE changed its data collection approach beginning in 2010 to improve its data and, as a result, does not have complete and comparable cost data for all years. In fiscal years 2007 through 2009, total support costs for NNSA and Science sites grew from $5 billion to about $5.5 billion (nominal dollars). Costs for fiscal year 2010 are unknown because DOE was pilot-testing its new reporting system and only collected data from some sites. For fiscal year 2011, the data are more complete, but changes to DOE’s definitions for support functions make it difficult to compare costs across all years. DOE has taken some steps to ensure the quality of the data in its new system and plans to fully implement a quality control process, such as peer reviews, to ensure data can be compared across sites, but has not yet done so.DOE and contractors have undertaken various efforts since 2007 to streamline and improve the efficiency of sites’ support functions. Streamlining efforts reported by officials from DOE and the eight NNSA and Science sites GAO reviewed focused mainly on procurement; human resources, including employee benefits; and facilities and infrastructure. Some efforts were part of larger initiatives involving multiple sites, while others were initiated at the site level. To streamline procurement and leverage the buying power of multiple sites, for example, NNSA began operating a central Supply Chain Management Center to negotiate with vendors for lower prices on goods and services, such as laboratory supplies and equipment. To streamline human resources, contractor officials from the eight NNSA and Science sites reported automating various processes, such as for hiring and training employees. Furthermore, DOE and contractors identified opportunities to expand these efforts and undertake new ones but also identified challenges to further streamlining. In August 2010, for example, the Deputy Secretary of Energy cited further opportunities to leverage DOE and sites’ buying power through a more centralized, and less fragmented, approach. Similarly, NNSA is considering centralizing certain human resource tasks at its sites, currently provided by individual contractors. DOE and contractor officials, however, said that centralizing functions can be challenging.DOE and its contractors have estimated savings for some streamlining efforts, particularly in procurement, but it is difficult to compare or quantify total savings across sites because DOE’s guidance for estimating savings is unclear and the methods used to estimate savings vary. For example, one laboratory estimated a $9 million savings from a software purchase in 2010 using its preferred estimation method. By other methods used elsewhere in DOE, however, the site estimated that its savings could have been as high as $35 million. DOE recently issued guidance on acceptable methods for estimating procurement cost savings, but the guidance is unclear and could lead to widely varying savings estimates. The guidance identifies some estimation methods that sites can use—such as comparing the price paid for goods or services with a previous price—but does not specify which methods are preferred when multiple options are available. Furthermore, the guidance allows sites to use any other methods approved by DOE officials. For support functions other than procurement, sites also have flexibility in cost savings estimation methods, potentially leading to widely varying estimates for similar efforts to streamline these functions.Why GAO Did This StudyThe Department of Energy (DOE) spends 90 percent of its annual budget—which totaled $27 billion in fiscal year 2011—on the contractors that carry out its diverse missions and manage its sites. These management and operating contractors also provide sites’ support functions, such as procuring goods, managing human resources, and maintaining facilities. With a unique contractor at each site, support functions have traditionally been managed in a decentralized, or fragmented, manner. In light of today’s pressures to trim budgets and find efficiencies, GAO was asked to review support functions at the 17 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Office of Science sites and determine (1) the costs of providing support functions for fiscal years 2007 through 2011; (2) efforts undertaken during that period to streamline sites’ support functions, as well as additional opportunities and challenges, if any; and (3) the extent to which cost savings from streamlining efforts can be quantified. GAO reviewed data and documents and spoke with DOE, NNSA, and Science officials and with contractors at eight sites—the four largest by budget from NNSA and Science.What GAO RecommendsGAO recommends that DOE (1) fully implement a quality control system for cost data on sites’ support functions, (2) ensure that all appropriate streamlining steps are being taken at the 17 sites and that challenges are addressed, and (3) clarify guidance on estimating cost savings from streamlining efforts. DOE agreed with the recommendations.For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Tue, 31 Jan 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-336R?source=ra What GAO FoundOur analysis showed that DOD’s Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Energy Management Report fully addressed two, did not address one (issue 4), and partially addressed five of the eight expanded reporting requirements. In some cases, it was difficult to determine the extent to which DOD had addressed an issue because information related to a specific reporting requirement was fragmented or scattered throughout the report. With regard to the one issue not addressed, DOD indicated it had plans to address it in a separate report tentatively scheduled to be published in early 2012.Why GAO Did This StudyThis report formally transmits our January 2012 briefing to committees in response to section 332(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 (section 332) and our response to House Report 111-166 regarding the Department of Defense’s (DOD) energy- efficiency programs. The act and House report directed DOD to report on a specific set of energy issues and directed GAO to review DOD’s report and submit to Congress a report on our findings.For more information, contact James R. McTigue, Jr., at (202) 512-7968 or mctiguej@gao.gov or Frank Rusco at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov Tue, 31 Jan 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-218?source=ra What GAO FoundFDA has not taken sufficient steps to ensure that antibiotic labels contain up-to-date breakpoints. FDA designates certain drugs as “reference-listed drugs” and the sponsors of these drugs play an important role in ensuring the accuracy of drug labels. Reference-listed drugs are approved drug products to which generic versions are compared. As of November 2011, FDA had not yet confirmed whether the breakpoints on the majority of reference-listed antibiotics labels were up to date. FDA contacted sponsors of 210 antibiotics in early 2008 to remind sponsors of the importance of maintaining their labels and requested that they assess whether the breakpoints on their drugs’ labels were up to date. Sponsors were asked to submit evidence to FDA showing that the breakpoints were either current or needed revision. As of November 2011, over 3.5 years after FDA contacted sponsors, the agency had not yet confirmed whether the breakpoints on the labels of 70 percent, or 146 of the 210 antibiotics, were up to date. FDA has not ensured that sponsors have fulfilled the responsibilities outlined in the early 2008 letters. For those submissions FDA has received, it has often taken over a year for FDA to complete its review. Officials attributed this delay to reviewers’ workload, challenging scientific issues or difficulties in obtaining needed data, and incomplete submissions. FDA also issued guidance to clarify sponsors’ responsibility to evaluate and maintain up-to-date breakpoints. The guidance reminded sponsors that they are required to maintain accurate labels and stated that certain sponsors should submit an evaluation of breakpoints on their antibiotic labels to FDA annually. However, FDA has not been systematically tracking whether sponsors are providing these annual updates. Some sponsors remain confused about their responsibility to evaluate and maintain up-to-date breakpoints. At GAO’s request, FDA reviewed a small sample of annual reports and determined that few sponsors appear to be responsive to the guidance.The FDAAA provisions related to antibiotic innovation have not resulted in the submission of new drug applications for antibiotics. FDAAA extended the period of time that sponsors of new drugs that meet certain criteria have exclusive right to market the drug. According to FDA officials, the agency has received very few inquiries regarding this provision and, as of November 2011, no new drug applications for antibiotics have been submitted that would qualify for this exclusivity. None of the drug sponsors GAO received comments from said that this provision provided sufficient incentive to develop a new antibiotic of this type. FDAAA also required that FDA hold a public meeting to discuss whether and how existing or potential incentives could be applied to promote the development of antibiotics. Both financial and regulatory incentives were discussed at FDA’s 2008 meeting, including tax incentives for research and development and providing greater regulatory clarity during the drug approval process.Why GAO Did This StudyAntibiotics are critical drugs that have saved millions of lives. Growing bacterial resistance to existing drugs and the fact that few new drugs are in development are public health concerns. The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) required the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to identify, periodically update, and make publicly available up-to-date breakpoints, the concentrations at which bacteria are categorized as susceptible to an antibiotic. Breakpoints are a required part of an antibiotic’s label and are used by providers to determine appropriate treatments. FDAAA provided a financial incentive for antibiotic innovation and required FDA to hold a public meeting on antibiotic incentives and innovation. FDAAA directed GAO to report on the impact of these provisions on new drugs. This report (1) assesses FDA’s efforts to help preserve antibiotic effectiveness by ensuring breakpoints on labels are up to date and (2) examines the impact of the antibiotic innovation provisions. GAO examined FDA data, guidance, and other documents; interviewed FDA officials; and obtained information from drug sponsors, such as manufacturers, that market antibiotics.What GAO RecommendsGAO recommends that the Commissioner of FDA take steps to help ensure antibiotic labels contain up-to-date information, such as by expediting the agency’s review of breakpoint submissions. HHS said it will consider implementing GAO’s recommendations.For more information, contact Marcia Crosse at (202) 512-7114 or crossem@gao.gov. Tue, 31 Jan 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-154?source=ra What GAO FoundFrom fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2010, DOD activities for the treatment and research of PH and TBI received more than $2.7 billion. In fiscal year 2007, funding for these activities totaled $900 million; in fiscal year 2008, it was $573.8 million; in fiscal year 2009, $395 million; and in fiscal year 2010, $838.6 million. GAO found, however, that the reports DOD provided to Congress on these activities did not include expenditures, as required by law, and that the obligations data they contained were unreliable. Governmentwide policies call for agencies to have effective internal controls to assure accurate reporting of obligations and expenditures. However, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs has not developed quality control mechanisms to help ensure that data on PH and TBI activities are complete and accurate. Further, although DOD listed patient care among reported costs, it did not specify what those costs included, making it difficult for decisionmakers and Congress to fully understand the costs.No one organization coordinates DOD’s PH and TBI activities. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a Center for PTSD and a Center for TBI to, among other things, implement DOD’s comprehensive plans for these issues, disseminate best practices, provide guidance, and conduct research. Subsequently, a Senior Oversight Committee established by the Secretaries of Defense and Veterans Affairs reported in its plan to Congress that DOD had created a single Defense Center of Excellence for PH and TBI (DCOE) to lead efforts in practice standards, training, outreach, research, and direct care. The Committee tasked DCOE with acting as an information clearinghouse that would allow servicemembers and their families to navigate the system of care. In its own plan, DCOE stated that it would serve as a coordinating authority for DOD's PH and TBI issues and perform a gap analysis to identify needed programming. GAO found, however, as it had in prior reports, that DCOE’s strategic plan did not reflect a clear mission focusing the organization on its statutory responsibilities. Instead, those responsibilities are dispersed among the TRICARE Management Activity, the Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, and others. While the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs has broad oversight for all of DOD’s medical missions, its global role prevents it from focusing on PH and TBI activities specifically. As a result, no single organization is devoted to ensuring that accurate and timely data are available on DOD’s PH and TBI activities or coordinating these activities. GAO, in conducting this review, had to obtain information from several different sources to compile a comprehensive list of DOD's PH and TBI activities. This finding was echoed in a recent RAND report that also noted that no single source in DOD tracked its PH and TBI programs or had appropriate resources to direct servicemembers to the full array of programs available. Without an entity to coordinate these activities, DOD will remain hampered in its efforts to ensure that resources are used effectively to meet goals, and Congress will be limited in its ability to obtain reliable information to guide decisionmaking.Why GAO Did This StudyPost-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which falls into the broader field of psychological health (PH), and traumatic brain injury (TBI) are recognized as the signature wounds of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In two reports issued in 2011 (GAO-11-219 and GAO-11-611 ), GAO cited numerous management weaknesses at the Defense Center of Excellence for PH and TBI (DCOE). For the present report, GAO reviewed (1) funding for DOD's PH and TBI activities in fiscal years 2007 through 2010 and the accuracy of its reporting on these activities to Congress and (2) DOD's ability to coordinate its PH and TBI activities to help ensure that funds are used to support programs of the most benefit to service- members. GAO interviewed DOD officials, reviewed legislation and DOD’s annual reports, and obtained relevant documentation.What GAO RecommendsGAO recommends that DOD direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to (1) include expenditure data in annual reports to Congress, as required; (2) establish quality control mechanisms on PH and TBI data; (3) if patient care costs are provided in future annual reports, specify what they include; and (4) revisit DCOE’s role as DOD’s coordinating authority for issues concerning PH and TBI, as stated in DCOE’s campaign plan, and determine whether DCOE or another organization should perform this function. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all four recommendations.For more information, contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Mon, 30 Jan 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-275R?source=ra What GAO FoundAccording to information provided by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and our survey of the Inspectors General (IG), five civilian agencies, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Energy, the Corporation for National and Community Service, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission used the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act's (PFCRA) authorities to refer 141 cases to DOJ for approval by the Attorney General during fiscal years 2006 through 2010. Of the 141 cases, 135, or 96 percent, were referred by HUD. The remaining four agencies referred a total of 6 cases during this period.We asked HUD IG officials to identify factors that facilitated HUD’s use of PFCRA. They told us that HUD’s use of PFCRA was the result of several factors; including the support of HUD’s top management, applying PFCRA penalties to already successful criminal prosecutions, proactive HUD IG office involvement, coordination within HUD and with DOJ, use of standardized PFCRA case documentation, and a PFCRA case tracking system. In contrast, officials from other agencies that did not use PFCRA’s administrative remedies identified several factors that limited their ability to use PFCRA. These factors included available alternative mechanisms to PFCRA that agency officials found more useful in addressing false claims and related fraud, and a PFCRA requirement for their agency to use Administrative Law Judges (ALJ), which are not available at DOD, to preside over PFCRA cases. On average, DOJ’s reviews of PFCRA cases took 211 days rather than 90-days as prescribed by PFCRA. DOJ officials told us this was due to several factors including (1) other high-dollar cases that often took precedence over PFCRA cases and (2) time for DOJ follow-up with the referring agencies to obtain necessary information. In their comments identifying factors that limited the use of PFCRA, DOJ officials also cited the requirement for PFCRA cases to be approved by the Attorney General or a designated Assistant Attorney General, instead of a director-level official who may approve other fraud cases involving similar dollar amounts. In our May 2011 survey, 39 IGs included these and additional factors that limited use of PFCRA. The IGs most often cited the use of alternative mechanisms to address false claims and resource constraints as factors limiting PFCRA use. The other limiting factors they identified included that penalty amounts recovered by the agencies, with few exceptions, are to be sent to the U.S. Treasury rather than retained by the agency; the false claims ceiling and penalty amounts are too low; the PFCRA process is too cumbersome; and there is a lack of available ALJs. Further, the IGs noted that regulatory agencies have few issues with false claims.Most IGs who responded to our May 2011 survey with an opinion agreed with the National Procurement Fraud Task Force recommendations for reforming PFCRA. For the recommendation that agencies be allowed to retain their PFCRA-related monetary recoveries, 51 of the 53 IGs in our survey who had an opinion agreed with this reform. While the support for the remaining recommendations was not as strong, the IGs who provided an opinion generally supported the other five proposals as well.Why GAO Did This StudyThis letter is in response to a Congressional request for information about federal executive agencies' recent use of the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986. PFCRA provides an administrative remedy available to federal executive branch agencies to address false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims and statements (false claims). PFCRA can be used for false claims where the alleged liability is less than $150,000 (claim ceiling). It also provides for monetary penalties up to $5,000 (a cap that most agencies are to adjust upward for inflation) and allows for an assessment of up to two times the amount of the fraudulent claim. In addition to PFCRA, federal agencies also use other mechanisms to address false claims, such as the False Claims Act, suspension and debarment processes, and statutes that address Medicaid and Medicare false claim frauds through the Social Security Act, as amended.In 1991, we reported that federal agencies did not use PFCRA extensively. Congress asked us to provide recent information on federal agencies’ use of PFCRA. Our objectives were to present information on (1) the extent to which federal agencies have used PFCRA in recent years, (2) factors reported by agency officials and inspectors general (IG) that either facilitated or limited the use of PFCRA, and (3) views of federal agency IGs on prior recommendations made by the National Procurement Fraud Task Force on possible PFCRA reforms.For more information, contact Susan Ragland at (202) 512-8486 or raglands@gao.gov. Fri, 27 Jan 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-5SP?source=ra This is GAO’s summary of the Performance and Accountability Report for fiscal year 2011. The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of the Congress, exists to support the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help the Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions.To fulfill our mission, we organize and manage our resources to support four broad strategic goals. These include helping to address challenges to the well-being and financial security of the American people, responding to changing security threats and global interdependence, and transforming the federal government to address national challenges. Strategic goal 4 is an internal goal focused on enhancing GAO’s value through improving its efficiency, effectiveness, and quality, and institutional stewardship and resource management.GAO maintains a workforce of highly trained professionals across a breadth of academic and scientific disciplines. In fiscal year 2011, about three-quarters of the approximately 3,200 employees were based at GAO headquarters in Washington, D.C.; the rest were deployed in 11 field offices across the country.In fiscal year 2011, we met or exceeded 13 of our 15 annual performance targets by, for example, identifying $45.7 billion in financial benefits for the federal government—a return of $81 for every dollar we spent—and 1,318 improvements in broad program and operational areas across the government. The rate at which our recommendations were implemented by federal agencies or the Congress was 80 percent, and over two-thirds of the products issued contained recommendations. We did not meet our testimony target but testified at 174 hearings before the Congress on topics across our body of work, a third of which were on areas considered at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. For people measures, we met or exceeded all but our new hire rate.In fiscal year 2011, we continued to address three management challenges—physical security, information security, and human capital. For example, we made significant progress on design of a new performance management system. For fiscal year 2012, we have removed physical and information security based on progress in those areas, identified several high-priority actions in the human capital area, and identified a new challenge related to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of our engagements. Thu, 26 Jan 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-51?source=ra What GAO FoundGAO found that diagnostic coding differences exist between MA plans and Medicare FFS. Using data on beneficiary characteristics and regression analysis, GAO estimated that before CMS’s adjustment, 2010 MA beneficiary risk scores were at least 4.8 percent, and perhaps as much as 7.1 percent, higher than they likely would have been if the same beneficiaries had been continuously enrolled in FFS. The higher risk scores were equivalent to $3.9 billion to $5.8 billion in payments to MA plans. Both GAO and CMS found that the impact of coding differences increased over time. This trend suggests that the cumulative impact of coding differences in 2011 and 2012 could be larger than in 2010.In contrast to GAO, CMS estimated that 3.4 percent of 2010 MA beneficiary risk scores were attributable to coding differences between MA plans and Medicare FFS. CMS’s adjustment for this difference avoided $2.7 billion in excess payments to MA plans. CMS’s 2010 estimate differs from GAO’s in that CMS’s methodology did not include more current data, did not incorporate the trend of the impact of coding differences over time, and did not account for beneficiary characteristics other than age and mortality, such as sex, health status, Medicaid enrollment status, beneficiary residential location, and whether the original reason for Medicare entitlement was disability.CMS did not update its coding adjustment estimate in 2011 and 2012 to include more current data, to account for additional years of coding differences, or to incorporate the trend of the impact of coding differences. By continuing to implement the same 3.4 percent adjustment for coding differences in 2011 and 2012, CMS likely underestimated the impact of coding differences in 2011 and 2012, resulting in excess payments to MA plans.GAO’s findings underscore the importance of both CMS continuing to adjust risk scores to account for coding differences and ensuring that those adjustments are as complete and accurate as possible.In its comments, CMS stated that it found our findings informative. CMS did not comment on our recommendation.Why GAO Did This StudyThe Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) pays plans in Medicare Advantage (MA)—the private plan alternative to Medicare fee-for-service (FFS)—a predetermined amount per beneficiary adjusted for health status. To make this adjustment, CMS calculates a risk score, a relative measure of expected health care costs, for each beneficiary. Risk scores should be the same among all beneficiaries with the same health conditions and demographic characteristics. Policymakers raised concerns that differences in diagnostic coding between MA plans and Medicare FFS could lead to inappropriately high MA risk scores and payments to MA plans. CMS began adjusting for coding differences in 2010. GAO (1) estimated the impact of any coding differences on MA risk scores and payments to plans in 2010 and (2) evaluated CMS’s methodology for estimating the impact of these differences in 2010, 2011, and 2012. To do this, GAO compared risk score growth for MA beneficiaries with an estimate of what risk score growth would have been for those beneficiaries if they were in Medicare FFS, and evaluated CMS’s methodology by assessing the data, study populations, study design, and beneficiary characteristics analyzed.What GAO RecommendsGAO recommends that CMS should improve the accuracy of its MA risk score adjustments by taking steps such as incorporating adjustments for additional beneficiary characteristics, using the most current data available, accounting for all relevant years of coding differences, and incorporating the effect of coding difference trends.For more information, contact James C. Cosgrove at (202) 512-7114 or cosgrove@gao.gov. Thu, 26 Jan 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-161?source=ra What GAO FoundIn GAO’s opinion, FHFA’s fiscal years 2011 and 2010 financial statements are fairly presented in all material respects. GAO also concluded that FHFA had effective internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2011. GAO found no reportable instances of noncompliance with the laws and regulations it tested.FHFA's fiscal year 2011 financial statements include costs for the FHFA Office of Inspector General (OIG), which make up approximately 10 percent of FHFA's fiscal year 2011 costs. While the OIG was established in 2008 by the enactment of HERA, the Inspector General was not confirmed by the U.S. Senate until October 2010. Therefore, there were no OIG costs to be reported in FHFA's fiscal year 2010 financial statements.In early September 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into conservatorship by the Director of FHFA, with the stated intent to stabilize these entities. The assets, liabilities, and activities of the two entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are not reflected in FHFA’s fiscal years 2011 and 2010 financial statements, based on determinations by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) that they do not meet the criteria for inclusion in the financial statements of the U.S. government or the Treasury under federal accounting concepts, though Treasury records an asset for its investments in the two entities and a liability for future payments to these entities on its financial statements. Specifically, OMB and Treasury concluded this because the entities are not currently reflected in the federal government’s budget and because the conservatorship arrangement is considered to be temporary. FHFA management concurred with this conclusion. Should circumstances change, this conclusion would need to be revisited.From early September 2008 through September 30, 2011, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have received about $169 billion in direct financial support from Treasury in exchange for Treasury’s purchase of the entities’ senior preferred stock. Additionally, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are requesting $7.8 billion and $6.0 billion, respectively, in additional support from Treasury due to losses sustained for the quarter ended September 30, 2011. Over the longer term, Congress and the executive branch face difficult decisions on how to restructure the entities and promote housing opportunities while limiting the risks to taxpayers and the financial markets.GAO noted matters involving FHFA’s internal control that were less significant than a material weakness or significant deficiency, but which nonetheless merit management’s attention. GAO will be reporting separately to FHFA management on these matters.Why GAO Did This StudyThe Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and gave it responsibility for, among other things, the supervision and regulation of the housing-related government-sponsored enterprises: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the 12 federal home loan banks, and the Office of Finance. Specifically, FHFA was assigned responsibility for ensuring that each of the regulated entities operates in a fiscally safe andsound manner, including maintenance of adequate capital and internal controls, and carries out its housing and community development finance mission. HERA also requires FHFA to annually prepare financial statements, and further requires GAO to audit these statements.Pursuant to HERA’s requirement, GAO audited FHFA’s fiscal years 2011 and 2010 financial statements to determine whether (1) the financial statements were fairly presented and (2) FHFA management maintained effective internal control over financial reporting. GAO also tested FHFA’s compliance with selected laws and regulations.What GAO RecommendsGAO is not making any recommendations in this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, FHFA stated that it accepted GAO’s audit findings and it would continue to work to enhance its internal controls and ensure the reliability of its financial reporting, its operational soundness, and public confidence in its mission.For more information, contact Steven J. Sebastian at (202) 512-3406 or sebastians@gao.gov. Thu, 26 Jan 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-402?source=ra What GAO FoundOur work to this point has identified several promising practices that could help to reduce the risk of fraud within the FECA program. The promising practices link back to fraud-prevention concepts contained in GAO’s Fraud Prevention Framework and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, and include agencies’ use of full-time staff dedicated to the FECA program, periodic reviews of claimants’ continued eligibility, data analysis for potential fraud indicators, and effective use of investigative resources. These promising practices have already resulted in successful investigations and prosecutions of FECA-related fraud at some agencies, and could help to further enhance the program’s fraud-prevention controls. However, our preliminary work has also identified several potential vulnerabilities in the program’s design and controls that could increase the risk for fraud. Specifically, we found that limited access to necessary data is potentially reducing agencies’ ability to effectively monitor claims and wage-loss information. In addition, agencies’ reliance on self-reported data related to wages and dependent status, lack of a physician selected by the government throughout the process, and difficulties associated with successful investigations and prosecutions all potentially reduce the program’s ability to prevent and detect fraudulent activity. Labor and employing agencies generally agreed with the preliminary findings presented in this report and provided technical comments, which were incorporated into this report. We plan to follow up on the promising practices and potential vulnerabilities as part of our ongoing work, although our progress has been slowed by difficulties in accessing certain databases.Why GAO Did This StudyAccording to the Department of Labor (Labor), in fiscal year 2010 about 251,000 federal and postal employees and their survivors received wage-loss compensation, medical and vocational rehabilitation services, and death benefits through the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA) program. Administered by Labor, the FECA program provides benefits to federal employees who sustained injuries or illnesses while performing their federal duties. Employees must submit claims to their employing agency, which are then reviewed by Labor. For those claims that are approved, employing agencies reimburse Labor for payments made to their employees, while Labor bears most of the program’s administrative costs. Wage-loss benefits for eligible workers—including those who are at, or older than, retirement age—with total disabilities are generally 66.67 percent of the worker’s salary (with no spouse or dependent) or 75 percent for a worker with a spouse or dependent. FECA wage-loss compensation benefits are tax free and not subject to time or age limits.Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) estimated that future actuarial liabilities for governmentwide FECA compensation payments to those receiving benefits as of fiscal year 2011 would total nearly $30 billion (this amount does not include any costs for workers added to the FECA rolls in future years). In 2010, the United States Postal Service (USPS) Inspector General (IG) reported that USPS alone had more than $12 billion of the $30 billion in estimated actuarial FECA liabilities. In April 2011, the USPS IG testified that USPS had removed 476 claimants from the program based on disability fraud since October 2008 and recovered more than $83 million in judgments. Given the significant projected outlays of the governmentwide FECA program and prior USPS IG findings of fraud, Congress asked us to provide preliminary observations on our ongoing work examining FECA fraud-prevention controls and discuss related prior work conducted by us and other federal agencies. Wed, 25 Jan 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-272?source=ra What GAO FoundSince 2004, DHS’s use of its CBRN risk assessments to inform its CBRN response plans has varied, from directly influencing information in the plans to not being used at all. DHS guidance states that response planning and resource decisions should be informed by risk information. GAO’s analysis showed that DHS used its CBRN risk assessments to directly inform 2 of 12 CBRN response plans GAO identified because planners considered the risk assessments to be more accurate than earlier DHS planning assumptions. For another 7 of the 12 plans, DHS officials said that the assessments indirectly informed the plans by providing background information prior to plan development. However, GAO could not independently verify this because DHS officials could not document how the risk assessments influenced the information contained in the plans. GAO’s analysis found general consistency between the risk assessments and the plans. For the remaining 3 plans, DHS officials did not use the risk assessments to inform the plans; for 2 of the 3 plans DHS officials told GAO they were not aware of the assessments. DHS officials also noted that there was no departmental guidance on when or how the CBRN risk assessments should be used when developing such plans.Since 2004, DHS’s use of its CBRN risk assessments to inform its CBRN-specific capabilities has varied, from directly impacting its capabilities to not being used at all. Of the 7 capabilities GAO reviewed, one was directly informed by the risk assessments; DHS used its biological agent risk assessments to confirm that its BioWatch program could generally detect the biological agents posing the greatest risk. For 5 of the 7 capabilities, DHS officials said they used the risk assessments along with other information sources to partially inform these capabilities. For example, DHS used its chemical agent risk assessments to determine whether its chemical detectors and the risk assessments were generally aligned for the highest risk agents. For 3 of these 5 capabilities, GAO could not independently verify that they were partially informed by the risk assessments because DHS officials could not document how the risk assessments influenced the capabilities. DHS did not use its CBRN risk assessments to inform the remaining CBRN capability because the assessments were not needed to meet the capability’s mission.DHS and its components do not have written procedures to institutionalize their use of DHS’s CBRN risk assessments for CBRN response planning and capability investment decisions. Standards for internal control in the federal government call for written procedures to better ensure management’s directives are enforced. DHS does not have procedures that stipulate when and how DHS officials should use the department’s CBRN risk assessments to inform CBRN response planning and capability investment decisions, and GAO found variation in the extent to which they were used. DHS officials agree with GAO that without written procedures, the consistent use of the department’s CBRN risk assessments by DHS officials may not be ensured beyond the tenure of any given agency official. DHS could better help to ensure that its CBRN response plans and capabilities are consistently informed by the department’s CBRN risk assessments by establishing written procedures detailing when and how DHS officials should consider using the risk assessments to inform their activities.Why GAO Did This StudyThe 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States highlighted the need to develop response plans and capabilities to protect U.S. citizens from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents. Since 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent at least $70 million developing more than 20 CBRN risk assessments. GAO was requested to assess, from fiscal year 2004 to the present, the extent to which DHS has used its CBRN risk assessments to inform CBRN response plans and CBRN capabilities, and has institutionalized their use. GAO examined relevant laws, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, an Executive Order, DHS guidance, and all 12 relevant interagency CBRN response plans developed by DHS. Based on a review of a United States governmentwide CBRN database and DHS interviews, among other things, GAO selected a nongeneralizable set of seven DHS capabilities used specifically for detecting or responding to CBRN incidents to identify examples of DHS’s use of its CBRN risk assessments. GAO also interviewed relevant DHS officials. This is a public version of a classified report that GAO issued in October 2011. Information DHS deemed sensitive or classified has been redacted.What GAO RecommendsGAO recommends that DHS develop more specific guidance, including written procedures, that details when and how DHS components should consider using the department’s CBRN risk assessments to inform related response planning efforts and capability investment decision making. DHS agreed with the recommendation.For more information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr. at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Wed, 25 Jan 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-58?source=ra What GAO FoundUSCP generally has enhanced retirement benefits, a higher minimum starting salary, and a wider variety of protective duties than other federal police forces in the DC metro area that GAO reviewed, but has similar employment requirements. Even though USCP, Park Police, Supreme Court Police, and Secret Service Uniformed Division are federal police forces, they provide enhanced retirement benefits similar to those offered by federal law enforcement agencies that have additional investigative duties. These enhanced benefits allow their officers to retire early and accrue retirement pensions faster than other federal police forces. USCP and these three forces also offered among the highest minimum entry-level salaries—ranging from $52,020 to $55,653—than the other six forces GAO reviewed, which had minimum entry-level salaries ranging from $38,609 to $52,018. USCP reported routinely having a wider variety of duties than most other forces. These duties ranged from routinely protecting members of Congress to protecting buildings. USCP and most of the forces generally have similar employment requirements, such as being in good physical condition.USCP’s attrition rate is generally lower than the majority of the federal police forces in our review; and USCP and seven of the other nine police forces considered human capital flexibilities to be at least of some importance to recruiting and retaining qualified officers, but use of these flexibilities generally depends on recruiting needs, among other factors. From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, USCP had the fourth lowest attrition rate (6.5 percent) among the 10 police forces GAO reviewed; the attrition rates for the nine other forces ranged from 3.5 percent to just under 14 percent. Officials from USCP and four other forces GAO reviewed stated that, currently, attrition is not a problem because of the challenging economy. For example, officials from USCP and Bureau of Engraving and Printing Police stated that their officers want to retain their jobs in the challenging economy. In addition, USCP and other forces said that when their officers do leave the force, they generally do so either because of personal reasons or for better career advancement opportunities, and officers generally stay for reasons such as good working environment or appreciation for the agency’s mission. The extent to which retirement benefits, pay, and use of human capital flexibilities affect attrition can vary among forces given other factors—such as family issues—that could influence an employee’s decision to leave or remain with his or her employer.If fully utilized, benefits for USCP officers who retire at the age of 57 under existing provisions generally would be within the range of retirement income targets suggested by some retirement experts. However, the level of benefits depends significantly on the level of employee retirement contributions. In 2010, the USCP Labor Committee presented six proposals that would enhance the current USCP benefit structure. GAO’s analysis shows that five of the six would increase existing costs, GAO’s review found the other proposal, which urges the USCP Board to exercise its current authority to allow officers to voluntarily remain employed until age 60 rather than retire at age 57, as mandated, would have only a minimal impact on USCP costs and could increase officers’ retirement income.Why GAO Did This StudyThe Washington, D.C. metropolitan (DC metro) area is home to many federal police forces, including the United States Capitol Police (USCP), which maintain the safety of federal property, employees, and the public. Officials are concerned that disparities in pay and retirement benefits have caused federal police forces to experience difficulties in recruiting and retaining officers. In 2010, the USCP Labor Committee proposed six changes to enhance the USCP benefit structure. GAO was asked to review USCP’s pay and retirement benefits and compare them to other federal police forces in the DC metro area. GAO (1) compared USCP to other forces with respect to retirement benefits, minimum entry-level salary, duties, and employment requirements; (2) compared attrition at USCP to other forces, and determined how, if at all, USCP and other forces used human capital flexibilities (e.g., retention bonus); and (3) determined what level of retirement income USCP benefits provide and the costs associated with the proposed benefit enhancements. GAO chose nine other federal police forces to review based on prior work, inclusion in the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) police occupational series, and officer presence in the DC metro area. GAO analyzed laws, regulations, OPM data from fiscal years 2005 through 2010, and human capital data from the 10 police forces. GAO also surveyed the 10 forces.USCP and the Office of Personnel Management generally agreed with our findings and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.For more information, contact Eileen R. Larence at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov or Charles A. Jeszeck at 202-512-7215 or jeszeckc@gao.gov. Wed, 25 Jan 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-374T?source=ra What GAO FoundGAO identified 56 contracts and task orders that were active during fiscal year 2010 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2011 under which contracting offices obligated roughly $35.2 million on Arlington’s behalf. These contracts supported cemetery operations, construction and facility maintenance, and new efforts to enhance information technology systems for the automation of burial operations. The Army has taken a number of steps since June 2010 at different levels to provide for more effective management and oversight of contracts, establishing new support relationships, formalizing policies and procedures, and increasing the use of dedicated contracting staff to manage and improve its acquisition processes. However, GAO found that ANCP does not maintain complete data on its contracts, responsibilities for contracting support are not yet fully defined, and dedicated contract staffing arrangements still need to be determined. The success of Arlington’s acquisition outcomes will depend on continued management focus from ANCP and its contracting partners to ensure sustained attention to contract management and institutionalize progress made to date. GAO made three recommendations to continue improvements in contract management. The Department of Defense (DOD) partially concurred and noted actions in progress to address these areas.The Army has taken positive steps and implemented improvements to address other management deficiencies and to provide information and assistance to families. It has implemented improvements across a broad range of areas at Arlington, including developing procedures for ensuring accountability over remains and improving its capability to respond to the public and to families’ inquiries. Nevertheless, the Army has remaining management challenges in several areas—managing information technology investments, updating workforce plans, developing an organizational assessment program, coordinating with key partners, developing a strategic plan, and developing guidance for providing assistance to families. GAO made six recommendations to help address these areas. DOD concurred or partially concurred and has begun to take some corrective actions.A transfer of jurisdiction for the Army’s two national cemeteries to VA is feasible based on historical precedent for the national cemeteries and examples of other reorganization efforts in the federal government. However, several factors may affect the advisability of making such a change, including the potential costs and benefits, potential transition challenges, and the potential effect on Arlington’s unique characteristics. In addition, given that the Army has taken steps to address deficiencies at Arlington and has improved its management, it may be premature to move forward with a change in jurisdiction, particularly if other options for improvement exist that entail less disruption. GAO identified opportunities for enhancing collaboration between the Army and VA that could leverage their strengths and potentially lead to improvements at all national cemeteries. GAO recommended that the Army and VA develop a mechanism to formalize collaboration between these organizations. DOD and VA concurred with this recommendation.Why GAO Did This StudyArlington National Cemetery (Arlington) contains the remains of more than 330,000 military servicemembers, their family members, and others. In June 2010, the Army Inspector General identified problems at the cemetery, including deficiencies in contracting and management, burial errors, and a failure to notify next of kin of errors. In response, the Secretary of the Army issued guidance creating the position of the Executive Director of the Army National Cemeteries Program (ANCP) to manage Arlington and requiring changes to address the deficiencies and improve cemetery operations. In response to Public Law 111-339, GAO assessed several areas, including (1) actions taken to improve contract management and oversight, (2) the Army’s efforts to address identified management deficiencies and provide information and assistance to families regarding efforts to detect and correct burial errors, and (3) factors affecting the feasibility and advisability of transferring jurisdiction for the Army’s national cemeteries to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The information in this testimony summarizes GAO’s recent reports on Arlington contracting (GAO-12-99) and management (GAO-12-105). These reports are based on, among other things, analyzing guidance, policies, plans, contract files, and other documentation from the Army, Arlington, and other organizations and interviews with Army and VA officials.What GAO RecommendsIn the reports, GAO made several recommendations to help Arlington sustain progress made to date.For more information, contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov and Belva Martin at (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov. Wed, 25 Jan 2012 12:00:00 -0500 http://www.gaonet.gov/products/GAO-12-110SP?source=ra This E-supplement is a companion to our report entitled "Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics Education: Strategic Planning Needed to Better Manage Overlapping Programs across Multiple Agencies," GAO-12-108. The purpose of the survey was to gather program information--such as objectives, services provided, target groups served, obligations, and outcome metrics tracked--on federal STEM education programs. This information was used to help assess the level of overlap that exists among federal STEM education programs. Tue, 24 Jan 2012 12:00:00 -0500